While the new electronic voting systems offer independent access for the
first time to the blind and the print impaired, serious questions are
being raised about their security.  In a new book, "Black Box Voting:
Ballot-Tampering in the 21st Century", it is revealed that Diebold places
the source code of its voting machine software on a publicly accessible
unsecured website.  There is no paper audit trail to verify the accuracy
of the machines. No one except the machine companies examines and tests
the source code and checks for system integrity.  States allow voting
machine companies to upgrade software at will without even testing it
themselves.  The machines have lost or miscalculated thousands of votes
in a particular race, resulting in awarding the election to the wrong
candidate when the election was not a close race.  More information is
below in the Washington Post article and at:

http://www.blackboxvoting.com/

Are we not sacrificing our democracy in the rush for accessibility?

Kelly


The Washington Post

March 28, 2003

    New Voting Systems Assailed

    By Dan Keating

As election officials rush to spend billions to  update the country's
voting machines with electronic systems, computer
scientists are mounting a challenge to the new devices, saying they are
less reliable and less secure from fraud than the equipment they are
replacing.

    Prompted by the demands of state and federal election reforms,
officials in Maryland, Georgia, Florida and Texas installed the
high-tech voting systems last fall. Officials in those states, and other
proponents of electronic voting, said the computer scientists' concerns
are far-fetched.

    "These systems, because of the level of testing they go through, are
the most reliable systems available," said Michael Barnes, who oversaw
Georgia's statewide upgrade. "People were happy with how they operated."

    In Maryland, "the system performed flawlessly in the two statewide
elections last year," said Joseph Torre, the official overseeing the
purchase of the state's new systems. "The public has a lot of confidence
in it, and they love it."

    But the scientists' campaign, which began in California's Silicon
Valley in January, has gathered signatures from more than 300 experts,
and the pressure has induced the industry to begin changing course.

    Electronic terminals eliminate hanging chads, pencil erasure marks
and the chance that a voter might accidentally select too many
candidates. Under the new systems, voters touch the screen or turn a
dial to make their choices and see a confirmation of those choices
before casting their votes, which are tallied right in the terminal.
Recounts are just a matter of retrieving the data from the computer
again. The only record of the vote is what is stored there.

    Critics of such systems say that they are vulnerable to tampering,
to human error and to computer malfunctions -- and that they lack the
most obvious protection, a separate, paper receipt that a voter can
confirm after voting and that can be recounted if problems are
suspected.

    Officials who have worked with touch-screen systems say these
concerns are unfounded and, in certain cases, somewhat paranoid.

    David Dill, the Stanford University professor of computer science
who launched the petition drive, said, "What people have learned
repeatedly, the hard way, is that the prudent practice -- if you want to
escape with your data intact -- is what other people would perceive as
paranoia."

    Other computer scientists, including Rebecca Mercuri of Bryn Mawr
College, say that problems are so likely that they are virtually
guaranteed to occur -- and already have. Lost and Found Mercuri, who has
studied voting security for more than a decade, points to a November
2000 election in South Brunswick, N.J., in which touch-screen equipment
manufactured by Sequoia Voting Systems was used.

    In a race in which voters could pick two candidates from a pair of
Republicans and a pair of Democrats, one machine recorded a vote pattern
that was out of sync with the pattern recorded elsewhere -- no votes
whatsoever for one Republican and one Democrat. Sequoia said at the time
that no votes were lost -- they were just never registered. Local
officials said it didn't matter whether the fault was the voters' or the
machine's, the expected votes were gone.

    In October, election officials in Raleigh, N.C., discovered that
early voters had to try several times to record their votes on iVotronic
touch screens from Election Systems and Software. Told of the problems,
officials compared the number of voters to the number of votes counted
and realized that 294 votes had apparently been lost.

    When Georgia debuted 22,000 Diebold touch screens last fall, some
people touched one candidate's name on the screen and saw another
candidate's name appear as their choice. Voters who were paying
attention had a chance to correct the error before finalizing their
vote, but those who weren't did not.

    Chris Rigall, spokesman for the secretary of state's office, said
that the machines were quickly replaced, but that there was no way of
knowing how many votes were incorrectly counted.

    In September in Florida, Miami-Dade and Broward counties had a
different kind of vote loss with ES&S touch-screen equipment: At the end
of the day, precincts that reported hundreds of voters also listed
virtually no votes counted. In that case, technicians were able to
retrieve the votes from the machines.

    "If the only way you know that it's working incorrectly is when
there's four votes instead of 1,200 votes, then how do you know that if
it's 1,100 votes instead of 1,200 votes? You'll never know," said
Mercuri.

    Because humans are imperfect and computers are complicated, said Ben
Bederson, a professor of computer science at the University of Maryland,
mistakes will always be made. With no backup to test, the scientists
say, mistakes will go undetected.

    "I'm not concerned about elections that are a mess," Dill said. "I'm
concerned about elections that appear to go smoothly, and no one knows
that it was all messed up inside the machine."

    "We're not paranoid," said Mercuri. "They're avoiding computational
realities. That's the computer science part of it. We can't avoid it any
more than physical scientists can avoid gravity."

    The Miami-Dade and Georgia terminals were reprogrammed right up
until the eve of the fall elections. The last-minute patches don't go
through sufficient review, Mercuri said, and any computer that can be
reprogrammed simply by inserting an update cartridge cannot be
considered secure or reliable.

    Dill said hackers constantly defeat sophisticated protections for
electronic transactions, bank records, credit reports and software.
"Someone sufficiently unscrupulous, with an investment of $50,000, could
put together a team of people who could very easily subvert all of the
security mechanisms that we've heard about on these [voting] machines,"
he said.

    People who have sold or administered electronic voting systems,
however, say the scenarios of fraud or widespread, election-changing
error were not of the real world. 'We'd Detect It' Howard Cramer, vice
president for sales at Sequoia, one of the nation's largest suppliers of
electronic voting systems, noted that his company has been supplying the
systems for a decade and a half. "Our existing approach is verifiably
accurate, 100 percent," he said. "Some of the things they're saying are
flat-out wrong. Some are conceivable, but outside the likelihood of
possibility."

    The designer of Georgia's security system, for example, said nobody
could insert a secret program to steal an election when the machines are
created, because no one even knows at that time who the candidates will
be, and the only people with access to the machines at the last minute
are local officials.

    "They're talking about what they could do if they had access to the
[computer program] code, if we had no procedures in place and no
physical security in place," said Brit Williams, a computer scientist at
Kennesaw State University. "I'm not arguing with that. But they're not
going to get access to that code. Even if they did, we'd detect it."

    He also said that Georgia's patch was checked before it was
installed and did not affect the tallying of votes. And no one, he said,
could reprogram Georgia's terminals by inserting a cartridge.

    "On our machine, the port is in a locked compartment. The only
person in the precinct who has a key to that locked compartment is the
precinct manager. [Critics are] looking at it from a purely computer
science point of view, saying the system is vulnerable, and it would be
vulnerable if we let anyone walk up and stick a card into it, but that
doesn't happen."

    After Dill launched his campaign, officials in the Silicon Valley
county of Santa Clara delayed a purchase of 5,000 touch-screen voting
machines. Despite insisting that their systems are reliable and secure,
the nation's leading vendors all immediately agreed to provide paper
receipts, and the California secretary of state announced a task force
to review the security concerns. A month ago, Santa Clara went ahead
with its $20 million purchase, insisting that receipts be provided once
the state approves the new equipment.

    Georgia and Maryland officials said that providing paper receipts
may create more problems than it solves -- that paper would have to be
transported and monitored with security, and printers could jam. Cramer
of Sequoia said paper is unnecessary, costly and may pose a problem for
blind voters.

    But if customers want receipts, he said, his company will supply
them. And Williams said receipts may have a place in the system. "The
advantage of a hard piece of paper -- one that a voter would hold in his
hand and say, 'That is who I voted for' -- that is psychological, and
there certainly is value to that. We need public confidence in our
elections," he said.

    Similarly, the official overseeing Maryland's program would accept
paper if it were available.

    "I've been doing voting systems for 15 years," Torre said. "I don't
care if they give voters a piece of paper or not. If they come out with
a receipt, that's fine. Maybe with the momentum out of California, we'll
have receipts before too long."


VICUG-L is the Visually Impaired Computer User Group List.
To join or leave the list, send a message to
[log in to unmask]  In the body of the message, simply type
"subscribe vicug-l" or "unsubscribe vicug-l" without the quotations.
 VICUG-L is archived on the World Wide Web at
http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/vicug-l.html