Fellow Citizens, After reading Ebou's revelations, I hold my head between my hands and cry out: Where do we turn to? I call out: THE HAGUE? AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL? CHAMPIONS OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICA, ETC... What would YOU do? One thing is certain though: ATE YALLA DI NA NYOW!!! I'm too emotionally spent right now... Sorry, I'll write something more coherent later.. Edrissa >From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]> >Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list ><[log in to unmask]> >To: [log in to unmask] >Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA THREE >Date: Sun, 6 May 2001 19:05:33 -0700 > > COUP IN >GAMBIA THREE >KB Dampha, I am pleased but equally saddened that you >asked about Gibril Saye or Lieutenant Saye. Pleased in >the sense that his case needs to be told which I shall >attempt to do the way I understand it. But am also >quite sad to remember every thing about this fine >soldier who was too good to die the way he did. >Everything you mentioned about this soldier, >especially his devotion and love to promote sports in >the GNA-had a keen hand in football, basketball, >volleyball and everything-made him more so a victim to >be mourned and wept for until that day when his body >is exhumed from that toilet pit and given a decent >burial. We can classify Saye as the real soldier with >difference. He was nice, respectable and highly >competent. But above everything, the young man was >soft hearted, couldn't hurt a fly when it comes to >killer instincts that we saw among the ranks of the >army since 1994. The guy had conscience and would >rather die than see the truth twisted and remain >indifferent to it like so many APRC lackeys we see >today. One of the reasons I later learnt for the >AFPRC's decision to eliminate him was among other >things his constant challenge to all of them over our >detention at the central prisons without any credible >reason or explanation for it. I understand he had >openly and constantly protested to the council members >to try us if they had anything against us or set us >free. But death row at Mile Two prisons was not, as >far as he was concerned, a place for good officers >like us. He had even gone against all odds one day by >coming to the prisons to see us with encouraging words >to the effect that they were working hard for our >freedom. He had brought us provisions and toilet >articles as well. It was shocking to learn few days >later that Saye was dead. >So you were right Dampha in stating that the 11th >November event found me in jail. About thirty-five of >us were detained for nothing we did. But I can still >remember how devastated Saye's family was over the >death of the man who solely provided for them. They >even had to send a secret inquirer at Mile-Two prison >to find out whether Saye was detained with us. His >father cannot still get over what he new was a murder >of his son, because he saw his son when he was leaving >for work the morning after the so-called abortive >counter coup. Soldiers who were present at the camp >that day also took the trouble to go to the family >house and explained to them what happened at Yundum >that weekend afternoon. >I personally conducted my private investigation over >the case and came out with the concrete evidence that >these men were murdered when they least expected it >from these cowards. A man like Saye would have never >dreamt about Sana Sabally taking a direct role in his >slaughtering. They were very close job associates, >sharing the same office where Saye was his deputy in >the heavy-weapons platoon. They were always together >in their small office by the fuel storeroom. Before >the coup one would easily mistaken them for brothers >given the way they used to hang closely together. >On the flip side however I think that was the reason >why Sabally freaked out after the 11th November >massacre. Killing a human being out of no justifiable >reason could be psychologically very traumatic to the >mind of the killer but when the relationship between >the killer and the victim was bonded by that human >factor bordering on friendship and love, the tragedy >turns into a clinical nightmare. >Anyway, that's another trivial story that I may come >back to in later discussions. >But as I said I started my investigation about 11th >November in the jail with special interest in Saye's >case. The first opportunity I had to know what exactly >happened was when in February surviving soldiers >arrested and accused of complicity in the counter coup >were brought to Mile-Two prisons under heavy armed >guard. The notorious Staff Sergeant Kanyi was part of >the guards. They had to be transferred from the Yundum >cells to death row at Mile Two. They were WO-2 A >Trawelleh, Sgt. N kabareh, Sgt. S. Manjang Cpl. >A.Jallow, Cpl. M. Saidykhan, L/CPL M.O. Njie, L/CPL K. >Kamara and PTE. B. Manneh. >When they were first brought in, they were so much >convinced of being lesser criminals than we were that >for a while they refused to say anything pertaining to >what bought them there. Every one of them thought his >arrest or detention was a mistake because, as far as >they were concerned, they did not have a clue about >any organized counter coup as such. As a result they >all thought sooner rather than later they were going >to go home. >Then on the22nd February, 1995, each of them received >a letter from Baboucarr Jatta's office (then army >commander) warning them to brace up for a general >court martial scheduled to start on 25th February >1995. That was to say that they had barely thirty >hours to face a court martial on charges of treason. >For their defense, they were not allowed to have any >representation from professional legal officers or >practitioners. The following officers' names were >forwarded to them as the only available persons they >could choose their legal representatives from: Captain >M.B. Sarr, Captain S. Fofana, Captain JP Jasseh and >Lt. Seckan. These were men who were big time legal >illiterates. For the prosecution however, Justice B. >Akamba a Ghanaian solicitor was the head of the team. >It was clear to all the accused that it was after all >a kangaroo court martial that awaited them and they >also knew that Baboucarr Jatta was a genius at it. It >was a lost course to all of them. >That was the time they really started talking. By the >time they were hastily tried, found guilty and all >sentenced to nine years imprisonment with hard labor, >they had told us everything they witnessed and knew >about the murder of their colleagues. >Most of them were arrested after Barrow, Faal and >Nyang were killed but well before Saye was arrested. >They were in the Yundum cells when Saye reported for >work the following morning and was placed under arrest >by the military police. Every clothes he was wearing >(he was in working uniform) was taken off him and was >left with only his underwear before the military >police forced him to join them in the cells. He was >stunned and tried to ask for explanation but was >simply told that the orders came from the council >members of the government. Who were they? Of course >the cowards: Yaya Jammeh, Sana Sabally, Edward >Singhateh, Sadibou Haidara and Yankuba Touray. >Anyway like all of them who were detained Saye had >felt that the error would be corrected and that he >would soon be set free. >Then the next day while Major Frazer Joof, commander >of the military police unit was taking their >statements at the military police office, they >received orders to stop the investigation and send >them back to the cells. They were informed that the >council members were at the officer's mess discussing >their fate. It was lunchtime, so they decided to have >their meals. Half way in their eating they heard some >strange movements out side. Then a voice they could >not recognized started calling for all those officers >arrested to come out now. Sorting out the officers >from the other ranks was, according to them, very >scary. >All the officers were handcuffed the moment they >stepped outside. Then they loaded them like sheep in >the back of an army Land Rover and covered them with >tarpaulin. >The windows of the cells at Yundum were not quite >high, so those in the cells could clearly view the >activities going on outside. It was from there that >they saw the convoy of council members departing with >the officers including Saye. Baboucarr Jatta was with >them too. >For two to three hours they sat in silence praying and >hoping that things were not really what they thought >they were, until they heard the convoy roaring back >into the camp with the green tarpaulins all soaked in >blood. They drove them back to the toilet area where >they stayed for another twenty to thirty minutes. Then >they came back and called for Sgt. E.M. Ceesay and >Sgt. Basiru Camara to follow them to the back. Few >minutes later they heard burst of automatic gunfire >twice. They were the last two to be murdered. It was a >nightmare of unprecedented proportion that shocked >every person with human emotion that evening. >The second part of my investigation, which filled in >the blank spaces left by the accused men, was >completed when I was freed from detention after ten >months. After being released and reinstated back to >the army, I eventually became very close to Baboucarr >Jatta who in his non-stop effort to clear himself of >any wrong doing that day told me the missing details. >Anyhow taking stock of what Jatta had in mind could be >extremely elusive. Sometimes he would echo as if Lt. >Barrow had really planned a coup; but at other time it >is as if, the AFPRC government, in order to eliminate >the officers and soldiers who felt they betrayed the >nation and the army, framed everybody. For example >when Lt. Barrow was arrested that night, Jatta's >explanation was that he had found him surrounded by >Sabally and his guards after he was severely beaten >up. He said that Sabally showed him a list of names of >government officials Barrow and his partners had >planned to execute if they had succeeded. His name >Jatta was on top of the list. >But he said upon scrutinizing the paper he had >discovered that the list was forged to justify their >desire to execute them. As a matter of fact, he >confirmed the forgery in the paper when he noticed >that his own name on top was quickly scribbled in >pencil while the whole list was in ink. He said he >took the list from Sabally and walked up to Barrow and >asked him why he wanted to kill him. But as soon as >Barrow started swearing that he did not mean to kill >anybody, Sabally turned around and hit him on the >mouth with the wooden butt of his AK47 rifle, breaking >all his front teeth. >"The torture they subjected Barrow and Faal to", Jatta >had said, "even if they were not shot and killed >finally, they would have most likely died from their >injuries". >Jatta also explained how all those arrested were later >taken to Mile-Two prisons first and then to Fajara >Barracks that night for execution during which a good >number of them took the risk and ran away into the >dark. Almost all of them escaped to Cassamance >including Lt. Minteh, Lt. Jarju Lt. Bah Lt. L.F. >Jammeh, Sgt Jadama, Sgt. Joof and others. The dash for >freedom happened when the captives were forced in line >at the middle of the field and then ordering some >selected soldiers to open fire on them in a typical >military execution style. Three times the order was >given, and three time the soldiers aimed and fired >above the heads of the victims. Then Edward Singhateh >soon got frustrated with the firing team, walked up to >where Barrow was standing, held him by the wrist, >pulled him away from everyone and then fired two shots >at him. One bullet hit Barrow on the leg and the fatal >one went through his ribs. He fell down on the ground >kicking and moaning until his whole body was reduced >to weak involuntary twitching of his muscles here and >there. >"It was then that everybody woke up to the reality >that they were dealing with real killers", said Jatta. > >There was total chaos. Some running for their lives >others dumb founded by Singhateh's action while most >of the soldiers suffered total shock. However, Faal >was unable to move because of the injuries he had >sustained that crippled him altogether. The bullet >that finished him was fired from the late Sadibou >Haidara's handgun. After that Staff Sergeant Kanyi was >left with his sadistic pleasure of pumping more brass >into poor Faal's body. >However let us not forget that in the heat of all this >commotion, Lt. Gibril Saye was at home perhaps helping >his wife nurse the three-week old son they just had. >So to even say that he was seen that night around >anywhere the coup was staged was ridiculous much more >being killed in a firefight that night as the cowards >tried to sell to the world. With the number of >soldiers supposedly killed in that single incident >that night, it is practically impossible or mind >boggling to imagine that it was a fire fight where all >the enemies were shot and killed while no one in the >friendly forces got a scratch on him. That must have >been the cause of the bitterness from Saye's family >members especially from his dad. >It should have also been a wake up call to the entire >Gambian population that the so-called soldiers of >difference were nothing but sadists with death. But as >Dampha rightly put it the civilian population in most >cases hardly show any interest in what happens in the >army or have little sympathy to the soldiers in active >service. The general concept is that they are all the >same, so whatever may happen among them good or bad is >their own business. On the contrary, most soldiers are >ordinary people, the typical Gambian type who sees his >work as a source of earning income. Although the >salary is very limited, the majority work hard to >manage their lives with it, get married, raise and >support good families hoping to survive the danger of >being killed in the job or avoid the evil of killing >unnecessarily until such time when they finish their >signed contracts and leave for something better. >However, talking about the summarily execution at >Yundum in which Saye was murdered Jatta had explained >it all in the way he experienced it. As it was >weekend, he said he was at home when he received a >call from an officer at Yundum Barracks reporting the >presence of the council members at the officers' mess. >And the way things appeared they did not seem to mean >any good towards the arrested officers and soldiers in >the cells. He immediately drove to the camp and found >them in the mess as reported. When he entered, they >instantly stopped talking. But after a short while >they informed him of their decision to execute >everybody in the cells for their role in trying to >overthrow their government. >According to Jatta, he tried to talk them against the >idea in every way to no avail. At one time he said he >almost got Sabally, the vice-chairman then, to >understand, but Singhateh called Yaya at the state >house to inform him about the situation. When >Singhateh returned from making the call at an office >close to the mess, he said that Yaya's decision was >final-death for all the officers. >That was when everybody moved out to get the officers >from the cells. It was lunchtime just like the >survivors inside the cells explained it later at Mile >Two. >Anyway everything was the same except that those in >the cells missed what happened in the killing process. >When the officers were handcuffed and covered with >tarpaulin in the back of the Land Rover, Staff >Sergeant Kanyi was ordered to ride with them at the >back. >By the time they arrived at the execution ground >behind Njamby Forest, Kanyi had severely hurt most of >them with bayonet stabs all over their bodies. He was >that instruction to Kanyi originated from Singhateh. >Jatta had claimed to have followed them all the way to >the killing field to put more pressure on them and to >still try to talk them out of it. Well, he must have >done a perfectly disgusting job in convincing them not >to kill, anyway. >The officers were as soon as they arrived at the >ground lined up in a firing-squad formation to be >shot. It was another tense moment where it appeared as >if everyone was waiting for the other person to >commence the shooting. Then as if it was an accidental >discharge from Kanyi's weapon who was standing very >close to Singhateh, he fired straight at the officers >hitting Saye and killing him instantly. After that, it >was a matter of finishing the rest since one had >already died. It was the final green light for the >butchering orgy to start. >Jatta went on to explain how confused the council >members felt when the killing was all over. They were >altogether confused with what to do with the bodies. >They finally arrived at the stupid decision to have >their guards bury the corpse in the bushes somewhere. >Jatta said he talked them against that for fear that >people will soon find the bodies. That was how they >were eventually taken to Yundum Barracks, to the >toilets. >He talked about how Sgt. E.M.Ceesay and Sgt. Basirou >Camara were also killed that day. He could >particularly remember Lance Corporal Batch Jallow, >Singhateh's driver at the time pulling the trigger on >those two. >He further gave the gruesome details of how Saye's >long legs (he was about 6ft. 8ins. tall) could not fit >in the ditch together with the others and how Kanyi >and co used a machete to cut off his legs before >force-fitting the body in the mass grave. It was the >mother of all evil that I know the culprits will >account for someday. It is hard to comprehend how >brutal these demons were on people who did not hurt >anyone in their existence. Why was it impossible for >anyone among them to stand up and say that this must >stop, for it is all-wrong? Where was god in the hearts >of these GAMBIANS? >Jatta said Saye's father made a final attempt to know >about the fate of his son after Sana Sabally and >Sadibou Haidara fell victims of their own creation on >the 27th of January 1995. He had gone to the ministry >of defense to ask Singhateh but the old man was >referred to his office at the army headquarters. All >that the father wanted to know was whether his son was >dead or alive. He said he frankly told him to give it >up in ever seeing his son alive again because he was >really dead. >The old man, he said, thanked him for the information >and left with high emotions. >Now back to where I stopped in my last piece COUP IN >GAMBIA. >For a brief flashback, I was part of the team of the >American guests visiting the vice president's office >when a GNA officer at the state house told me about >the soldiers at Yundum Barracks on their way to Banjul >to overthrow the PPP government. However, because of >my duty that day to escort the guests upstairs to Mr. >Sahou Sabally's office, I tried to calmly perform it >without raising any alarms. Yet I was very worried. >The whole thing was really scary. >Upstairs, Mr. Sabally welcomed the team in few nice >words and then said. "Gentlemen, I am afraid to inform >you that we just received a report that the soldiers >at Yundum Barracks were on a rampage again". >He had sounded as if the matter was a familiar thing >that may die out soon. It was pretty much possible >that Mr. Sabally had thought that it was one of those >demonstrations from Yundum again which the TSG could >stop like they did before. Whether Mr. Sabally >understood the imbalance of power between the two >forces caused by the Nigerians lately could be >anyone's guess. Whatever he was thinking at that >moment, he appeared very calm about the matter. >Anyway Mr. Winters the ambassador before stepping into >the office immediately asked whether it was not better >for them to go back to the ship until the situation >was under control then they come back. The vice >president insisted that there was no need for that. He >told them to stay indicating that it was possible that >their help may be needed. While they stepped into the >office, I took permission to go and find out what was >going on. It was granted. >Downstairs, the same officer who first announced the >trouble at Yundum was still at the spot I left him. I >wanted him to tell me more about what he had heard and >whether it was not mistaken for the exercise rehearsal >the GNA was supposed to hold with the American marines >that morning. >It was not a rehearsal or anything like that. The way >they got the report, the soldiers had broken into the >armory sharing all the weapons among them and were >coming down to Banjul. Asked whether names of any >leaders were mention in the report, he said no. I did >not know whether it was only the other ranks again >like the past two demonstrations before or whether the >officers were part it this time. >I looked at the state house environment again >especially the security situation and felt very >insecure there. I had my office there and had been >working there for almost two years but the officers >and other ranks of the presidential guards were like >clowns. These people never trained, did not understand >section, company or battalion battle drills. They did >not know the difference between camouflage and >concealment in the language of battlefield tactic. >Combat fitness did not exist in their vocabulary. They >were overfed, better paid than all the security forces >in the country, spoiled and generally very rude >towards GNA officers. Their only reserved powers were >linked to the crazy "jujus" they carried in abundance >making think that they were bulletproof charms. The >charms were only for bluffing, because if they had >strongly believed in those powers the majority would >not have thrown their weapons at the last minute and >jumped over the tall state house fence and disappeared >into Banjul. Those who remained, Musa Jammeh and >others, simply opened the gates and surrendered. But >how could we blame them if their main commander who >should have taken charge of the critical situation >Captain Lamin Kaba Bajo chose to abandon the camp and >joined former president Jawara on board the USS Lamour >County? What was there to protect in a president who >had lost his nation? Perhaps if he had stayed the >majority of his men would not have had the nerve to >run away with their tails between their legs. What >else would you expect from such men, anyway? I knew >that staying with the state guard was unwise or even >suicidal. Beside, they only had AK47 rifles and most >of them hardly used their weapons for training or >anything. >If it was true that the soldiers had actually broken >into the armory, I thought, and were bent on taking >the country by force, there was no force that could >challenge them in the country. The GNA armory was jam >packed with super deadly weapons such as the RPG-7s, >AAMGs, 81MM and 60MM mortars that excluded the medium >range machine guns and the Chinese-type LMGs. >Truthfully the GNA was not quite trained on how to >employ these weapons in combat, but I know by merely >firing them at the direction of any enemy force not >exposed to even the sound that comes out of their >barrels was enough to chase them away or make them >surrender. >I therefore told the officer what I believed could >have been a possible way of pulling something. The >Gambia Marine, commanded by Major Antouman Saho had >new 50 Caliber machine guns delivered by the Americans >that very morning for the patrol boat. The firepower >of those weapons were enough to make the soldiers from >Yundum to listen if fired back to them out of >necessity. The ballistics of their projectiles has the >capability of piercing six inches of homogeneous steel >and was meant to kill armor in battlefields. They are >so deadly that there in an international law >forbidding anyone from shooting it directly at humans. >With the men at the Gambia Marine who had some pretty >good experience with similar weapons of the Chinese >type mounted on some of their other patrol boats, it >was possible to assemble a counter force that could >challenge the soldiers from Yundum. >The gentleman agreed with my analogy; hence I took off >to the Marine Unit base. >Major Saho was there, but he would not buy my idea. He >was in his office and was fully aware of what was >going on but had put it to me that he did not even >want his men to know about the coup situation because >he did not trust them. " I don't want to have >anything to do with this trouble", he had continued. >"Was it not the Nigerians who were being paid fat >salaries to defend the country? Let's leave things >with them to solve." >Nothing was going to make him involve himself in the >problem or his men or weapons for that matter. >Anyway when I heard him talking to the concerned >citizens calling him from various offices in the >country asking to know what was going on, and he kept >on assuring them that special plans were underway to >arrest the situation, then I realized that I was at >the wrong place. Banjul was an island and the last >thing I wanted was to be cornered in the city in an >armed conflict. After all most of our family members >were at the other side of the bridge. I decided to >drive alone via Bond Road towards Yundum. I had had no >reason to fear any soldier from there. As for the >officers, leaving the Nigerians out, there were Major >Davis, second in command of the battalion, Captain >Badjie (now colonel) commanding "C" company, Captain >Sonko Commanding "B" company, Captain Johnson, AHQ >Camp, Captain Dibba Band, the late Captain Baldeh >Band, Lt. Ndure Cham (now major) engineering section, >late Lt. Barrow MT section, Lt. Sheriff Gomez, >battalion adjutant, Lt. Yaya Jammeh MP commander, Lt. >Mbye platoon commander, 2LT Haidara platoon commander >and 2lt Singhateh, platoon commander. 2Lt Sabally was >supposed to be at Farafenni at his new parent unit. >Going by anything in the past present or even future, >I could not see what I could have done wrong to any >soldiers or officers for me to be treated otherwise >than with respect and understanding. Terrible thinking >in a coup situation, as I learnt later. >In the first place, I was later made to understand >that Major Antouman Saho had reported me to all the >council members that I went to the marine unit to get >his weapons to counter the coup but that he drove me >away because the coup was an absolute necessity. That, >I suspect, contributed to my arrest and detention four >days later. Betrayal by people you trust is another >coup malady. So in trying to draw some basic >principles for any soldier caught in a coup situation, >my first ones will include this one: NEVER TRUST ANY >PERSON IN UNIFORM AROUND YOU. >However, my trip to Yundum stopped at Denton Bridge, >where the TSG commanded on the ground by Majors >Chongan and Swareh were making frantic efforts to >prevent the soldiers from crossing over. >I will deal with that crucial encounter next week. >In the mean time I want to commend all of you in the >struggle for your tireless efforts to liberate the >Gambia. This is a fight for freedom, and I know that >we are winning one battle after another but the war is >yet to be finished. Dampha, Saul, Kujabi, Hamjatta, >Jabou, Conteh, Joe, Ebrima, edrissa, Jobe, the >Movements in NY and Uk and all those combatants in the >front line, I salute you for your diligence and >endurance to sustain the struggle. I also want to take >a special moment to welcome an impressive new member, >abdou touray, whose contribution is so far fantastic. >Keep up the great work. We shall win. > >Ebou Colly > > > > > >__________________________________________________ >Do You Yahoo!? >Yahoo! Auctions - buy the things you want at great prices >http://auctions.yahoo.com/ > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L >Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html >You may also send subscription requests to >[log in to unmask] >if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your >full name and e-mail address. >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- _________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask] if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your full name and e-mail address. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------