Ebou:
Excerpts from political theorists shall not necessary serve to explain or
solve the problem on what strategy to use when dealing with the incumbent
regime.  Reason is conventional political rationale is turned upside its head
when it concerns the political reality on the ground back home.

Our initial approach did not work for reasons which have been outlined by
others; election irregularities, a highly uninformed and mostly illiterate
populus, the firmly engrained Gambian philosophy which tends to give some
leaders a "levianthanesque" status, insufficient financing for the Opposition
and much more.


We therefore have a limited amount of options as it stands now:
1.  We can accept their olive branch and move forth with that strategy

OR

2.In Lieu of the issues we have ascertained to have caused this election
fiasco, we can revise our strategy and come up with better and more tangible
means of improving the situation for our people and the Opposition on the
ground.

To compare these two strategies, it would be wise to momentarily set aside
the strategy of duplicity as it concerns the works of those political
theorists whose theories have failed to explain why conventional political
logic has been turned upside down in our country.  So - from this end --
nothing will be reproduced from any book and instead I shall attempt to
understand what positives and negatives following each strategy will bring
forth.

AVENUE # 1
Accepting the olive branch and consequently sending some of our
representatives to meet with Jammeh does have its advantages, for it gives us
a way to put forth some demands on the tables.  Issues such as freeing
political prisoners, having a more transparent system and such can be
broached with the incumbent regime.  However, this strategy does have its
disadvantages; in my opinion, this olive branch ploy can also have the effect
of pacifying us because negotiating with them also means that we put
ourselves in a position where we have to walk a precarious tight rope in the
fear that perhaps taking them to task too much will scuttle the common agenda
we have on the table.  Accepting this offering will eventually lead to the
disconcerting scenario where the L will most likely cease to be an
independent entity because - as in the case of most situations where two
opposing parties sit at the negotiating table -  - preconditions will be tied
to any concessions by either side and since the current regime will at least
initially - have most of the trump cards - this strategy will put us at an
inherent disadvantage since making changes back home will implicitly depend
on how our online community behaves.

Also, our concession to their initial demand will also serve to give this
regime and its leader an even greater "leviathanesque" status in a country
where superstition is rife that Jammeh is a great man and even has mystical
powers.  We simply cannot afford to give the regular Samba the impression
that the incumbents in power have actually managed to pacify the L and
therefore reduce its effectiveness in serving as clear reminder to the regime
back home that there are Gambians out there who have the tool (Gambia L) to
remind the present regime of their misdeeds.  So we should also pay heed to
the distinct possibility that this might serve to reduce the effectiveness of
the List and at the same time, enhance the regime's standing in the eyes of
the Gambian on the ground.

AVENUE # 2
This would entail revising our strategy based on some of the mistakes and
misconceptions we have had in the past about the Gambian political reality.
This would mean keeping up with our prior strategy of at least keeping the
government honest in a variety of ways by keeping a close watch on their
numerous misdeeds.  This ploy will not only serve to keep the government
honest, but also give us a great deal more independence with respect to the
way we intend to run our campaign.  We can still petition organizations and
important people without the fear that this will endanger plans we have with
the current regime.

Given, some have offered the counter argument that leading our campaign
similar to the manner we have in the past will lead to more intransigence
from the regime and thus a situation where our goals will not be achieved.
But one can also argue that their intransigence cannot be attributed to any
failing of ours.  We simply point out the issues we have with their record
and it is therefore up to them to active this type of criticism in a positive
manner.  If anything, their insensitivity to our concerns will simply show
that this regime is inflexible and unwilling to change, signals which do not
bode well with the international community.

Some have also posited that we should endeavor to better the Gambian
community and not criticize.  Certain members of this list have taken it upon
themselves to help through various ventures.  Medical machines have been
donated to the community, funds have been raised for those who were injured
during the student massacre last year, books have been sent to schools
through various drives by members of this list, political parties have been
given funds and much, much more.  This essentially shows that while we can
perhaps come up with better methods to make life better on the ground for
Gambians, to characterize this list as not having helped in improving the
lives of our brothers and sisters on the ground is unfair.  IMO, this line of
argument is a moot factor for we have shown that we can keep the government
honest and at the same time also address humanitarian issues which our
countrymen face.


To me, it seems as if the second avenue is a much better strategy to take.


Thanks,
Yusupha

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