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Subject: Pambazuka News 309: African Unon: Towards continental government?
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PAMBAZUKA NEWS 309: AFRICAN UNON: TOWARDS CONTINENTAL GOVERNMENT? (1)

The authoritative electronic weekly newsletter and platform for
social justice in Africa

Pambazuka News (English edition): ISSN 1753-6839

Pambazuka News is the authoritative pan African electronic weekly
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cutting edge commentary and in-depth analysis on politics and current
affairs, development, human rights, refugees, gender issues and
culture in Africa.

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CONTENTS: 1. Highlights from this issue, 2. Announcements, 3.
Features, 4. Comment and analysis

Support the struggle for social justice in Africa. Give generously!

Donate at: http://www.securegiving.co.uk/donate_to/fahamu.html



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1 Highlights from this issue

FEATURED THIS WEEK

SPECIAL ISSUE

TOWARDS CONTINENTAL GOVERNMENT?

PART 1
HAKIMA ABBAS introduces this special issue on continental government
KWAME AKONOR asks whether continental government is simply stuffing
old wine in new bottles
FAIZA MOHAMED looks at union government from the perspective of women
in Africa
SOAWR coalition issues a policy brief
TAJUDEEN ABDUL RAHEEM calls out for common citizenship for all Africans


PART 2 (coming tomorrow)
L. MUTHONI WANYEKI argues that more time is needed to ensure popular
participation in discussions about unity
SELOME ARAYA argues for a stronger role for the African diaspora
ROTIMI SANKORE says we need action on health and unity of the living,
not of the dying or dead
TIM MURITHI looks at how we got to where we are in the great unity
debate
ROUND-UPS: links to previous articles on African unity and to
interviews with activists about their fears and aspirations



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2 Announcements

SPECIAL ISSUE IN THREE PARTS

Firoze Manji

This week, to coincide with civil society meetings being launched in
Accra, Ghana, in the run up to the African Union (AU) Summit on
Continental Government, we publish a special issue of Pambazuka News.
Given the large number of articles and issues addressed, we will be
sending out Pambazuka News in three parts. Part 1 and Part 2 will
contain the main articles on the topic, and will be sent out,
respectively, today (Thursday), and tomorrow (Friday). Part 3, the
Links and Resources section, will contain some of your usual
favourites, letters to the editor, as well as the summaries of useful
websites. Thanks for your understanding.



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3 Features

TOWARDS CONTINENTAL GOVERNMENT?

Hakima Abbas

The United States of Africa is a notion cherished in the minds of Pan-
Africanists from the continent to the diaspora. The proposal
currently on the table at the African Union is elaborated in the
'Study on an African Union Government Towards the United States of
Africa'. Few critics entirely dismiss the principle of regional
integration, but across Africa there is huge variance in the vision
of a united Africa. As a contribution to a public debate on the
proposals for continental government, we publish a special issue of
Pambazuka News providing perspectives from a range of activists and
intellectuals.


'Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest
forces for good in the world. I believe strongly and sincerely that
with the deep-rooted wisdom and dignity, the innate respect for human
lives, the intense humanity that is our heritage, the African race,
united under one federal government, will emerge not as just another
world bloc to flaunt its wealth and strength, but as a great power
whose greatness is indestructible because it is built not on fear,
envy and suspicion, nor won at the expense of others, but founded on
hope, trust, friendship and directed to the good of all mankind.' -
Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah

The United States of Africa is a notion cherished in the minds of Pan-
Africanists from the continent to the diaspora. Coined during the
decolonisation period by liberation leaders and activists seeking the
unity of Africa through political, economic and social integration,
in 2007, the concepts and debates around the United States of Africa
are seeing a rebirth at the African Union (AU). In June, a 'Grand
Debate on the Union Government' will be the sole focus at the African
Union Heads of States Summit. Symbolically held in Accra, Ghana, as
the country celebrates its 50th year of independence marked by the
ascent to presidency of one of the worlds leading Pan-Africanists,
Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah, the grand debate is based on the proposals
coordinated by the committee of seven championed by Libya, Uganda and
Nigeria.

The proposal currently on the table at the African Union is
elaborated in the 'Study on an African Union Government Towards the
United States of Africa'[1] . The Proposal underlines the need for
common policy standards, harmonised approaches and joint trade,
investment and development negotiations while underscoring the values
of the rule of law, respect for human rights as well as popular and
transparent governance as those that should underpin the Union
Government. Proponents of a potential federation consider that
regional integration will enable Africa to address the common
challenges of political and economic exploitation, food insecurity,
internal conflicts, amongst others, by empowering the continent with
a united, self-determined voice and negotiation capacity that will
wield due influence in the global context.

Few critics entirely dismiss the principle of regional integration
but across Africa there is huge variance in the vision of a united
Africa. Some claim that, given the failure of African nation building
at a state level, as is manifested in a lack of democratic
participation, civil wars, lack of development and widespread human
rights violations among others, the United States of Africa is a
dream that must be pursued, but can never be attained until each
state is strengthened. Others still criticise the current proposal as
too tempered to create any significant change to the realities for
the people of Africa.

The study considers the establishment and implementation of Union
Government in three phases, with a fully operational Union Government
and the constitutional framework for a United States of Africa
established by 2012. The Union Government would be composed of an
Executive Council with a President and Vice President appointed by
the Assembly for a term of six years and with commissioners appointed
by the Executive Council. A legislative parliament would be elected
by direct and universal adult suffrage with proportional representation.

While the participation of African peoples is envisaged through the
African parliament and Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the
African Union (ECOSOCC) consultations, which the proposal enshrines
in all Assembly deliberations, the voice of the people most directly
affected by potential regional integration have been barely heard, as
African policy makers prepare themselves for the Grand Debate. Yet,
the rhetoric of the African Union claims the vision of 'an Africa
driven by its own citizens' [2].

The strategy for such a people-driven union has yet to be formulated
or implemented sufficiently to sincerely suggest that the proposal
and debate on a Union Government and United States of Africa are
guided by the vision of the people of the continent. The African
Union has, since its inception, been didactic, with decisions being
made with little consultation. African CSOs and citizens have little
access or understanding of the AU and its organs, so have limited
opportunity to meaningfully participate. While the ECOSOCC provides a
potential avenue for the voice of the people to contribute to AU
decision making, the body is yet to be an influential force. The gap
between regional policy makers and the people of the continent have
serious implications for implementation of decisions and regional
accountability.

In order to strengthen civil society and citizen engagement with the
African Union and its organs, Fahamu established the AU-Monitor. The
AU-Monitor provides relevant, high quality and timely information and
analysis that enables meaningful participation of citizens in the
debates of the African Union and facilitates civil society advocacy
and policy setting. Recognising the potentially inadequate
popularisation and engagement of citizenry in the Grand Debate on the
Union Government at the Heads of States summit, the AU-Monitor has
been soliciting articles, news and analysis by a variety of
stakeholders with a range of perspectives.

This publication is a selection of the articles and interviews that
have contributed to the on-going debate, which we hope will assist in
catalysing the full potential of a people-driven, united Africa.

In this special issue, Tim Murithi provides a historic framework for
the institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism. He assesses the role of
civil society in contributing to the union government debate. Kwame
Akonor asks whether the African Union and its processes of regional
integration are simply the same rehashed endeavours that were tried
and failed at the Organisation of African Unity, and proposes means
of constructively overcoming these challenges.

Demba Moussa Dembele examines the external and internal challenges
faced by Africa in the global context and questions whether the
current African leadership is capable of building a United States of
Africa. Muthoni Wanyeki highlights the reasons for the current
impetus toward a union among Africa's leadership and explores the
implications of the union on the AU, outlining the challenges to the
union project while setting out conditions for its success. While
Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem reflects on the common citizenship anticipated
within a federation and underscores the importance of the potential
for realised freedom of movement on the continent, Faiza Mohamed
explains why a gender perspective is important in analysing the
perceived groundbreaking benefits of a federation which ignores the
realities faced by African women. She raises the importance of
placing women's economic empowerment at the forefront of the
actualisation of Africas growth and development.

Addressing some of the questions raised by Abdul-Raheem about 'who is
African', Selome Araya talks about the inclusion of the diaspora in
the framing of regional integration, defining Africa as a history
rather than a geography. Kisira Kokelo, Issa Shivji and Gichinga
Ndirangu address the economic and developmental implications of a
union government. Shivji draws on the experiences of regional
cooperation in East Africa to address some of the potential pitfalls
of regional economic and political integration. Eyob Balcha
underscores the critical social aspect of integration. Finally, in an
important contribution to the debate, Sanou Mbaye presents a concrete
plan of action for federal government and calls for self-determined
action toward a unified Africa.

'Pan Africanism is the fullest expression of our struggle today and
our greatest building base is Africa. We must sensitise the member-
states and push them to action. We must press for a public opinion
that is pan Africanist at a continental level', Alpha Oumar Konare,
Chairman of the African Commission, on the importance of the proposal
for a Union Government, January 2007.

[1] To download the study please visit http://www.africa-union.org/
report.htm [2] Vision and Mission of the African Union, May 2004.

* Hakima Abbas is Fahamus Policy Analyst for AU-Monitor initiative
* Please send comments to [log in to unmask] or comment online at
http://www.pambazuka.org

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STUFFING OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES?

Kwame Akonor

While the futuristic idea of an African superstate is a necessary and
desirable alternative to the contemporary reality of an Africa of
states, the political union of African states can only come to
fruition if the lessons of the OAU's failures are fully mastered. The
AU will continue in the foreseeable future to be an important vehicle
for addressing the continent's numerous projects, argues Kwame
Akonor. But the AU cannot empower and develop Africa, nor guarantee
Africa's collective security or provide a common platform for
Africa's collective diplomacy, if the AU remains the way it is today.


'A bunch of broomsticks is not as easily broken as a single stick' –
African proverb.

As the African Union (AU) enters its fifth year of existence, it is
rather fitting that it has devoted its annual summit to be a 'Grand
Debate on the Union Government'. Since its inception on 9 July 2002,
at Durban, South Africa, there have been conflicting perspectives on
the AU's role in Africa's development. Africa's political elite, and
supporters of the AU, generally argue that the new institution would
enhance the economic, political and social integration and
development of African people. A great deal of Africa's civil society
however are not so optimistic: they perceive the AU as a mere
continuation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) under a
different name.

This essay argues that while the futuristic idea of an African
superstate is a necessary and desirable alternative to the
contemporary reality of an Africa of states, the political union of
African states can only come to fruition if the lessons of OAU's
failures are fully mastered.

At the heart of the OAU's failings was not so much a structural as an
ideological shortcoming. The OAU lacked a cohesive ideology that
could provide the proper situational interpretation of the African
context. Ideologies not only rationalise and explain the reasons for
a given situation; they also provide strategies toward future goals.
(Zartman, 1966, p. 38). What the OAU lacked then was an ideology
capable of rationalising and explaining Africa's balkanisation,
dependency and underdevelopment, and an ideology capable of providing
strategies that would guarantee and enhance Africa's power, prestige
and progress in the postcolonial era.

Which ideology is capable of filling this vacuum? Pan-Africanism!
Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1986) defines Pan-Africanism as an ideology with a
cognitive component that recognises all African peoples, both in
Africa and the diaspora, as being of one folk or nation, as a result
of a shared cultural identity, a shared historical experience, and an
indivisible future destiny (p. 391). And he goes on to argue, that
the most fundamental goal of Pan-Africanism is the commitment to the
collective empowerment of African peoples, wherever they are (p.
391). Thus, it must be quickly added that calling oneself Pan-
Africanist does not make one so, and being of African descent does
not automatically make a person a Pan-Africanist. Indeed, most of the
OAU founders of yesteryear, and the AU founders of today, label
themselves Pan-Africanist, without any appreciably clarity and
commitment to the ideology of Pan-Africanism.

By rejecting the brand of Pan-Africanism advocated by the Casablanca
group, the OAU at its birth, consciously or not, gave its blessings
to the colonial political and economic formation - together with its
ideological and cultural systems. Indeed, the final curse of African
independence, and the OAU's ascendancy, was that it solidified the
balkanisation and dependency inherited from colonialism. The problem
was compounded when the Casablanca group rather than opting out of
the OAU decided to remain in it, perhaps for fear of isolation.
Ghana's Nkrumah, a staunch advocate of the Casablanca thinking, on
arrival from the OAU's inaugural summit even remarked triumphantly
that 'the political unification of the African continent, my lifelong
dream, is finally here'. (cited in Rooney, 1988, p. 223).

But of course, this was not the case; his Pan African ideal of a
continental African government had been soundly rejected. And it also
did not help much that none of the 22 countries, newly independent
since the OAU's founding, refused to join. Some newly independent
countries joined the OAU merely for geographic reasons, well aware of
the organisation's impotence. Eritrea, OAU's last but one newest
member, when joining the OAU in 1993 declared: 'we are joining the
OAU not because of your achievement, but because you are our African
brothers (Afeworki 1993). According to Eritrea's Issaias Afeworki,
membership of the OAU was 'not spiritually gratifying or politically
challenging [because] the OAU has become a nominal organization that
has failed to deliver on its pronounced goals and objectives'.
(Afeworki 1993). Nevermind that the OAU had failed to support
Eritrea's bloody 30-year struggle for independence (the continent's
longest civil war) from Ethiopia, incidentally the seat of the OAU
headquarters.

Not surprisingly, the OAU became a geographical entity with no
geopolitical weight. It forged a unity that further deepened the
political marginalisation, economic dependence, and cultural doubt of
the continent; the very antithesis of Pan-Africanism. The lesson here
is that a union cannot be effective without ideological uniformity or
unity of purpose. For while it is necessary for all Africa and
Africans to unite, there is no point to this project if the result is
a united Africa with divergent and confusing perspectives on the
goals of unity, or a united Africa where consensus on a shared
African worldview is elusive.

From a Pan-Africanist perspective therefore, it is better to have a
united, empowered and independent Africa, comprising some African
states, rather than to have a united, but weak and dependent Africa,
comprising of all African states.

The old patterns persist

Unfortunately, like the OAU before it, an overwhelming majority of
the AU's founding members, eschew any genuine commitment and
seriousness to the Pan-African ideal of an empowered African
superstate that would increase the capacity of Africans to take
direct control of their destinies. The preference for the status quo
was made apparent during the Sirte Summit in September 1999, when
African leaders, once again, retreated from the continental
government thesis. While Libya's Qathafi (1999) argued passionately
for a transformative entity, in the form of a confederation of
African states, as a 'historical solution' to the continent's
numerous problems, an overwhelming number of his fellow African
leaders remained deeply skeptical about his vision of a 'United
States of Africa'.

Qathafi's plea that African leaders 'give up a little bit of their
sovereignty in the interests of the whole of Africa' was not even
entertained as a realisable goal (Pompey 2000; Rosine 1999). The
leaders of Egypt, Kenya and Uganda spoke for many when they said
publicly that the idea of an African superstate was premature
(Kipkoech 1999; Rosine 1999). Granted, Qathafi's Arabic persuasion
may predispose him to use non-African cultural perspectives, rather
than an African centred paradigm, as a basis for defining a better
world vision. Be that as it may, his call for an African superstate,
like that of the Casablanca bloc of the 1960s, is a central pan-
africanist strategy to achieving collective power in the contemporary
international system.

Needless to say, the AU that was created has limited authority and
coercive powers capable of changing the behavior of member states.
Furthermore, since its ideological underpinnings does not promise the
eventual collective acquisition of power, the AU cannot be expected
to significantly transform the lives of Africans for the better. When
we consider the AU's current efforts in the areas of security,
economics, and politics, it becomes obvious, but not surprising, that
these are contrary to the fundamental goal of Pan-Africanism.

In the area of security and the preservation of peace, the formation
of a single African High Command is considered central to the
fundamental Pan-Africanist objective of collective empowerment.
First, it is logical from a Pan-Africanist perspective to have one
army to manage conflicts on the continent and to maximise the power
of Africa, relative to other actors, in the international system.
Africa has a combined 3,500,000 men and women in its armed forces, a
number that any power bloc would be forced to reckon with. Secondly,
an African High Command would help to reduce the military
expenditures of individual African countries and divert such
expenditures to much needed social services. Taken together, African
countries spend in excess of US$20 billion annually on the military.
A significant reduction in such spending would result if Africa had
an efficient joint force and a central command. However, Muammar Al
Qathafi's call, since 1975, for abolishing national armies to create
a single African army has been constantly rebuffed by his
counterparts. The last time his idea was rebuffed was at the AU's
extraordinary summit in March 2004.

At this summit, a watered down version of Qathafi's single army
proposal, based on the maintenance of each African state's
independence and sovereignty, was created instead. The creation of
the African Standby Force (as this force is known) represents a
marked departure from the OAU days. However there are numerous
problems with its structures, important amongst these are: the lack
of mechanisms to counter unilateral action of strong member
countries; the non-veto power decision making structure; and the
selection and inclusion of conflict prone countries as force members.
Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmed Maher, later told reporters after
the AU Summit that delegates rejected the Qathafi's proposal because
'Africa is not ready yet for this [single African army] idea' (quoted
in Pitman 2004).

Regarding economics, the strategies and programs pursued by the AU
and its member states indicate continued reliance on international
capital and the uncoordinated development of individual national
economies. No real attempt has been made to achieve continental
African economic unity despite the obvious economic wisdom of such an
approach. The observation by Green and Seidman (1968), almost four
decades ago, is still true today:

'Africa as a whole could provide markets able to support large-scale
efficient industrial complexes; no single African state nor existing
sub-regional economic union can do so. African states cannot
establish large-scale productive complexes stimulating demand
throughout the economy as poles of rapid economic growth because
their markets are far too small. Instead the separate tiny economies
willy-nilly plan on lines leading to the dead ends of excessive
dependence on raw material exports and small scale inefficient
'national factories' at high costs per unit of output. Inevitably,
therefore, they fail to reduce substantially their basic dependence
on foreign markets, complex manufactures and capital.' (Green and
Seidman, 1968, p. 22)

It should be noted that the specific economic policies pursued by the
majority of African states are determined largely by the
International Monetary Fund and other international financial
institutions (IFIs), who demand explicit commitments from governments
to implement remedial policies that the IFIs deem essential to the
continued disbursement of loans. The impact of these structural
adjustment conditionalities, while mostly negative, compromises the
economic autonomy of African countries.

The AU's economic blueprint, the New Partnership for Africa's
Development (NEPAD 2001) does not veer off the path traveled by the
individual African member states: it too sees international capital
and the separate development of national economies as a panacea.
NEPAD has serious flaws, too many to list here (for a concise
critique, see Taylor and Nel 2002).

From a Pan-Africanist viewpoint however, NEPAD's biggest failing is
that it does not sufficiently recognise African peoples as partners
for, and of, development. As it stands now, NEPAD is an appeal to the
goodwill and benevolence of the industrialised countries for aid and
investment. Even so, NEPAD is an elite driven process that provides
no means for mobilising the African masses for real development. The
AU's interest in securing international capital and maintaining neo-
colonial relationship with the West, (rather than pursuing genuine
inter-African cooperation), led the authors of NEPAD to consult first
with the G8 industrialised countries, before African governments had
had a chance to discuss it amongst themselves and with their own
people. There is even talk of constructing a tunnel linking Africa
with Europe.

Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade (2002), one of the authors and
spokesperson for NEPAD has said: 'NEPAD plans to construct a tunnel
linking Africa to Europe under the Mediterranean Sea from the
northern tip of Algeria through to Gibraltar.'

What about a much needed railroad or highway linking the continent,
from Algiers to Antananarivo? The fact that NEPAD was conceived by a
small group of African leaders, without any input from the masses,
coupled with the rush to the G8 (G8 2002) for the programe's
endorsement, made several AU leaders question the wisdom of the
entire enterprise. One such critic was Gambia's president, Yahya
Jammeh, who said: 'People are sick and tired of African beggars.
Nobody will ever develop your country for you. I am not criticising
NEPAD, but the way it was conceived to be dependent on
begging' (Lokongo 2002, p. 18).

Needless to say, NEPAD, as presently constituted, has the potential
of dividing, not unifying, Africa: The G8, on which the AU relies for
the programme's major funding, has already made it clear that it
would only help African countries 'whose performance reflects the
NEPAD commitments' (G8 2002). Western nations can thus pick and
choose which AU member states are deserving of assistance, and those
that are not. The overall effect would not be a stronger Africa. At
best, it would reward individual African countries for good
behaviour. Thus one cannot expect NEPAD to transform Africa from its
disarticulated, dependent and underdeveloped status.

When it comes to politics, it has been established that the AU's
founding majority has no desire for a supranational political entity
that would lead to a full and complete African unity. Africa today
therefore does not have one state to represent it or a single voice
to articulate its concerns in the international system; hence no
power. Also, the political map of African remains a sacred cow
despite the fact that Africa's 165 demarcated borders (the world's
most fragmented region) have in of themselves become the basis of
many African conflicts. Unfortunately, Article 4(b) of the AU
Constitutive Act, like Article 3(3) of the OAU charter before it,
affirms these colonial demarcations.

The AU should amend the principle of inviolability of the colonial
borders and negotiate new boundaries that have more meaning for
Africans. It must be borne in mind that the carving up of Africa in
1884 was not meant to unify, but rather to divide the continent.
These are by no means easy political choices, but African leaders
have to confront them before any real chance of optimising Africa's
power can be realised.

Politically, it seems what binds the AU is a professed commitment to
democracy and good governance. Even on this score, the AU's efforts
so far have, at best, been confused. This is because the AU has no
established criteria on what constitutes 'good governance' or
'democracy', beyond the minimalist procedural requisites of free and
fair elections.

At its inaugural launch in July 2001, the AU barred Madagascar from
the new organisation and refused to recognise Ravalomanana as
Madagascar's new president, citing the contentious nature of the
elections and the unorthodox way Mr. Ravalomanana consolidated his
'victory'. The AU maintained that it would admit Madagascar only if
fresh presidential elections were held. That the AU showed resolve
early, on a key principle on which it was founded is noteworthy. But
it appears, in this particular case, that the resolve shown was not
carefully thought through. Madagascar's Supreme Court ruling that
Ravalomanana's victory and government were legitimate, coupled with
dissent among AU members on the issue, should have given the AU pause
and deep reflection on its decision.

Not long after AU's decision, several African countries (Senegal,
Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Libya and the Comoros islands) broke ranks
with the AU and endorsed Ravalomanana's government – so much for
Africa speaking with a single voice! The AU did a face saving U-turn
and recognised Ravalomanana the following year, a move which no doubt
has cost AU some credibility, especially since no new presidential
elections were held.

In any case, on the democracy question, the AU does not have much
credibility to begin with: African leaders do not easily give up the
reins of power, and represent some of the world's longest-serving
presidents. The following sample proves the point: Gabon's Omar Bongo
Ondimba has been at the helm of his nation for 40 years. Libya has
been under Muammar Al Qathafi for 38 years. Angola's Jose Eduardo dos
Santos has 28 years under his belt. Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe has been
in power for 27 years.

If the AU were serious about democratic values and good governance,
membership of that body should not have been automatic, but rather,
granted on merit or a set of political criteria. For example, the
basic membership prerequisites of the European Union (after which the
AU is modelled) has three basic thematic criteria - political,
economic and institutional - also known as the Copenhagen Criteria),
where the political criteria directs the applicant country to achieve
stability of its institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

What the AU needs now is clear and consistent guidelines on what it
considers to be the consent of the governed and enforcement
mechanisms to ensure strict compliance. Ideally, the democratic
principles advocated must be compatible with the values and practices
of the African society.

More than Pan-Africanism

Aside from the lack of, and/or commitment to, a transformative and
empowering ideology based on Pan-Africanism, the OAU did not
flourish, due to operational failures caused by a lack of popular
legitimacy, administrative bottlenecks and financial stress. I will
only discuss here the issue of popular legitimacy.

A major hurdle to the OAU's efficacy was that it was a state-centric
elite political organisation that did little to involve the average
African in its operations and decision making. Consequently, it had a
flag and an anthem that no one saluted or recognised, and an Africa
Day that was hardly celebrated.

As indicated, the AU promises citizen involvement and participation.
Especially the Pan African Parliament (PAP) holds promise of broadly
representing the African citizenry. Though in its first five years of
existence, the Pan African Parliament is to have advisory and
consultative powers only. A lot more can be done to make it an
effective body by 2007, when it assumes legislative functions.

First, the PAP representation should be broadened with respect to
gender, the African diaspora constituency and cross-national party
coalitions. The seat currently allocated to women members in the PAP
now stands at 20 per cent. This can be said to be a good beginning,
however, there is room for improvement as this 20 per cent quota is
10 per cent less than that which the Fourth UN Conference on Women
urged as minimum for women parliamentarians. While it is true that
representation of women in African national parliaments is scarce, it
is not unreasonable to increase their quota, especially if we
consider the fact that African women hold the keys to Africa's
overall development.

Next, is the issue of diaspora representation. Following a proposal
by the Senegalese government that diaspora Africans be considered the
'Sixth Region' of Africa, the AU has been working on the
institutional development of the African diaspora in organs. This is
a move in the right direction, toward the pan-africanist goal of an
empowered African collective at the global level.

The challenge the AU faces is to clearly define the criteria for
membership of the African diaspora, its rights, duties and
privileges. The African diaspora constituency must be accorded real
and tangible (and not merely symbolic) membership. Their
representation in the PAP will signal that the AU is serious in its
efforts to integrate the continent and the diaspora.

A final area where PAP representation can be made more inclusive is
to provide mechanisms that allow the development of continent-wide
political groupings, as opposed to national parties now envisaged for
the PAP. Should this occur, the PAP members could form coalitions
along ideological and tactical directions such as workers, pan-
Africanists, liberals, socialists, conservatives etc.

Conclusion

The AU will continue, in the foreseeable future, to be an important
vehicle for addressing the continent's numerous projects. But the AU
cannot empower and develop Africa, nor guarantee Africa's collective
security, nor provide a common platform for Africa's collective
diplomacy if the AU remains the way it is today: bereft of a genuine
commitment to Pan-Africanism and an empowered African superstate.

Moving beyond this status quo would require, amongst other things,
leaders who share a pan-Africanist commitment, and who are willing to
engage the African citizenry in a search for solutions that preserves
Africa's independence and dignity: strategies which reflect Africa's
image and interests. As we have seen, much work must be done before
the dream of the collective empowerment of all African peoples comes
true; until then, the dream of African unity remains only a mirage.

(See http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/42077 for full
list of references)

*Dr. Kwame Akonor is director of the African Development Institute
(ADI), a New York based think tank that advocates self-reliant and
endogenous development policies for Africa. He is also Assistant
Professor of International Relations at Seton Hall University, and
acting Chair of the Africana Studies Department. The full text of
'Stuffing Old Wine in New Bottles: The Case of the Africa Union' will
be published in Africa in the 21st Century: Toward a New Future
edited by Ama Mazama (Routledge 2007).
* Please send comments to [log in to unmask] or comment online at
http://www.pambazuka.org

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4 Comment and analysis

CONTINENTAL GOVERNMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF WOMEN

Faiza Jama Mohamed

Before African governments can win the confidence of African women
that they will deliver on huge projects like a continental
government, they must first come up with a plan for the
implementation of the articles of the Protocol on the Rights of Women
in Africa, argues Faiza Mohamed. African leaders should get rid of
all the customary practices that continue to limit women's potentials
as a necessary step for continental government.


Barely two weeks from the time of writing, African heads of state and
government will be meeting for their 10th ordinary summit in Accra
for a grand debate on the prospects of creating a government of
African states. In the build up to this historic debate, civil
society organisations have been vigorously consulting and busy in
awakening public interest in the matter with a view to maximising the
African public's participation in the discussion about the added
value of having one government for Africa. Sadly, time has been
short, and African leaders are moving ahead with their debate without
greater input from the African peoples that they represent. This
brief article is an attempt to bring some of the concerns African
women would like their African leaders to consider in their striving
for a United African States (UAS).

One of the advantages of a UAS that has been highlighted a lot is the
free movement of peoples and goods throughout the continent. While
the dismantling of artificial boundaries created by colonial powers
long ago would be a great welcome to the peoples of Africa, and
especially those who were hindered from freely connecting with their
relatives living on the other side of the border, women in the Upper
Volta region of Ghana who are held bondage under the traditional
practice of Trokosi share no joy in this potential euphoria over free
movement in the continent.

For those who do not know of this practice, trokosi in the Ewe
language means 'slaves of the gods'. What this tradition entails is
that families who have commited crimes have to give away their virgin
daughters to priests, so that the gods will be pleased and forgive
them of their crimes. There are two categories of trokosi – those who
can be released after serving a specified number of years (usually
three to five years) and those who are committed for life. If a girl
dies or if the priest tires of her, her family has to replace her.
For serious crimes, families give up generations of girls in
perpetual atonement. In accordance with the tradition, a trokosi who
is released can never be married because she is married for life to
the god.

Many released trokosi hence remain in concubinage to the priest for
the rest of their lives and when he dies his trokosi are passed on to
his successor. Women and girls who are victims of this practice know
of no freedom of their minds and bodies, let alone freedom to travel
in their villages. For them, free movement in Africa, as championed
in the continental government proposal, will bring no comfort.

Though Ghana has passed a law in 1998 criminalising the trokosi
practice, hundreds of girls and women are believed to be still held
in several shrines. It is ironic that discussion on African unity is
being discussed in Ghana where women and girls are being held as
slaves for life. The African leaders should include seriously looking
into and abolishing practices such as trokosi that enslave women and
girls and infringe on their dignity and well-being.

Another advantageous point highlighted in the continental proposal is
how Africa will be in a stronger position in trade agreements with
non-Africans; and how this will bring greater benefits to the peoples
of Africa. By and large, women remain the majority of those tilling
Africa's productive lands, and thus are responsible for produces that
feed Africa and beyond. Alas they remain the poorest with no control
over the lands they till and the crops they harvest.

For the African peoples to prosper, it is necessary that African
leaders take the logical action to get rid of all the customary
practices that continue to limit women's potentials to inherit and
own land. As they deliberate on serious discussion on ways to realise
the United African States, they also need to recognise the need to
have a roadmap for placing women's economic empowerment in the front
for actualisation of Africa's growth and development.

In July 2003, our African leaders adopted the protocol on the rights
of women which aims to address the many injustices that African women
suffer from, including those discussed here, and which reduce their
potentials to effectively contribute to the development and wellbeing
of the African population. Four years later, only 21 countries (39
per cent) out of the 53 member states of the African Union have
ratified it.

The majority of the member states are lagging behind in their
commitment to women to enjoy the rights recognised in the protocol,
which stands for the minimum standard of rights that African women
would accept and so in their Accra deliberations the African leaders
need not only to reaffirm their commitment to uphold the rights
provided in the protocol but to also declare that it will be the
premise from which African women's rights will be advanced. For them
to win the confidence of African women that they can undertake and
deliver on huge projects like a continental government, they must
first come out with a plan for the implementation of the articles of
the protocol throughout the continent within a one year period. A
United African States will be possible ifAfrica's women are with you!

* Faiza Jama Mohamed is the Africa Regional Director of Equality Now
and convener of the Solidarity for African Women's Rights (SOAWR)
coalition.

* Please send comments to [log in to unmask] or comment online at
http://www.pambazuka.org

SOAWR POLICY BRIEF ON CONTINENTAL GOVERNMENT

Solidarity for African Women's Rights

The 9th Assembly of the African Union Heads of States and Governments
will convene in July 2007 in Accra, Ghana under the theme, 'The Grand
Debate on the Union Government'. It is significant that the debate
takes place nearly two years after the ratification of the African
Union Protocol to the Charter of African Women's Rights, and three
years after the adoption of the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality
in Africa, which reaffirms the commitment of African states to
advance the agenda of gender equality. Both instruments provide a
critical framework to address the rights of women and girls in
Africa. To date 21 countries have ratified the protocol on women's
rights, leaving 32 yet to ratify.The delay in ratification of the
protocol by member states of the union undermines the universal
achievement of continental standards on women's rights.

In the proposal of the Union Government lies a long held vision to
consolidate African unity, and an affirmation of the quest to unite
Africa's peoples across shared values and rights. Unfortunately,
across the continent, the status of women continues to deteriorate
under war and conflict, deeply rooted economic inequality, repressive
undemocratic regimes, domestic violence and trauma, harmful cultural
practices and poverty. In spite of the continental instruments for
change, women's rights remain elusive.

At the heart of the union debate must be a commitment to unite
Africa's people across gender by upholding respect for women's rights
and equality of opportunities for both men and women.

Specifically, the African Heads of States and Government meeting in
Accra should show commitment to continental unity by embracing the
following:

•       Incorporation of gender equality in the values underpinning the
Proposal of United States of Africa.
•       Instituting and making public during the next Summit a performance
audit of the Directorates of the African Union Commission in terms of
the incorporation of gender concerns (2004-2007).
•       Prioritisation of the rights and entitlements of refugees and
displaced populations, particularly women and girls.
•       Prioritisation of full citizenship status for women in terms of
rights, particularly women who marry across nationalities and lose
their rights.
•       Guarantee to women the freedom to trade and work across states'
borders. Women small traders manage a high degree of non-formal cross
border trade.
•       Embedding the principle of gender parity in the election and
appointment of persons to the continental institutions.
•       Ensuring that the 50 per cent of women commissioners at the African
Union Commission is continued to be honoured.
•       Increasing the minimum threshold for women MPs elected to the
African parliament to at least two per country.
•       Publicly censuring countries that have yet to ratify the Protocol
on the Rights of African Women.
•       Honour their commitment to deliver on the Solemn Declaration on
Gender Equality in Africa.

The debate on the Union Government is timely, but it will only be
relevant in as far as it recognises that the majority of the African
people are women and girls; and that to win their confidence African
leaders need to seriously take up their concerns head on.

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THE DEMAND FOR COMMON CITIZENSHIP

Tajudeen Abdul Raheem

Any serious talk of building a United States of Africa must begin
with the need to guarantee full citizenship rights to all Africans,
and the complimentary freedoms to move, settle, work and participate
in the political processes anywhere they may be, argues Tajudeen
Abdul Raheem. This is the only thing that would convince us that our
leaders are serious.


I want to begin this in a personal way because the issues we are
dealing with are not theoretical or rhetorical. They are about our
rights and dignity as a people. They are too important for us not to
recognise them as validating 'the personal is political' dictum made
famous by the women's movement.

I am blessed with two daughters who are growing up in the United
Kingdom. They became British citizens at birth, in spite of the fact
that their mother and myself were only British residents when they
were born. Both girls enjoy all the rights and entitlements of
British children in terms of free and compulsory education from
nursery through to secondary education and up to university, if they
so choose. They are also entitled to prescription free medicine until
they are 16. In some sense the sky may be their limit in terms of
individual ambitions. Of course, like every other British child, they
will have to deal with racial, religious, class and other prejudices
as they grow up, and deal with them as and when necessary, especially
racial discrimination.

If they had been born in a majority of our countries the fact of
being children of residents does not automatically mean that they
qualify for the citizenship of the country in which they were born.
The circumstances of their birth, which they did not choose, becomes
a disadvantage from which they will never be able to escape for all
their lives. At the height of the state sponsored Anti Ban Yarwanda
(in practice Anti Tutsi) during the Obote 2 regime in Uganda, one of
his xenophobic ministers reportedly declared: 'does the fact that a
Sheep was born in a Kraal make it a cow?', continuing that 'a
Muyarwanda born in Uganda even if he or she dies and is buried in
Uganda remains a Muyarwanda'. In this type of mindset and the legal
and political regime constructed on it, identity becomes a prison,
from which a person will never escape. There is nothing wrong in a
Muyarwanda remaining a Muyarwanda all their lives, but if that
identity is now used to justify discrimination against the person,
marginalise them and deny the right to full participation in the
economic, social and political affairs of the country then it is no
longer a question of origin but politics and power.

This is the common practice across this continent. In order to
disclaim and disempower people, we first deny them their right to
citizenship. It is an affirmation of the negative: 'not belonging' or
'not one of us'. Even those to whom we can not deny those rights,
because we cannot prove that their parents or grandparents come from
another country, we proceed to the second default position:
'settlers' , i.e. not indigenous/ancestrally to that area, even if
they are from other parts of the same country. So the same Ugandans
will argue that a Muchiga from Kabale born and brought up in Kabarole
or Hoima are settlers, because their ancestors do not originate from
Toro or Bunyoro.

Nigerians have perfected this type of discrimination by requiring on
official forms declaration of STATE OF RESIDENCE and STATE OF ORIGIN.
The former may, given the decades, and in some cases, centuries, of
internal migration, not reveal the ethnicity of the person, but the
latter certainly will. Origin requires stating your ancestry where
your parents or grandparents or even great grandparents come from. It
means that third generation or more of Igbo, Kalabari, Hausa,
Itsekiri and other non Yoruba Nigerians in Lagos may still be
regarded as 'foreigners', just as several generations of Yorubas or
Igbos in northern Nigeria will be branded 'non indigenes' with
serious implications for their citizenship rights, access to state
resources and political participation.

There is no worse time for these denials of rights to come to the
fore than during elections. All British residents from the
Commonwealth, including temporary residents like students could vote
in British elections, yet Africans born and brought up in different
African countries, many of them with no knowledge or experience of
the other country, can neither vote nor be voted for in many
countries of birth. Elections are supposed to be exclusively 'for
indigenes' but even among the so called 'indigenes' the right to
participate is often limited to voting for those Nigerians called
'sons of the soil' (and they are always 'sons' because patriachy
disempowers women in land and other property). So somebody of Igbo
ancestry may vote in Lagos, but he or she will face enormous
prejudice if he or she decides to stand for public office because,
despite being a melting pot of all kinds of peoples including other
West Africans and descendants of freed slaves from Brazil, somehow
Lagos is still believed to be a Yoruba place, and has to be
represented by 'proper Yoruba' . The ridiculous thing about this
narrow indigeneity is that an overwhelming majority of the Yorubas
who now claim Lagos as theirs were migrants from other parts of the
Yoruba inter-land! Similarly if someone of Yoruba or Igbo origin, no
matter how distant, decides to become governor or legislator in Kano
(another city built out of free flow of peoples from all corners of
the Sahel and Nigeria, and also Arabia due to the trans-Saharan
trade), he or she will be reminded that he/she does not belong.

In Kenya, where I now reside, there is by far greater excitement,
speculation and confidence among Kenyans about the chances of Barrack
Obama winning the Democratic nomination and proceeding to becoming
the first Black President of the USA than you will find among
American voters themselves. All because his late father was a Kenyan.
But ask the same Kenyans about the chances of Raila Odinga, a
frontrunner for the presidential candidature of the opposition ODM-
Kenya, many of them will declare bluntly: no way, he can't make it,
he is Luo. But so was Obama's father, therefore Barrack is, by our
immutable patriarchal genealogy, a Luo. Why are we enthusiastic about
a Luo man becoming the president of the USA, but give no chance to a
fellow Luo who wants to be president of Kenya where majority Luo
people reside? It is alright in America, but somehow not kosher here
in Kenya. If Obama does not get the nomination many Africans will put
it down to racism. So what is it when we discriminate against fellow
Africans in countries where the bulk of the population are Africans?

Part of the excuses (not explanations, mark you) you get when
discussing the Raila presidential ambitions is that he comes from a
minority ethnic group and that there was no way the majority Kikuyu
will allow it. In the same breath you will be assured that whoever
Raila supports may win. So you get this contradictory position of
Raila (and Luos) forever playing the role of kingmakers, never to be
kings themselves.

A situation whereby whole groups of fellow citizens are reduced to
playing second class roles cannot lead to a viable democratic
society. If you ask many Nigerians about the chances of someone from
the oil-producing Niger Delta becoming president of the country they
will give you all kinds of evasive answers. But behind it all is the
unwritten law that the presidency of the country belongs to a certain
dominant group, almost in perpetuity, despite the fact that these
majority groups are parasites on resources that come predominantly
from minority areas.

It is only when talking about oil that many Nigerians become very
nationalistic, and accuse anyone who asks for sensitivity towards the
people, from whose shores the Black Gold flows, of wanting to break
up Nigeria. Some Nigerians even argue that the oil producing states
already get more than enough share of the oil resources from the
central government and challenged them to show what they have done
with it.

The wider question is: what have the governments of Nigeria done with
the resources of the country? If the leaders hah used the resources
for the benefit of the great majority of the citizens, the issue will
not have become as politicised and polarised as it has become. Of
what value is being a Nigerian to most of the peoples in the Niger
Delta who have continued to harvest death and destruction from the
oil resources in their areas. It is dodging the question to accuse
them of separatism. No country should be a catholic marriage, in
which there cannot be the possibility of divorce.

The possibility of divorce does not mean that all marriages will end
in one. What will make people voluntarily show their loyalty and
commitment to any political community is their level of security,
confidence and identification with it as stakeholders who know that
the state will be there for them to protect them and defend their
interests.

It is the absence of these that has made many of our states
illegitimate in the eyes and practice of many Africans. And that is
why every little thing threatens these states.

What can be done? We can not run away from the problems of
citizenship on this continent anymore. As we discussed during the
launch of the Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative (CRAI) in
Kampala recently, millions of Africans are today victims of the
arbitrary denial of citizenship and consequent statelessness.

A situation in which Africans with non-African citizenship can feel
more secure and exercise full rights of political participation in
their adopted countries than in many of our countries has to be
reversed immediately.

To return to the case of my daughters, the prejudices and
discrimination they will face In many African countries may not just
be because their parents were residents, or settlers. The fact of
both of their parents coming from different countries will not be a
bonus, but another disadvantage. They may not have automatic right to
their mother's citizenship. In fact in some countries their mum may
not take them to her home country without their father's 'permission'
because the father 'owns' the children!

Many African women married to other Africans from different countries
suffer discrimination both ways: punished for not marrying wisely! At
home they will foreignise them, and in the country of their husbands,
they remain foreigners. Show me any country in Africa where a Sonia
Ghandi could be leading even a minor political party, no matter who
her husband may have been.

The first thing we need to do is to reconcile our states to the
diversity of our peoples by giving African citizenship to all
Africans wherever they may be.

I know that a number of questions will be posed, the principal one
being 'who is an African?' A simple answer will be any citizen of any
African country no matter how that citizenship was acquired including
ancestry, indigeneity, settlement, marriage, naturalisation and any
other legally recognised means. Another question will be 'where does
the African diaspora come in?' They will qualify under ancestry but
also voluntary naturalisation.

Some countries have adjusted to granting dual or multiple
citizenship, but only for remittance purposes in most cases. Because
of the growing role that remittances from Africans abroad play in
holding families and communities together, many countries now
recognise the right of their citizens to have other citizenship,
therefore abandoning the previous 'either' 'or' exclusion. But even
here, there is a catch: dual citizenship is often assumed to be one
of African citizenship and a European or north American one. For
someone like me who was born Nigerian and have had a Ugandan passport
for more than ten years, there were always suspicions among
immigration and security officials. Somehow it is alright for an
African to hold Western passports but deemed 'odd' to be a dual
African citizen. This further goes to prove that we continue to treat
ourselves as foreigners.

The granting of African citizenship will not automatically solve all
the problems of ethnicity, racism, exclusionism and intolerance. What
it will set is a new and more inclusive legal and political framework
for us to deal with these problems as equal members of a shared
political community without anyone of us feeling superior or
inferior, or at the mercy of other citizens. It will be like being
members of the same family. No matter how much you may dislike your
brother or sister, cousin or uncle, when it comes to family affairs
you all have equal right of participation. There is an African saying
that no matter how close a friend may be, the day we want to worship
our ancestors he or she has to excuse himself or herself.

Whatever problems there may be, we can then resolve them among
ourselves. And if we cannot, we will learn to understand and manage
them without the threat of opponents being foreignised and declared
stateless.

Any serious talk of building a United States of Africa that does not
begin from this fundamental reconfiguration of our legal and
political status within such a state will be doomed from the start.
The continuing challenges to regional and continental integration for
the past 50 years since independence from colonialism largely stem
from the anomaly of seeking to unite our artificial states while
keeping our peoples apart.

In West Africa, which has had free movement for three decades, it is
still common to find citizens of other West African countries
'deported' and routinely harassed and victims of extortions by
various security, intelligence and immigration officials at various
border points and inside West African countries.

The problem is not with the right to move freely but the lack of
political will to take further complementary steps to make regional
citizenship real for the peoples of the region. These will include
faster progress on regional liberalisation and harmonisation of
trade, financial and commercial transactions within the region. In
spite of free movement market traders, the famous West African market
women, who keep their families, communities and the whole region
going through their micro enterprises are still subjected to all
kinds of extortion at border points in a way that criminalises intra-
regional trade. Instead of saluting and encouraging these 'cross
border' traders as the Pan Africanist entrepreneurs that they are, we
criminalise them as 'smugglers' and euphemistically call their
exchanges 'informal sector' , 'second sector' or 'parallel market'.

Yet the truth is that the majority of our peoples survive directly or
indirectly in these sectors. Any Pan Africanist economist who is not
allowing theory to confuse him or her can easily see that this is the
real African economy. It is the state sector that needs to give way
to the real thing and find ways of collecting the taxes that are
currently going into private pockets at our various corruption
extortion posts called borders.

The East Africa Community in its steady march towards the creation of
a federation seem to be unlearning some of its own previous effort
and learning well from the challenges in the ECOWAS region. It is
merging freedom of movement with complimentary whittling down of
barriers to trade, finance and commerce and removing all kinds of
unnecessary bureaucratic bottle necks. For instance, a visa for non
community citizens and residents to one of the countries is now valid
for re-entry from all the three countries and very soon Rwanda and
Burundi too. It also has a legislative Assembly and regional court
that are potentially more powerful than what is available in the
ECOWAS and also the Pan African Parliament.

If the leaders of Africa want to be taken seriously and silence the
cynicism that has continued to dominate any discussion about the
African Union, they need to demonstrate they have the required
political will and are ready to use them to deliver a truly people-
driven union.

One major area that will affect everybody immediately and transform
people's perception is guaranteeing full citizenship rights to all
Africans with its complimentary freedom to move, settle, work and
participate in the political processes anywhere they may be. This
will mean that we cease to require dehumanising visa regimes that
make it almost impossible to travel legally across the continent. Pan
African trade will no longer be criminalised as 'smuggling'.

It means the Pan African Parliament should be given full legislative
powers and its elections can be held on a Pan African adult suffrage.
Pan African Affairs will no longer be in Foreign Affairs but become
part of the domestic political contestations. Africans will no longer
be undesirable 'aliens' across Africa. The humiliation of beings
'others' in Europe and treated as 'others' at home will be ended. And
we can all arrive at border posts with pride at the welcoming notices
proclaiming 'Africans this way' and 'Others...this way'!

This will put African people at the centre of the 'Grand Debate',
instead of them being cynical observers, as many are at the moment,
or, worse still, completely unconcerned.

*Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is the deputy director of the UN Millennium
Campaign in Africa, based in Nairobi, Kenya. He is also General
Secretary of the Global Pan African Movement, based in Kampala,
Uganda. He writes this article in his personal capacity as a
concerned pan-Africanist.

* Please send comments to [log in to unmask] or comment online at
http://www.pambazuka.org


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