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GAMBIA-L  May 2000

GAMBIA-L May 2000

Subject:

A framework for change

From:

"Katim S. Touray" <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Sun, 14 May 2000 23:48:21 -0700

Content-Type:

text/plain

Parts/Attachments:

Parts/Attachments

text/plain (167 lines)

Hi folks,

I'm going to try to keep this note short, because the framework paper I'm appending runs to about 9 pages.  So you are warned!

You might recall that a few weeks back, I promised to work on a paper aimed at providing a basis for furthering efforts at dealing with the Jammeh government in the aftermath of last month's killings in The Gambia.  The paper was also aimed at providing a template that can be used in developing a Web site for coordinating efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the leadership crisis we face in The Gambia. Along these lines, and finally, it is my hope that the paper can be used as a common platform for various groups around the world to engage the international community in lobbying, educating, and working with them in regards the strengthening democracy in The Gambia, and by implication, increasing prospects for peace in the country.

I'd like to offer my apologies for not getting the paper out sooner, but I'm glad that a draft is ready, and I am appending it to this e-mail.  I would appreciate it if you take a look at it, and also share it with as many people (both off- and on-line) as is possible.  In the end, it would benefit all of us if we have as many ideas as is possible incorporated in the paper.  Another reason it would desireable to have many people have their input in the paper is that I would rather we end up with something nobody owns.  This is for the simple reason that what's aimed for in the paper is a better Gambia for all, and thus, it is imperative that anyone interested in contributing his or her ideas is given a chance to do so.

From a logistic perspective, I would like volunteers to take on the role of coordinating the revisions of different sections of the paper. Specifically, I would like one person to take on each of the following sections:

    2.1. Incompetence
    2.2. The Killing Fields
    2.3. Abuse of Human Rights and Press Freedom
    2.4. Corruption
    3.1  Framework for a peaceful transfer of power
    3.2. Help needed from the International Community

The work entailed in coordinating the revisions of each of the above sections would involve collecting different suggestions specific to a topic, and editing the section.  I will work with these volunteers to stitch together the different sections into a final paper that, hopefully, as many organizations as possible can sign on to.  Toward this end, I would appreciate it if different organizations and interested parties can take a close look at the draft with a view toward how best they can contribute to it, and make it even better.  Please contact me directly at [log in to unmask] if you would like to coordinate drafting one of the above sections.

I mentioned previously that the paper is aimed at providing a common platform for various groups to work with the international commmunity in dealing with the Jammeh government.  Thus, the aim is that the final version can be used by, say, a delegation in the US in their discussions with government and Congressional personnel about how they can help in our efforts to deal with the Jammeh government.  The fact that other organizations would have signed on the paper would further strengthen the case of the US groups, and in similar fashion, groups in the UK, Germany, or Sweden can also use the same document with the full knowledge that they are also speaking on behalf of all the groups that have signed on to the paper.

The above arrangement is aimed at providing the best interim measure that can be used in the absence of a formal umbrella organization.  It is my hope that, in time, we can gradually work toward building both a functional umbrella organization, and a Web site that will serve both such an organization as well as it's various branches, and affiliates.  In this regard, I would like to say that work on the Free Gambia Web site, an option we had started working on, is not yet off the ground.  However, I hope to be able to start contacting people who might be able to help, or have expressed interest in helping so we can pick up the project again.

Before I end this rather long and winding intro to a long paper, I would like to plead and BEG all of you to PLEASE try to read the proposals with an open mind.  I am very aware that sentiments are running real high, and a lot of people are not really in a compromising mood.  However, it is my sincere belief that the best way out of the present impasse we are in is for all of us to be willing to accept what we normally would not, and do so for the sake of our nation.  Please remember that there really is no point in taking a stand that's going to lead no where but to a violent, and strife ridden Gambia.

I would also venture to say that at this point in our history, we must realize that someone has to take the moral high ground.  True, we can, and should probably, insist that justice be done.  However, we must also bear in mind that there is a way we push things too far, and end up with no justice simply because there will be no country left.  Look at Sierra Leone.  In the end, we must realize that if we insist on an eye for an eye, there really is no basis for calling for a change.  Because we simply would have proven to be just like those we are clamouring to push out.

I will leave it at that, and await your feedback.  By the way, I am yet to contact the other list managers about what to do with the whole issue of confirming postings.  It is indeed an inconvenience, and I hope we can work something out.  Have a great week, and best wishes.

Katim


--------------------------------------------  Start of appended Framework Paper  ----------------------------------------------------------------
 
THE GAMBIA UNDER JAMMEH:  The case, and framework for change

1.  INTRODUCTION
The Gambia is a small, English-speaking country of about 4,000 square miles on the West African coast, and bordered on all sides except the Atlantic, by French-speaking Senegal.  The Gambia is very poor, and ranked 163 (out of 174 countries) in the 1999 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).  The country had an estimated population of 1.2 million in 1997, and a per capita gross national product (GNP) of $350, compared to an average of $522 for Sub-Saharan Africa, and about $29,000 for the US.
 
The country obtained it's Independence from Britain in 1965, and became a Republic in April, 1970.  Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, who lead the country to Independence was it's Prime Minister from 1965 to 1970, and it's President from 1970 until his government was overthrown on July 22, 1994 by junior army officers.  The resulting government called the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) was dominated by the military, and headed by Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh.
 
While Jawara's rule was characterized by an internationally-renowned respect for human rights, adherence to a multi-party democratic system of governance, and tolerance for diversity, Jammeh's rule has been noted for human rights abuses, alleged killings, misappropriation, and outright incompetence.  Against this background, it is not surprising that Jammeh's security forces, early last April, opened fire on unarmed student demonstrator killing up to 12 of them, in addition to a journalist who was volunteering as a Red Cross worker.
 
This paper provides a brief overview of the governance, or lack thereof, of The Gambia under Jammeh, alternatives to his government, and provides a framework for a transition to a free, fair, open, and democratic Gambia.  The paper is aimed at providing The Gambia's development partners a means to enable them help The Gambia avoid descending into the chaos, and tragedies that have befallen countries like Sierra Leone, and Liberia.  It is also hoped that Gambian organizations and concerned citizens will use the framework proposed here to work toward a Gambia that all can live in peace, and be genuinely proud of.
 
2.  The GAMBIA UNDER JAMMEH
His Excellency, Dr. Alhaji Col. (Rtd.) Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh came to power in July, 1994 after leading a military coup against the democratically-elected government of Sir Dawda K. Jawara who had been in power for almost 30 years.  The then 29-year old, and Lt. Jammeh headed the military-dominated AFPRC government that was formed to replace the Jawara administration.  The AFPRC originally intended to remain in power for 4 years before handing over power to a democratically-elected civilian government, but following an outcry from both within The Gambia, and the International community, they agreed to elections leading to a transition to civilian rule.
 
After the adoption of a revised (and many say flawed) Constitution, Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held in late, 1996.  In preparation for the elections, Jammeh and other key AFPRC military officials resigned their military commissions.  Jammeh formed a political party, Alliance for Patriotic Reconciliation and Construction (APRC) to field their candidates in the general elections, with Jammeh as their Presidential candidate.  The APRC won most of the parliamentary seats contested, and Jammeh also won the Presidential elections.  In January, 1997, Jammeh was sworn in as the civilian President, and head of an APRC government with an overwhelming majority of military retirees.
 
Unfortunately for The Gambia, almost 6 years of Jammeh's rule has brought about untold suffering, death, and deprivation to many Gambians.  This is especially sad in light of the fact that many people initially welcomed the AFPRC following the overthrow of the Jawara government.  Furthermore, Jammeh proclaimed at the outset that his was going to be a government with a difference; one that was both accountable and transparent.  Judging from their record so far, it seems that Jammeh and his officials forgot their promises, and pronouncements when they came to power.  Both the AFPRC and the APRC governments have not only failed to meet the expectations of many Gambians, they have been noted for incompetence, corruption, human rights abuses, trampling press freedom, and killing Gambians in the name of state security.
 
2.1.  Incompetence
Both the AFPRC, and it's successor, the APRC governments have been characterized by intolerance, abuses of human rights, and press freedom, and accused of numerous killings that are yet to be satisfactorily addressed.  In addition, there has been an militarization of the country, coupled with the establishment of a National Intelligence Agency (NIA) used more to witch-hunt and silence the government's critics than addressing genuine security concerns.  Jammeh's governments have not only failed to provide competent leadership for the Gambia, but also wreaked havoc on the country's civil service.
 
One example of the incompetence that has been shown by Jammeh has been the exceedingly high turn-over rate of appointments in his cabinet, as well as in other high-level government offices.  For example, in the 6 years since he came to power in 1994, what used to be the Ministry of External Affairs has not only had a name change, it has also had 4 Secretaries of State.  Similarly, the Ministry of Justice has had about 4 changes in leadership.  Such high turn over rates in the leadership of the country's high offices not only signal a misuse of highly-trained and experienced human resources, but also a tendency for Jammeh to use these offices as incentives in a self-serving patronage system.
 
Besides the lack of continuity in the country's governance, Jammeh has also failed the aspirations of Gambians in the area of economic development.  While there have been strides in building health-care facilities, schools, a new airport complex, and the country's first TV station, the fact remains that the lot of the average Gambian has not faired well under Jammeh.  In fact, many indicators of the quality of human life are still miserable.
 
2.2.  The Killing Fields
It is perhaps in the area of democracy, human Rights, and press freedom that the record of both Jammeh governments have been most dismal.  Starting with the AFPRC from July 1994 to Jan. 1997, there have been numerous incidents of gross abuse of human rights, assaults on individuals, and allegations of killings by the government's security forces.  For example, an estimated 40 soldiers lost their lives in November, 1994, in circumstances the government called a coup attempt, even though many insist that the victims were framed, and some may indeed have been summarily executed.
 
Besides the above-mentioned "coup attempt", there have been other incidents that have resulted in the loss of life under suspicious circumstances.  For example, in June, 1995 the body of Mr. Ousman "Koro" Ceesay, then the country's Finance Minister was found in his burnt-out car.  Despite allegations that Mr. Ceesay's death was murder, and that the burning of his car and body was staged, the Jammeh government has yet to conduct a proper investigation of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Ceesay's death.
 
In addition to Mr. Ceesay, others who have lost their lives under suspicious circumstances under Jammeh's rule include the head of his own security detail.  Thus, in November, 1995, the army barracks in Farafenni were attacked by a anti-Jammeh elements, resulting in the loss of 6 lives.  In addition, an incident at the Kartong army camp in 1997 also resulted in the death of at least 1 soldier.  And in Dec., 1999, the head of Jammeh's own security guards was killed while he was allegedly on his way to his office in preparation to launch a coup against Jammeh.  A second victim of this incident was a suspected soldier who was pursued by Jammeh loyalists, and shot in broad daylight in Banjul's main market.  Yet another alleged plotter was wounded, and arrested in a gun-fight  The country still awaits his trial.
 
The fates of the above mentioned victims of Jammeh's rule should not be surprising, in light of the fact that he has gone on record as saying that he will put his opponents "6 feet below ground."  Such irresponsible talk is not only typical of Jammeh, it has also become his trademark method of intimidating people opposed to him.  And in the event anyone doubts him, he once in while makes good on the threat.
 
Almost no one is exempt from Jammeh's excesses, and those of his officials.  Thus, it was this past Jan. that a 11-year old student died from injuries he sustained from beatings he suffered at the hands of Fire fighters who had been called to the school to maintain order.  In addition, a 13 year-old girl was raped by a uniformed security person, who has yet to be accosted.  These incidents prompted students to demonstrate their anger, and protest against the killing and rape of their own by Jammeh's forces.
 
The demonstrations that the Gambian students embarked on April 10 were met with typical savagery by Jammeh's security forces.  They opened fire on the students, killing 13 of them, along with a journalists who was shot at the Red Cross premises, while he was working as a volunteer, to help the wounded.  Students in other parts of the country also took to the streets on April 11, and again, the Jammeh forces responded with lethal force, killing at least one (and reportedly more) of the students.
 
To be sure, the students demonstrations were also marked by destruction of property (mostly government offices and facilities), but from all indications, the rampage against government properties happened AFTER the students were shot by the security forces.  To add insult to injury, the reaction of government officials has been to blame the students, claim that their forces did not use live bullets, and thank the security forces for handling the situation well.  This after all these students, and a journalist lost their lives.
 
While an inquest in the April 10 and 11 killings have started, and this is to be commended, it is also worth noting that the Jammeh government continues to turn a deaf ear to pleas for a full and thorough investigations of the deaths of the likes of Mr. Ousman "Koro" Ceesay, and the soldiers that died in the November, 1994 "coup attempt."
 
Even though there have been specific allegations made against the Edward Singhateh, and Yankuba Touray (both currently serving in the Jammeh government), there have been no attempts to address these allegations.  If anything, it seems that the closure of the online forum on which the allegations were first posted, was an indication of the government's sensitivity to any attempts at reviving talk about these killings.  It must be noted, however, that it would be hypocritical for the Jammeh government to pick and choose which killings to investigate because in the end, all victims are equally deserving of justice.
 
2.3.  Abuse of Human Rights and Press Freedom
Jammeh governments also has a remarkable record of abusing human and democratic rights and press freedoms.  Thus, the 1999 Amnesty International Annual Report on The Gambia stated that the government detained at least 20 prisoners of conscience, and at least three prisoners were reported to have been tortured.  In addition, Decree 89, which banned politicians active before the 1994 coup is still in effect.  The Decree was introduced by the military before the transfer of power to civilian rule, and has been used by the APRC government to prevent their opponents from contesting elections in the Gambia.  In addition, opposition party members and officials have been beaten by Jammeh supporters and/or arbitrarily arrested by Jammeh's security forces.
 
Jammeh has also abused and trampled on the democratic rights of Gambians.  Thus, while he ensured that the revised Gambian constitution was tailored to enable people younger than 40 years (including him), the same constitution barred many Gambians from contesting elections or holding elected office simply because they were former officers of political parties that existed during Jawara's rule.  Furthermore, the same constitution granted Jammeh and other officials of the AFPRC government immunity from prosecution for acts they committed while in office.
 
The killing of Omar Barrow, the Gambian journalist who died last month in the demonstrations was the latest example of Jammeh's high-handedness against the Press in The Gambia.  Even though he proclaimed, on coming to power in July 1994, that his was going to be an administration with a difference, and one that was open to criticism, the policies of both his AFPRC and APRC governments have been exactly the opposite of those pronouncements.  For example, in Oct. 1993, the APRC government deported Mr. Kenneth Best, the owner and founder of the country's first daily newspaper, The Daily Observer for being critical of them.
 
In addition, many other Gambian and non-Gambian journalists have been subjected to arbitrary detention by Jammeh's government.  A number of these arrests and other forms of  government high-handedness against the Gambian Press were reported in the 1999 review by the International Press Institute (IPI) of Press Freedom in The Gambia.  For example, Citizen FM, a private radio station deemed too critical of the government was closed on the basis of a 1913 law that the government selectively applied.  Furthermore, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) have arrested many Gambian journalists on numerous occasions, and deported non-Gambian journalists.
 
2.4.  Corruption
President Jammeh also is yet to provide a satisfactory response to a number of allegations of corruption and embezzlement on his part, or those of his officials.  First, there have been allegations that a $35 million loan from The Republic of China (Taiwan) to The Gambia was diverted to private accounts.  In addition, President Jammeh was named as the beneficiary of $3 million deposited in a Swiss bank account by one Capt. Ebou Jallow, who has since resigned from the Gambian army, and now lives in exile in the US.  While most of the $3 million was recovered, and returned to the Gambian treasury, the issue of the $35 million from Taiwan is still unresolved.
 
In April, 1999, Chantrils SA, a subsidiary of Swiss-based oil traders Glencore, successfully sued the Gambian government in London's High Court for breaching a contract to sell crude oil on behalf of The Gambia.  According to documents made public in the trial, Chantrils SA contracted to sell 20,000 (twenty thousand) barrels of Nigerian crude oil a day on behalf of The Gambia, and deposit the initial payment, and proceeds in an account at United Overseas Bank, in Geneva, Switzerland.
 
The oil was contracted from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to The Gambia, and supposedly as a reward from the late General Sani Abacha to President Jammeh for standing by Abacha when the rest of the world condemned his dictatorship, and killing of Ken Saro Wiwa.  The contract to lift Nigerian oil lasted from August, 1996 to June, 1998, when General Abacha died.  Also, the oil was sold by Chantril SA for $0.20 (twenty cents) per barrel at a time when, according to the United States Energy Information Agency, the landed cost of Nigerian crude oil varied from $14 to $20 per barrel, or between 70 and 100 times more than what Chantril SA paid for the oil.
 
Furthermore, the Gambia government was represented in the contract by a Senegalese national, Samuel Sarr, who testified in court that he was given a Gambian diplomatic passport, and asked by President Jammeh to report directly to him in matters relating to the oil deal.  To this day, President Jammeh has brushed off questions about the oil deal, and any talk about where the money went.  The trial in the UK concluded with a fine against the Gambia government, even though from all indications, the Gambia government never received any money from the proceeds of the sale of the oil.
 
It is particularly important that President Jammeh and his government is made to answer to these allegations of corruption.  With a per capita GNP of $350, the sums of money that have been allegedly swindled by President Jammeh and his officials are simply too much to be ignored.  Furthermore, in a period when there is a strong and growing campaign to write off debts owed by poor countries like The Gambia, it only makes sense that the Jammeh government fully accounts for these sums they were alleged to have stolen, before The Gambia is considered eligible to debt relief, and indeed other forms of development assistance.
 
2.5.  Other Issues
Besides incompetence, the killings, abuse of human and democratic rights, trampling Press freedom, and corruption, there are other significant issues that warrant a speedy and peaceful end to President Jammeh's government.  First, even though The Gambia is a secular, multi-religion, and  multi-ethnic society, President Jammeh as actively promoted the use of Islam in his official duties, and frequently quotes verses from the Quran in his public speeches.  Furthermore, he has gone to the extent of building a mosque on State House grounds; an act that is potentially divisive, and at least insensitive to the feelings of the Gambia's non-Muslim population.
 
President Jammeh's role in the sub-region should also be another reason to end his rule in The Gambia.  Given that The Gambia practically divides Senegal in two, and that there presently is festering a separatist war in Cassamance, Senegal's southern part, it is imperative that a Gambian President help bring about peace.  President Jammeh, instead, has had a rather suspicious relationship with the separatist movement in Cassamance, and according to some, has in fact been their supporter.
 
Senegal recently concluded two rounds of free, fair, and open democratic elections that resulted in a peaceful transfer of power from one civilian President to another.  The historic moment was not lost on observers in the sub-region, and indeed the world over.  These elections have without doubt made Senegal a shinning example to other African countries, and also a bastion of democratic values in Africa.  That President Jammeh might be contributing to the destabilization of Senegal should be a cause for concern to all interested in maintaining peace, and fostering progress in the Sub-region.
 
3.  FRAMEWORK FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER
The April 10 and 11 killings in The Gambia are the latest in a series of tragedies that have befallen The Gambia since Jammeh came to power in July, 1994.  In the aftermath of these killings, many people have suggested ending Jammeh's rule in The Gambia, to prevent the country from plunging into the war and strife that have befallen countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia.  This paper is one of the many ideas forwarded by Gambians the world over about how to bring about change in The Gambia.  The main premise of the proposed framework for change presented in this paper is that in the end, the end to Jammeh's rule should be peaceful, and ensure that there will be no more military governments in The Gambia.  Furthermore, the proposal aims to find common ground between what might at first glance seem like irreconcilable positions taken by pro-Jammeh, and anti-Jammeh forces in the Gambian political equation.
 
Toward this end, it is proposed herein that in order to preserve the peace in, and integrity of The Gambia, President Jammeh should immediately resign from his office, and hand-over power to a National Unity Government that will supervise the next general elections.  In addition, the national unity government will conduct impartial investigations into last Aprils killings in The Gambia, as well as other outstanding allegations of abuse of power and other crimes leveled against President Jammeh and his officials.
 
In return for agreeing to step down immediately, President Jammeh and his officials will be offered amnesty and immunity from prosecution from crimes they might have committed while in office provided that they cooperate fully with truth and reconciliation investigations into allegations against them.  Anyone found to have embezzled public funds will be required to return all the money they embezzled.  Furthermore, people will be encouraged to help the investigations by offering them a percentage of embezzled funds they have provided information about, and helped the government to recover.
 
The proposed framework for a peaceful transfer of power from President Jammeh also provides for compensation to the surviving victims, and families of deceased victims of Jammeh's government actions.  Furthermore, compensation will be offered not only to those who were opposed to Jammeh's rule, but ALL victims, and/or their families, irrespective of which side they were on.
 
It is hoped that the proposed framework will appeal to the best intentions of all Gambians.  Without doubt, almost every proposal will be opposed by one group or the other.  However, it is hoped that in the end, all Gambians will be able to put their personal animosities and grudges aside, and agree to a workable compromise not because that's what they like, but because it would be what's best for The Gambia.
 
Finally, this paper presents options to take in the event President Jammeh and his government are not interested in compromising, and working toward a peaceful resolution of the grave leadership crisis faced by The Gambia.  In that unfortunate event, there will be a concerted effort by various Gambian groups around the world to bring the record of the Jammeh government to the world's attention, with a view toward imposing sanctions that will effectively cripple the government.  Furthermore, these efforts will also be aimed at ensuring free, open, and fair general elections next year, and ensuring that opposition parties are adequately funded to launch a credible campaign against President Jammeh in the 2001 general elections.
 
3.1.  Proposals
    i)  President Jammeh and his cabinet agrees to resign, and hand-over power to a National Unity Government (NUG), comprised of different political parties, and interest groups
    ii)  The head of the NUG will agree to step-down after the Presidential elections next year; and by implication, will not contest the elections him or herself
    iii)  In exchange for handing over power, President Jammeh and his Cabinet will be accorded the following:
        a.  Immunity from prosecution for any and all crimes committed while in office
        b.  A life-time pension, based on their current salaries
    iv)  The above immunities and pension-plans shall be contingent on:
        a.  An agreement by President Jammeh, his Cabinet, and past associates to participate in a truth-and-reconciliation commission to investigate crimes they have been accused of
        b.  An agreement by President Jammeh and his Cabinet to refrain from committing any further crimes AFTER the ratification of the amnesty agreement
        c.  An agreement by President Jammeh and his Cabinet to return any state monies deemed to have been illegally acquired while in office
        d.  An Act of the Gambian Parliament to ratify the agreement
    v)  Families of all victims of violent incidents during President Jammeh's reign will be given benefits based on the victims salaries at the time of their deaths, or their potential earnings had they lived.
 
3.2.  Alternatives
It is possible that President Jammeh, and/or his officials and supporter would not agree to handing over power to a transition National Unity Government.  In that case, the alternatives for dealing with the Jammeh government include internal programs, and global efforts geared toward educating the Gambian public, crippling the Jammeh government, and enabling opposition parties to launch effective campaigns in the next general elections.
 
The internal programs that can be initiated include public education programs in the mass media (where possible), and alternative means such as cassette tapes.  In addition, concerted efforts will be made to ensure that the Jammeh administration is crippled by cutting-off any help it has been getting from friendly governments such as Libya, Taiwan, and Cuba.  These efforts will be in addition to a global public relations campaign against the Jammeh government, and organized through individual efforts, Gambian organizations around the world, and in partnership with interested non-governmental organizations, human rights and democracy groups.
 
Finally, various governments and development agencies will be lobbied to ensure that all financial, and material assistance to President Jammeh's government ceases.  In particular, governments around the world will be provided with a list of top Jammeh government officials that should be banned from International travel.  In addition, the Gambian military and security forces will be a target for implementing sanctions against.  The aim would be to deny them training facilities, scholarships, materiel and spare parts as long as they are being used by President Jammeh to stay in power.
 
4.  HELP NEEDED FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Despite the fact that Jammeh governments have been noted for being international pariahs, the poverty of The Gambia means that any Gambian government must rely heavily on international assistance.  According to the UNDP Human Development Report 1999, official development assistance accounted for 10% of The Gambia's GNP in 1997, compared to an average of 6.7% for Sub-Saharan Africa.  This shows that The Gambia is more dependent on international assistance than many other African countries.  Thus, the Jammeh government would be particularly vulnerable to a comprehensive, coordinated, and well thought-out effort by the International community to force it to either transfer power peacefully, or at least abide by internationally-accepted standards of behavior.
 
Toward this end, the signatories to this paper will work with foreign governments, development organizations and agencies, as well as human rights organizations for them to help ensure a prosperous and secure future for The Gambia by:
 
     i)  exerting pressure on Jammeh to agree to a peaceful change of government
    ii)  ending disbursement of funds for the Jammeh government
    iii)  ending supplies of arms, and assistance to the Gambian military and security forces
    iv)  urge other governments, development agencies and organizations to exert pressure Jammeh, and/or to stop supporting his government
    v)  helping strengthen democracy in The Gambia by providing opposition groups and independent local media with material and financial assistance
 
5.  REFERENCES
Amnesty International Publications and News Releases on The Gambia (1996 - present)(http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/countries/indx127.htm)
International Press Institute.  1999 World Press Freedom Review - Gambia. (http://www.freemedia.at/archive97/gambia.htm)
Saine, A.  The military and "democratization" in The Gambia: 1994-2000 in "Liberalization and Democracy in Africa." John Mbaku (Editor) (forthcoming)
U. S. Department of State.  Human Rights Reports for 1999 - Gambia. (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/gambia.html)
United Nations Development Programme.  Human Development Report 1999. (http://www.undp.org/hdro/99.htm)
 
6.      Signatory Organizations
 
--------------------------------------------  End of appended paper  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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May 2017, Week 3
May 2017, Week 1
April 2017, Week 5
April 2017, Week 4
April 2017, Week 3
April 2017, Week 1
March 2017, Week 5
March 2017, Week 3
March 2017, Week 2
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January 2017, Week 2
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December 2016, Week 5
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December 2016, Week 3
December 2016, Week 2
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November 2016, Week 3
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May 2016, Week 3
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April 2016, Week 2
March 2016, Week 2
February 2016, Week 2
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January 2016, Week 4
January 2016, Week 3
January 2016, Week 2
January 2016, Week 1
December 2015, Week 5
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November 2015, Week 5
November 2015, Week 1
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October 2015, Week 4
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October 2015, Week 2
September 2015, Week 5
September 2015, Week 4
September 2015, Week 3
September 2015, Week 1
August 2015, Week 1
July 2015, Week 4
July 2015, Week 3
July 2015, Week 2
July 2015, Week 1
June 2015, Week 4
June 2015, Week 3
June 2015, Week 2
June 2015, Week 1
May 2015, Week 4
May 2015, Week 3
May 2015, Week 2
May 2015, Week 1
April 2015, Week 5
April 2015, Week 4
April 2015, Week 2
April 2015, Week 1
March 2015, Week 4
March 2015, Week 3
March 2015, Week 2
March 2015, Week 1
February 2015, Week 4
February 2015, Week 3
February 2015, Week 2
February 2015, Week 1
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January 2015, Week 3
January 2015, Week 2
January 2015, Week 1
December 2014, Week 5
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December 2014, Week 3
December 2014, Week 2
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October 2014, Week 1
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September 2014, Week 2
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August 2014, Week 3
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July 2014, Week 3
July 2014, Week 2
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June 2014, Week 5
June 2014, Week 4
June 2014, Week 3
June 2014, Week 2
June 2014, Week 1
May 2014, Week 5
May 2014, Week 4
May 2014, Week 3
May 2014, Week 2
May 2014, Week 1
April 2014, Week 5
April 2014, Week 4
April 2014, Week 3
April 2014, Week 2
April 2014, Week 1
March 2014, Week 5
March 2014, Week 4
March 2014, Week 3
March 2014, Week 2
March 2014, Week 1
February 2014, Week 4
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December 2013, Week 5
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December 2012, Week 5
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July 2012, Week 2
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June 2012, Week 3
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June 2012, Week 1
May 2012, Week 5
May 2012, Week 4
May 2012, Week 3
May 2012, Week 2
May 2012, Week 1
April 2012, Week 5
April 2012, Week 4
April 2012, Week 3
April 2012, Week 2
April 2012, Week 1
March 2012, Week 5
March 2012, Week 4
March 2012, Week 3
March 2012, Week 2
March 2012, Week 1
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February 2012, Week 3
February 2012, Week 2
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December 2011, Week 5
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November 2011, Week 1
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October 2011, Week 3
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October 2011, Week 1
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September 2011, Week 3
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December 2010, Week 5
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December 2009, Week 5
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April 2009, Week 1
March 2009, Week 5
March 2009, Week 4
March 2009, Week 3
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December 2007, Week 5
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June 2007, Week 1
May 2007, Week 5
May 2007, Week 4
May 2007, Week 3
May 2007, Week 2
May 2007, Week 1
April 2007, Week 5
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April 2007, Week 1
March 2007, Week 5
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March 2007, Week 3
March 2007, Week 2
March 2007, Week 1
February 2007, Week 4
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February 2007, Week 1
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December 2006, Week 5
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September 2006, Week 3
September 2006, Week 2
September 2006, Week 1
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August 2006, Week 3
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August 2006, Week 1
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July 2006, Week 4
July 2006, Week 3
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July 2006, Week 1
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June 2006, Week 1
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May 2006, Week 3
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April 2006, Week 3
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April 2006, Week 1
March 2006, Week 5
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