Dear Readers,

Thought some of you might be interested in reading the paper below on the "Political Career of Edward Francis Small." It is written by Dr David Perfect and reproduced from the 1991 book/volume edited by Arnold Hughes. The book/volume – published by the University of Birmingham - is entitled: "The Gambia: Studies in Society and Politics.

The original version of this paper was presented at/to a Roundtable conference "on Current Research in the Gambia", held at the University of Birmingham in September 1989.

Edward Francis Small has been described as the "Father of Modern Gambian Politics". He has also been called the "Father of Gambian Journalism and Trade Unionism". He is considered by many as the "Father of Gambian Nationalism and Independence".

It was Edward Francis Small, who served as the FIRST ELECTED member of the (Gambia’s) Legislative Council in 1947. Prior to this, people were nominated, rather than elected to the Council. Before 1960, the focus of Gambian Politics was the (Gambia’s) Legislative Council, first established in 1843.

I’ll subsequently send the bibliography for this piece and the earlier article by Arnold Hughes for the benefit of some of you doing research in Gambian Politics/History.

Regards,

Ebrima Ceesay

_________________________________________________

 

The Political Career of Edward Francis Small *

By Dr David Perfect

Politics in The Gambia in the first half of the twentieth century has attracted little attention from historians or political scientists. The only important sources are Langley (1973: 134-53), who discusses Gambian politics in the 1920s, and Perfect (1987: ch. 2 - 5). In consequence, the career of Edward Francis Small, who for three decades from the 1920s was involved in all aspects of Gambian public life, has been sadly neglected. Small's achievements include being the founder of the Gambia branch of the National Congress of British West Africa, the first inter-territorial political organisation of the region; the first Gambian to be directly elected to the Legislative Council and the first to be appointed to the Executive Council. He was also the most important leader of the Bathurst Ratepayers' Association, which dominated municipal politics in Bathurst (Banjul) in the 1930s and 1940s; founded the first Gambian trade union; established a co-operative movement for farmers; and created the modern Gambian press.

Despite this varied record, no detailed account of Small's public life has yet been published. Since his performance as a labour leader has recently been analysed, this article concentrates on his career in politics - although it should be emphasised that Small's labour and political activities were intimately connected (Hughes and Perfect 1989: 549-72; Langley 1973: 137-39 and 233-35; Wilson 1974: 240-43; Perfect 1987, ch. 2 - 5.) Small's background and life are outlined in the first section of the paper to provide the context for the subsequent analysis. The reasons for his entrance into politics in the early 1920s are discussed in the second section, while his performance as a political leader is analysed in the third. His record as a member of the Legislative Council and his political opinions are examined in the fourth and fifth sections, while his political legacy is assessed in the conclusion.

 

Outline of Small's background and life

E. F. Small, who was born in Bathurst almost certainly in January 1891, was a member of the Aku community, which consisted of the descendants of liberated slaves resettled in Bathurst earlier in the century. (According to Langley, Small was born in 1890, but this is contradicted by a plaque in Banjul which commemorates his career and by other evidence.) A Wesleyan Methodist (like many Aku), he was the son of a prominent self-employed tailor and outfitter named John W. Small and completed his education at the prestigious Methodist Boys' High School in Freetown. Small's background and early career are described by Langley (1973: 137-38) and Perfect (1987: 33). John Small was termed one of Bathurst's principal artizans' by Archer (1906: 314).

* I wish to thank Arnold Hughes for his helpful comments on this paper.

The recipient of a government scholarship, Small's education and general intelligence were considered well above the average, but he did not attend university or qualify for a profession.* Small claimed (The Gambia Outlook 20/6/53) that in 1910 he had been offered a scholarship (by a Freetown committee) to attend college in Wales. It is not known why he was unable to take up the offer. Instead, he started work as a probationer in the Freetown Post Office in 1919. He then held a series of clerical jobs in Freetown and Bathurst, before becoming a teacher in Bathurst in 1915. Soon afterwards he decided to become a clergyman and in 1917 he was sent by Rev. P.S. Toye, the Chairman of the Gambia District of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, to Ballanghar (MacCarthy Island Province) to serve a stationary period as a mission agent. But within 18 months, following the 'Ballanghar incident' (see below), he had been dismissed from mission employment. He then worked briefly as a trading agent, before resigning in order to attend a conference in Accra in March 1920 at which the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) was founded.

Once back in Bathurst, Small established the Gambia section of the NCBWA before going to London as part of a Congress deputation to the Colonial Office. He did not return to Bathurst until early 1922 and soon moved on to Dakar, where he produced the inaugural edition of The Gambia Outlook and Senegambian Reporter, the first Gambian newspaper produced since the demise of The Bathurst Observer around 1888.

He next travelled to London, where he remained until 1926, eking out a meagre existence and keeping one step ahead of his creditors (Perfect 587: 36). After returning home, he re-established The Gambia Outlook which he owned, published and edited) and henceforth his main occupation was journalism. But he was also very active in other fields. In 1929, he founded the first Gambian trade union, the Bathurst Trade Union (BTU), and organised one of the most successful strikes in Africa before World War II. He also launched a co-operative movement for groundnut farmers in 1929-30 and acted as an unofficial ombudsman by raising the grievances of fellow Gambians with the colonial authorities. By mid 1933, however, the honeymoon period was over. Small had lost control of the BTU; the co-operative movement had collapsed; he had been forced by mounting debts to suspend publication of his newspaper and he was now living in poverty (Perfect 1987; Hughes and Perfect 1989: 553-9; see also Langley 1973:233-5).

The emergence of the Ratepayers' Association as Bathurst's leading political organisation in the mid-1930s, and the resumption of publication of The Gambia Outlook, after a 15-month hiatus, in June 1934 provided Small with some consolation. But it was not until his appointment to the legislative Council in 1942 that his political fortunes really began to revive. The culmination of this process was his victory in the first direct election to the Legislative Council in 1947 and his subsequent appointment to the Executive Council (see section 4). Small's financial position was also now much improved, although it should be stressed that he was never well-off. This was often stressed after Small's death (Jones, The Vanguard, 10/1/59; Joiner, The Gambia Echo, 22/4/68).

E.F. Small was defeated in the second Legislative Council election of 1951 and consequently also lost his seat on the Executive Council. He ceased thereafter to be at the forefront of politics. Nevertheless, until shortly before his death in January 1958, he remained active in public affairs as the Nominated Member of the Legislative Council (from 1954), editor of The Gambia Outlook and chairman of the Gambia Labour Union, which he founded in 1935 after he failed to regain control of the BTU (Allen 1970; Hughes and Perfect 1989).

* See Rev. P.S. Toye to Rev.W.Goudie, General Secretary, General Committee of Management, Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, 21/12/16, for the assessment of Small (box 762, Methodist Missionary Society Archives, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London [hence MMS]).

 

Small's entrance into politics

Small's original intention, as noted above, was to pursue a career in the church; he only became involved in politics because of the Ballanghar incident. On New Year's Eve 1918, Small ordered the bell of the mission chapel at Ballanghar to be tolled to herald the annual Watchnight service. The sound disturbed James Walker, a European trader living in the town; an argument developed and the two men came to blows. What was essentially a trivial incident assumed a more serious dimension when Small first lodged a complaint with the provincial Travelling Commissioner, J.L. McCallum, and then, after McCallum had held him responsible for the fracas, denounced the Commissioner's conduct. McCallum, who was incensed by Small's criticisms, insisted on his removal from Ballanghar.

Under pressure from the Gambia government, Rev. Toye agreed to withdraw Small to Sukuta, another station not far from Bathurst, where he could keep him under closer supervision. But Small, who resented the treatment he had received, proceeded openly to criticise Toye and in consequence was eventually dismissed from mission employment. He duly protested to the Wesleyan Methodist Society's Committee of Management, but met with little sympathy and was not re-engaged (file C309/1918, GNA; box 762, MMS).

Small's sense of injustice also extended to his treatment by the state and, together with other discontented young Aku, he founded the Gambia Native Defensive Union (GNDU) in early 1919. The GNDU was not an organisation of civil servants devoid of political aims, as the government believed. In fact, it was formed by clerks and agents of trading firms attacking 'the blatant flaws in the administration of the Central Government' (Langley 1973: 136; The Gambia Outlook, 11/1/58; Perfect 1987: 34). Nevertheless, it might have remained in obscurity had it not been for the fact that elsewhere in British West Africa preparations were being finalised for a conference of educated West Africans. Since its organisers wished all four British West African colonies to be represented, a Bathurst solicitor had been asked to drum up support in the Gambia, but had apparently failed to do so. Small was thus able to step into the breach by converting the GNDU into the conference's fund-raising committee in Bathurst. Enough money was raised for one Gambian delegate to attend and Small, as the secretary of the fund-raising committee, was the obvious candidate. (An alternative account is given by Langley 1973: 135-6).

The conference was held in Accra in March 1920, with Small one of eleven principal speakers, and 'resolved itself into a permanent National Congress of British West Africa' (Langley 1973: 125-31; Kimble 1963: 381-5). Small delivered a paper on the right of West Africans to self-determination; this was not a demand for independence, but rather a criticism of the practice of colonial powers exchanging colonies without taking account of local public opinion. Although this was a specific reference to the partitioning of Togoland and the Cameroons between Britain and France, the issue had caused concern to Gambians since the 1870s. The most important of the 83 resolutions which were adopted called for the concession of the franchise; half the seats on the Legislative Councils should be reserved for Africans. These African members should be directly elected by the people, not nominated by colonial governors as at present. Small arrived back in Bathurst in May 1920 and within a few weeks had established the Gambia section of the NCBWA and become its secretary (Langley 1973: 134-40; Perfect 1987: 34-5). His performance as a Congress leader is discussed below.

Political leader

The history of the Gambia section of the NCBWA has received less attention than that of the three other territorial committees and the role played by Small (who was secretary between 1920 and 1922) has been virtually ignored (Kimble 1963: 375-403; Olusanya 1968: 321-33; Kilson 1970: 571-88; Eluwa 1972: 38-51; Langley 1973: 134-94; Wyse 1985: 675-98). In three colonies - Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast - the franchise was conceded between 1922 and 1925, although since an official majority was retained and the nomination of some African members continued, the new constitutions by no means satisfied the Congress leadership. The implementation of the 1925 Gold Coast constitution was delayed until 1928 because of opposition from the local Congress committee (Kimble 1963: 443-55), but there was not even the semblance of constitutional reform in The Gambia and the franchise was not finally conceded until 1946. It is now generally agreed that the NCBWA deserves at least some credit for achieving the franchise elsewhere in West Africa (Kimble 1963: 435-44; Langley 1973: 265-85; Boahen 1985: 638; Wyse 1985: 682-83). It is therefore legitimate to ask why the Gambia section alone was unsuccessful.

It may be argued that four factors, when considered together, explain the peculiar ineffectiveness of the Gambia section. First, C.H. Armitage, who was governor between 1920 and 1927, was a staunch critic of the NCBWA in general and its Gambian branch in particular and was determined to prevent it achieving its aims. In his address to the Legislative Council (10/1/21, Colonial Office file, Public Record Office, Kew, hence CO, 89/14), he quoted Sir Hugh Clifford's famous denunciation of the NCBWA (address to the Nigerian Council in December 1920) with approval.(Clifford's speech is summarised by Coleman 1958: 192-4). Armitage's attitude did not alter over the next few years (dispatch to Amery 2/1/25, GNA C498/1920).

Second, the Gambia's small size and relative unimportance meant that unless there was widespread political unrest in the colony, the Colonial Office was likely to adopt a cautious approach to constitutional reform. This became apparent in 1926 when Armitage, who believed that pro-Small 'Extremists' had lost control over the local committee, recommended that the franchise be conceded to Bathurst. But the Colonial Office could see no necessity for constitutional reform and turned down the idea. The Colonial Office now believed that the granting of a constitution to Sierra Leone in 1924 had been a mistake and was anxious not to repeat the experiment (Strachey, 23/11/26, CO 87/225/13; GNA 160/1925, 581/1923; CO 87/230/4; Langley 1973: 149-50).

Third, almost from the beginning the Gambia section was opposed by the 'upper-level elite' of Aku society and later also alienated the Muslim community in Bathurst. Kilson (1970: 581-85) distinguishes the 'upper-level' elite of lawyers, merchants and clergymen from the 'lower-level' elite of clerks, primary school teachers, artisans, etc. The Bathurst upper-level elite consisted of the leading Aku families, such as the Forsters and the Carrols, which dominated the professions and trade and were organised in an informal 'Committee of Gentleman' whose President was Samuel Forster. Small and his associates tended to be clerks, artisans and petty traders and could be classified as 'lower-level elite'.

Finally, on its own admission, the Gambia section was unable to attract any worthwhile support in the Protectorate, the home of nine-tenths of the colony's population, which enabled the colonial authorities to argue that it was quite unrepresentative of public opinion (Gambia section to Churchill, 22/6/21, GNA C633/1921). The other territorial committees were equally unable to attract support in the interior. See, for example, Langley (1973: 159-63) and Wyse (1985) on the situation in Sierra Leone.

Some of these factors, including the Colonial Office's view of the Gambia and Armitage's distrust of educated Africans, were beyond Small's control. Armitage had formerly been Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast and had developed a strongly pro-Chief and anti-educated African position (Legislative Council 10/1/21, CO 89/14; Kimble 1963: 81-83). However, he and other Christian Congress leaders were at least partly to blame for the withdrawal of Bathurst's Muslims, after the appointment of Ousman Jeng, a former treasurer of the Muslim wing of the Gambia territorial committee as the first Muslim Member of the Legislative Council in 1922 (Perfect 1987: 35; the growing alienation of the Muslim community is noted in Langley 1973: 149-50).*

* For examples of the ways in which the actions of Christian leaders irritated Muslims, see Armitage to Churchill (24/3/22, GNA S1526/1921); Almami Omar Sowe to Colonial Secretary (4/5/25, GA 160/25) and report by C, Greig, Commissioner of Police (26/3/26 , GNA C498/1920).

Small was also directly responsible for the defection of S.J. (later Sir Samuel) Forster, the Senior Unofficial Member of the Legislative council, and other Aku 'upper-level' elite. Langley (1973: 134-40) lists many of the leading members of the Gambia section in June 1920 and describes some of their backgrounds. A number of other upper-level Aku, such as Dr Thomas Bishop, the other unofficial member of the Legislative Council, and a well-known barrister named M.J.R. Pratt, seem to have played no further part in the Congress. (On Forster, see the obituary notice by T.B. Jones, The Gambia Echo, 15/7/40; Macmillan 1920: 294; Hughes and Perfect 1989: 553-6.) Although never an enthusiastic supporter of the NCBWA, Forster had helped finance the Gambian delegation to the Accra Conference and had agreed to chair the section's General Committee.

But he had been irritated to learn that Small had posed as his representative at the Accra Conference without permission and was further offended when, against his wishes, Small convened a so-called 'mass meeting' in Bathurst to secure popular endorsement of the Accra resolutions. The term 'mass meeting' was used by the Congress to describe any public meeting - however many (or few) people attended.

Forster apparently believed that Small now intended to open up politics to the whole community and feared that this would lead to the swamping of the Aku Christian elite by the Wolof Muslim majority. In order to try to prevent this, he resigned (GNA C766/1920; I.J.T. Turbett 18/9/36, CO 267/655/3215). Forster's attitude to the franchise is described by E.H. Joiner (The Vanguard, 23/5/59).

Forster himself rarely committed his opinions to paper and so Joiner's assertion cannot be verified. But the consequences for the Gambia section were dire; at a stroke, its most influential supporter became - and remained - its inveterate opponent. Forster's subsequent view of the Congress was revealed in a speech to the Legislative Council (10/1/21, CO 89/14).

Small's performance as a leader of the Gambia section was therefore not unduly impressive and he must share the blame for its failure. He did not attempt to revive the moribund organisation after his return to Bathurst, preferring to concentrate on developing the labour movement, but by the early 1930s he was again in the thick of politics as the leader of the Bathurst Ratepayers' Association (RPA). The RPA was founded in July 1932, ostensibly by R.S. Rendall, a retired Aku civil servant who became its secretary. But in reality, the RPA was controlled by Small - even though he was then technically not himself a ratepayer - through an informal political organisation he had founded in 1931, the Committee of Citizens (despatch to Cunliffe-Lister 1/1/34, GNA C1769/1934; GNA S135/1931, 665/1932; The Gambia Outlook, June and July 1932; Perfect 1987: 83-4). Governor H.R. Palmer described Rendall as 'a man of straw' and had no doubt that Small was the 'moving spirit' behind the RPA (Palmer to Cunliffe-Lister 10/1/33, GNA S135/1931).

A number of ratepayers' associations were established (or revived) in West African towns in the 1920s to promote candidates in elections to Municipal or Legislative councils. Ratepayers' associations were formed in Accra and the Cape Coast prior to Legislative Council elections in the Gold Coast in 1928-29, while the (Freetown) West Ward Ratepayers' Association was reactivated before the Sierra Leone Legislative Council election of 1924 (Kimble 1963: 451-55; Kilson 1970: 583). Similarly, the Bathurst RPA sought to organise elections to the Bathurst Urban District Council (BUDC), a municipal body established in 1930; in this case, however, the RPA was formed after the first BUDC election in order to oppose the existing elected councillors. The latter had fallen into disrepute by refusing to participate in the campaign organised by Small and Rendell against the proposed codification of the laws of The Gambia (CO 87/231/11, 87/233/7; GNA 581/1923; Perfect 1987: 83-4).

The effectiveness of the RPA - and Small's leadership of it - can be judged by an analysis of its performance in municipal elections in the 1930s and 1940s and by consideration of its ability to achieve its political ends. At the time of the RPA's foundation, there were five elected African members of the BUDC, all of whom were probably members of the pro-Forster Gambia Representative Committee. The GRC was founded in 1926, shortly before the visit to Bathurst of the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore. Its aim was to persuade Ormsby-Gore that Forster, rather than the Congress, enjoyed most support in Bathurst. The GRC was revived in 1930 to put forward candidates for the inaugural BUDC election of 1930 (The Gambia Outlook 18/10 and 30/11/30).

At first the RPA's challenge to the GRC was unsuccessful, but in 1934 four RPA candidates gained seats at the expense of GRC councillors (GNA 818/1930, 1187/1932, 707/1933, 635/1934). The BUDC was reconstituted as the Bathurst Advisory Town Council (BATC) in 1935. In the first BATC election to the new body in 1936, the RPA won all six seats open to Africans. This marked the beginning of the RPA's dominance of municipal politics; it appears that until October 1946, every elected member of the BATC and the Bathurst Temporary Local Authority (which replaced it in 1944) was a RPA supporter (CO 87/240/10, 87/259/7; GNA C1951/1935; The Gambia Outlook 21/9/46).

The RPA was thus undoubtedly popular; nevertheless, its influence, even over municipal affairs, was limited. This was partly because its councillors could always be outvoted by a combination of officials and European unofficials and partly because the BATC (unlike the BUDC) had a purely advisory role. The BUDC had had wide executive powers, but these were never exercised (Gov. Richards' address to Legislative Council 21/5/35, CO 87/240/10). The RPA also generally failed to achieve its wider political ends. It could not prevent 'codification' nor the implementation of other aspects of Governor Palmer's reform programme; its opposition to the introduction of income tax in 1940 and its attempts to achieve the franchise were equally unsuccessful (CO 87/254/1; CO 89/23). The RPA asked the Secretary of State to concede the franchise in 1933 and again in 1938, but both petitions were rejected (GNA C177171934; GNA 665/1932).

It did enjoy one notable achievement, when it finally secured Small's appointment to the Legislative Council. As far back as 1933, the right to nominate a candidate to the legislature had been granted to the BUDC and on that occasion, W. D. Carrol, a barrister who was Forster's nephew and political ally, had been the unanimous choice of the councillors. The BUDC had been granted this right as a reward for loyally supporting Governor Palmer's reform programme (CO 87/237/6).

Five years later, Carrol had retained his seat, but only because Governor W. T. Southorn, who was suspicious about Small's political opinions (see section 5), had instructed the official members to support him; the elected minority had in fact voted for his opponent, Small. In November 1941, a third indirect election was held to fill the vacancy caused by Carrol's death. This time Southorn - who was impressed by Small's staunch loyalty to the Allied cause since the outbreak of World War II - ordered the official members to abstain and so the support of the RPA councillors proved decisive in securing Small's victory (Southern to Moyne 3/12/41, CO 87/253/4; Perfect 1987: 106). He was thus
able to enter the legislature at last in January 1942.

Legislative and Executive Councillor

Small served three terms on the Legislative Council. Between 1942 and November 1947, he represented the Municipal Council; he was the Elected Member (and also an Executive Councillor) between November 1947 and October 1951 and the governor's Nominated Member between November 1954 and his death in January 1958. During this period he fought two Legislative Council elections, in November 1947 (which he won) and October 1951 (which he lost badly).

Small's performance as a Legislative Councillor may be judged by his ability to use his position to alter government policy and to serve the wishes of his 'constituents' (the people of Bathurst). It is argued below that, although in practice his influence over government policy was limited, Small's diligence on behalf of his constituents was viewed favourably by the electorate and helped him win the 1947 election. But Small was far less active during his second term on the Legislative Council and he paid the price in the 1951 election. These two periods are considered in turn.

The most important development of Small's first term of service was the concession of the franchise in November 1946. Small had pursued this goal since the early 1920s, but his petitions had always been rejected, not least because it was assumed that he would win any subsequent election (Southern to Moyne, 3/12/41, CO 87/253/4). Eventually he had become disillusioned by the lack of progress and by the 1940s no longer pressed the issue with much vigour. He argued (The Gambia Outlook 8/3/41) that if an official majority was retained, the elected members had 'negligible' power. However, the Gambia Government was now prepared to concede the franchise and in 1943 the Secretary of State approved Governor H. R. Blood's proposal that Bathurst and Kombo St Mary be allowed to elect a single member (CO 87/253/5, 87/256/1-3, 87/259/5, 87/260/2).

The extent to which popular pressure, rather than imperial initiative, brought about constitutional reform in West Africa in the 1940s has been disputed. But in The Gambia, at least, it does seem clear that the impetus was provided by the colonial authorities and the Colonial Office was able to adopt a leisurely approach over the issue (Hargreaves 1982; Pearce 1982; Crook 1986; Blood to Hall 16/4/46, CO 87/260/2; Williams 13/3/43, CO 87/253/5). Nevertheless, the Bathurst public believed that Small had been personally responsible for the achievement of the franchise, an impression perhaps reinforced by his membership of the committee which had drawn up the new constitution (CO 87/256/1). Small was undoubtedly the most influential member of the Franchise Committee, although it should be stressed that by no means all the committee's recommendations were ultimately accepted. This political myth undoubtedly helped him win the1947 election.

Constitutional reform was not of course the only topic discussed by the Legislative Council between 1942 and 1947. Small frequently spoke in debates and did not hesitate to criticise and vote against government legislation. Since the official majority could always be invoked to ensure that government legislation was passed, such opposition seemed pointless; however, just occasionally, concerted opposition from Small and another unofficial member, J. A. Mahoney, was sufficient to persuade the government to withdraw, or at least substantially modify, unpopular legislation. For example, in a speech to the Legislative Council on 12 November 1946 (CO 89/30), Mahoney pointed out that the government had dispensed with the Vagrancy and Overcrowding Bills after objections from the unofficial members.

Small also used his privileged access to government officials (and even on occasion the Colonial Office) to raise the grievances of individuals with the appropriate authorities. He first acted as an unofficial ombudsman in the 1920s and had continued to do so ever since. Most of his clients lived in Bathurst, but it is important to emphasise that he represented Muslims as well as Christians (GNA C1250/1929, C1655/1932, C2709A/1945, L85/1952; CO 87/226/17, 87/260/7). Prior to his appointment to the Legislative Council, he had little influence over the government, but after appointment his enhanced status meant that his interventions had to be taken seriously. Even now his clients were not always satisfied by the outcome. Nevertheless, had he not enjoyed at least a modicum of success, it is unlikely that his services would have been sought with such frequency.

Despite Small's conspicuous failure in the Mohammed Faal case (Perfect 1987: 107), the Gambia Political Intelligence Report for October/November 1948 (CO 537/3651) noted the 'excessive number of importunities to which he is subject for the exercise of his influence with Government on behalf of individuals'.

It is probable that Small expected to be paid by his clients. Governor Blood reported a rumour that Faal paid Small between £50 and £150 (Blood to Creasy 29/5/46, CO 87/260/7). It was not thought unreasonable for patrons to expect payment for their services; see the comment about Herbert Macaulay, who performed a similar role in Lagos in the 1920s and 1930s (Hughes and Cohen 1978: 48). Moreover, he no doubt derived political advantage from his actions, since clients presumably offered him their support in the Legislative Council election of 1947.

Small, who was one of three Christian candidates, was opposed by two Muslims, Sheikh Omar Fye, a wealthy Wolof merchant who had been the Muslim Member of the Legislative Council since 1932, and I.M. Garba-Jahumpa, a Wolof trade union leader. Garba-Jahumpa had once been General Secretary of Small's Gambia Labour Union, but the two men had fallen out by 1946. Fye and Small had together launched the Gambia Planters' Syndicate (the forerunner of the Gambia Farmers' Co-operative Marketing Association) in 1929, but by the early 1930s the two were enemies and remained so at least until the late 1940s (Perfect 1987: 106-13). Fye and Garba-Jahumpa appeared to be favoured by demographic factors, since three-quarters of the electorate was Muslim and only a quarter Christian, while more than two-fifths of the electorate was Wolof and less than a tenth Aku.*

Moreover, if the electorate wanted experience, then Fye was at least as suitable a candidate as Small, while if it preferred youth, then the 35 year old Garba-Jahumpa best fitted the bill. Garba-Jahumpa could also count on the support of a political organisation, the Bathurst Young Muslims Society (BYMS), which had performed creditably in the 1946 Bathurst Town Council election, and a trade union, the Gambia Amalgamated Trade Union. The BYMS, which was founded in 1936 as a purely cultural body, was converted into a political organisation by Garba-Jahumpa and won 3 seats in the 1946 BTC election. The GATU, founded in early 1947, was probably the largest Gambian trade union at the time (Perfect 1987: 111-4).

Nevertheless, despite all these apparent disadvantages, it was Small who won the election by nearly 500 votes over Fye, while Garba-Jahumpa finished a poor third and the other two candidates picked up only seven votes between them. Small gained 47% of the poll (The Gambia Outlook 1/11/47). The main reasons for his perhaps unexpected success are outlined below.

First, Small was undoubtedly supported not only by the overwhelming majority of Aku and of Christians, which was predictable, but also by many Muslims. Small had been careful to demonstrate beforehand that he did not represent the Christian community alone and one of his principal supporters was the influential former Muslim Member of the Legislative Council, Ousman Jeng. Jeng's role was to stir up opposition to Fye within Bathurst's Muslim community and also persuade Muslim voters that the overtly sectarian stance of Garba-Jahumpa was out of keeping with Gambian political traditions. Ousman Jeng and E.F. Small had been political opponents in the 1920s, but had been reconciled by 1932; indeed, Jeng represented the RPA on the Bathurst (Advisory) Town Council between 1936 and 1949. (Perfect 1987: 106; Ward to Stanley 18/2/43, CO 87/253/5). Presumably he also stressed Small's past willingness to take up Muslim, as well as Christian, grievances, with the authorities.

Second, Small's performance as a Legislative Councillor was probably thought to have been more creditable than that of Fye, his main opponent. On the one hand, it was generally believed in Bathurst (however erroneously) that Small had secured the franchise; on the other hand, Fye had shown little interest in constitutional reform and had also angered Bathurst voters by opposing the recommendation of the Franchise Committee that Bathurst and Kombo St Mary should form separate constituencies. Fye had also failed to match Small's record in opposing unpopular government legislation and had sometimes even voted with the official majority against Small and the third African councillor, J.A. Mahoney. In addition, he seems to have been less willing than Small to raise individual grievances with the authorities (Ward to Stanley 18/2/43, CO 87/253/5; Legislative Council 25/4/44, CO 89/30).

* The precise ethnic and religious breakdown of the electorate in 1947 is unknown. Estimates are based on the 1944 census for Bathurst and the 1951 census for Bathurst and Kombo St. Mary.

The bills which Small and/or Mahoney opposed, but Fye supported, included one which permitted a high rate of income tax to be set for the Gambia and another which allowed additional duty to be levied on trade goods; both would have been unpopular in Bathurst (Legislative Council 29/10/42, 22/9/45, CO 89/30). No examples of Fye raising grievances with the authorities have been found in surviving secretariat files.

After his success in the 1947 election, Small was appointed both to the Legislative and the Executive Council, but thereafter his enthusiasm for politics may have begun to diminish. He showed little interest in the constitutional question after 1947 and, unlike some of his political opponents in the 1951 election, was prepared to accept the limited reforms of the first Wyn-Harris Constitution of 1951. The new constitution was criticised by Garba-Jahumpa and by Small's latest political protege, Rev. J.C. Faye (CO 554/536; Perfect 1987: 117-9). He may also have pursued the grievances of his constituents less vigorously than before, while he was also less active in raising political issues on the Legislative Council or for that matter on the Executive Council.

This reduced activity was perfectly understandable, for Small was now in his early sixties and already something of a recluse (Gambia Political Report 4/48, CO 537/3651; Ward to Rowland 17/11/51, CO 554/536). The surviving minutes of the Legislative Council give no indication that Small was particularly active after 1947 (CO 89/30). Indeed, he probably originally intended to bow out of politics in favour of J.C. Faye when his second term of service on the Legislative Council expired. Faye had served as a RPA member of the BATC between 1940 and 1942 and had represented the Protectorate on the Legislative and Executive Councils since 1947 (Perfect 1987: 117-9).

However, a few months before the election, Faye, rather than Small, was chosen to be the Gambia's representative at the Festival of Britain celebrations. Small had assumed that, as the Senior Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council, he would be selected and resented the fact that Faye had accepted the position. He may therefore have decided in a fit of pique not to endorse Faye's candidature after all, but instead to stand once again, this time as the representative of 'The Gambia National League', a new creation which incorporated the Committee of Citizens and other groups.

Small entered the fray belatedly and did little campaigning. He was now denied many of the advantages he had possessed in 1947 and seemed an anachronistic figure, out of touch with the changing times. It therefore caused little surprise that he gained only 45 votes (2% of those cast), far behind the three leading candidates for the two seats at stake (The Gambia News Bulletin 26/10/51). This proved to be the last occasion on which he contested a direct election, but he did participate (unsuccessfully) in the 'indirect' portion of the 1954 election. He was subsequently selected by Governor Wyn-Harris - apparently with universal approval - to be the Nominated Member of the Legislative Council (The Gambia News Bulletin 29/10-3/11/54; CO 554/1513).

Small's political opinions

It is important to state at the outset that Small left no private papers for posterity. His political opinions therefore have to be assessed from his 'public' pronouncements, particularly his correspondence with the colonial authorities and his newspaper articles. This is unfortunate since, in private, Small may have expressed quite different views. Nevertheless, it is still useful to assess the two conflicting theories, based on the public evidence, which have been outlined elsewhere. The first is that Small was a 'link subversive' engaged in 'revolutionary activity' in West Africa in the 1920s and 1930s; the second is that he was essentially 'a black Edwardian, though slightly more radical in his polities'. (Wilson 1974: 227; Langley 1973: 138). It may be suggested that both theories oversimplify his complex personality and also fail to take into account the fact that his views altered in the course of his long career.

In the early 1920s, Small apparently shared the convictions of most NCBWA leaders. The moderation of this position needs to be emphasised. The Congress sought only to achieve parity between officials and unofficials on the Legislative Council and not an unofficial majority and made no demands for unofficial membership of the Executive Council. In 1933, during his 'radical' phase, Small outlined detailed proposals for the reform of the two councils which went little further than this position; he was still content with parity on the Legislative Council and although he did call for some unofficial representation on the Executive Council, he did not demand an unofficial majority (Kimble (1963: 383; Small and Oke, GNA C1771/1934).

It should also be stressed that the Congress made no demands for independence, but rather emphasised its loyalty to the British Empire, while Small argued that West African politicians should try to ensure that the Congress become 'a profitable asset for the British Empire' (Kimble 1963: 385; West Africa, 3/9/21). Small may have endorsed the principle of colonial rule, but he was nevertheless quite prepared to condemn the shortcomings of the Gambia government. His interventions (which covered a wide variety of topics) were greatly resented by successive governors, who would brook no criticism of their authority; by 1927 the Colonial Office was likewise convinced that Small was a 'bad hat' (GNA C309/1918, C1250/1929, C1251/1929; Ormsby-Gore 29/7/27, CO 87/226/17). A climate of official hostility towards Small was thus created which was further reinforced from 1929-30, when the colonial authorities came to the conclusion that he had become a communist (Workman to Passfield, 2/6/30, GNA C1308/1930; Flood 8/1/30, CO 87/229/12).

This opinion was based essentially on Small's known association with three organisations - the Labour Research Department (LRD), the League Against Imperialism (LAI) and the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUC-NW) - which were all considered to be communist fronts. The LRD was founded in 1912 as a research organisation linked to the British Labour Party, but by 1924 its membership consisted primarily of British communists. Small may first have come into contact with the LRD during his visit to London in 1920-21 and the ties were revived in 1929 when the LRD helped him found the Bathurst Trade Union (Hughes and Perfect 1989: 553-5). Small was probably unaware that the LRD had moved to the left in the mid 1920s.

The LAI, formed in 1927, had by 1929 apparently 'come under the control of the Comintern (the Communist International) and its Soviet leadership' following the resignation of a number of non-communist founder members. Some members of its British Section were also in the LRD, which explains their knowledge of Small's activities (Wilson 1974: 179). LAI's British section secretary, Reginald Bridgeman, was also on the LRD's Executive (Bellamy and Saville 1984: 26-50).

Finally, the ITUC-NW, which was established at the Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928 and was based in Comintern headquarters in Moscow, organised an International Conference of Negro Workers in Hamburg in July 1930. Small was one of the West African delegates at the conference and delivered a fiery denunciation of 'capitalist and imperialist exploitation'. He was subsequently elected to the ITUC-NW Executive (Wilson 1974: ch. 7; Perfect 1987: 64-5).

Small's apparent conversion to communism proved to be the final straw for the colonial authorities, who already regarded him with great suspicion. Small paid a high price for official hostility, since the consequences included the refusal of the Colonial Office to permit his appointment as Honorary Consul in Bathurst for Liberia in 1930; the passing of the Trade Union Ordinance of 1932 (which, as intended, helped to destroy the unity of the trade union movement); and the undermining by government officials of the Gambia Farmers' Co-operative Marketing Association (Wilson 1974: 242-3; Perfect 1987: 66-70). Suspicion of Small's motives also helped to account for the rejection of the RPA's petitions against legal reform, the denial of the franchise in the 1930s and Small's defeat in the 'indirect' election to the Legislative Council in 1938.

The belief of the colonial authorities that Small had become a communist is of course no proof that he had actually done so. Small denied the charge and continued to stress his loyalty to the British Empire. Workman (11/6/30, GNA C1206/1929) notes Small's denial (which was hardly surprising in the circumstances). Langley (1973: 117) cites the statement of 'Our Policy' outlined in The Gambia Outlook. It is also worth recalling that he was a devout Methodist who would certainly have disapproved of the anti-clerical elements of communism.

On balance, it appears that, at most, Small's flirtation with communism was short-lived and it is much more likely that he was primarily interested in the practical benefits his external contacts could offer him. The LRD could, for example, help finance Small's activities and put pressure on the British Government on his behalf. It is therefore significant that when Small realised that the LAI and the LRD were neither as influential nor as useful as he had supposed, he severed his ties with both organisations. Instead, he tried (albeit unsuccessfully) to develop a relationship with the highly unrevolutionary British Conservative Party, which was surely not the action of a committed communist! (Rendall to Secretary, Parliamentary Conservative Party 22/12/32, GNA S135/1931; Perfect 1987: 65-66).

It is argued that in the early 1930s Small was not as radical as the authorities supposed. But it is still valid to suggest that in the 1940s and 1950s he became increasingly conservative. Middle age may have curbed his youthful idealism; L. de V. Bottomley, the United Africa Company's agent in Bathurst, argued that Small had 'mellowed with age and experience' (Southern to Moyne, 3/12/41, CO 87/253/4). Moreover, on a number of occasions in this period, he represented the Gambia in a semi­official capacity at important events in London.

For example, he headed the Gambian delegation at the conference of African Legislative Councillors in 1948, received a grant of £275 so that he could attend the foundation conference of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in 1949 and attended the Coronation in 1953. The Gambia Government financed the Gambian delegation to the ICFTU Conference under pressure from the Colonial Office, which wanted to prevent African trade unions affiliating to the rival (pro-communist) World Federation of Trade Unions (GNA S2804FV1944; The Gambia Outlook 6/11/48, 6/6/53). Small clearly enjoyed his new status and was anxious not to jeopardise official patronage. Consequently, he was much more reluctant than in the 1920s and 1930s to criticise government policy.

Small's growing conservatism was also revealed by his attitude to electoral reform. As we have seen, he endorsed the 1951 Wyn-Harris constitution. Moreover, he actually considered the franchise adopted for the Bathurst Town Council in 1946 to be too liberal. He wished to bar civil servants from standing as candidates and allegedly also objected to the enfranchisement of Muslim women, a position which caused Governor Blood to dismiss him as a 'reactionary' (Blood to Creech Jones 23/10/46, CO 87/259/7; Legislative Council 25/5/44, CO 89/30). Small argued that civil servants would feel obliged to support the official line on the Council. Indeed, his stance was not dissimilar from the one adopted by SJ. Forster in the 1920s, which Small had then attacked. But unlike Blood, Wyn-Harris welcomed Small's changing opinions, was probably disappointed by his defeat in the 1951 election and appointed him to the Legislative Council in 1954 (Ward to Rowland, 17/11/51, CO 554/536). He also recommended that Small receive the O.B.E. in 1953, a gesture which demonstrated how far the official attitude to Small had altered since the 1930s.

Conclusion: Small's political legacy

Edward Francis Small has been called the 'father of modern Gambian politics' (Gailey 1964: 192). He has also been hailed (and described himself) as 'father of trade unionism in the Gambia' (Perfect 1987: 92). They are titles he richly deserves, not only because he founded the Gambia branch of the National Congress of British West Africa and was the first Gambian to be elected (directly) to the Legislative Council, but also because he bestowed an important political legacy on future generations.

First, no political leader before Small had sought to represent wider interests than those of the Aku 'upper-level' elite. Previously, Aku politicians (including Samuel Forster) had paid little attention to the wishes of Wolof or even of lower-level Aku. In contrast, Small and his associates organised 'mass meetings' open to all sections of Bathurst society, which provided a forum for the expression of popular demands. He was also willing to take up the individual grievances of ordinary citizens of Bathurst.

Small's desire to 'democratize' politics should not be exaggerated. In particular, he made little effort to incorporate the protectorate into the political system, for which he was rightly criticised. But his record on this score was no worse than that of his political heirs, Faye and Garba-Jahumpa, and it was not until the rise to prominence of the Protectorate-born, but Colony-educated, Dawda Jawara, that a serious attempt was made to bridge the gulf between the urban and the rural areas (Blood to Stanley 28/2/44, CO 87/256/1). Neither Faye nor Garba-Jahumpa paid much attention to the Protectorate when 'ministers' between 1954 and 1960 (Wyn-Harris to Lennox-Boyd 17/3/58, CO 554/1513).

Second, Small established the principle that religion and ethnicity should be kept out of politics. He was strongly opposed to narrowly sectarian parties, such as those promoted by Garba-Jahumpa from the mid-1940s, and all his political and other organisations were open to Muslims and Wolof as well as to Christians and Aku. This principle has been accepted by most Gambian politicians since Small's day and consequently ethnicity and religion have not become the sources of political tension that they have in many African countries.

Third, Small created a tradition of critical and independent political journalism. He was never afraid to take up issues of concern to the people of Bathurst in the columns of The Gambia Outlook and was also quite prepared to attack government policy. He also demonstrated his independence by his consistent refusal to give up ownership of The Gambia Outlook despite the financial sacrifices that this involved. Sarkis Madi, a wealthy Lebanese merchant, apparently wished to take over ownership of The Gambia Outlook in 1926. He would have retained Small as editor and paid off his liabilities. But fearing that his independence might be curbed, Small declined the offer (reported by Henry Jones, at the tune an employee of Madi and a friend of Small, The Gambia Echo 2/12/57). This mantle has been taken up by some modern Gambian journalists, who have also shown a willingness to criticise the government (and individual politicians), particularly over corruption. Sanna Manneh is the latest journalist to attack ministers for alleged corruption (da Costa 1990b).

Finally, Small passed on to his successors the principle that a politicians's first duty should be to serve the public. Small did not enter politics to make money, nor to further his career. If he had been prepared to toe the line and not make trouble for the authorities, he would surely have been able to make a successful career in the civil service or the church and live in reasonable prosperity. Instead he remained on the breadline for many years and even in old age was not as well-off as other Aku who had made far fewer sacrifices. He also courted social rejection by taking up the grievances of humbler citizens of Bathurst and it was only towards the end of his life that he became a respected figure in Aku society.

Small's contribution to Gambian politics has not always been recognised, although it is pleasing to be able to report that his career was officially honoured during the Silver Jubilee of independence in February 1990 (da Costa 1990a). It is hoped that this article will go some way towards redressing the balance and will help to restore him to his rightful position in Gambian history.

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