The categorical imperative of a polity laid waste by a tyrannous evil is a
moral realignment of the bien pensant constituents of the polity to restore
decency, civility, constitutionality and, above all, the Rule Of Law in the
said polity. To the extent that this is true, and still extant, then the
raison d'être of the mooted Opposition Alliance was and still remains, sui
generis, moral. The numbers each individual participant of the Alliance adds
to the pool of resources that ends up being the electoral arsenal of the
Alliance is nothing but an added bonus to the Alliance. Reason being chiefly
that given the unpopular nature of the current gov't, it will take only one
party to demolish it electorally in a free and fair elections. This is to say
that the numbers needed to demolish the APRC in free and fair elections by a
single Opposition party can easily be obtained by a single Opposition party.
A party like, say, the UDP can single-handedly demolish the APRC in a free
and fair elections. So the numbers that the parties bring into the Alliance
were not an issue as such; rather, the numbers would only turn out to be an
added bonus to make more pronounced and decided the decapitation of the ugly
head of the dictatorship in October.
Well, talk of free and fair elections in the Gambia presupposes such a milieu
in the Gambia. Alas, in the real world that is the Gambia today, there can
never be free and fair elections. This being the case, it remains the case
that the best that can hopefully offset massive electoral frauds by the
incumbency is to have a coalescing of Opposition efforts, intelligence,
logistics and, above all, a united principled stance against any attempts to
subvert due process. When it comes to these, no party is in short supply of
what it can contribute to the pool of resources the Alliance will need to
decapitate the ugly head of the dictatorship. This argument, despite its use
of the resources that parties will bring to Alliance, remains at root a moral
argument. However, the most manifestly demonstrable moral argument is of a
consequential nature. What do we mean by this? Given the corrupted nature of
the Gambian body politic, redressing its health shouldn't be the task one
individual party at the expense of others. The redressing of the democratic
deficit requires, above all, a united coalescing of ALL the Opposition
parties that genuinely believe in liberal democracy to work together to
restore constitutionalism, confidence and due process in our body politic. It
is very likely that if the reforms become the task of one individual party
with the exclusion of others, the reforms needed would not be enough,
far-reaching or, worst most likely to favour those purporting to carry out
the reforms. Certainly, this is the moral I case I demonstrated very strongly
in private as I certainly did on this List.
Alas, things never materialised the way in which we supposed the moral case
for an Opposition Alliance would have helped smoothen matters for the
eventual political horsetrading that naturally expires before political
Alliances come into being. Partly, this was made possible by the
extraordinary pressure being borne by the organising chair of the Opposition
multi-party talks, Mr. Assan Musa Camara. The pressure came into being
largely because of time constraints and its concomitant effects like
expediency and exigency in decision-making and forging ahead. That being the
case, it didn't surprise those closely monitoring the events when procedural
and democratic discrepancies became associated with the YMCA multi-party
talks organised by Mr. Assan Musa Camara. What made the whole thing
phenomenally tragic is that those who were never going to be part of a
political Alliance that constitutes the heavy presence of the PPP, seized
upon and exploited these procedural and democratic discrepancies; and
deceitfully used them as a reason for not attending the said YMCA multi-party
talks. The truth remains that a party like the PDOIS has always been
afflicted with a moral dilemma since it occurred to them that in the
"rejuvenated" AFPRC/APRC, they have backed the wrong horse with too much
political capital, which has hence left them haemorrhaging profusely. Without
much credibility left, one would have thought that the PDOIS would smell the
coffee by now and contribute immensely - without their usual intellectual
hauteur or holier-than-thou attitude - towards the decapitation of the ugly
head of the dictatorship. Sadly, this didn't become the case. Rather, PDOIS'
moral dilemma transformed into something more disreputable and unbecoming:
that of a deep-seated moral and intellectual ambivalence towards the question
of Jammeh and the APRC. This is made worse by the re-emergence of the PPP
pace the abrogation of Decree 89. More to the point, PDOIS has and continues
to view the vast assemblage of political interests that constitutes the UDP
as a Trojan horse designed primarily and cannily to bring back the PPP or
fight its cause. This is why the point becomes incontrovertible that PDOIS
was never going to be part of a political Alliance that constitutes the heavy
presence of the PPP - of all parties. It is a tragedy that to this day, PDOIS
remains an intellectual movement solely and fanatically obsessed with Jawara
and the PPP. Gambia is the poorer for such a disreputable and deplorable
political agenda.
As things stand vis-à-vis the Alliance and the need to coopt more parties
into the scheme of things, two things ought to be done - post haste. Firstly,
the Alliance ought to give up on all hopes of coopting the PDOIS into the
Alliance. Therewith, they stand to gain more than they lose: electorally,
PDOIS is insignificant; save in the urban and rural settings of SerreKunda
and Wuli, PDOIS can't poll more than a 1000 votes in any given constituency.
It will be interesting to see how they poll this time around; I'm of the view
that they are heading for a relative decimation of their share of the
national votes. Watch this space. The case for coopting PDOIS was always
moral and nothing else. That doesn't seem ever likely to be the case now or
ever be the case in the near future. The Alliance, therefore, need not expend
any further political capital or time in the vain hopes of coopting PDOIS.
What the Alliance is very likely to get from PDOIS is to have a Moses-like
figure - in the form of the venerable Halifa - atop Mount Sinai with his Ten
Conditions: non-negotiable and divine. One of such conditions is the risible
and ridiculous stipulation that a complete nonentity or outsider from the
current pool of Opposition leaders to lead the Alliance. And, you guessed
right, the nonentity or outsider must be chosen from their radical
metropolitan feminist allies. Suddenly, the fight to decapitate the monstrous
head of the dictatorship is reduced to pandering to the insurrection of the
feminist movement! People are thinking of selecting an electable individual
to help bring in those crucial votes and help in warding off a second round
re-run with the incumbency, PDOIS is busy crudely patronising women! This is
how deplorable PDOIS' stance vis-à-vis a possible political Alliance has
really become. I say to the Alliance, let us move on amicably; and each to
what their consciences dictate to them. Time is of the essence here.
The second task that lies ahead of the Alliance is to coopt the two remaining
political parties: the NRP and the NCP. This will cost them but coopting
these two parties will turn out to be very useful - morally, intellectually
and politically. Before I go about proposing the manner and means available
in which the co-optation ought to be carried out, let me first spell out the
principles that ought to undergird the co-optation of these two parties into
the Alliance. The principles that ought to undergird the co-optation of NRP
and NCP, is a tenuous application of Burkean conservatism. What do we mean by
this? By a tenuous application of Burkean conservatism, we refer to it to
mean that the convener of the multi-party talks geared towards the
co-optation of both NRP and NCP - hopefully, Mr. Assan Musa Camara - should
be bear in mind that we gain only if we add to what we have already gained;
and given the exigency and expediency in involved in such multi-party talks,
we don't gain when we dissolve completely what has already been gained for
what has yet to take form or shape. A simplistic way of saying this goes like
this: the co-optation of both NCP and NRP shouldn't be at the expense of a
complete dissolution of the current Alliance. In essence, the co-optation of
these two parties into the Alliance trades on the principle of strengthening
rather than weakening the current Alliance. If and when ethical arguments
reach the point indeterminacy, wherein they run the risk of running aground
the current Alliance, the loss to be borne is not worth the while of anyone:
as a trade-off, we are better off disengaging. After all, a bird in hand, as
the old adage goes, is worth two in the bush. This then should be the
principle that undergirds attempts at coopting the NRP and NCP into the
Alliance.
The manner in which the multi-party talks are convened and conducted should
be primarily informal. Again, this is merely a reflection of time
constraints, and its concomitant effects like exigency and expediency. The
chair or convener of the talks should informally arrange with all the parties
to be involved in the negotiations to meet in a less conspicuous environment
than the YMCA one; and, of course, bar public participation in any shape or
form in the talks. The reason for this is simple: once the public becomes an
audience to the unavoidable inter-party bickering, some politicians will most
definitely exploit the situation by playing to the gallery and or
intellectualise the occasion by grandstanding. That will not take us
anywhere. There shouldn't be any indecent haste to announce anything to the
public; all participants to the said multi-party talks must be signatories to
whatever press release the convener of the said talks feels obliged to
release via the media for public consumption.
As per what is on offer or tradeable, this will largely depend on a mutual
trade-off between the expectations and anxieties of those hoping to be
coopted and what in essence is on offer from the Alliance. Below, I propose
what can be mutually made available to those hoping to be coopted into the
Alliance. First, a disclaimer: let it be known that these proposals are my
own deliberations and doesn't represent the views of any current member or
non-member of the Alliance. Let me now proceed with my humble proposals:
1. The convener of the said multi-party talks must make it known to all those
hoping to be coopted into the Alliance that they are but partners in the
Alliance, just like all current members. There is nothing like junior or
senior partners in the Alliance; there are only partners. To the extent that
this is true, all parties in the Alliance are of equal worth.
2. Currently, modalities and a comprehensive political agenda exist with
which the parties can use as a launching pad to enter into negotiations. If
and when NRP and NCP feel the need that there are things they would dearly
love to see incorporated into the agenda, and if the proposal is well within
reason, then it should be considered. Similarly, if they express objections
to items on the agenda, it ought to be given careful consideration and judged
according to its merit or lack thereof before it is either incorporated or
dismissed. Summary dismissals of objections or proposals should be avoided.
3. To drive home the principle of equal worth of all parties in the Alliance,
there shan't be any Vice Presidential candidate to the Alliance's
Presidential candidate. Reason being that in order to make real the
perception of equal worth of all parties in the Alliance, i.e., there are no
junior or senior partners in the Alliance, there is a need to forego a Vice
Presidential candidate in order to make that point unequivocally. Stuff is:
if the Vice Presidential candidate is selected from, say, the PPP at the
expense of, say, the NRP, GPP and NCP, it is very likely to be construed as
PPP being the most senior partner in the Alliance after the UDP. That kind of
perception must be avoided at all cost.
4. Two other areas of potential inter-party rift are the questions of policy
applications and or implementations vis-à-vis the ailing economy and the
monitoring of the health of the transition agenda. To disarm these potential
sources of inter-party rift, let me propose that the Finance and Economic
Affairs portfolio be given to a seasoned technocrat with no known party
affiliations to temperamentally steer the economy from its current dire
straits without any undue radical reforms of the economy, which all parties
have not agreed to. Radical reformulation of economic philosophy should
reflect mutual consent of all partners of the Alliance.
5. As per the monitoring of the health of the Alliance's transition agenda, I
propose a portfolio be created with a seat at Cabinet meetings whose main
functions would be to implement, monitor and where possible fine tune - with
the explicit blessing of all partners of the Alliance - the progress or lack
thereof of items on the Alliance's agenda redress the democratic deficit. I
propose the individual to be appointed to administer this huge task be of no
known political affiliation and be a senior judge with relevant experience in
judicial adjudication and administration.
6. As per how the parties interact to offset or mediate their differences in
the future, let Mr. Assan Musa Camara be given the title of Minister without
portfolio in the sense that given the nature of his elder statesmanship, he
is more predisposed to act as an impartial trouble-shooter than anyone
currently in or out of the Alliance. More to the point, he has the integrity,
the courage and, above all, the wisdom to carry out such a duty without fear,
ill-will or favour to any political grouping.
7. How the rest of the portfolios are shared amongst the parties, should be a
matter of inter-party negotiations and what portfolios each party ended up
getting should get reflected in past experience and how they can best
contribute towards the smooth and successful running of such portfolios. For
instance, PPP had a relatively very exceptional and successful foreign
policy; perhaps, that should be a pointer to them getting that portfolio.
Similar criterion applies to all the other parties.
Of course, not everyone will agree with everything I have identified here.
But I'm of the view that it is a good way of starting. The task that lies
ahead of us is formidable indeed. That by itself is enough of a reason for
those of us who happen to believe in different things to coalesce and fight
the dictatorship together as one people united against a common enemy - as it
happens, Jammeh and the APRC. Indeed, as my intellectual hero, Isaiah Berlin,
once rhapsodised of Imperial Russia on the brink of the Bolshevik Revolution,
"Critical turning-points in history tend to occur, we are told, when a form
of life and its institutions are increasingly felt to cramp and obstruct the
most vigorous productive forces alive in a society - economic or social,
artistic or intellectual - and it has not enough strength to resist them.
Against such a social order, men and groups of very different tempers and
classes and conditions unite."
Nothing best describes the Gambia's current dilemma and the way out of it. I
certainly hope that Opposition put things within this context and forge ahead
selflessly and liberate the Gambia from the current dictatorship - come
October 18th.
Hamjatta Kanteh
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