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From:
jim clark <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
Sci-Cult Science-as-Culture <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Fri, 10 Nov 2000 15:13:50 -0600
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TEXT/PLAIN
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Hi

On Fri, 10 Nov 2000, sdv wrote:
> Any experts on Kuhn out there to deconstruct and reply to this overstated
> nonsense?

First, let us hear what Kuhn himself had to say (not that his
very clear statement did much to prevent any number of people
from misinterpreting him).  In short, Kuhn was appalled at the
kinds of extrapolations that people made from his work.  Here are
some passages from the addendum to his book (I would especially
draw sdv's attention to Kuhn's inclusion of the word "accuracy"
as one determining factor in theory acceptance, which seems a
reasonable synonym of "correctness" in this context):

"A number of them [philosophers], however, have reported that I
believe the following: the proponents of incommensurable theories
cannot communicate with each other at all; as a result, in a
debate over theory-choice there can be no good reasons; instead
theory must be chosen for reasons that are ultimately personal
and subjective; some sort of mystical apperception is responsible
for the decision actually reached. More than any other parts of
the book, the passages on which these misconstructions rest have
been responsible for charges of irrationality. (Kuhn, 1970, pp.
198-199) ... Nothing about that relatively familiar thesis [i.e.,
importance of persuasion] implies either that there are no good
reasons for being persuaded or that those reasons are ultimately
decisive for the group.  Nor does it even imply that the
reasons for choice are different from those usually listed by
philosophers of science: accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness, and
the like. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 199) ... the demonstrated ability to
set up and to solve puzzles presented by nature is, in case
ofvalue conflict, the dominant criterion for most members of a
scientific group. (Kuhn, 1970, p.205)"

What sdv's reply demonstrates to me is the kind of unreflective
commentary that characterizes so much of the criticism of
science.  The underlying assumptions of the "devastating" reply
were:  (1) I don't know Kuhn, (2) Kuhn actually said (or meant)
what many have attributed to him, (3) Kuhn is the be-all and the
end-all of philosophical/historical positions on science, (4)
Kuhn's analysis of historical events was in fact an accurate
characterization of science, (5) philosophy and history are the
proper disciplines to resolve these difficult questions,
(6) one can develop accurate models of science without
rigorous application of scientific methods to the problems, and
so on.

Scientists interested in these issues should not assume that they
have been well-addressed to date, at least not if one adheres to
the rational and empirical criteria emphasized in scientific
modes of thought.  Of course, if one is willing to ignore reason
and evidence, then my criticisms are probably irrelevant.

Best wishes
Jim

 ===========================================================================
James M. Clark                          (204) 786-9757
Department of Psychology                (204) 774-4134 Fax
University of Winnipeg                  4L05D
Winnipeg, Manitoba  R3B 2E9             [log in to unmask]
CANADA                                  http://www.uwinnipeg.ca/~clark
 ===========================================================================

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