> > Subject: Open letter to Tony Blair > > HUGH MACDONALD ASSOCIATES > RESEARCH CONSULTANTS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS > 19 NORTON CLOSE > OXFORD > OX3 7BQ > > 2 May 1999 > > Rt. Hon. Tony Blair > Prime Minister > 10 Downing St. > London SW1 > > Dear Tony, > > This is an open letter to you. > As a long-standing member of the Labour Party, and an expert in > international security with direct experience of Milosevic's Serbia, I > write about the unsustainable claims you have been making for a moral > foreign policy; and the clear, measurable, damage to our national > interests and to international security which are resulting. > The inept military strategy NATO has adopted in the Kosovo crisis > stems importantly if not exclusively from moral confusion and holy > foolhardiness. This has hopelessly derailed the strategic and moral ends > which the allies ought to have been seeking, namely a practical and > effective political settlement. > Irrespective of whether the alliance goes on to extort an absolute > victory, or settles for a limited outcome, the attached paper estimates > the consequences so far of the policy constructed by you. > I am appalled by ethnic cleansing wherever it occurs. The UN > Charter and Security Council should be reformed so as to make abuses > under the Universal Declaration matters prima facie requiring the > exercise of Chapter VII powers. > Yet in twelve years since the effective end of the Cold War, no > serious reform of the UN has occurred. The Permanent Members, > including Britain, are locked in a protracted struggle over their national > interests. And the most powerful Permanent Member, the US, > absolutely refuses to subject any of its capabilities or interests to > stronger forms of international law. > 'New internationalism' therefore seeks to operate through an > institution, NATO, that depends largely on the US and Britain. Such > new internationalism is not deserving of the name, and it is profoundly > silly of a British Prime Minister to propagate such a doctrine. > In the first place it cannot hope to represent, and will therefore > rightly be rejected by, the vast populations and societies that will never > belong to NATO. > Attaching a moral mission to NATO opens the world's most > powerful military alliance to the leadership of fanatics, whether > Generals, Foreign Ministers, Prime Ministers or Presidents. The rest of > the world is bound to say 'Thanks, but no thanks'. And many NATO > governments will quietly say the same. > The conduct of this war has violently demonstrated what many of > us have been saying for years if not decades: that NATO is a shambolic > institution covering over important differences that naturally occur > among sovereign states. As presently structured it is incapable of > conducting a meaningful diplomatic-military strategy through the use > of force, or of setting and pursuing military aims that are beyond the > limits of consensus in advanced liberal-democratic societies. > Your attempt to hijack that consensus through claims of 'genocide' > is both a flop in the context, and a dangerous misappropriation of the > most extremely sensitive word in the twentieth century lexicon. > Genocide means, 'the systematic extermination of an entire people > whether on grounds of its ethnic, religious or social characteristics'. > You are well aware that this word acquired a special significance for > the civilised world because of the Shoa; because of what Hitler's Reich > sought to do to the Jewish people. > What is happening to the Kosovo Albanians is terrible; but it is not > genocide. > NATO fulfilled a profoundly important purpose when it is focussed > on a threat to all member states. But NATO acting as "Globocop" > without UN Security Council endorsement is extremely dangerous. > NATO might have been able to play a crucial role on behalf of the > United Nations in many local and regional conflicts. The chances of > that happening now have been heavily damaged. > Historically, it was one of Britain's most useful if unheralded roles > during the Cold War to counter ideological excesses by 'mad bombers' > of whatever national stripe. It is particularly distressing, therefore, to > witness a British Prime Minister pleading for war, for the continuation > of war, for the widening of war, for NATO to go on pursuing its > original, inappropriate, unsustainable war aims. > And how far do you want to go on fighting? To the last American > Marine Division? > This is a war eagerly foisted on a reluctant and distracted American > President by irresponsible European leaders who convinced the White > House that a victory would be rapidly delivered. Forty days later we > hear NATO leaders telling us that, on the one hand, the military > campaign is having greater success every day; and on the other that, > unfortunately, the constraints placed on NATO military actions are > reducing the efficiency of air power; by which we all know is meant, > 'we cannot hit civilian targets'. > Even this is a half-truth to cover a blatant strategic blunder. What > prevented NATO from striking Yugoslav military forces in the field in > Kosovo at the outset? It was the knowledge that there would be heavier > military casualties on the NATO side. The wrong military strategy was > adopted on wrong-headed military reasoning. > Experimenting with the use of force in the Yugoslav crisis, with the > underlying purpose of establishing a new intra-western balance > between the US and EU, is irresponsible almost beyond belief. Yet that > is the thrust of the Report carried by the IHT on Friday 30 April. > NATO, unable to bargain its way through a crisis of the use of > force, is consequently unable to adjust its objectives to changing > possibilities. This directly causes escalation and irrationality. > We all watched American leaders struggling with the same > phenomenon in Vietnam. > Run by what one (Israeli) commentator terms 'dime-a-dozen > generals, diplomats and politicians' (or what you call 'the mature > generation of 1968'), NATO is capable of bankrupting even the > greatest economic boom the world has known. Requiring $30-40 > billion to destroy and then necessarily rebuild a renegade state of 12 > million people, as Serbia is deemed to be, and with as many as 50 such > situations arising now or in the foreseeable future, it will not take long > for the new internationalism to need a very big overdraft. > Two other of the many problems with your moral stance are as > follows. > Firstly, it is open-eyed to some outrages, and blind to others. > NATO's figure of 2,000 casualties on all sides in Kosovo during > 1998 demonstrates that the civil war was not larger and worse than, for > example, the ongoing civil wars in eastern Anatolia or Colombia. And > it was far less bad than the situation in Algeria, or many others further > south in the African continent. Is it then purely coincidental that you > choose to focus on a relatively weak nearby regime you happen to > oppose for entirely different, highly political, reasons? > Let us recollect that various of your Ministers, including notably > the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Overseas > Development, agitated persistently to 'bomb the Serbs' during the civil > war in Bosnia. > I have today gone through all of the main documents published by > the OSCE-KVM during the period October 1998-March 1999. These > suggest that the violence against civilians in Kosovo did not increase > and actually diminished as the verification Mission increased is size > and scope. > Official figures, put out by the OSCE-KVM and cited by the State > Department, show that there were virtually no deaths of civilians not > directly implicated in military actions in Kosovo during the early > months of 1999. The average daily number of deaths may have been > 15-20. This is unacceptable, and deserves the attention and > involvement of international agencies. But it is not by any means an > unparalleled situation, even in post-war Europe. > What did increase during this period was the scope and power of > the Yugoslav Army's operations against the Kosovo Liberation Army. > As you know, and history will not hide this, the KLA's military > actions grew not because it was the most representative voice of the > Albanian people; nor because Milosevic's repressive regime became > more violent in Kosovo. They grew because Albania collapsed in 1997, > becoming more and more dependent on the US; and because Croatia, > sustained and financed by sources in various western countries, > became an ever larger and more flagrantly open conduit of arms and > advice to the KLA. > Hence actual conditions in Kosovo, however tense and with > whatever potential for exploding, cannot in any way morally or legally > justify putting down an ultimatum to a sovereign government; cannot > justify resorting to bombing without warning or declaration of war; > cannot justify taking military action against areas and installations > completely unconnected to the province experiencing the civil and > military emergency; and, to repeat, cannot justify action by a military > alliance with no juridical locus standi in the conflict, and without > reference to the UN Security Council. > The second main moral issue can be stated in this question; how do > you propose translating 'fighting for a new internationalism' beyond > European parochial bounds? > Most NATO countries, especially America which believes that it > invented and has a natural monopoly on the concept, are not interested > in this. Britain has no capacity to do it alone. The EU lacks a > constitution for 'moral foreign policy' in CFSP. After the present > debacle it is less rather than more likely it will be able to agree such an > ambitious framework. > So, when, for example, Indonesia shortly falls into a far worse orgy > of killings than anything seen in Kosovo before NATO began its > campaign, what action will you insist the international community > takes? > This is a terribly serious question. Even in the Kosovo war Britain's > operational military capabilities have been shown to have decisive > shortcomings. The strategic understanding may be there. The > experience of history and the willingness to take greater risks and > losses may be there. The desire to see a radically reformed world may > be there (at least in the heads of a handful of temporarily powerful > social democrats). But where is the military delivery capability? Where > are the bombs and the planes and the divisions? Where is there > evidence that if the Americans were not paying ninety per-cent of the > cost, and digging deep into their stockpiles of the most advanced > weapons, Britain and the other European NATO members would be > able to successfully challenge, let alone defeat, lowly, backward > Yugoslavia? > Britain's standing in the NATO alliance, and the worldwide > interests ofthis country, are being profoundly damaged by your > administration. > The cause is clear: it lies in hyperbole of language; persistent > lobbying for things that we are unable to perform on our own; > unwillingness to recognise that failure to attain goals effectively means > there is something wrong with the way such goals are being pursued; > and arrogant insensitivity to the way that 'ethical foreign policy', as > practised in India, Israel, Africa or Yugoslavia, rides roughshod into > cultural and political sensitivities, creating appalling messes that > officials need months (or years) to rectify. > At the recent NATO Summit you came close to suffering, and may > yet suffer, the worst humiliation a Prime Minister has suffered at the > hands of an American President since Suez. > You should be distressed by this, but hardly surprised: every > situation your know-all Foreign Minister and visionary amateur > advisors engage with will crumble in their hands. > If you truly believe the policy you are following in Yugoslavia has a > moral foundation, then you ought to state clearly and consistently that > the aim of Britain's moral foreign policy is to employ coercive means > against ALL obdurate governments in the Balkan region of Europe, so > as to reverse ALL of the ethnic cleansing that has occurred since 1990; > and explicitly include in your strictures notice to Croatia that it must > fully reverse the ethnic cleansing of all Serbs from Croatia (600,000- > 800,000 people); and to Bosnia-Herzegovina that it must fully reverse > the ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Croats and Slav-muslims from Sarajevo, > districts around Sarajevo, and other territories controlled by the Croat- > Muslim Federation, as well as reversing the ethnic cleansing > undertaken in the territories of Republika Srpska (1.5-2.0 million > people in total). > This would be very popular with vast numbers of Serbs. It would > more effectively diminish support for the Milosevic regime than all the > bombs in NATO's arsenal. > On the issues of its prudence and attainability, I trust you will seek > and take advice on from your most experienced professional foreign > policy advisors. > In this dreadful moral and strategic shambles I recognise that > power and leadership are not easily exercised; and far prefer an honest > and open society to any alternative. Hence if I might be able to assist in > elaborating a constructive and peaceful way through this situation, to > something better for all of us on the other side, I trust you will feel able > to approach me. > > Yours sincerely, > > Hugh Macdonald > > Attached paper follows: > > THE KOSOVO CRISIS: LAW, MORALITY AND STRATEGY > > NATO has found itself without a sound and prudent interpretation > of international law. This makes it inter alia inordinately difficult to > operate effective sanctions against Milosevic in the context of ethnic > cleansing in Kosovo. > It strengthens the argument that states can resort to the use of force > outside the constraints of the UN Charter. > It raises the question whether NATO would have played so fast > and loose with a country in possession of stronger defences, and, most > importantly, medium-range or intermediate-range SSM. In the security > perspective of the prosperous societies in Europe the most dangerous > arms proliferation trend is via these technologies. > The UN Security Council has been bypassed, which establishes a > precedent other great powers will use in future, conceivably to the > great detriment of western security. China vis-a-vis Taiwan is one > likely instance. > The Secretary General has been insulted, whilst his muted > remonstrances and diffident actions make him appear as a catspaw of > NATO's will. > The sense in which the NATO allies can speak on behalf of the > international community, politically or morally, has been vitiated. It is > clear they do not speak for Russia or China or India or Indonesia, > which, leaving aside the rest, constitute well over half of humanity. > This runs a coach and horses through repeated assertions that, "In > this conflict we are fighting for a new internationalism where the brutal > repression of whole ethnic groups will not be tolerated". > The Russians have been deeply alienated. This will affect their > domestic politics and their international conduct in Europe and in other > regions. Yeltsin's capacity to influence his own succession is reduced. > Nationalism increases. Military influences in foreign relations grow. > Collaboration with the west is cramped. There will be a renewed > search for distinctive interests in the Balkans, the Middle East, Central > Asia and other regions. Collaboration with China, Iran, Iraq and other > states actively opposed to the western-dominated international order > will become less accessible to influence. Loans from the IMF will not > affect that significantly. > The Balkans have been seriously destabilised. On one hand the > genie of great-Albanian nationalism is now out of the bottle. On the > other, twelve million Serbs and whatever government they live under in > future will enter a stage of socio-economic and political alienation from > which only evil powers intent on the further long-term undermining of > Europe may benefit. Quite apart from Milosevic's so-called "Samson > option" (which is frightening), Serbian national opposition to America > and NATO will increase. No "puppet regime" will endure in Belgrade. > This vanquishes the central if unstated goal of US strategy towards > Yugoslavia since the demise of Titoism, which has been to re-subject > Serbia to control by the western powers. > The humanitarian disasters of ethnic cleansing which have scarred > the region since 1990 have been further exacerbated, with little realistic > prospect that the process can be more than minimally reversed. Nor is > it clear that NATO leaders want to reverse earlier stages of ethnic > cleansing, which affected some 2.5-3.5 million Slav-muslims, Serbs > and Croats. That casts doubt on the sincerity of the claim that NATO is > not directing its power exclusively against Serbia or the Serbian nation. > The operational military strategy followed by NATO is setting a > series of examples from which both terrorist-backed independence > movements and repressive dictatorships can draw inspiration (pace the > mounting civil strife in Indonesia). > Estimated military costs of the war so far range upwards from $10 > billion. Economic damage and loss of trade may amount to as much > again. Long-term reconstruction in the region, if the EU carries through > on its recently stated aim, is thought to require $30 billion. These costs > will be measured in the foregoing of other more productive economic > and social goals in NATO countries in the near future. > Having destroyed Serbia, if it comes to that, the western powers > will be obliged to promptly rebuild it; otherwise, there will be a further > twist to the development gulf that has turned low levels of living in so > many countries Romania, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia (and > now also Serbia?) into proximate causes of ethnic nationalist hatred and > war. > An alienated, destroyed and impoverished Serbia, having lost > Kosovo, may be a far more serious "renegade state" than it supposedly > is today under Milosevic. > In those conditions what is to stop Hungarians from pressing for > independence for Vojvodina? What is to discourage Croatia from > renewing its never-lost historic mission of dominating Bosnia? Even if > all the Balkan states are brought into the EU and NATO, how are their > conflicts going to be less severe than, say, those between Greece and > Turkey? > If the western powers build up Serbia again, as a necessary > foundation of regional balance, will Serbian nationalism be diminished > rather than strengthened? Nobody who understands the Serbs would > predict so. And anyway, it will be asked, what did we go to war for in > the first place? To replace Milosevic with a stronger nationalist? To > give Kosovo independence to become the core of an unstable new > Albania? > Despite effective temporary alliance solidarity it is clear that NATO > has absolutely no idea what its objectives are or ought to be. Beyond > blindly insisting that its initial unrealistic political conditions for a > "settlement" (which would have settled nothing) are met, what is the > alliance hoping to achieve by this war? This question has no clear > answer, let alone one agreed by all countries. Alliance solidarity is > therefore unreal and figmentary. Moral hectoring of public opinion in > alliance societies, particularly on the issue of widening the war to > involve large-scale ground forces, has failed to gain sustainable > support. > While bearing the brunt of snatching Europe's folie de grandeur > from the brink of defeat, the United States will not sacrifice its military > men and women in large numbers for a cause that has no electoral > significance. > At the core of what NATO tried doing on 24 March were two > incredibly flawed strategic assessments, namely that air power alone > could stop Yugoslavia from subjugating Kosovo's territory and people > to its military will; and that Milosevic's political control and social > support inside Serbia would be decisively weakened by bombing > Belgrade. > Whatever rhetoric accompanies this assessment, by way of > justifying a surprise attack on a sovereign state and the absence of any > recourse to a mandate from the UN, the use of force itself must be > justified by a probability of success in achieving its aims. Indeed that is > one of the stipulative conditions for a war to be a just war (ius ad > bellum). > The history of air power gives no example of air power alone > overwhelming a sovereign power, other than when it is used > deliberately against a civilian population as an instrument of imposing > final defeat. > The history of warfare in conditions of industrial society shows that > surprise attack together with limited aims strengthens support for a > national leadership. > The lame and vacuous claims that in the case of Serbia these things > could not be known in advance, or that intelligence sources suggested > otherwise, merely show that post-modern globalising leaders no longer > read or understand history. > While concentrating on the inscrutable depths of Milosevic's > political machine, nobody took account of what the millions of Serbs > who live in open societies in the west were telling anyone who spoke to > them, which was that use of force against Serbia over Kosovo would > be tantamount to an attack on the entire nation. > The claim that the initiation of this war can be morally justified is > negated by these facts. It was known beforehand that the risk of failure > of NATO's strategic plan was very great. It was known beforehand that > in the event of failure there would be a huge humanitarian catastrophe > inside Kosovo. To the extent that such risks were discounted by > political leaders the basis of NATO strategy is not only illegal and > ineffectual; it is morally unacceptable as well. > Widening the war against Serbia, as NATO feels compelled to do > (with no additional moral reasoning), means an exponential growth of > ethnic hatred between the Orthodox and Muslim worlds, in the Balkans > and beyond. This risks spreading to Russia and Central Asia as well. > Not to have a morally acceptable alternative strategy, other than to > continue escalating the war in search of an absolute victory, is a second > great violation of just war principles (ius in bello). > Specifically, such just war rules as proportionality of harm and > double effect mean that if the means adopted do not realise the > envisaged ends it is not morally acceptable to continue inflicting > unjustifiable harm on an enemy, still less on innocent civilians who are > caught up in the struggle. > Hence even if was genuinely but mistakenly thought NATO had a > good moral position at the outset, it no longer has one. Moral reasoning > requires NATO to change its strategy. > Rejecting offers of mediation while continuing to exercise force > against a wider set of targets shows that maintaining NATO's cohesion > is a more important goal than any humanitarian consideration. Yet by > this NATO also demonstrates that its military planning lacked any > credible diplomatic accompaniment to a strategy of coercion. > Blind insistence on unconditional fulfilment of five war aims > through weeks of bombing, while hundreds of thousands of civilians > have been driven from Kosovo or out of their homes, cannot be > justified as a moral strategy. It is the antithesis of strategy; an > elephantine return to the machtpolitik that the great powers employed > in their colonial wars during previous centuries. > To pretend that the use of force for political ends is motivated only > or largely by moral aims only fools and confuses the western leaders > who demand of their military servants a plan, without alternatives, for > doing something that military force has never done in history before - to > forcibly restore people to their homes, rather than forcibly evicting > them from their homes. > Despite NATO military intervention in Bosnia in 1995, the creation > of today's SFOR, and the expenditure of several billion dollars, very > few of those ethnically cleansed in previous years have returned to their > homes. Nor will they: violence changes people, and things, whether it is > intended for good or for evil. > The self-confusion which this situation has created in the minds of > the holy fools who direct NATO strategy is nowhere more vividly > shown than in the oft-repeated assertion that in this "just war" NATO is > not actually at war at all. > A moral foreign policy cannot simply cut into a moral quagmire > like this, determining what is "acceptable" and what is "unacceptable" > ethnic cleansing. The argument that "you have to start somewhere" is > NOT a moral argument. > A moral argument has to start with a moral principle. If, "You have > to start somewhere" is made into a moral argument (e.g. in moral > pragmatism) then you must show that it is going to take you > somewhere else that is morally preferable. > The only sensible conjunction between force, politics and ethics is > that of the great German military thinker, Clausewitz, whose > formulation is that "nobody starts a war, or at least nobody in their right > mind ought to start a war, without first knowing what he intends to > achieve by it, and how he proposes to fight it". > Knowing that the strategy NATO was adopting had a low > probability of rapid success, and carried a high risk of catastrophic > side-effects, where was the morally acceptable, pre-planned, > alternative? Plan "B"? The "exit strategy"? The only answer given is > that the alternative plan is the existing plan. The last time we heard that > from a western government at war was when the people of Vietnam > and Cambodia were being bombed into the stone age. > Those who forget history are condemned to repeat it. > > Dr. Hugh Macdonald > Senior Research Associate > School of Economic and Social Studies > University of East Anglia, UK > > Visiting Scholar > BESA Centre for Strategic Studies > Bar Ilan University, Israel > > 30 April, 1999