Perpetrators and Complicitous Actors 





Hundreds of marabouts in Senegal subject talibés living under their de facto guardianship to conditions akin to slavery. They force the children to perform a worst form of child labor—begging on the streets for long hours—and subject them to often brutal physical and psychological abuse, all within a climate of fear. They are also responsible for gross negligence, failing to fulfill the children’s basic needs—including food, shelter, and healthcare—despite a presumption of adequate resources, brought in primarily by the children themselves. Senior religious leaders have failed to subject exploitative marabouts to any kind of regulation or implement disciplinary measures.

The governments of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, who bear ultimate responsibility under national and international law for human rights abuses within and at their borders, have failed to take effective action to protect these children, including through punishing the perpetrators and preventing future abuse. In Senegal, the government has made next to no attempt to introduce, much less enforce, regulation of the daaras, apparently allowing the anticipated political backlash from the brotherhoods to trump the welfare of tens of thousands of children. The government has likewise made almost no effort to enforce key laws and hold accountable marabouts who force children to beg or physically abuse them. In Guinea-Bissau, the government has taken some meaningful steps to prevent the large-scale trafficking of children to Senegal, but remains unwilling to hold accountable marabouts who are involved in the practice. Moreover, the Bissau-Guinean government has largely ignored the growing problem of begging talibés in its own cities.

Many parents who knowingly send their children into an abusive situation also bear responsibility for failing to adequately protect their children from harm. Lastly, humanitarian organizations, while attempting to fill the protection gap left by the state, have sometimes incentivized the proliferation of unscrupulous marabouts and urban daaras where forced begging is rampant. 

Marabouts and Religious Leaders 
Marabouts interviewed by Human Rights Watch often rationalized the practice of forced child begging with explanations that hardly withstand reason. Some marabouts who hide behind these explanations ultimately stand to gain considerable money from the talibés’ labor. Meanwhile, marabouts and religious leaders who take seriously their role as a religious teacher have failed to publicly voice concern, much less take action to end the abuses. 

Justifications for Forced Begging: Food, Rent, Humility 
Each of the some 30 marabouts interviewed by Human Rights Watch about why they force children under their care to beg gave one or more of three reasons: to provide for the talibés’ food; to pay the rent and related costs; and to teach humility. However, forced child begging as practiced throughout Senegal is wholly inconsistent with each of these stated reasons. 

Every marabout interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that he had too many talibés to be able to adequately feed them himself, so begging was necessary to meet the daaras’ food needs. While this may provide for a collection of meals, it is wholly inconsistent with begging for money. As noted above, Human Rights Watch interviewed children living in more than 100 daaras and, with just one exception, none of the money or rice the talibés collected was ever used for their food needs. 

A majority of marabouts also said that begging was necessary to assist with the daara’s other costs, including rent. Aliou Seck, a marabout in Saint-Louis, explained: “Begging, in terms of the hours, is mostly so that the daara can survive—in order to pay the electricity, to buy Quranic books, for medicines and shoes, and for soap to clean.”[213] But by occupying abandoned or partially constructed buildings, many marabouts avoid having to pay rent in the first place. And, as demonstrated throughout this report, the clear majority of marabouts who force talibés to beg fail to provide medical care, clothing, adequate shelter, or other basic needs. 

Even in daaras where marabouts do pay rent and cover other costs, it is not the children’s responsibility—particularly through a worst form of child labor—to pay for the daara. This is all the more so given that most marabouts consciously chose to leave a village in which they had a house, separate children from families that could have been the primary provider of basic needs, and take them into a situation where these costs exist.

Finally, a majority of marabouts claimed that begging is important for the talibé’s moral education, particularly to teach humility. Masso Baldé, a marabout in Saint-Louis, explained: “Begging is above all for humility—we need to give an education that is very difficult. In order to truly learn the Quran, one must suffer. Begging is a part of that.”[214]

While many marabouts profess the importance of teaching humility, three times as many talibés interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that their marabout’s own children did not beg as those who said that they did.[215] Similarly, as detailed above, some marabouts take clothes from talibés and give them to their own children. In these cases, any argument that forced begging is necessary to inculcate humility appears incredibly hollow. Lastly, the collection of food from community families, combined with living in relatively ascetic conditions and assisting with cultivation, was formerly sufficient to teach humility in the traditional daara—and remains sufficient in village daaras and some urban daaras throughout Senegal. 

If one accepts that asceticism and humility are important components of Quranic education, the teaching of these qualities still offers no justification, as many marabouts say, for the forced begging, daily quotas, and physical punishment for failing to bring the quota inflicted on the talibés. As asserted by a Senegalese academic who has studied the daara system: “As we currently observe [the situation] in urban areas, begging does not represent an element of religious education.”[216]

Unjustified by any of the marabouts’ explanations, the practice of forced begging for money, particularly with an often brutally enforced quota, can only be described as exploitation. Aliou Seydi, a marabout in Kolda who has followed his father’s example by not having his talibés beg, explained:

The teachings of Islam are completely contrary to sending children on the street and forcing them to beg. They can work the fields—that teaches them a skill, teaches them hard work. But certain marabouts have ignored this—they love the comfort, the money they receive from living off the backs of the children. That is the only explanation for how the practice has become.[217]





Mohamad Aliou Ba, Village Marabout in the Region of Kolda[218]
A Quranic teacher since 1990, Mohamad Ba returned from Dakar to his Kolda village in 1996, with the help of UNICEF. The daara, a well-made structure built by Ba, currently has 60 talibés—six live with families in surrounding villages and 54 reside at the daara. Three women in the village cook for the talibés in residence, and the costs are covered through the cultivation of millet, rice, and fruit. 

During the week, the children go to school from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., with a break for lunch and recreation. On the weekend, the talibés combine Quranic studies with cultivation and prayer lessons. Only during the harvest period do children assist with cultivation on weekdays. 

On his own initiative, Ba “modernized” the daara. The talibés learn French in addition to Quranic and formal Arabic studies. With a strong focus on studies, talibés master the Quran in three years, or in five years when combined with French and Arabic proficiency. When a talibé masters the Quran, Ba travels with the child to his village, for the traditional test and celebration. 

In addition to providing greater assistance for village daaras, Ba recommends the creation of a “diploma for completing Quranic school, to show who has really mastered the Quran.” 

Mohamadou Sali Ba, a marabout in Saint-Louis, similarly felt that exploitation through forced begging, as well as physical abuse in daaras, sharply conflicted with the tenets of Islam:

We are all under God, and it is necessary to respect the Quran and all human beings. I do not hit my students because that affects their intelligence—they only think about being hit and they cannot study. These false marabouts, who exploit the children with long begging hours and beat them severely, it makes me very angry. In the Quran, the Prophet teaches politeness and mutual respect. Those marabouts that do not act in accordance with this cannot really serve themselves under the Quran.[219]
From Ascetic to Affluent 
While Human Rights Watch is not in a position to determine the origin of a given marabout’s apparent wealth, it is clear that some measure of many marabouts’ wealth is derived from the exploitation of talibés. At the least, the money obtained through forced begging is sufficient to provide for a considerably higher standard of care in the daara.

Human Rights Watch visited more than 40 daaras in Senegal, observing that many marabouts—including some who force talibés to beg—live ascetic and relatively poor lives. Other marabouts—generally those that demand higher quotas of money, rice, and sugar—appeared to use proceeds from forced begging for their personal benefit. Many talibés, fellow marabouts, and community members told Human Rights Watch that they knew marabouts who owned multiple homes and enjoyed all available modern luxuries. 

In a country where 30 percent of the population lives on less than a dollar a day,[220] half of the population lives below the poverty line,[221] and the government pays the average primary school teacher a monthly wage of around 125,000 CFA ($272),[222] many marabouts have found a way to live comfortably through the exploitation of children. 

While each daara is unique in terms of the number of talibés and the quota imposed, below are calculations from four representative daaras from which Human Rights Watch interviewed talibés:

Proceeds of Forced Child Begging: Sums Demanded by Marabouts in Four Representative Daaras[223]





Location 


Number of Talibés 


Daily Quota per Talibé 


Weekly Demanded Total from Talibés 


Marabout’s Annual Demanded Total 



Thiès 


~20 


250 CFA, rice and sugar optional 


35,000 CFA ($76) 


1,820,000 CFA (~$4,000) 



Saint-Louis 


28 


300 CFA and ½ kg rice 


58,800 CFA ($128); 98 kg rice, worth 39,000 CFA ($85) 


5,085,600 CFA (~$11,000) 



Dakar 


~60 


On Friday, 1,000 CFA; other days, 300 CFA; every day, 2 kg rice, and 20 morsels sugar 


168,000 CFA ($365); 840 kg rice, worth 336,000 CFA ($730); and 8,400 sugar morsels, worth 28,000 CFA ($61) 


27,664,000 CFA (~$60,000) 



Guédiawaye 


150+ 


On Friday, 750 CFA; Sunday, rest; other days, 500 CFA; every day but Sunday, 1 or 2 kg rice (dependent on age), sugar optional 


487,500 CFA ($1,060); 1,350 kg rice, worth 540,000 CFA ($1,174) 


53,430,000 CFA (~$116,000) 

A former talibé from the daara in Dakar detailed above, who had run away with four others because of frequent beatings, told Human Rights Watch that the marabout lived in a “nice” house separate from his daara in Dakar, and that he also had the largest house, which the talibé had visited, within his and the surrounding villages in Guinea-Bissau—complete with fully installed electricity, multiple motorbikes, and multiple televisions.[224]

Indeed, talibés from several daaras told Human Rights Watch that they believed their marabouts were wealthy enough from their exploitation to own multiple, often lavish homes, which the talibés had visited.[225] Human Rights Watch visited one daara with over 200 talibés in Guédiawaye, where the talibés lived crammed in an abandoned structure swarming with insects and without water, windows, doors, or a toilet. A kilometer away, the daara’s marabout, Malic Mane, had a house, visited by Human Rights Watch, but he more often resided in a second house in the Dakar suburb of Mbao—coming to the daara only once or twice a week according to talibés at the daara.[226] Several local organizations had informed the Ministry of Justice of the daara’s squalid conditions in 2005, according to the director of one organization, but no action was taken.[227] Human Rights Watch scheduled two meetings with the marabout, but the marabout failed to honor the engagement.[228]

Fellow marabouts and community members in Kolda, a region in southern Senegal from which a disproportionate percentage of Senegalese talibés and marabouts hail, cited wealth as relatively common. One marabout in Kolda stated:

The practice of considerable money coming back from Dakar daaras is very common. There is a grand marabout here in Kolda who has sent students with a grand talibé to Dakar, and then money is sent back to him here, which he lives off very comfortably. And there are many marabouts who use the money from begging to build large homes and to control other buildings, here and in Guinea-Bissau.[229]
A community member who has lived in the region of Kolda for more than 40 years likewise told Human Rights Watch: 

I know marabouts here who have big houses, cars, and motorbikes, own multiple buildings, and who dress nicer than businessmen. Some of them live here currently; some have daaras elsewhere in the country. It almost becomes a contest between them to have the most talibés.[230]
Silent Acceptance
A number of marabouts and imams expressed indignation over the proliferation of “faux-marabouts” and what they perceived to be the prioritization of begging and money over the Quran in other daaras. However, few were willing to publically denounce the exploitation, press for government regulation, or bring religious institutional pressure to bear on those engaging in the practice. 

Mohamed Niass, a marabout and imam in Guédiawaye, told Human Rights Watch:

The question about exploitation by marabouts is pertinent. It is important for all of us to raise human rights and necessary to denounce exploitation. The Prophet commanded that we educate children, not exploit them.... I see these problems, the children who beg all day and who do not have shoes or clothes, and it angers me.[231]
Ibrahima Puye, a marabout in Guédiawaye, expressed concern that the proliferation of forced begging would result in discrediting the practice of Quranic education within Senegalese society:

I know of the level of exploitation by some other marabouts, and it makes me angry ... [because] the result is that all marabouts are seen as the same. Some kids are on the street all day, because their marabouts do not care about education.... This must stop so that these faux-marabouts do not sully the name of all daaras.[232]
Yet despite the anger expressed to Human Rights Watch, these marabouts, and hundreds of others who feel similarly, have yet to take action to demand regulation and accountability from the government or religious hierarchy.[233] In January 2010, the spokesperson for the Tijaniyya brotherhood voiced opposition to rampant forced begging; however, the statement was not accompanied by concrete action.[234] Leaders of the other brotherhoods have yet to even publicly object to the practice. As expressed by one Senegalese humanitarian worker, “If leaders of the two great brotherhoods in Senegal said ‘no more forced child begging,’ there would be no more forced begging.”[235]

In contrast to Senegal, religious authorities in Guinea-Bissau have begun to speak out against the practice of sending children to daaras in Senegal. Alhadji Alonso Faty, the first vice-president of the High Islamic Council (Conselho Superior Islâmico) in Guinea-Bissau, was one of a half dozen religious leaders who took part in a commission that investigated the conditions of talibés in Senegal, which he said shocked and “revolted” him and his colleagues.[236] The commission presented their findings on national television and urged parents to keep their children in Guinea-Bissau. The president of the National Community of Islamic Youth (Comunidade Nacional da JuventudeIslâmica, CNJI) said that her organization had worked closely with imams in Bissau and cited as concrete results the discussion of sending children to Senegal during the Friday prayer and on radio broadcasts.[237] The head imam in Bafatá, the second-largest city in Guinea-Bissau, told Human Rights Watch that he had publicly expressed his opposition to sending children to Senegal and advised families against it.[238]

Despite these efforts, marabouts continue to bring hundreds, likely thousands, of children from Guinea-Bissau into Senegal each year. The CNJI president acknowledged that sensitization efforts were mostly concentrated in the capital of Bissau and its surroundings, while the vast majority of cross-border movement takes place in the regions of Bafatá and Gabú, in the east.[239] More importantly, all of these religious leaders expressed that, even in the case of child trafficking, they were reluctant to involve the state and press for criminal charges to be brought against perpetrators. 

Government of Senegal 
The state is the primary entity responsible for protecting the rights of children within its borders, something which the government of Senegal has failed to do with respect to tens of thousands of talibés. In 2007, the government established the Partnership for the Withdrawal and Reinsertion of Street Children (Partenariat pour le Retrait et la Réinsertion des Enfants de la Rue, PARRER), a coordinating body of government ministries, civil society, religious groups, and aid agencies to help address the problem of street children, including the talibés. While PARRER has commissioned and undertaken studies on the number of begging children in Senegal and effective response strategies, it focuses, as its president told Human Rights Watch, “not on the government, [but] on prevention and building social mobilization.”[240] In January 2010, the state signed a 23 million CFA ($50,000) partnership with PARRER, for the coordinating body to continue prevention work.[241]

While improved funding to remove children from the street and to sensitize parents is noteworthy, the government continues to neglect other, crucially important responses that could serve as a deterrent. Central to the widespread neglect and abuse of the talibés is the government’s failure to inspect and regulate the daaras and to require that children access a well-rounded education, much less investigate and prosecute marabouts engaged in the abuse and exploitation of children. 

Lack of Regulation 
With the exception of a few modern daaras, none of the Quranic schools in Senegal are subject to any form of government regulation, be it regarding the curriculum, living conditions, or standards of health. The government does not require registration of the daara or the children in the daara, nor are there requirements regarding hours of learning; subjects taught; teacher qualifications; student-to-teacher ratio; the quality of the structure where children live and learn; or provision of clean water, nutrition, and healthcare. 

Not surprisingly, this has allowed for the proliferation of daaras and marabouts, including those who appear to have little interest in educating children. The government’s failure to regulate the daaras has contributed to every human rights abuse endured by the talibés documented in this report. It can only begin to protect these children if it is enacts legislation to register and regulate all daaras, creating adequate mechanisms to monitor compliance, and then exercise its power to close daaras in which children are forced to beg, brutalized, and subjected to conditions that endanger their education and health. 

The need for regulation has long been discussed by Senegalese government officials, the diplomatic community, and aid agencies. Various ministries, particularly the Ministry of Education, have hosted and attended tens of conferences, seminars, and workshops on Quranic education in Senegal.[242] In 2004, the Daara Inspection Directorate was established within the Ministry of Education; however, the unit did not become operational until 2008. Furthermore, its mandate is very limited: the daaras subject to inspection are “modern” daaras.[243] Traditional daaras and urban residential daaras—which one inspector referred to as “daaras outside the law”—are not overseen.[244] Expansion plans for modern daaras, discussed below, will increase the number of daaras subject to regulation, but will still not impact government oversight over the daaras that are the subject of this report. While the government formally recognized all Quranic schools in February 2010, recognition was not coupled with regulation.[245] As a result, it is precisely the daaras most prominently associated with exploitation and abuse that remain outside of the state’s regulatory reach. 

As long ago as 1978, a seminar at the Islamic Institute in Dakar, attended by high-level officials of the Ministry of Education,[246] recommended that Quranic school teachers should meet well-defined professional criteria; that pedagogy should be established; and that there should be requirements for opening and operating daaras.[247] However, when interviewed by Human Rights Watch, one high-level official in the Ministry of Family stated: “It is impossible for the state to regulate immediately. It must first gain the marabouts’ trust [and] reflect further on the institution of daaras.”[248]Three decades after leading Islamic authorities in Senegal led a call for regulation to eliminate the then-newly burgeoning exploitation of children, the government still professes a need to further study the issue—now with tens of thousands of children affected. 

Eschewing Accountability 
State authorities in Senegal have also failed to investigate and hold accountable marabouts implicated in abuse and neglect. In 2005, the government passed a law that criminalized forcing another into begging for financial gain, under penalty of a large fine and imprisonment for between two and five years.[249] Five years later, no government official interviewed by Human Rights Watch could identify a single instance when the law was applied to sanction a marabout solely for the practice of forced begging. 

One high-level official in the Directorate for the Protection of Children’s Rights, within the Ministry of Family, explained to Human Rights Watch the two choices the state has identified to address forced child begging:

Either the state applies the [anti-forced begging] law with rigor—and is in a situation where it arrests hundreds, perhaps thousands of marabouts—or the state works with some marabouts, who can then look at others and say, “It’s not like this, it’s like this.” We have chosen the second option, because otherwise too large a number would be implicated; it is just not possible or optimal.[250]
It is not clear why these are the only two options. An influential assemblywoman, who disagreed with the state’s reluctance, noted that the state could hold accountable the most exploitative or abusive marabouts through imprisonment and fines, and use alternative sanctions like public shaming for others. Most importantly, she noted, the state is obligated to take the children out of the abusive environment and return them to their families.[251] Indeed, determining the most exploitative marabouts requires only simple interviews with talibés who are begging outside of their daara, to determine the quota and the punishment for failing to bring the quota.

Beyond failing to punish marabouts for forced begging, state authorities have demonstrated a reluctance to launch and follow through with criminal proceedings, even when marabouts engage in excessive physical abuse against talibés. In the few cases that have resulted in sentencing, judges have only imposed short prison terms. Article 298 of the penal code states that anyone who voluntarily injures or strikes a child under 15 years of age, excluding “minor assaults,” shall be punished with imprisonment and a fine. The findings in this report demonstrate that many marabouts abuse their talibés in a manner far beyond a “minor assault.” Yet for each year between 2005 and 2009, fewer than five arrests of marabouts were made for physical abuse against talibés.[252] Government officials with the Ministry of Justice in Mbour and Kolda said that they could not remember a single case in which a marabout was brought before the tribunal for physically abusing a talibé.[253]

Cases resulting in criminal proceedings and punishment have almost exclusively been those in which a talibé was beaten to death or near-death. A marabout who beat a talibé to death was sentenced to four years imprisonment in 2007; and a marabout who beat a talibé to near-death in 2008 was sentenced to three years in prison.[254] One of the few cases in which the perpetrator received a substantial punishment was in 2008, when an assistant Quranic teacher was sentenced to life in prison for torturing and gruesomely suffocating a talibé in his father’s daara.[255]

Fear of Backlash 
As noted in the background section of this report, religious leaders wield enormous social, political, and economic power in Senegal. Almost every humanitarian worker and many government officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch described how the brotherhoods’ power underscores the government’s lack of political will to ensure that relevant ministry personnel—notably from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Education—both regulate and hold marabouts accountable for abuse and exploitation. One government official in the Ministry of Family told Human Rights Watch: 

The state has made efforts, but is very sensitive to the issue, particularly in terms of punishment. The grand marabouts—the leaders of the brotherhoods—this involves them, even if indirectly. If you touch any of the marabouts, you touch the brotherhoods, and that is very difficult here. You lose votes, maybe you lose office, and you face trouble.[256]
One high-level government official told Human Rights Watch that in 2005 she publicly pushed for the prosecution of a marabout who had severely beaten a three-year-old talibé. While the marabout ultimately received a two-year prison sentence, the government official received multiple death threats by telephone. The official noted that her colleagues are afraid to take the same risks.[257] Similarly, an individual who runs a center for talibés in Mbour described how she faced threats and ostracism from marabouts and the local community for trying to press charges regarding the rape of a young talibé.[258]

Social pressure, in addition to outright threats, reduces the number of cases brought before the authorities. One man who dared to file charges after his son was brutally beaten by a marabout was shunned by his village and his own father, who told an Associated Press journalist: “[The beating] was an accident and my son had no right to humiliate the marabout.... The day they took the marabout to prison, it hurt me so much it was as if they had come to jail me.”[259]

While individuals may endure threats and social pressure for taking action against marabouts, these concerns are no excuse for the Senegalese government, whose support could reduce reprisals. One government official in the Ministry of Justice expressed this sentiment to Human Rights Watch:

There is a great fear of the grand marabouts, but why? This is a law about child protection. It is necessary to apply the text of the law—poverty and religion are not excuses for throwing a child on the street, for making money off a child.[260]
Assistance for Religious Education 
Many parents refuse to send their children to state schools due to the curriculum’s lack of Quranic instruction and the imposition of informal school fees. In recognition of the former, in 2004 the government amended the education law to allow for religious instruction in state schools.[261] The government has also built state-funded “modern” daaras in which Quranic studies are combined with Arabic, French, and subjects such as mathematics and science. With funding assistance from international partners, the Ministry of Education in 2010 began the construction of modern daaras to number 100 by 2012, each of which will accommodate around 300 students. According to the plan, the state will establish and regulate the curriculum, teacher training and standards, and health and safety requirements. The schools will be subjected to inspection by state officials and, if they fail to meet standards, can be ordered to close. According to the Ministry of Education, this will satisfy the state’s responsibility regarding universal primary education for these children, while accommodating parental preferences.[262]

While the initiative shows many promising attributes, it is not a solution for the vast majority of exploited talibés. As noted by an inspector in the Ministry of Education, more than 1,600 daaras have already applied to be chosen as one of the 100 to “modernize.”[263] Moreover, those marabouts interested in personal financial gain at the expense of education are unlikely to apply in the first place, because they can reap far greater profits than a state-employed teacher. The result is that while the right to education will be extended to an important number of children, the impact on the tens of thousands of talibés toiling on the streets will be minimal. Their daaras will remain unregulated under current government plans, and additional daaras “outside the law” will very likely be opened. 

Plans to expand modern daaras must be paralleled with efforts to ensure that state education is accessible and attractive to children and parents, as well as a determined effort by state authorities to close daaras marked by exploitation and abuse and sanction those who have committed or allowed such abuse. Addressing the widespread exploitation and abuse of children cannot be postponed during the decades it will take to extend “modernization” to the vast majority of daaras in Senegal. 

Lack of Coherent Response 
A final problem that has plagued the Senegalese government is its diffuse and uncoordinated response to the exploitation of talibés. Multiple officials from national and international organizations told Human Rights Watch that a major impediment to effective state action is that the government response is spread over the Ministries of Family, Education, Justice, Interior, Social Affairs, and even Foreign Affairs with respect to Guinea-Bissau—not to mention dozens of directorates within these ministries—without a clear leader. Officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch felt that the response was at worst contradictory, but more often simply incoherent, with officials in one ministry unaware of other government initiatives.[264] Given the gravity of the problem in Senegal, there is a need to identify one official as a focal point to develop a coordinated strategy.

Government of Guinea-Bissau 
While the government of Guinea-Bissau has taken some meaningful steps to combat the illegal cross-border movement of talibés into Senegal, efforts remain hesitant and marred by insufficient financing. Most importantly, the government has lacked the will to sanction marabouts who move children across the border in a manner that violates domestic laws and international human rights norms. Furthermore, the Bissau-Guinean government has largely ignored a burgeoning domestic problem of begging talibés. Underpinning both cross-border movement and forced begging is the government’s failure to ensure the right to education for many children. 

Insufficient Action to Address Illegal Cross-Border Migration 
After decades of ignoring the mass exodus of Bissau-Guinean children to daaras in Senegal, where thousands have been abused and exploited, the government of Guinea-Bissau finally formed a National Committee to Fight against the Trafficking in Persons (National Trafficking Committee) in 2008 and acknowledged the severity of the problem.[265] Since then, the government has taken positive steps to reduce the illegal movement of children to Senegal, including through training border guards and civil police. Yet action remains limited and slow. The government has left police woefully underfunded to combat the problem, has failed to criminalize child trafficking, and has avoided accountability efforts.

Border Efforts: Improving at Border Posts, Lacking Elsewhere
The National Trafficking Committee has conducted training for civil and border police, and immigration and customs personnel, with some positive results. The commissioner of the civil police force in Bafatá region, perhaps the principal departure point for marabouts and talibés, told Human Rights Watch that in 2007 and 2008, civil and border police stopped around 200 talibés at the border and returned them home. They also arrested nine individuals, either marabouts or someone tasked by the marabout, who were moving the children across the border.[266] In 2009, according to the commissioner and confirmed by the leading humanitarian organization in the region, less trafficking through official posts resulted in the police stopping fewer children and only arresting two marabouts.[267]

While the commissioner felt that this reduction was in part due to reduced overall illegal cross-border movement, he acknowledged that it was also a result of “marabouts better hiding themselves and the children when they are going across.”[268] The police commissioner in Gabú further explained: 

There are different explanations for fewer captures. The first is that trafficking has slowed. The second is that the people moving these children have new methods. They used to go through the two official border posts; now, they travel by hundreds of clandestine crossings. Instead of taking 20 children, they take two or three. And they now cross at night, because they know that informers will disclose their location during the day.[269]
Indeed, several children interviewed by Human Rights Watch described crossing the border at night, and one recalled having to walk a long distance with a grand talibé to pass the border clandestinely, before being met by the marabout with a car in Senegal.[270]

A senior police official also acknowledged that efforts to stop child trafficking through official posts remained hampered by bribe-taking officials.[271] Moreover, a humanitarian organization director who assists in border police trainings described receiving phone calls from border officials inquiring as to whether individuals could pass without children’s paperwork—suggesting both the need for further police training, but also the improvements that have led some to recognize a potential problem and seek guidance.[272]

Police face their biggest problem in combating the illegal cross-border movement of children, however, from the lack of funding by the Bissau-Guinean government. Police and border officials in Bafatá region told Human Rights Watch that they collectively had just one car and one motorbike; in Gabú, there was one car, one motorbike, and one bicycle. As Bafatá’s police commissioner described, “If the car is on mission elsewhere, and we receive a call about the movement of children across the border, we are immobile—we cannot do anything.”[273]

Lack of Legal Framework and Accountability
The lack of laws specifically criminalizing trafficking in Guinea-Bissau severely undermines efforts to reduce child trafficking, worsened by a lack of accountability for marabouts who illegally move children into Senegal. 

At this writing, there is no law in Guinea-Bissau that criminalizes trafficking, including child trafficking. There is, however, a draft law. The government focal person for the National Trafficking Committee, as well as a UNICEF child protection officer assisting on the issue, expressed optimism that the legislature would pass the law during the first half of 2010, but admitted that the process has already been delayed several times.[274]

At present, arrests are based on border requirements and violations of penal code provisions including kidnapping and “abuse of confidence.”[275] Under Bissau-Guinean law, a non-parent taking a child across the border must present a signed declaration from both parents indicating their approval and a stated purpose.[276] Quranic school education is a legitimate purpose according to the law, but a government official said that both the parents and the marabout must state that the child will not beg and will not be beaten.[277] When these requirements are not met, the cross-border movement is illegal, and, according to the law, the marabout should be arrested and taken before a tribunal. 

In practice, this rarely happens. Humanitarian officials who work closely on the issue told Human Rights Watch that no case of a marabout attempting to illegally move children across the border has gone all the way through trial, much less been judged and criminally punished.[278] While the humanitarian officials cited a lack of political will as the primary explanation, the state’s focal person on the National Trafficking Committee cited the lack of legislation specifically sanctioning the practice as the main impediment and assured: “When the [anti-trafficking] law exists, it will be for everyone—marabouts will not be treated differently than anyone else. The law is the law, and the law will be applied to everyone the same.”[279]

Growing Forced Begging Problem in Guinea-Bissau
Numerous aid workers as well as representatives from UNICEF and the National Community of Islamic Youth told Human Rights Watch that the problem of forced begging in Guinea-Bissau has risen dramatically within the last five years, particularly in the capital.[280] The prevalence of tens of begging talibés, with a forced quota, was confirmed by Human Rights Watch in several cities, notably Bissau and Gabú.[281]

At present, the Bissau-Guinean government has failed to take concrete action to combat the rising problem. Unlike in Senegal, forced begging is neither criminalized in domestic law nor defined as a worst form of child labor.[282] The government’s principal response, according to multiple state officials, is sensitization against the practice of forced begging, combined with exploratory efforts into offering financial assistance for madrasas, the Bissau-Guinean equivalent to modern daaras in Senegal.[283] Human Rights Watch urges the Bissau-Guinean government to look carefully at the example of Senegal, where decades of “alternative solutions” and avoiding accountability have served to embolden the perpetrators and resulted in ever-growing numbers of victims.

Denying the Right to Education 
Under Bissau-Guinean law, primary education should be compulsory and free, in accordance with international law. Yet when free primary education was introduced in the mid-2000s, the government was unprepared for the enormous number of children who entered school for the first time. The state, recovering from a decade of instability, found itself unable to cover the costs of teachers, materials, and buildings. While the law prescribes education to be “free,” representatives of multiple organizations working on education issues with the government said that informal fees, including inscription and monthly fees, are widespread. The fees force many parents to remove their children from state school and send them to a Quranic school, in either Guinea-Bissau or Senegal, where parents were not responsible for any costs.[284] As a result of this and other barriers to accessing education, more than 60 percent of children in Guinea-Bissau are not enrolled in state school.[285]

Human Rights Watch interviewed eight children in two different village residential daaras in Guinea-Bissau. Seven of the eight had previously attended state school, combining regular school subjects with Quranic studies in their home village, until their parents could no longer cover the state school fees. Six of the seven who were previously in state school said that both they and their parents would have preferred that they continue attending state school and Quranic school at home.[286] While the Bissau-Guinean government certainly faces financial constraints, it must take positive steps toward the realization of the right to education. 

As in Senegal, many families in Guinea-Bissau emphasize religious learning at least equally to, if not greater than, state school education. For these families, the government should work with leading Islamic organizations in Guinea-Bissau to regulate and standardize Quranic schools, with a view to ensure educational quality, adequate living conditions, and no exploitation. 

Although the project remains in its infancy, the Bissau-Guinean government has started to take steps toward this goal. In September 2009, the government, under the direction of the Institute for the Development of Education (Instituto Nacional para o Desenvolvimento da Educaçao National, INDE), formulated an action plan for the integration of madrasas[287] into the national education system. The plan calls for a consistent curriculum and teacher standards, as well as state subsidies. While these principles have been clarified, ambiguities remain, including whether madrasas will be stand-alone schools with full state school curriculum, or an exclusively religious school associated with a nearby state school. Moreover, as described by several aid workers, it remains unclear how the government plans to fund these initiatives, since 60 percent of its children remain outside the education system largely due to already inadequate funding.

Parents Responsible for Neglect and Abuse 
Parents’ treatment of the children they choose to send hundreds of kilometers away to marabouts ranges from neglect to knowing complicity in abuse. In some cases, parents are indeed unaware of the abuse endured by their children—in part due to deliberate obfuscation by the marabout—but in others, they willingly send or return their children to a situation they know to be abusive.

Parents interviewed by Human Rights Watch gave three primary motivations for entrusting a child to a marabout. First, every parent interviewed stressed their desire for the child to memorize the Quran. Second, many parents stated that they could not financially support the child, and thus chose to confide him to a marabout. Finally, some parents stated that the marabout “demanded” the child, and that since the marabout was an authority figure—often an elder, respected relative or community member—they “could not say no.” 

In general, talibés in urban residential daaras originate from some of the poorest, rural regions of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. In Kolda region—from where the largest number of talibés in Senegal hail—the average household has less than a dollar a day (278 CFA, or US$0.60) to spend per person. Seventy-three percent of household expenditures are dedicated to food, leaving 5 percent and 3 percent, respectively, for health and education.[288] Pressed financially, some parents send their children ostensibly to learn the Quran, but also to alleviate household expenditures. One father who sent three of his nine children to learn the Quran told Human Rights Watch: 

I would prefer that my children stay by my side, but I did not have the means to keep them all here.... It was for economic reasons that I sent them. When you confide a child to the marabout, the marabout is in charge of food and clothing....[289]
The president of a Senegalese organization that works to sensitize parents, communities, and religious leaders regarding children’s rights in Islam and the risks of sending their children away, explained to Human Rights Watch:

There are a number of people directly responsible for the well-being of these children who are not fulfilling their roles. Here is an example. A father has two children—he sends one to French school and one to Quranic school. For the child in French school, he takes care of food, healthcare, school fees, a place to sleep ... everything. For the child in Quranic school, he takes care of nothing. He hands the child over to the marabout and then takes no part in the child’s well-being. Why, in the name of culture, is this okay?[290]
Indeed, several parents interviewed by Human Rights Watch believed that they had no responsibilities once they confided their child to the marabout. One father of two talibés said, “When I handed [my children] over to the marabout, I gave them to him. They are his responsibility now. If you have questions, you should go ask him—I do not have any answers.”[291] A mother in another village likewise said that she was no longer responsible for the child with a marabout, and that the researcher should speak with him.[292] The overwhelming number of talibés interviewed by Human Rights Watch did not want to leave their family and expressed mild to severe feelings of abandonment, amplified by the fact that, despite the ease of mobile phone communication, they had not spoken with their parents since leaving the village. 

The Convention on the Rights of the Child assigns to parents the primary responsibility to ensure “within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the child’s development.”[293] At present, the parents of thousands of exploited and abused talibés are failing to meet this obligation. These parents provide no assistance to the marabout for the child’s physical development and fail to maintain contact to aid the child’s emotional development, much less monitor the child’s welfare.

In many cases, parents appear to be unaware of the severity of abuses that their children suffer or are likely to suffer in a daara. In Human Rights Watch’s interviews with talibés, the marabout was frequently someone from the talibés’ village of origin; a relative, either a distant or close one; or someone from or with whom their father studied the Quran. In very few cases was the marabout someone with whom the parents, particularly the father, had no prior contact. Parents therefore often believe that despite the existence of exploitative marabouts, their son’s marabout will focus on education. 

When children are returned to their villages by humanitarian organizations after running away, some parents are shocked to hear of their treatment. A village chief in Kolda region who sent one of his nine children to a marabout in Dakar told Human Rights Watch:

I was not satisfied with what happened when I sent my son to Dakar. He did not master the Quran and he was tired from begging. He suffered a great deal there and then ran away. He hid for four years.... When I spoke to the marabout, he made excuses—he said that my child had become a bandit. It was another talibé who helped me find my child. I will not send any more children to marabouts who have relocated to cities.[294]
Malam Baio, the director of SOS Talibé Children in Bafatá, Guinea-Bissau, created a video detailing the conditions and level of exploitation under which most talibés in Senegal’s cities live, which he shows to village communities. He told Human Rights Watch that most parents are appalled when presented with visual evidence of conditions in daaras. Notwithstanding, some of the same parents send their children to Dakar daaras anyway.[295]

Many parents are indeed well aware that their children suffer neglect and abuse. Human Rights Watch interviewed many families who knew that their children begged long hours, but justified it as necessary for the marabout to survive and pay rent.[296] In a recent study in Kolda region, 30 percent of families who had entrusted a child with a marabout believed that living conditions at the daara were indeed harsher for the child than those at home.[297] In these cases, parents are not only implicated in neglect, but also complicit in abuse. 

Most egregious, however, some parents return runaway children to a marabout known to be abusive. Human Rights Watch documented tens of cases in which this occurred; in some instances the parents even further beat the child for having run away. 

Adama H. was seven years old in 2008 when he ran away from his daara in Mbour because of beatings and constant illness. He found his way home, where he told his parents about the abuse. His parents, particularly his father, decided immediately to return him to the daara. At merely eight years old, he fled again. Knowing that home was no refuge, he set out on foot toward Dakar, 70 kilometers away. A driver eventually brought him to Dakar, where he lived on the street before a social worker found him. At a shelter for two months when interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Adama said, “I want to go back home, but I am afraid, because I don’t want to be sent back to the marabout.”[298]

Another former talibé, Seydou R., 13, told Human Rights Watch a similar story:

I could not handle the beatings anymore, so I ran away. The first time I made it home, but my parents brought me back to the daara. I decided that if I ran away again, I would not go back home. The next two times I was caught, and the marabout gave the worst beatings for trying to run away. When I finally succeeded, I walked by foot to Fatick, where I found a vehicle heading to Dakar and jumped on.[299]
Unable to turn to his parents, Seydou traveled alone to Dakar, at 12 years old, where he had lived on the street for eight months when interviewed by Human Rights Watch.[300] Even if parents can claim not knowing the exploitative conditions in daaras when first entrusting their child to a marabout, the decision to return a child to that situation once they are aware of the abuse without question makes parents complicit in the abuse. 

Humanitarian Aid Organizations: Incentivizing Urban Migration, Ignoring Accountability
Dozens of national and international humanitarian aid organizations in Senegal provide a range of services to assist talibés and improve conditions in daaras. Many have done so for almost a decade. Forms of assistance include provision of mats for sleeping; water; clothing and shoes; construction of shelters; food; bath soap, laundry detergent, and disinfectant; medicines or healthcare assistance; French classes; money to satisfy the talibés quota; microcredit loans to marabouts to start businesses; and payment of the marabout’s rent. Given the deplorable conditions in urban daaras, the aid organizations’ efforts are certainly understandable, but they have unintended consequences: by and large, they incentivize marabouts to come to the cities—where begging is prevalent—and they reduce the responsibility of the state, families, and religious authorities. Moreover, many marabouts continue to force their talibés to beg, thereby obtaining even greater net income as the aid organizations help eliminate costs. In extreme cases, marabouts sell the food and medicines they receive from aid organizations. Many organizations have failed to halt assistance to marabouts who continue to exploit talibés under their care, much less report such marabouts to the authorities for abuse and neglect. 

Large-scale giving by aid organizations, with no strings attached, encourages village marabouts to come to the cities, where the overwhelming majority of assistance is provided. A marabout in a Kolda village described this enthusiasm to Human Rights Watch: 

Part of this [mass migration of marabouts to cities] is because on television programs, you see images of marabouts benefiting from NGO and state aid in Dakar. This motivates many marabouts to go to the cities, as they think they will benefit.[301]
Rather than assisting marabouts who remain in villages, where begging is almost nonexistent, most humanitarian assistance has had the effect of pulling marabouts and their talibés to cities, where begging is omnipresent. Several organizations, including UNICEF, Terre des Hommes, and Intermonde, are working with the Senegalese government’s project against the worst forms of child labor in order to return several urban daaras to villages. Other groups, like ONG Gounass and Tostan, assist village daaras in particular or community development more generally and encourage marabouts and families to keep children in their villages. But the vast majority of money assisting daaras continues to be funneled into urban daaras, particularly in Dakar region. 

Some marabouts appear to effectively use the assistance to reduce or eliminate their talibés’ begging hours and greatly improve the health conditions in the daara. Human Rights Watch visited several daaras supported by aid organizations where every child could be seen wearing clean clothes and shoes, there were blackboards and new books, and children did not beg for more than food.[302] In other daaras, marabouts drastically reduced hours of begging and told Human Rights Watch that, with a little more assistance, they would stop forcing children to beg for money altogether.[303]

However, according to interviews with talibés and aid agencies, many marabouts who receive assistance do not adjust the practice of begging at all, but merely use the assistance to obtain even greater net income. As detailed above, current talibés from one Dakar daara told Human Rights Watch that their marabout sold medicines given by an aid agency, requiring the talibés to pay for their own medicines through greater hours of begging.[304] Moreover, several people who formerly assisted one international aid organization expressed grave concerns about that organization’s decision to support daaras through assistance including loans and paying the marabout’s rent. They stated that although the organization told marabouts to cease forcing talibés to beg in return for the provisions, they routinely encountered talibés from these daaras begging on the street. Their opinion was that the organization was indeed “sustaining and encouraging the practice of faux-marabouts.”[305] Finally, one aid agency’s internal review of its three-year program—no longer in existence—to assist scores of daaras acknowledged that some daaras made no effort to either improve sanitation or reduce begging despite considerable assistance provided.[306]

The internal review noted that a serious shortcoming of its program was the lack of consequences for marabouts who failed to demonstrate progress in reducing the hours of begging.[307] Indeed, one employee told Human Rights Watch that when a marabout was caught forcing children to beg after the agreed-upon hours, the sole response was to put an “X” down in one of the organization’s records; no matter how many bad marks the marabout received, the organization never ended its support, claiming that it was trying to “build confidence among the marabouts.”[308] There is little doubt that significant assistance, with no serious efforts at conditioning the assistance or holding accountable those who abuse it, serves to encourage unscrupulous marabouts to start daaras and exploit children.

UNICEF’s current position is not to directly support urban daaras through material means, but rather to work with families, marabouts, and communities on prevention efforts to keep children in their villages and address the issue on a systemic level, including through assisting the Ministry of Family to relocate several urban daaras to villages, improving access to the public education system, and improving the financial standing of families and communities so that children are able to remain at home.[309] While most humanitarian organizations have not followed UNICEF’s lead by halting direct assistance to urban daaras, they must take greater efforts to ensure that assistance is not incentivizing the exploitation of more talibés. 

Even when direct assistance improves daara conditions, the programs are generally not sustainable over the long term, and diminish the responsibility of marabouts, parents, religious institutions, and the state. The internal review of the same aid organization’s talibé program stated that sustainability was the most significant obstacle it faced, acknowledging that once program funding ended and provisions to the marabouts accordingly ceased, most daaras returned to their pre-assistance state of begging and lack of sanitation.[310] With tens of thousands of begging talibés in Senegal’s cities, aid agencies simply cannot finance a permanent end to exploitation. Indeed, given the continued rise in the number of talibés forced to beg on the streets, such assistance has proved largely ineffective, and reduces the obviousness of the otherwise indisputable need for a government response to the problem. 

Finally, while many international and national humanitarian organizations played a crucial role in pressuring the Senegalese government to pass the 2005 anti-trafficking law that criminalized forced begging, many have subsequently failed to insist on accountability or denounce the government’s utter failure to enforce the law. The humanitarian organization Samusocial Senegal stands out as an exemplary outlier, informing Human Rights Watch that its standard response when members of its staff encounter a child who has been subject to physical abuse is to inform the authorities.[311] By contrast, directors of more than 10 humanitarian organizations working on the talibé problem told Human Rights Watch that pressure for accountability was at present unnecessary, counterproductive, or even a waste of time because it had fallen on the state’s deaf ears for so long.[312] One director of a national organization went so far as to say that sanctions would be unfair: “You cannot sanction someone who does not understand or know why they are being sanctioned—that is what it would be to criminalize or imprison most of the marabouts.”[313]

International and national humanitarian organizations in Senegal and Guinea-Bissau have thus adopted an approach of so-called “constructive engagement” and prevention toward the abuse and neglect inflicted by the marabouts. In so doing they have largely failed to report cases of abuse and neglect to the relevant authorities, much less demand accountability for abusive marabouts.

For their part, UNICEF, in both Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, has contributed to addressing the abuses against the talibés over the last decade. It has commissioned and led several studies on the prevalence of child begging in Senegal and on underlying reasons for child migration and confiage. It has, as discussed, also worked extensively on the protection of vulnerable children, including talibés, through prevention efforts. However, while UNICEF’s country operations in Senegal and Guinea-Bissau have lobbied the respective governments to pass legislation against trafficking and forced begging, they have been hesitant to follow with sustained pressure to apply the laws, particularly regarding prosecution and punishment for forced begging—a hesitancy that stems from concerns about damaging working relationships with government officials over this sensitive issue.[314] Human Rights Watch believes that as the preeminent child protection body, UNICEF must couple its noteworthy prevention work with sustained calls for accountability, as the exploitation and abuse of the talibés will only end with both types of action.

Ultimately, despite the efforts of many humanitarian organizations and community associations, the phenomenon of begging talibés continues to grow. As the director of one large humanitarian organization who formerly ran programs that directly assisted daaras, but who has now shifted his strategy to relocating daaras back to the villages, told Human Rights Watch:

Everyone is profiting from this status quo. International NGOs have manipulated the situation and are receiving their funding. National partners are profiting, as they are funded for implementing programs. Marabouts are profiting. Every NGO is doing something, but it is not clear how they are helping given that the number of begging talibés continues to rise. Everyone is profiting, everyone but the talibés.[315]
  

Previous 

 
“Off the Backs of the Children”Map of Senegal and Guinea-BissauSummaryRecommendationsMethodologyBackgroundExploitation and Abuses Endured by the Talibés ...Perpetrators and Complicitous ActorsRelevant International and National LawAcknowledgements   Next


[213] Human Rights Watch interview with Aliou Seck, marabout, Saint-Louis, November 30, 2009. Numerous other marabouts made similar statements. For example, Human Rights Watch interviews with Mohamed Niass, Guédiawaye, November 21, 2009; with Demba Balde, Guédiawaye, November 21, 2009; and with Abdullai Ba, Saint-Louis, December 2, 2009.


[214] Human Rights Watch interview with Masso Balde, marabout, Saint-Louis, December 1, 2009. Numerous other marabouts made similar statements. For example, Human Rights Watch interviews with Abdullai Ba, Saint-Louis, December 1, 2009 (“Begging is to show the children what it is like to have nothing, to show them that they must work hard, to show them the way of righteousness…. They are obliged to survive like this to know pain, in order to be truly blessed later.”); with Alu Diallo, Thiès, December 8, 2009; and with Celein Douda Faye, Guédiawaye, November 23, 2009.


[215] For example, Human Rights Watch interviews with 12-year-old talibé, Saint-Louis, December 1, 2009 (also stating that marabout’s children went to French school); with 13-year-old former talibé in Saint-Louis, Saint-Louis, December 1, 2009 (also stating that marabout’s son went to a private modern daara for which the marabout paid fees); with 12-year-old former talibé in Dakar, Mbour, December 21, 2009; with 13-year-old former talibé in Dakar, Bafatá, Guinea-Bissau, January 11, 2010; and with 14-year-old talibé, Saint-Louis, December 1, 2009 (marabout’s children do beg, but also attend a French school specifically for marabout’s children). This is in contrast to the tradition of daaras, according to one religious historian, in which even the sons of marabouts and village chiefs were part of the ascetic practices. Human Rights Watch interview with Mamadou Ndiaye, director of the Education Department at the Islamic Institute in Dakar and professor in the Arabic Department at University Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD), Dakar, January 21, 2010. 


[216]Ndiaye, L’Enseignement arabo-islamique au Sénégal, p. 24.


[217] Human Rights Watch interview with Aliou Seydi, marabout, Kolda, January 6, 2010.


[218] Human Rights Watch interview with Mohamad Aliou Ba, marabout, Guero Yiro Alpha, Kolda region, January 7, 2010.


[219] Human Rights Watch interview with Mohamadou Sali Ba, marabout, Saint-Louis, November 30, 2009.


[220] United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Indicators: Senegal, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx (accessed February 4, 2010) (based on a 2005 government survey).


[221] See 2007 Statistics from the Ministry of Economy and Finances, Republic of Senegal, cited in Codou Bop, “Senegal: Homophobia and Islamic Political Manipulation,” Sexuality Policy Watch Working Papers, no. 4, March 2008, p. 3, http://www.sxpolitics.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/texto-codou-_revny.pdf (accessed March 27, 2010); Republic of Senegal, Evaluation quantitative du DSRP-I (2003-2005), July 2007, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSENEGAL/Resources/Doc5_Rapport_eval_quant_DSRP1.pdf (accessed February 4, 2010).


[222] See Anti-Slavery International, Begging for Change: Research findings and recommendations on forced child begging in Albania/Greece, India and Senegal, 2009, p. 11.


[223] The information in this table is based on interviews with talibés at daaras in each of these four cities. The figure for the weekly demanded total is calculated by multiplying the daily quota per talibé by the number of talibés in the daara and the number of days per week that they begged. The figure for the marabout’s annual income is calculated by multiplying the weekly total, including sums of money and the value of rice and sugar, by 52. Human Rights Watch interviews with 10-year-old talibé, Thiès, January 24, 2010; with 11-year-old talibé, Saint-Louis, December 1, 2009; with 14-year-old talibé, Saint-Louis, December 1, 2009; with 15-year-old former talibé in Dakar, Gabú, Guinea-Bissau, January 12, 2010; and with 12-year-old talibé in Guédiawaye, November 23, 2009.


[224] Human Rights Watch interview with 15-year-old former talibé in Dakar, Gabú, Guinea-Bissau, January 12, 2010. 


[225] Human Rights Watch interviews with 18-year-old former talibé in Dakar, Dakar, December 15, 2009 (stating that the marabout more often lived at a home in a Dakar suburb, rarely coming into the daara, though he also had a home near the daara); and with 10-year-old talibé, Saint-Louis, November 30, 2009 (stating that marabout had a home for his family back in Fouta Toro, where he often visited, in addition to his residence at the daara).


[226] Human Rights Watch interview with a group of talibés, Guédiawaye, December 12 and 20, 2009. 


[227] Human Rights Watch interview with a director of a local humanitarian organization, Guédiawaye, December 12, 2009. The director said that the marabout is very powerful and that the state was afraid to bring any action against him as a result.


[228] The first meeting was confirmed the day before the arranged time, and the second meeting was confirmed that morning. When the marabout was called at the arranged time for the first meeting, he said that he had guests at his house in Mbao and would be unable to make it. When the marabout was called at the arranged time for the second meeting, he did not answer and turned off his phone, so that subsequent attempts went straight to voicemail.


[229] Human Rights Watch interview with Aliou Seydi, marabout, Kolda, January 6, 2010. A marabout in Guédiawaye similarly described: “These marabouts build huge buildings in Kolda and Guinea-Bissau with the money. They are part of a group that does not honor the real Quran.” Human Rights Watch interview with a marabout, Guédiawaye, November 19, 2009.


[230] Human Rights Watch interview with Kolda resident and community leader, Kolda, January 5, 2010.


[231] Human Rights Watch interview with Mohamed Niass, marabout, Guédiawaye, November 21, 2009. A number of other marabouts expressed similar anger. For example, Human Rights Watch interviews with Mohamadou Sali Ba, marabout, Saint-Louis, November 30, 2009; with Oustas Pape Faye, marabout, Guédiawaye, November 19, 2009; and with Selene Toure, marabout, Guédiawaye, November 21, 2009.


[232] Human Rights Watch interview with Ibrahima Puye, marabout, Guédiawaye, November 18, 2009.


[233] One marabout blamed the government, who he said tasked “people who do not know anything about the daaras” with inspection, leading the government to “not do anything.” He suggested that if someone like himself was tasked—if there was a delegated marabout from each neighborhood responsible for overseeing the daaras in that neighborhood—”it would be easy to identify and to shut down the bad daaras. The exploitation could end easily.” Human Rights Watch interview with a marabout, Guédiawaye, November 21, 2009. 


[234] See Abdoul Aziz Seck, “Serigne Abdoul Aziz Sy ‘Junior’ Invite les Talibés à Refuser d’Etre Exploités,” Le Populaire, January 27, 2010.


[235] Human Rights Watch interview with a director of large humanitarian organization, Dakar, November 11, 2009.


[236] Human Rights Watch interview with Alhadji Alonso Faty, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, January 15, 2010.


[237] Human Rights Watch interview with Helena Assana Said, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, January 14, 2010. Said also said that these imams have publicly stated that parents should send their children to Portuguese schools, in addition to learning the Quran.


[238] Human Rights Watch interview with El Hadj Thierno Kolabro Ba, Bafatá, Guinea-Bissau, January 11, 2010.


[239] Human Rights Watch interview with Helena Assana Said, January 14, 2010.


[240] Human Rights Watch interview with Mame Gaye, president of PARRER, Dakar, November 25, 2009.


[241] The Support Unit for Child Protection (La Cellule d’appui à la protection de l’enfance, CAPE) signed the agreement on behalf of the state. See Babacar Dieng, “Convention de partenariat entre Cape et Parrer - 23 millions de francs de l’Etat pour aider les enfants de la rue,” Le Soleil, January 19, 2010. 


[242] For a discussion of a number of seminars and workshops—and government-organized working groups—between 1976 and 1982, for example, see Ndiaye, L’Enseignement arabo-islamique au Sénégal, pp. 217-229, 310-317.


[243] Human Rights Watch interview with Hameth Sall, daara inspector in the Ministry of Education and department head at the Islamic Institute, Dakar, February 8, 2010; Pape Coly Ngom, “Daaras modernes – Le ministre crée une inspection,” Le Soleil, December 22, 2009. 


[244] Human Rights Watch interview with Hameth Sall, February 8, 2010.


[245] See Iba Der Thiam, “Reconnaissance des écoles coraniques par le gouvernement,” Le Soleil, February 4, 2010. 


[246] At that time the Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale (Ministry of National Education).


[247] Ndiaye, L’Enseignement arabo-islamique au Sénégal, pp. 314-316.


[248] Human Rights Watch interview with a high-level official in the Ministry of Family, December 15, 2009. The program director of PARRER similarly told Human Rights Watch that regulation was not possible at present because it was “necessary to experiment first” with methods of assistance, curriculum, and other issues. Human Rights Watch interview with Cheikh Amadou Bamba Diaw, Dakar, November 25, 2009.


[249] Law no. 2005-06 of May 10, 2005, relating to the fight against the trafficking of persons and similar practices and the protection of victims (Loi n° 2005-06 du 10 mai 2005 relatif à la lutte contre la traite des personnes et pratiques assimilées et à la protection des victimes), art. 3.


[250] Human Rights Watch interview with an official in the Ministry of Family, Dakar, December 15, 2009.


[251] Human Rights Watch interview Aida Mbodj, former minister of the Family and current vice-president of the National Assembly, Dakar, February 11, 2010.


[252] See US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005: Senegal,” March 8, 2006 (citing two such arrests according to statistics provided by the government of Senegal); US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2006: Senegal,” March 6, 2007 (citing three arrests); and US State Department, “Trafficking in Persons Report 2009,” June 16, 2009 (citing two arrests for 2008).


[253] Human Rights Watch interviews with an official in the Ministry of Justice, Kolda, January 6, 2010; and with an official in the Ministry of Justice, Mbour, December 18, 2009. A humanitarian worker in Mbour indicated that there had been such an arrest following a particularly gruesome beating by one marabout in 2008. Human Rights Watch interview with a social worker for a local humanitarian organization, Mbour, December 14, 2009. See also Pape Mbar Faye, “Maltraitance à Mbour : Un maître coranique déféré pour avoir torturé son talibé,” WalFadjri, June 11, 2008, http://www.seneweb.com/news/article/16853.php (accessed February 5, 2010). 


[254] See Soro Diop, “Affaire de la bastonnade du talibé M. B : Garde à vue prolongée pour le maître coranique,” Le Quotidien, July 9, 2008; Birane Diaw, “Sévices corporels sur un talibé de 8 ans : 3 ans ferme requis pour le maître coranique,” Le Quotidien, October 23, 2008; Birane Diaw, “Jugement des sévices sur un talibé à Kaolack : Le maître coranique écope de 3 ans ferme,” Le Quotidien, November 13, 2008.


[255] See Samba Oumar Fall, “Pour avoir torturé à mort un élève, Bassirou Diané écope la perpétuité,” Le Soleil, January 28, 2008, http://www.seneweb.com/news/article/14457.php (accessed February 5, 2010).


[256] Human Rights Watch interview with an official in the Ministry of Family, Dakar, December 2009. An official in the Ministry of Justice made similar statements. Human Rights Watch interview, Dakar, January 2010 (“The whole problem of the talibés exists because of the non-application of the law, the law against begging. The Senegalese government does not apply the law, because the country is dominated by the power of the marabouts (‘force maraboutique’).”). 


[257] Human Rights Watch interview Aida Mbodj, former minister of the Family and current vice-president of the National Assembly, Dakar, February 11, 2010. 


[258] “Senegal Aid Workers Express Concern About Abuse of Child Beggars,” Voice of America, March 10, 2008.


[259] Rukmini Callimachi, “Child beggar’s father fights abusive teacher,” Associated Press, August 17, 2008.


[260] Human Rights Watch interview with a high-level official in the Ministry of Justice, Dakar, December 22, 2009. 


[261] Law no. 2004-37 of December 15, 2004, modifying and completing the National Education Orientation Law no. 91-22 of February 16, 1991 (Loi n° 2004-37 du 15 Décembre 2004 modifiant et complétant la loi d’orientation de l’Education nationale n° 91-22 du 16 Février 1991).


[262] Human Rights Watch interview with Hameth Sall, February 8, 2010.


[263] Ibid.


[264] Human Rights Watch interviews with directors of international and local humanitarian organizations, Dakar, December 2009 and January 2010. 


[265] Human Rights Watch interview with Emanuel Fernandes, focal person of the National Committee on the Trade of Persons and official in the Institute of Women and Children (Instituto da Mulher e Criança, IMC), Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, January 13, 2010 (stating that prior to 2008 and the creation of the Committee, there were only two humanitarian organizations that worked and raised awareness on this issue). 


[266] Human Rights Watch interview with August Monte, commissioner of the civil police force for the region of Bafatá, Bafatá, Guinea-Bissau, January 11, 2010. The Gabú regional police commissioner told Human Rights Watch that, from his experience, it is more often a designated intermediary, generally a former or older talibé, who is tasked with moving the children across the border. He stated, “He is recruited, this former talibé, and then he sensitizes the village about the virtues of the marabout, about the possible education—then he recruits the children. Less often, the marabout comes to recruit for himself, looking to exploit children in the same way that he was likely exploited.” Human Rights Watch interview with Ibrahima Mane, regional commissioner of the civil police force, Gabú, Guinea-Bissau, January 13, 2010. 


[267] Human Rights Watch interviews with August Monte, January 11, 2010; and with Malam Baio, director of SOS Talibé Children, Bafatá, Guinea-Bissau, January 10, 2010.


[268] Human Rights Watch interview with August Monte, January 11, 2010.


[269] Human Rights Watch interview with Ibrahima Mane, January 13, 2010. 


[270] Human Rights Watch interview with 11-year-old talibé, Saint-Louis, December 1, 2009.


[271] Human Rights Watch interview with a high-level police official, Guinea-Bissau, January 2010.


[272] Human Rights Watch interview with Laudolino Carlos Medina, executive secretary of AMIC, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, January 14, 2010.


[273] Human Rights Watch interview with August Monte, January 11, 2010.


[274] Human Rights Watch interviews with Emanuel Fernandes, January 13, 2010; and with UNICEF child protection officer, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, January 15, 2010.


[275] Human Rights Watch interview with Emanuel Fernandes, January 13, 2010.


[276] Ibid.; and Human Rights Watch interview with Laudolino Carlos Medina, January 14, 2010.


[277] Human Rights Watch interview with Emanuel Fernandes, January 13, 2010.


[278] Human Rights Watch interviews with Laudolino Carlos Medina, January 14, 2010; and with Malam Baio, January 10, 2010.


[279] Human Rights Watch interview with Emanuel Fernandes, January 13, 2010.


[280] Human Rights Watch interviews with Laudolino Carlos Medina; with UNICEF child protection officer, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, January 15, 2010; and with Helena Assana Said, president of CNJI, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, January 14, 2010 (noting also that the CNJI had identified the daaras where it happened, tried to sensitize marabouts to at least reduce begging hours, and were starting a marrainage program where talibés would sleep with a host family, in addition to receiving food and other assistance). 


[281] Human Rights Watch interviews with eight-year-old talibé, Gabú, Guinea-Bissau, January 12, 2010; and with nine-year-old talibé, Gabú, Guinea-Bissau, January 13, 2010.


[282] The government of Guinea-Bissau, marred by instability and constant changes in personnel in state institutions, has spent the last decade stagnated in its efforts to harmonize domestic laws with international treaty obligations. UNICEF, which has been working with the government, expressed optimism that real progress would be made this year, including on legislation against forced begging. Human Rights Watch interview with UNICEF child protection officer, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, January 15, 2010. However, directors of two humanitarian organizations in Guinea-Bissau that work with the talibés expressed less optimism, given the lack of progress over the last decade to reform Guinea-Bissau’s laws and the hesitance of the government to interfere with religious leaders. Human Rights Watch interviews with directors of local humanitarian organizations, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, January 2010. 


[283] Human Rights Watch interviews with Emanuel Fernandes, January 13, 2010; with official in the Ministry of Interior, Bafatá, Guinea-Bissau, January 11, 2010; and with regional official, Bafatá, Guinea-Bissau, January 11, 2010.


[284] Human Rights Watch group interviews with talibés ages nine, nine, 12, 16, and 19, Bafatá region, Guinea-Bissau, January 10, 2010; with talibés ages eight, 12, and 15, Bafatá region, Guinea-Bissau, January 10, 2010; and Human Rights Watch interview with the father of a former talibé, Bafatá, Guinea-Bissau, January 10, 2010.


[285] Human Rights Watch interviews with UNICEF child protection officer, January 15, 2010; with an international humanitarian organization official working closely with the government on education policy, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, January 15, 2010; with Helena Assana Said, January 14, 2010; and with Laudolino Carlos Medina, January 14, 2010.


[286] Human Rights Watch group interviews with talibés ages nine, nine, 12, 16, and 19, Bafatá region, Guinea-Bissau, January 10, 2010; with talibés ages eight, 12, and 15, Bafatá region, Guinea-Bissau, January 10, 2010.


[287] In Guinea-Bissau, a daara is a school where children primarily and in some cases only learn the Quran, whereas a Bissau-Guinean madrasa involves Quranic studies, Arabic, and often Portuguese and other state school subjects.


[288] Draft version of study on Kolda region performed by a large research institute, seen by Human Rights Watch (publication pending) (finding also that the average household size in Kolda was 10.5 people). 


[289] Human Rights Watch interview with the father of three talibés, Kolda region, January 7, 2010. Another father of two talibés said that whether his male children stayed at home and went to state school or were sent to live in a daara depended, in part, on the success of the harvest when the child came of school age. Human Rights Watch interview with the father of two talibés in Saint-Louis, Fouta Toro area, December 2, 2009. 


[290] Human Rights Watch interview with Amadou Tidiana Talla, president of ONG Gounass, Kolda, January 8, 2010.


[291] Human Rights Watch interview with the father of two talibés in Saint-Louis, Fouta Toro area, December 2, 2009. 


[292] Human Rights Watch interview with the mother of one talibé in Saint-Louis, Fouta Toro area, December 2, 2009.


[293] CRC, art. 27.


[294] Human Rights Watch interview with a village chief and father who sent a child to a Dakar daara, Guero Yiro Boucar, Kolda region, January 7, 2010. Other parents made similar statements. Human Rights Watch interviews with the mother of former talibé, Bafatá, Guinea-Bissau, January 11, 2010 (telling Human Rights Watch that her youngest son, age three, would not be going to Senegal to learn the Quran after the experience of her older son, who was returned after running away from his marabout’s physical abuse); and with the father of a former talibé, Gabú, Guinea-Bissau, January 12, 2010 (“It was only when the child returned here that we learned the full truth about the difficulties in Senegal”).


[295] Human Rights Watch interview with Malam Baio, January 10, 2010. 


[296] Human Rights Watch interviews with the father of one talibé in Saint-Louis, Fouta Toro area, December 2, 2009; with the father of one talibé in Saint-Louis, Fouta Toro area, December 2, 2009; and with the mother of one current talibé and one former talibé in Dakar, Gabú, Guinea-Bissau, January 13, 2010.


[297] Draft version of study on Kolda region performed by a large research institute, seen by Human Rights Watch (publication pending) (reporting also that 30 percent of parents believed that the child would be in equal living conditions and 31 percent believed that the child would be in better living conditions). 


[298] Human Rights Watch interview with eight-year-old former talibé in Mbour, Dakar, November 8, 2009. Many talibés related similar stories. For example, Human Rights Watch interviews with 13-year-old former talibé in Touba, Dakar, November 25, 2009 (beaten by father after he ran away from the daara, forcing him to run away to the streets of Dakar); with 13-year-old former talibé in Saint-Louis, Saint-Louis, December 1, 2009 (beaten by father after he ran away from the daara at age nine; knowing that he would be returned to the daara, he ran away from home); and with 18-year-old former talibé in Saint-Louis, Dakar, December 10, 2009 (about to be returned to daara after running home at 11 years old, he ran away again, forcing him to live on and off the streets in Kaolack, Mbour, Thiès, and Dakar over the last seven years). 


[299] Human Rights Watch interview with 13-year-old former talibé in Kaolack, Dakar, December 15, 2009.


[300] Ibid. 


[301] Human Rights Watch interview with Mohamed Aliou Ba, village marabout, Guero Yiro Alpha, Kolda region, January 7, 2010. The brother of a marabout who left Kolda for Dakar, as well as a government official in Kolda, described similar influences on marabouts’ migration. Human Rights Watch interviews with the father of Dakar talibé and brother of marabout, Kolda region, January 7, 2010 (“The way that the government and NGOs do their work, the money never leaves Dakar—so the marabouts go there. That was the perception of my brother who left [his village in Kolda]. If you are going to change things, the money must go to the population directly, it must go to the base.”); and with a government official in the Ministry of Social Affairs, Kolda, January 8, 2010 (“The marabouts think that if they have a large number of children around them, that the state or NGOs will assist them. They have seen it happen with other marabouts.”).


[302] Human Rights Watch interviews with Mohamed Niass, marabout and imam, Guédiawaye, November 21, 2009; and with Seybatou Ciss, marabout, Mbour, December 19, 2009.


[303] Human Rights Watch interviews with Ibrahima Puye, marabout, Guédiawaye, November 18, 2009; with Oustas Pape Faye, marabout, Guédiawaye, November 19, 2009; and with Malick Sy, marabout, Mbour, December 18, 2009. A 2008 internal review of one humanitarian organization’s large-scale talibé program, shared with Human Rights Watch, likewise found that some marabouts who received their assistance had abandoned the practice of begging, while others had at least reduced hours. 


[304] Human Rights Watch group interview with talibés ages five, seven, nine, 10, and 11, Dakar, January 28, 2010.


[305] Human Rights Watch interview with former employees of an international humanitarian organization, Dakar, November 20, 2009.


[306] Internal review of humanitarian organization’s talibé program, 2008, unpublished document on file with Human Rights Watch. In the same internal review, the organization noted that its assistance may indeed have resulted in an increase in the number of talibés sent to specific daaras, though it believed that the overall increase was likely to have occurred regardless and the organization’s actions only impacted the relative distribution of talibés among daaras rather than the whole number. It is clear, however, that when organizations focus on urban daaras, the relative distribution changes in favor of urban daaras over village daaras—bringing children to where begging is widespread as opposed to largely nonexistent.


[307] Ibid. 


[308] Human Rights Watch interview with a humanitarian official, Senegal, December 9, 2009.


[309] Human Rights Watch interview with UNICEF child protection officer, Dakar, February 24, 2010.


[310] Internal review of humanitarian organization’s talibé program, 2008, unpublished document on file with Human Rights Watch. 


[311] Human Rights Watch interview with Abdullai Diop, head of Samusocial Senegal’s medical team, Dakar, February 22, 2010.


[312] Human Rights Watch interviews with officials in international and local humanitarian organizations in Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, November 2009 through January 2010. 


[313] Human Rights Watch interview with the director of a local humanitarian organization, Dakar, December 2009. 


[314] Human Rights Watch interviews with UNICEF child protection officers in Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, December 2009 and January 2010. 


[315] Human Rights Watch interview with the director of an international humanitarian organization, Dakar, November 11, 2009.

                                          
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