This is a continuing of my earlier e-mailing titled Answering Eric--Part
I.

I agree with David that the most important part of transference is
intrapsychic, but it seems to me that to deny the external reality of
the other person entails an implausible solipsism which drastically
reduces the clinical usefulness of the concept.

{Jim Duffy} I wonder if David really intended to go this far. He
qualified his statement by saying "analytically speaking" when defining
another person. It seems plausible that David did not mean to endorse an
implausible solipsism so much as address the topic of self-analysis form
the standpoint of explaining how one could do a self-analysis (and a
self-analysis is, so to speak, something of a solipsistic enterprise
insofar as one must examine one's own internal objects). However, I
share with Eric an unwillingness to go along with theorists who would
indeed endorse solipsism with reference to obliterating the reality of
another person in deference to constucting an exclusive intrapsychic
reality.
........................
Eric continued:

Can everyone at least agree that defining transference as "distortion"
does not imply that reality is knowable altthough it does imply that
reality is "fixed" in the sense of existing independent of other minds?

{JD} I can agree that "distortion" does not imply reality is knowable,
as I explained in Part I. And I agree that even the word "reality"
implies it is something "fixed" as in "existing independent of other
minds."
...............
Eric continued:

Another person's beliefs and feelings are obviously not independent of
the person's own mind, but their reality does not depend on what other
people think and feel. I also agree with David that nobody can be
certain about what is distortion either in the analyst's or patient's
beliefs in the ongoing therapeutic interaction, but analyst and patient
should each try to make the best assessment.

{JD} And it worth noting that this lack of certainty, or dubiety, exists
in degrees depending on the situation and the amount and nature of the
evidence available for formulating beliefs about reality. Some
assertions of distortion are highly plausible and worthy of adoption by
all concerned. Some are highly implausible, except as metaphors for
something else, of course. And some are just plain one person's willful
version of reality doing unreasoning combat with another's for reasons
unrelated to the assertion itself.
..............
Eric continued:

Part of the therapeutic value of analyzing the transference is learning
how distortion arises in this relationship as a way of changing
relationships outside of analysis. "Distortion" in an interpersonal
relationship is another name for misunderstanding or misinterpretation.
Can anyone reasonably deny that misunderstandings can occur? The concept
of misunderstanding has no meaning in the absence of some concept of
reality to which a belief may or may not correspond.

{JD} Right on..."to which a belief may or may not correspond." Some
beliefs are more susceptible to error than others. And although all
beliefs are susceptible to error, the likelihood of error can in many
practial matters be regarded as essentially nsignificant (e.g., I am not
for all practical purposes likely to be in error in asserting that I am
not a frog and probably never will be either a frog or in error in this
matter).

The matter of HOW LIKELY one's assertion is to be a better or worse
approximation to truth is the central issue, and a decision in this
matter requires careful attention to the evidence and the rationale each
participant in a misunderstanding is using to arrive at beliefs about
reality.

But sometimes it even matters very little who is in fact closer to
reality when the evidence and rationale are unsubstantial. Often what
matter more in these instances is whose version of reality is better at
serving as a problem-solving algorithm.

Jim Duffy




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