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Factors Behind Senegal's Democratic Change

Factors Behind Senegal's Democratic Change
March 22, 2000

Sidy Gaye
PANA Correspondent

DAKAR, Senegal (PANA) - The democratic transition which took place Sunday in Senegal after 25 years of multiparty politics was facilitated at least by eight factors which significantly contributed to the free expression of universal suffrage and transparency in the presidential election held on 27 February and the run-off on 19 March.

The major factor is the option clearly chosen by the Senegalese people and politicians in government as well as those in the opposition, to ensure that the ballot box must be the only means to attain political power.

According to observers, this consensus was facilitated by the goodwill of Abdou Diouf, the incumbent president.

When he came to power in January 1981, Diouf legalised a large number of opposition parties, including radicals who were then strongly inclined to urban guerrilla warfare, insurrection, peasant or proletarian revolution.

During his 10 years as prime minister, the successor of President Leopold Sedar Senghor (1960-1980) took the measure to satisfy the thirst for thorough political reform in the country.

The violent expression of this demand on the streets of Dakar from 1968 onwards, eventually took a toll on Senghor who then resigned.

As the constitutional successor of Senghor, Diouf preferred to immediately opt for "full multipartyism," thus renouncing the limitation of the number of parties.

Under the scheme set in motion in 1974, as part of the return to multiparty politics, three parties emerged representing three schools of thought - Democratic Socialism of the ruling Senegalese Progress Union (UPS) which later became the Socialist Party (PS), the Liberalism of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) founded by Abdoulaye Wade, and the Marxism-Leninism of the African Independence Party (PAI).

A fourth trend, Conservatism, the Senegalese Republican Movement (MRS) led by Boubacar Gueye was authorised later.

The second factor which fostered the long process of maturity for Senegalese democracy was the strong determination of an emerging civil society to "strengthen the institutions of the republic and make them credible," in partnership with the opposition.

In this context, the private media - newspapers and radio stations - boosted these aspirations by acting as catalyst.

Fortunately for Senegal, since the turn of the 1980s, private media organisations are not run by politicians but mainly by professionals who had turned their backs on the official media.

The judiciary, representative institutions (national assembly and local government), the central government and the armed forces were gradually monitored and controlled by citizens who were increasingly becoming critical and demanding.

However, it is especially in the "formulation, on a consensual basis, of concrete proposals to perfect the Senegalese electoral system" that decisive steps were taken, observers note.

This was the third major factor which led to the political revolution which took place in Senegal between 27 February and 19 March 2000.

The strong resistance of the civil society in the aftermath of the 1988 presidential election, marked by massive vote rigging and the imprisonment of the major opposition leaders, laid the foundation of that revolution.

Peace was demanded and obtained by Wade, Diouf's main opponent.

In return, a long process of revising the whole legal system governing the various stages of the electoral process was carried out between 1988 and 1992.

Two round tables were held during that period under the supervision of Prof. Ibou Diaite in 1988, and former ICJ judge Keba Mbaye in 1992.

The judges, whose independent approach was acknowledged by all the parties, piloted the proceedings which led to an electoral law then hailed as "the best in the world."

The law, re-adapted along the way on the basis of a consensus, and the setting up of a National Elections Observatory (ONEL) on 10 December 1998, led to the fourth factor that ushered change.

It was the introduction of an electoral process "collectively monitored, from start to finish, not only by all the parties involved, but also by independent national observers and a free media represented in all parts of the country and using all modern means of communication at its disposal."

In addition to the achievements from a lasting political struggle, four other factors, strictly conjectural, but very often mentioned by political analysts, fostered democratic change in Senegal after 40 years of socialist Party rule.

One is the upswing of the youth who represent 40 percent of the electorate after the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 years by law in 1992, and women, who became the majority with 52 percent of the electorate.

A large number of citizens registered as voters for the first time, in view of the 2000 presidential election which they wanted to use as a platform to impose their will and priorities.

Another factor was the "decline of the Socialist Party," with the departure of former influential minister Djibo Leyti Ka after the "congress without debate" of March 1996 which catapulted his rival, Ousmane Tanor Dieng, to the top hierarchy of the party as First Secretary.

Djibo Ka and his friends set up their own party in 1998 and won 11 seats in the parliamentary elections held the same year. In the first round of the 2000 presidential election, he won 7.09 percent of the vote.

The decline of the Socialist Party was compounded by the resignation, six months to the presidential election, of another former minister, Moustapha Niasse, to whom Wade has promised the position of prime minister.

Niasse supported Wade in the second round of the presidential election after winning 16.76 percent of the vote in the first round.

The last two factors are the extraordinary 'Rainbow Coalition' of more than 20 parties that supported the opposition leader in the first round.

The coalition, which also included other components of the civil society, was strengthened in the second round poll by a successful drive "to neutralise and isolate President Abdou Diouf from his key external supporters."