Ebou: Excerpts from political theorists shall not necessary serve to explain or solve the problem on what strategy to use when dealing with the incumbent regime. Reason is conventional political rationale is turned upside its head when it concerns the political reality on the ground back home. Our initial approach did not work for reasons which have been outlined by others; election irregularities, a highly uninformed and mostly illiterate populus, the firmly engrained Gambian philosophy which tends to give some leaders a "levianthanesque" status, insufficient financing for the Opposition and much more. We therefore have a limited amount of options as it stands now: 1. We can accept their olive branch and move forth with that strategy OR 2.In Lieu of the issues we have ascertained to have caused this election fiasco, we can revise our strategy and come up with better and more tangible means of improving the situation for our people and the Opposition on the ground. To compare these two strategies, it would be wise to momentarily set aside the strategy of duplicity as it concerns the works of those political theorists whose theories have failed to explain why conventional political logic has been turned upside down in our country. So - from this end -- nothing will be reproduced from any book and instead I shall attempt to understand what positives and negatives following each strategy will bring forth. AVENUE # 1 Accepting the olive branch and consequently sending some of our representatives to meet with Jammeh does have its advantages, for it gives us a way to put forth some demands on the tables. Issues such as freeing political prisoners, having a more transparent system and such can be broached with the incumbent regime. However, this strategy does have its disadvantages; in my opinion, this olive branch ploy can also have the effect of pacifying us because negotiating with them also means that we put ourselves in a position where we have to walk a precarious tight rope in the fear that perhaps taking them to task too much will scuttle the common agenda we have on the table. Accepting this offering will eventually lead to the disconcerting scenario where the L will most likely cease to be an independent entity because - as in the case of most situations where two opposing parties sit at the negotiating table - - preconditions will be tied to any concessions by either side and since the current regime will at least initially - have most of the trump cards - this strategy will put us at an inherent disadvantage since making changes back home will implicitly depend on how our online community behaves. Also, our concession to their initial demand will also serve to give this regime and its leader an even greater "leviathanesque" status in a country where superstition is rife that Jammeh is a great man and even has mystical powers. We simply cannot afford to give the regular Samba the impression that the incumbents in power have actually managed to pacify the L and therefore reduce its effectiveness in serving as clear reminder to the regime back home that there are Gambians out there who have the tool (Gambia L) to remind the present regime of their misdeeds. So we should also pay heed to the distinct possibility that this might serve to reduce the effectiveness of the List and at the same time, enhance the regime's standing in the eyes of the Gambian on the ground. AVENUE # 2 This would entail revising our strategy based on some of the mistakes and misconceptions we have had in the past about the Gambian political reality. This would mean keeping up with our prior strategy of at least keeping the government honest in a variety of ways by keeping a close watch on their numerous misdeeds. This ploy will not only serve to keep the government honest, but also give us a great deal more independence with respect to the way we intend to run our campaign. We can still petition organizations and important people without the fear that this will endanger plans we have with the current regime. Given, some have offered the counter argument that leading our campaign similar to the manner we have in the past will lead to more intransigence from the regime and thus a situation where our goals will not be achieved. But one can also argue that their intransigence cannot be attributed to any failing of ours. We simply point out the issues we have with their record and it is therefore up to them to active this type of criticism in a positive manner. If anything, their insensitivity to our concerns will simply show that this regime is inflexible and unwilling to change, signals which do not bode well with the international community. Some have also posited that we should endeavor to better the Gambian community and not criticize. Certain members of this list have taken it upon themselves to help through various ventures. Medical machines have been donated to the community, funds have been raised for those who were injured during the student massacre last year, books have been sent to schools through various drives by members of this list, political parties have been given funds and much, much more. This essentially shows that while we can perhaps come up with better methods to make life better on the ground for Gambians, to characterize this list as not having helped in improving the lives of our brothers and sisters on the ground is unfair. IMO, this line of argument is a moot factor for we have shown that we can keep the government honest and at the same time also address humanitarian issues which our countrymen face. To me, it seems as if the second avenue is a much better strategy to take. Thanks, Yusupha <<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>> To view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: [log in to unmask] <<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>