The categorical imperative of a polity laid waste by a tyrannous evil is a moral realignment of the bien pensant constituents of the polity to restore decency, civility, constitutionality and, above all, the Rule Of Law in the said polity. To the extent that this is true, and still extant, then the raison d'être of the mooted Opposition Alliance was and still remains, sui generis, moral. The numbers each individual participant of the Alliance adds to the pool of resources that ends up being the electoral arsenal of the Alliance is nothing but an added bonus to the Alliance. Reason being chiefly that given the unpopular nature of the current gov't, it will take only one party to demolish it electorally in a free and fair elections. This is to say that the numbers needed to demolish the APRC in free and fair elections by a single Opposition party can easily be obtained by a single Opposition party. A party like, say, the UDP can single-handedly demolish the APRC in a free and fair elections. So the numbers that the parties bring into the Alliance were not an issue as such; rather, the numbers would only turn out to be an added bonus to make more pronounced and decided the decapitation of the ugly head of the dictatorship in October. Well, talk of free and fair elections in the Gambia presupposes such a milieu in the Gambia. Alas, in the real world that is the Gambia today, there can never be free and fair elections. This being the case, it remains the case that the best that can hopefully offset massive electoral frauds by the incumbency is to have a coalescing of Opposition efforts, intelligence, logistics and, above all, a united principled stance against any attempts to subvert due process. When it comes to these, no party is in short supply of what it can contribute to the pool of resources the Alliance will need to decapitate the ugly head of the dictatorship. This argument, despite its use of the resources that parties will bring to Alliance, remains at root a moral argument. However, the most manifestly demonstrable moral argument is of a consequential nature. What do we mean by this? Given the corrupted nature of the Gambian body politic, redressing its health shouldn't be the task one individual party at the expense of others. The redressing of the democratic deficit requires, above all, a united coalescing of ALL the Opposition parties that genuinely believe in liberal democracy to work together to restore constitutionalism, confidence and due process in our body politic. It is very likely that if the reforms become the task of one individual party with the exclusion of others, the reforms needed would not be enough, far-reaching or, worst most likely to favour those purporting to carry out the reforms. Certainly, this is the moral I case I demonstrated very strongly in private as I certainly did on this List. Alas, things never materialised the way in which we supposed the moral case for an Opposition Alliance would have helped smoothen matters for the eventual political horsetrading that naturally expires before political Alliances come into being. Partly, this was made possible by the extraordinary pressure being borne by the organising chair of the Opposition multi-party talks, Mr. Assan Musa Camara. The pressure came into being largely because of time constraints and its concomitant effects like expediency and exigency in decision-making and forging ahead. That being the case, it didn't surprise those closely monitoring the events when procedural and democratic discrepancies became associated with the YMCA multi-party talks organised by Mr. Assan Musa Camara. What made the whole thing phenomenally tragic is that those who were never going to be part of a political Alliance that constitutes the heavy presence of the PPP, seized upon and exploited these procedural and democratic discrepancies; and deceitfully used them as a reason for not attending the said YMCA multi-party talks. The truth remains that a party like the PDOIS has always been afflicted with a moral dilemma since it occurred to them that in the "rejuvenated" AFPRC/APRC, they have backed the wrong horse with too much political capital, which has hence left them haemorrhaging profusely. Without much credibility left, one would have thought that the PDOIS would smell the coffee by now and contribute immensely - without their usual intellectual hauteur or holier-than-thou attitude - towards the decapitation of the ugly head of the dictatorship. Sadly, this didn't become the case. Rather, PDOIS' moral dilemma transformed into something more disreputable and unbecoming: that of a deep-seated moral and intellectual ambivalence towards the question of Jammeh and the APRC. This is made worse by the re-emergence of the PPP pace the abrogation of Decree 89. More to the point, PDOIS has and continues to view the vast assemblage of political interests that constitutes the UDP as a Trojan horse designed primarily and cannily to bring back the PPP or fight its cause. This is why the point becomes incontrovertible that PDOIS was never going to be part of a political Alliance that constitutes the heavy presence of the PPP - of all parties. It is a tragedy that to this day, PDOIS remains an intellectual movement solely and fanatically obsessed with Jawara and the PPP. Gambia is the poorer for such a disreputable and deplorable political agenda. As things stand vis-à-vis the Alliance and the need to coopt more parties into the scheme of things, two things ought to be done - post haste. Firstly, the Alliance ought to give up on all hopes of coopting the PDOIS into the Alliance. Therewith, they stand to gain more than they lose: electorally, PDOIS is insignificant; save in the urban and rural settings of SerreKunda and Wuli, PDOIS can't poll more than a 1000 votes in any given constituency. It will be interesting to see how they poll this time around; I'm of the view that they are heading for a relative decimation of their share of the national votes. Watch this space. The case for coopting PDOIS was always moral and nothing else. That doesn't seem ever likely to be the case now or ever be the case in the near future. The Alliance, therefore, need not expend any further political capital or time in the vain hopes of coopting PDOIS. What the Alliance is very likely to get from PDOIS is to have a Moses-like figure - in the form of the venerable Halifa - atop Mount Sinai with his Ten Conditions: non-negotiable and divine. One of such conditions is the risible and ridiculous stipulation that a complete nonentity or outsider from the current pool of Opposition leaders to lead the Alliance. And, you guessed right, the nonentity or outsider must be chosen from their radical metropolitan feminist allies. Suddenly, the fight to decapitate the monstrous head of the dictatorship is reduced to pandering to the insurrection of the feminist movement! People are thinking of selecting an electable individual to help bring in those crucial votes and help in warding off a second round re-run with the incumbency, PDOIS is busy crudely patronising women! This is how deplorable PDOIS' stance vis-à-vis a possible political Alliance has really become. I say to the Alliance, let us move on amicably; and each to what their consciences dictate to them. Time is of the essence here. The second task that lies ahead of the Alliance is to coopt the two remaining political parties: the NRP and the NCP. This will cost them but coopting these two parties will turn out to be very useful - morally, intellectually and politically. Before I go about proposing the manner and means available in which the co-optation ought to be carried out, let me first spell out the principles that ought to undergird the co-optation of these two parties into the Alliance. The principles that ought to undergird the co-optation of NRP and NCP, is a tenuous application of Burkean conservatism. What do we mean by this? By a tenuous application of Burkean conservatism, we refer to it to mean that the convener of the multi-party talks geared towards the co-optation of both NRP and NCP - hopefully, Mr. Assan Musa Camara - should be bear in mind that we gain only if we add to what we have already gained; and given the exigency and expediency in involved in such multi-party talks, we don't gain when we dissolve completely what has already been gained for what has yet to take form or shape. A simplistic way of saying this goes like this: the co-optation of both NCP and NRP shouldn't be at the expense of a complete dissolution of the current Alliance. In essence, the co-optation of these two parties into the Alliance trades on the principle of strengthening rather than weakening the current Alliance. If and when ethical arguments reach the point indeterminacy, wherein they run the risk of running aground the current Alliance, the loss to be borne is not worth the while of anyone: as a trade-off, we are better off disengaging. After all, a bird in hand, as the old adage goes, is worth two in the bush. This then should be the principle that undergirds attempts at coopting the NRP and NCP into the Alliance. The manner in which the multi-party talks are convened and conducted should be primarily informal. Again, this is merely a reflection of time constraints, and its concomitant effects like exigency and expediency. The chair or convener of the talks should informally arrange with all the parties to be involved in the negotiations to meet in a less conspicuous environment than the YMCA one; and, of course, bar public participation in any shape or form in the talks. The reason for this is simple: once the public becomes an audience to the unavoidable inter-party bickering, some politicians will most definitely exploit the situation by playing to the gallery and or intellectualise the occasion by grandstanding. That will not take us anywhere. There shouldn't be any indecent haste to announce anything to the public; all participants to the said multi-party talks must be signatories to whatever press release the convener of the said talks feels obliged to release via the media for public consumption. As per what is on offer or tradeable, this will largely depend on a mutual trade-off between the expectations and anxieties of those hoping to be coopted and what in essence is on offer from the Alliance. Below, I propose what can be mutually made available to those hoping to be coopted into the Alliance. First, a disclaimer: let it be known that these proposals are my own deliberations and doesn't represent the views of any current member or non-member of the Alliance. Let me now proceed with my humble proposals: 1. The convener of the said multi-party talks must make it known to all those hoping to be coopted into the Alliance that they are but partners in the Alliance, just like all current members. There is nothing like junior or senior partners in the Alliance; there are only partners. To the extent that this is true, all parties in the Alliance are of equal worth. 2. Currently, modalities and a comprehensive political agenda exist with which the parties can use as a launching pad to enter into negotiations. If and when NRP and NCP feel the need that there are things they would dearly love to see incorporated into the agenda, and if the proposal is well within reason, then it should be considered. Similarly, if they express objections to items on the agenda, it ought to be given careful consideration and judged according to its merit or lack thereof before it is either incorporated or dismissed. Summary dismissals of objections or proposals should be avoided. 3. To drive home the principle of equal worth of all parties in the Alliance, there shan't be any Vice Presidential candidate to the Alliance's Presidential candidate. Reason being that in order to make real the perception of equal worth of all parties in the Alliance, i.e., there are no junior or senior partners in the Alliance, there is a need to forego a Vice Presidential candidate in order to make that point unequivocally. Stuff is: if the Vice Presidential candidate is selected from, say, the PPP at the expense of, say, the NRP, GPP and NCP, it is very likely to be construed as PPP being the most senior partner in the Alliance after the UDP. That kind of perception must be avoided at all cost. 4. Two other areas of potential inter-party rift are the questions of policy applications and or implementations vis-à-vis the ailing economy and the monitoring of the health of the transition agenda. To disarm these potential sources of inter-party rift, let me propose that the Finance and Economic Affairs portfolio be given to a seasoned technocrat with no known party affiliations to temperamentally steer the economy from its current dire straits without any undue radical reforms of the economy, which all parties have not agreed to. Radical reformulation of economic philosophy should reflect mutual consent of all partners of the Alliance. 5. As per the monitoring of the health of the Alliance's transition agenda, I propose a portfolio be created with a seat at Cabinet meetings whose main functions would be to implement, monitor and where possible fine tune - with the explicit blessing of all partners of the Alliance - the progress or lack thereof of items on the Alliance's agenda redress the democratic deficit. I propose the individual to be appointed to administer this huge task be of no known political affiliation and be a senior judge with relevant experience in judicial adjudication and administration. 6. As per how the parties interact to offset or mediate their differences in the future, let Mr. Assan Musa Camara be given the title of Minister without portfolio in the sense that given the nature of his elder statesmanship, he is more predisposed to act as an impartial trouble-shooter than anyone currently in or out of the Alliance. More to the point, he has the integrity, the courage and, above all, the wisdom to carry out such a duty without fear, ill-will or favour to any political grouping. 7. How the rest of the portfolios are shared amongst the parties, should be a matter of inter-party negotiations and what portfolios each party ended up getting should get reflected in past experience and how they can best contribute towards the smooth and successful running of such portfolios. For instance, PPP had a relatively very exceptional and successful foreign policy; perhaps, that should be a pointer to them getting that portfolio. Similar criterion applies to all the other parties. Of course, not everyone will agree with everything I have identified here. But I'm of the view that it is a good way of starting. The task that lies ahead of us is formidable indeed. That by itself is enough of a reason for those of us who happen to believe in different things to coalesce and fight the dictatorship together as one people united against a common enemy - as it happens, Jammeh and the APRC. Indeed, as my intellectual hero, Isaiah Berlin, once rhapsodised of Imperial Russia on the brink of the Bolshevik Revolution, "Critical turning-points in history tend to occur, we are told, when a form of life and its institutions are increasingly felt to cramp and obstruct the most vigorous productive forces alive in a society - economic or social, artistic or intellectual - and it has not enough strength to resist them. Against such a social order, men and groups of very different tempers and classes and conditions unite." Nothing best describes the Gambia's current dilemma and the way out of it. I certainly hope that Opposition put things within this context and forge ahead selflessly and liberate the Gambia from the current dictatorship - come October 18th. Hamjatta Kanteh ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask] if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your full name and e-mail address. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------