You say,
"My point, drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, is that when you are
dealing with things involving personal perceptions, their truth is
established by their correspondence to where they reside, how they came
about, etc.  Our objective then is to understand those perceptions and
their underlying bases, to find common points of reference and thereby
achieve understanding.  It may be extremely useful to know how well
these personal perceptions are grounded on externally or mutually
verifiable points of reference, but it is much more important to
understand the personal construction of perceptions.  This is usually
better accomplished with sympathetic understanding rather than external
verification.  The patient's perceptions may be far more important than
the actual reality of an event.  In other words, from the point of view
of healing, the externally verifiable truth or falsity of incest, for
example, is far less important than the personal perception that it
occurred."
 
My answer: I have a small collection of books on Wittgenstien whose meanings are
notoriously difficult to decipher. Your statement that "the externally
verifiable truth or falsity of incest, for example, is far less important than
the personal perception that it occurred" captures what I believe is most
theoretically important in the Masson controversy as I will try to show in
another posting by quoting Janet Malcolm in some detail.  When you say, "when
you are dealing with things involving personal perceptions, their truth is
established by their correspondence to where they reside, how they came
about, etc." it seems to me you again espouse the doctrine of "controversial
relativism" (or whatever label you choose).  In my view (and I believe that of
most philosophers in the Anglo-American Analytic tradition) the truth of a
statement depends on its correspondence to its referent (this is a necessary
simplification) and has nothing to do with "how they came about."  When I
describe my claim as a "simplification," I don't mean that this affects the
validity of the claim.  Philosophers who argue various truth theories
(correspondence, coherence, pragmatic etc) all agree that the outcome of of the
debate would have no effect on science--i.e. would not change what scientists
believe is true or false.
 
I believe the "Masson controversy" helps to demonstrate the importance of theory
(good theory can make treatment more helpful and bad theory can harm patients).
I recommend the chapter "The Memory Wars" in "Searching for Memory" by the
eminent memory researcher Daniel Schacter (1996 Basic Books).  I am not
questioning the importance of "psychic reality," but I believe that a widespread
disregard for reality itself has severely damaged the reputation of
psychoanalysis as exemplified by therapists who in the courtroom have proclaimed
that only the patient's psychic reality is of importance.  The fatal error in
this position resides in the failure of these therapists to be aware of their
own role in creating this reality, a reality that was sometimes false and
extremely damaging to patients and their families.  I acknowledge the immense
importance of psychic reality but believe reality is of equal importance. Why is
it necessary to choose?  Why not study both and their interrelationships?