Katim,

I must congratulate you for producing this magnificent  masterpiece. After a
studious reading
of this beta version, I came across a bug. I also think we need a fundamental
fix on this version.
A fix that will be permanent. A fix that will ensure that the Jammeh era will
never reoccur in the Gambia.
The bug I found in this version is in first sentence of the third paragraph of
Section 3.  Parts of that line somewhat echoed Article 13 of Jammeh's own
indemnity clause. I do understand the desire for a peaceful change, but our
situation should never be put at par with what the South Africans underwent. The
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up, not to forgive the
perpetrators of Apartheid, (for Apartheid was only second to Slavery), nor as a
maintenance of peace in the country, but more for economic reasons. It was a
move designed not to alienate the white population and their backers, who
dominated the economy of the land for more than half a century and raised it to
near-Western standards. This is surely not the case with what these moronic
nitwits have done to our country. I believe the only appropriate action to be
taken here ought to be in the style of the "Nuremberg Trials". This was the bug
I found in your masterpiece.

The fix is something that is not even mentioned in the masterpiece: The Army.
Since the main purpose of having an Army was for the sole protection of Sir
Dawda Jawara, I think they are now redundant. The Gambian society does not NEED
an Army. The geographic position of the Gambia does not compel us to have an
Army. All we need here is harmony with our neighbour.  To prevent the likes of
Yaya Jammeh being a hiatus to the tranquil lives of Gambians and the history of
the Gambia, it is imperative that something more drastic be put into place than
Truth and Reconciliation.

WE MUST DISBAND THE ARMY  TOTALLY and render illegal the only instrument they
know: the Gun. The best thing to do is to get rid of these people altogether. To
compromise the crimes and sufferings these people have inflicted on Gambians and
The Gambia, solely for peace, is like letting a known convicted rapist and
serial killer marry my daughter, only because I love my daughter.  No Way!!, or
rather to use a language that we are all versed in "Do Ma Nangu!!".

These are my observations to the piece below.

Prince Coker


----- Original Message -----
From: "Katim S. Touray" <[log in to unmask]>
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Monday, May 15, 2000 8:48 AM
Subject: A framework for change


Hi folks,

I'm going to try to keep this note short, because the framework paper I'm
appending runs to about 9 pages.  So you are warned!

You might recall that a few weeks back, I promised to work on a paper aimed at
providing a basis for furthering efforts at dealing with the Jammeh government
in the aftermath of last month's killings in The Gambia.  The paper was also
aimed at providing a template that can be used in developing a Web site for
coordinating efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the leadership
crisis we face in The Gambia. Along these lines, and finally, it is my hope that
the paper can be used as a common platform for various groups around the world
to engage the international community in lobbying, educating, and working with
them in regards the strengthening democracy in The Gambia, and by implication,
increasing prospects for peace in the country.

I'd like to offer my apologies for not getting the paper out sooner, but I'm
glad that a draft is ready, and I am appending it to this e-mail.  I would
appreciate it if you take a look at it, and also share it with as many people
(both off- and on-line) as is possible.  In the end, it would benefit all of us
if we have as many ideas as is possible incorporated in the paper.  Another
reason it would desireable to have many people have their input in the paper is
that I would rather we end up with something nobody owns.  This is for the
simple reason that what's aimed for in the paper is a better Gambia for all, and
thus, it is imperative that anyone interested in contributing his or her ideas
is given a chance to do so.

From a logistic perspective, I would like volunteers to take on the role of
coordinating the revisions of different sections of the paper. Specifically, I
would like one person to take on each of the following sections:

    2.1. Incompetence
    2.2. The Killing Fields
    2.3. Abuse of Human Rights and Press Freedom
    2.4. Corruption
    3.1  Framework for a peaceful transfer of power
    3.2. Help needed from the International Community

The work entailed in coordinating the revisions of each of the above sections
would involve collecting different suggestions specific to a topic, and editing
the section.  I will work with these volunteers to stitch together the different
sections into a final paper that, hopefully, as many organizations as possible
can sign on to.  Toward this end, I would appreciate it if different
organizations and interested parties can take a close look at the draft with a
view toward how best they can contribute to it, and make it even better.  Please
contact me directly at [log in to unmask] if you would like to coordinate drafting
one of the above sections.

I mentioned previously that the paper is aimed at providing a common platform
for various groups to work with the international commmunity in dealing with the
Jammeh government.  Thus, the aim is that the final version can be used by, say,
a delegation in the US in their discussions with government and Congressional
personnel about how they can help in our efforts to deal with the Jammeh
government.  The fact that other organizations would have signed on the paper
would further strengthen the case of the US groups, and in similar fashion,
groups in the UK, Germany, or Sweden can also use the same document with the
full knowledge that they are also speaking on behalf of all the groups that have
signed on to the paper.

The above arrangement is aimed at providing the best interim measure that can be
used in the absence of a formal umbrella organization.  It is my hope that, in
time, we can gradually work toward building both a functional umbrella
organization, and a Web site that will serve both such an organization as well
as it's various branches, and affiliates.  In this regard, I would like to say
that work on the Free Gambia Web site, an option we had started working on, is
not yet off the ground.  However, I hope to be able to start contacting people
who might be able to help, or have expressed interest in helping so we can pick
up the project again.

Before I end this rather long and winding intro to a long paper, I would like to
plead and BEG all of you to PLEASE try to read the proposals with an open mind.
I am very aware that sentiments are running real high, and a lot of people are
not really in a compromising mood.  However, it is my sincere belief that the
best way out of the present impasse we are in is for all of us to be willing to
accept what we normally would not, and do so for the sake of our nation.  Please
remember that there really is no point in taking a stand that's going to lead no
where but to a violent, and strife ridden Gambia.

I would also venture to say that at this point in our history, we must realize
that someone has to take the moral high ground.  True, we can, and should
probably, insist that justice be done.  However, we must also bear in mind that
there is a way we push things too far, and end up with no justice simply because
there will be no country left.  Look at Sierra Leone.  In the end, we must
realize that if we insist on an eye for an eye, there really is no basis for
calling for a change.  Because we simply would have proven to be just like those
we are clamouring to push out.

I will leave it at that, and await your feedback.  By the way, I am yet to
contact the other list managers about what to do with the whole issue of
confirming postings.  It is indeed an inconvenience, and I hope we can work
something out.  Have a great week, and best wishes.

Katim


--------------------------------------------  Start of appended Framework
aper  ----------------------------------------------------------------

THE GAMBIA UNDER JAMMEH:  The case, and framework for change

1.  INTRODUCTION
The Gambia is a small, English-speaking country of about 4,000 square miles on
the West African coast, and bordered on all sides except the Atlantic, by
French-speaking Senegal.  The Gambia is very poor, and ranked 163 (out of 174
countries) in the 1999 Human Development Report of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP).  The country had an estimated population of 1.2
million in 1997, and a per capita gross national product (GNP) of $350, compared
to an average of $522 for Sub-Saharan Africa, and about $29,000 for the US.

The country obtained it's Independence from Britain in 1965, and became a
Republic in April, 1970.  Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, who lead the country to
Independence was it's Prime Minister from 1965 to 1970, and it's President from
1970 until his government was overthrown on July 22, 1994 by junior army
officers.  The resulting government called the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling
Council (AFPRC) was dominated by the military, and headed by Yahya A. J. J.
Jammeh.

While Jawara's rule was characterized by an internationally-renowned respect for
human rights, adherence to a multi-party democratic system of governance, and
tolerance for diversity, Jammeh's rule has been noted for human rights abuses,
alleged killings, misappropriation, and outright incompetence.  Against this
background, it is not surprising that Jammeh's security forces, early last
April, opened fire on unarmed student demonstrator killing up to 12 of them, in
addition to a journalist who was volunteering as a Red Cross worker.

This paper provides a brief overview of the governance, or lack thereof, of The
Gambia under Jammeh, alternatives to his government, and provides a framework
for a transition to a free, fair, open, and democratic Gambia.  The paper is
aimed at providing The Gambia's development partners a means to enable them help
The Gambia avoid descending into the chaos, and tragedies that have befallen
countries like Sierra Leone, and Liberia.  It is also hoped that Gambian
organizations and concerned citizens will use the framework proposed here to
work toward a Gambia that all can live in peace, and be genuinely proud of.

2.  The GAMBIA UNDER JAMMEH
His Excellency, Dr. Alhaji Col. (Rtd.) Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh came to power in
July, 1994 after leading a military coup against the democratically-elected
government of Sir Dawda K. Jawara who had been in power for almost 30 years.
The then 29-year old, and Lt. Jammeh headed the military-dominated AFPRC
government that was formed to replace the Jawara administration.  The AFPRC
originally intended to remain in power for 4 years before handing over power to
a democratically-elected civilian government, but following an outcry from both
within The Gambia, and the International community, they agreed to elections
leading to a transition to civilian rule.

After the adoption of a revised (and many say flawed) Constitution, Presidential
and Parliamentary elections were held in late, 1996.  In preparation for the
elections, Jammeh and other key AFPRC military officials resigned their military
commissions.  Jammeh formed a political party, Alliance for Patriotic
Reconciliation and Construction (APRC) to field their candidates in the general
elections, with Jammeh as their Presidential candidate.  The APRC won most of
the parliamentary seats contested, and Jammeh also won the Presidential
elections.  In January, 1997, Jammeh was sworn in as the civilian President, and
head of an APRC government with an overwhelming majority of military retirees.

Unfortunately for The Gambia, almost 6 years of Jammeh's rule has brought about
untold suffering, death, and deprivation to many Gambians.  This is especially
sad in light of the fact that many people initially welcomed the AFPRC following
the overthrow of the Jawara government.  Furthermore, Jammeh proclaimed at the
outset that his was going to be a government with a difference; one that was
both accountable and transparent.  Judging from their record so far, it seems
that Jammeh and his officials forgot their promises, and pronouncements when
they came to power.  Both the AFPRC and the APRC governments have not only
failed to meet the expectations of many Gambians, they have been noted for
incompetence, corruption, human rights abuses, trampling press freedom, and
killing Gambians in the name of state security.

2.1.  Incompetence
Both the AFPRC, and it's successor, the APRC governments have been characterized
by intolerance, abuses of human rights, and press freedom, and accused of
numerous killings that are yet to be satisfactorily addressed.  In addition,
there has been an militarization of the country, coupled with the establishment
of a National Intelligence Agency (NIA) used more to witch-hunt and silence the
government's critics than addressing genuine security concerns.  Jammeh's
governments have not only failed to provide competent leadership for the Gambia,
but also wreaked havoc on the country's civil service.

One example of the incompetence that has been shown by Jammeh has been the
exceedingly high turn-over rate of appointments in his cabinet, as well as in
other high-level government offices.  For example, in the 6 years since he came
to power in 1994, what used to be the Ministry of External Affairs has not only
had a name change, it has also had 4 Secretaries of State.  Similarly, the
Ministry of Justice has had about 4 changes in leadership.  Such high turn over
rates in the leadership of the country's high offices not only signal a misuse
of highly-trained and experienced human resources, but also a tendency for
Jammeh to use these offices as incentives in a self-serving patronage system.

Besides the lack of continuity in the country's governance, Jammeh has also
failed the aspirations of Gambians in the area of economic development.  While
there have been strides in building health-care facilities, schools, a new
airport complex, and the country's first TV station, the fact remains that the
lot of the average Gambian has not faired well under Jammeh.  In fact, many
indicators of the quality of human life are still miserable.

2.2.  The Killing Fields
It is perhaps in the area of democracy, human Rights, and press freedom that the
record of both Jammeh governments have been most dismal.  Starting with the
AFPRC from July 1994 to Jan. 1997, there have been numerous incidents of gross
abuse of human rights, assaults on individuals, and allegations of killings by
the government's security forces.  For example, an estimated 40 soldiers lost
their lives in November, 1994, in circumstances the government called a coup
attempt, even though many insist that the victims were framed, and some may
indeed have been summarily executed.

Besides the above-mentioned "coup attempt", there have been other incidents that
have resulted in the loss of life under suspicious circumstances.  For example,
in June, 1995 the body of Mr. Ousman "Koro" Ceesay, then the country's Finance
Minister was found in his burnt-out car.  Despite allegations that Mr. Ceesay's
death was murder, and that the burning of his car and body was staged, the
Jammeh government has yet to conduct a proper investigation of the circumstances
surrounding Mr. Ceesay's death.

In addition to Mr. Ceesay, others who have lost their lives under suspicious
circumstances under Jammeh's rule include the head of his own security detail.
Thus, in November, 1995, the army barracks in Farafenni were attacked by a
anti-Jammeh elements, resulting in the loss of 6 lives.  In addition, an
incident at the Kartong army camp in 1997 also resulted in the death of at least
1 soldier.  And in Dec., 1999, the head of Jammeh's own security guards was
killed while he was allegedly on his way to his office in preparation to launch
a coup against Jammeh.  A second victim of this incident was a suspected soldier
who was pursued by Jammeh loyalists, and shot in broad daylight in Banjul's main
market.  Yet another alleged plotter was wounded, and arrested in a gun-fight
The country still awaits his trial.

The fates of the above mentioned victims of Jammeh's rule should not be
surprising, in light of the fact that he has gone on record as saying that he
will put his opponents "6 feet below ground."  Such irresponsible talk is not
only typical of Jammeh, it has also become his trademark method of intimidating
people opposed to him.  And in the event anyone doubts him, he once in while
makes good on the threat.

Almost no one is exempt from Jammeh's excesses, and those of his officials.
Thus, it was this past Jan. that a 11-year old student died from injuries he
sustained from beatings he suffered at the hands of Fire fighters who had been
called to the school to maintain order.  In addition, a 13 year-old girl was
raped by a uniformed security person, who has yet to be accosted.  These
incidents prompted students to demonstrate their anger, and protest against the
killing and rape of their own by Jammeh's forces.

The demonstrations that the Gambian students embarked on April 10 were met with
typical savagery by Jammeh's security forces.  They opened fire on the students,
killing 13 of them, along with a journalists who was shot at the Red Cross
premises, while he was working as a volunteer, to help the wounded.  Students in
other parts of the country also took to the streets on April 11, and again, the
Jammeh forces responded with lethal force, killing at least one (and reportedly
more) of the students.

To be sure, the students demonstrations were also marked by destruction of
property (mostly government offices and facilities), but from all indications,
the rampage against government properties happened AFTER the students were shot
by the security forces.  To add insult to injury, the reaction of government
officials has been to blame the students, claim that their forces did not use
live bullets, and thank the security forces for handling the situation well.
This after all these students, and a journalist lost their lives.

While an inquest in the April 10 and 11 killings have started, and this is to be
commended, it is also worth noting that the Jammeh government continues to turn
a deaf ear to pleas for a full and thorough investigations of the deaths of the
likes of Mr. Ousman "Koro" Ceesay, and the soldiers that died in the November,
1994 "coup attempt."

Even though there have been specific allegations made against the Edward
Singhateh, and Yankuba Touray (both currently serving in the Jammeh government),
there have been no attempts to address these allegations.  If anything, it seems
that the closure of the online forum on which the allegations were first posted,
was an indication of the government's sensitivity to any attempts at reviving
talk about these killings.  It must be noted, however, that it would be
hypocritical for the Jammeh government to pick and choose which killings to
investigate because in the end, all victims are equally deserving of justice.

2.3.  Abuse of Human Rights and Press Freedom
Jammeh governments also has a remarkable record of abusing human and democratic
rights and press freedoms.  Thus, the 1999 Amnesty International Annual Report
on The Gambia stated that the government detained at least 20 prisoners of
conscience, and at least three prisoners were reported to have been tortured.
In addition, Decree 89, which banned politicians active before the 1994 coup is
still in effect.  The Decree was introduced by the military before the transfer
of power to civilian rule, and has been used by the APRC government to prevent
their opponents from contesting elections in the Gambia.  In addition,
opposition party members and officials have been beaten by Jammeh supporters
and/or arbitrarily arrested by Jammeh's security forces.

Jammeh has also abused and trampled on the democratic rights of Gambians.  Thus,
while he ensured that the revised Gambian constitution was tailored to enable
people younger than 40 years (including him), the same constitution barred many
Gambians from contesting elections or holding elected office simply because they
were former officers of political parties that existed during Jawara's rule.
Furthermore, the same constitution granted Jammeh and other officials of the
AFPRC government immunity from prosecution for acts they committed while in
office.

The killing of Omar Barrow, the Gambian journalist who died last month in the
demonstrations was the latest example of Jammeh's high-handedness against the
Press in The Gambia.  Even though he proclaimed, on coming to power in July
1994, that his was going to be an administration with a difference, and one that
was open to criticism, the policies of both his AFPRC and APRC governments have
been exactly the opposite of those pronouncements.  For example, in Oct. 1993,
the APRC government deported Mr. Kenneth Best, the owner and founder of the
country's first daily newspaper, The Daily Observer for being critical of them.

In addition, many other Gambian and non-Gambian journalists have been subjected
to arbitrary detention by Jammeh's government.  A number of these arrests and
other forms of  government high-handedness against the Gambian Press were
reported in the 1999 review by the International Press Institute (IPI) of Press
Freedom in The Gambia.  For example, Citizen FM, a private radio station deemed
too critical of the government was closed on the basis of a 1913 law that the
government selectively applied.  Furthermore, the National Intelligence Agency
(NIA) have arrested many Gambian journalists on numerous occasions, and deported
non-Gambian journalists.

2.4.  Corruption
President Jammeh also is yet to provide a satisfactory response to a number of
allegations of corruption and embezzlement on his part, or those of his
officials.  First, there have been allegations that a $35 million loan from The
Republic of China (Taiwan) to The Gambia was diverted to private accounts.  In a
ddition, President Jammeh was named as the beneficiary of $3 million deposited
in a Swiss bank account by one Capt. Ebou Jallow, who has since resigned from
the Gambian army, and now lives in exile in the US.  While most of the $3
million was recovered, and returned to the Gambian treasury, the issue of the
$35 million from Taiwan is still unresolved.

In April, 1999, Chantrils SA, a subsidiary of Swiss-based oil traders Glencore,
successfully sued the Gambian government in London's High Court for breaching a
contract to sell crude oil on behalf of The Gambia.  According to documents made
public in the trial, Chantrils SA contracted to sell 20,000 (twenty thousand)
barrels of Nigerian crude oil a day on behalf of The Gambia, and deposit the
initial payment, and proceeds in an account at United Overseas Bank, in Geneva,
Switzerland.

The oil was contracted from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to The
Gambia, and supposedly as a reward from the late General Sani Abacha to
President Jammeh for standing by Abacha when the rest of the world condemned his
dictatorship, and killing of Ken Saro Wiwa.  The contract to lift Nigerian oil
lasted from August, 1996 to June, 1998, when General Abacha died.  Also, the oil
was sold by Chantril SA for $0.20 (twenty cents) per barrel at a time when,
according to the United States Energy Information Agency, the landed cost of
Nigerian crude oil varied from $14 to $20 per barrel, or between 70 and 100
times more than what Chantril SA paid for the oil.

Furthermore, the Gambia government was represented in the contract by a
Senegalese national, Samuel Sarr, who testified in court that he was given a
Gambian diplomatic passport, and asked by President Jammeh to report directly to
him in matters relating to the oil deal.  To this day, President Jammeh has
brushed off questions about the oil deal, and any talk about where the money
went.  The trial in the UK concluded with a fine against the Gambia government,
even though from all indications, the Gambia government never received any money
from the proceeds of the sale of the oil.

It is particularly important that President Jammeh and his government is made to
answer to these allegations of corruption.  With a per capita GNP of $350, the
sums of money that have been allegedly swindled by President Jammeh and his
officials are simply too much to be ignored.  Furthermore, in a period when
there is a strong and growing campaign to write off debts owed by poor countries
like The Gambia, it only makes sense that the Jammeh government fully accounts
for these sums they were alleged to have stolen, before The Gambia is considered
eligible to debt relief, and indeed other forms of development assistance.

2.5.  Other Issues
Besides incompetence, the killings, abuse of human and democratic rights,
trampling Press freedom, and corruption, there are other significant issues that
warrant a speedy and peaceful end to President Jammeh's government.  First, even
though The Gambia is a secular, multi-religion, and  multi-ethnic society,
President Jammeh as actively promoted the use of Islam in his official duties,
and frequently quotes verses from the Quran in his public speeches.
Furthermore, he has gone to the extent of building a mosque on State House
grounds; an act that is potentially divisive, and at least insensitive to the
feelings of the Gambia's non-Muslim population.

President Jammeh's role in the sub-region should also be another reason to end
his rule in The Gambia.  Given that The Gambia practically divides Senegal in
two, and that there presently is festering a separatist war in Cassamance,
Senegal's southern part, it is imperative that a Gambian President help bring
about peace.  President Jammeh, instead, has had a rather suspicious
relationship with the separatist movement in Cassamance, and according to some,
has in fact been their supporter.

Senegal recently concluded two rounds of free, fair, and open democratic
elections that resulted in a peaceful transfer of power from one civilian
President to another.  The historic moment was not lost on observers in the
sub-region, and indeed the world over.  These elections have without doubt made
Senegal a shinning example to other African countries, and also a bastion of
democratic values in Africa.  That President Jammeh might be contributing to the
destabilization of Senegal should be a cause for concern to all interested in
maintaining peace, and fostering progress in the Sub-region.

3.  FRAMEWORK FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER
The April 10 and 11 killings in The Gambia are the latest in a series of
tragedies that have befallen The Gambia since Jammeh came to power in July,
1994.  In the aftermath of these killings, many people have suggested ending
Jammeh's rule in The Gambia, to prevent the country from plunging into the war
and strife that have befallen countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia.  This
paper is one of the many ideas forwarded by Gambians the world over about how to
bring about change in The Gambia.  The main premise of the proposed framework
for change presented in this paper is that in the end, the end to Jammeh's rule
should be peaceful, and ensure that there will be no more military governments
in The Gambia.  Furthermore, the proposal aims to find common ground between
what might at first glance seem like irreconcilable positions taken by
pro-Jammeh, and anti-Jammeh forces in the Gambian political equation.

Toward this end, it is proposed herein that in order to preserve the peace in,
and integrity of The Gambia, President Jammeh should immediately resign from his
office, and hand-over power to a National Unity Government that will supervise
the next general elections.  In addition, the national unity government will
conduct impartial investigations into last Aprils killings in The Gambia, as
well as other outstanding allegations of abuse of power and other crimes leveled
against President Jammeh and his officials.

In return for agreeing to step down immediately, President Jammeh and his
officials will be offered amnesty and immunity from prosecution from crimes they
might have committed while in office provided that they cooperate fully with
truth and reconciliation investigations into allegations against them.  Anyone
found to have embezzled public funds will be required to return all the money
they embezzled.  Furthermore, people will be encouraged to help the
investigations by offering them a percentage of embezzled funds they have
provided information about, and helped the government to recover.

The proposed framework for a peaceful transfer of power from President Jammeh
also provides for compensation to the surviving victims, and families of
deceased victims of Jammeh's government actions.  Furthermore, compensation will
be offered not only to those who were opposed to Jammeh's rule, but ALL victims,
and/or their families, irrespective of which side they were on.

It is hoped that the proposed framework will appeal to the best intentions of
all Gambians.  Without doubt, almost every proposal will be opposed by one group
or the other.  However, it is hoped that in the end, all Gambians will be able
to put their personal animosities and grudges aside, and agree to a workable
compromise not because that's what they like, but because it would be what's
best for The Gambia.

Finally, this paper presents options to take in the event President Jammeh and
his government are not interested in compromising, and working toward a peaceful
resolution of the grave leadership crisis faced by The Gambia.  In that
unfortunate event, there will be a concerted effort by various Gambian groups
around the world to bring the record of the Jammeh government to the world's
attention, with a view toward imposing sanctions that will effectively cripple
the government.  Furthermore, these efforts will also be aimed at ensuring free,
open, and fair general elections next year, and ensuring that opposition parties
are adequately funded to launch a credible campaign against President Jammeh in
the 2001 general elections.

3.1.  Proposals
    i)  President Jammeh and his cabinet agrees to resign, and hand-over power
to a National Unity Government (NUG), comprised of different political parties,
and interest groups
    ii)  The head of the NUG will agree to step-down after the Presidential
elections next year; and by implication, will not contest the elections him or
herself
    iii)  In exchange for handing over power, President Jammeh and his Cabinet
will be accorded the following:
        a.  Immunity from prosecution for any and all crimes committed while in
office
        b.  A life-time pension, based on their current salaries
    iv)  The above immunities and pension-plans shall be contingent on:
        a.  An agreement by President Jammeh, his Cabinet, and past associates
to participate in a truth-and-reconciliation commission to investigate crimes
they have been accused of
        b.  An agreement by President Jammeh and his Cabinet to refrain from
committing any further crimes AFTER the ratification of the amnesty agreement
        c.  An agreement by President Jammeh and his Cabinet to return any state
monies deemed to have been illegally acquired while in office
        d.  An Act of the Gambian Parliament to ratify the agreement
    v)  Families of all victims of violent incidents during President Jammeh's
reign will be given benefits based on the victims salaries at the time of their
deaths, or their potential earnings had they lived.

3.2.  Alternatives
It is possible that President Jammeh, and/or his officials and supporter would
not agree to handing over power to a transition National Unity Government.  In
that case, the alternatives for dealing with the Jammeh government include
internal programs, and global efforts geared toward educating the Gambian
public, crippling the Jammeh government, and enabling opposition parties to
launch effective campaigns in the next general elections.

The internal programs that can be initiated include public education programs in
the mass media (where possible), and alternative means such as cassette tapes.
In addition, concerted efforts will be made to ensure that the Jammeh
administration is crippled by cutting-off any help it has been getting from
friendly governments such as Libya, Taiwan, and Cuba.  These efforts will be in
addition to a global public relations campaign against the Jammeh government,
and organized through individual efforts, Gambian organizations around the
world, and in partnership with interested non-governmental organizations, human
rights and democracy groups.

Finally, various governments and development agencies will be lobbied to ensure
that all financial, and material assistance to President Jammeh's government
ceases.  In particular, governments around the world will be provided with a
list of top Jammeh government officials that should be banned from International
travel.  In addition, the Gambian military and security forces will be a target
for implementing sanctions against.  The aim would be to deny them training
facilities, scholarships, materiel and spare parts as long as they are being
used by President Jammeh to stay in power.

4.  HELP NEEDED FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Despite the fact that Jammeh governments have been noted for being international
pariahs, the poverty of The Gambia means that any Gambian government must rely
heavily on international assistance.  According to the UNDP Human Development
Report 1999, official development assistance accounted for 10% of The Gambia's
GNP in 1997, compared to an average of 6.7% for Sub-Saharan Africa.  This shows
that The Gambia is more dependent on international assistance than many other
African countries.  Thus, the Jammeh government would be particularly vulnerable
to a comprehensive, coordinated, and well thought-out effort by the
International community to force it to either transfer power peacefully, or at
least abide by internationally-accepted standards of behavior.

Toward this end, the signatories to this paper will work with foreign
governments, development organizations and agencies, as well as human rights
organizations for them to help ensure a prosperous and secure future for The
Gambia by:

     i)  exerting pressure on Jammeh to agree to a peaceful change of government
    ii)  ending disbursement of funds for the Jammeh government
    iii)  ending supplies of arms, and assistance to the Gambian military and
security forces
    iv)  urge other governments, development agencies and organizations to exert
pressure Jammeh, and/or to stop supporting his government
    v)  helping strengthen democracy in The Gambia by providing opposition
groups and independent local media with material and financial assistance

5.  REFERENCES
Amnesty International Publications and News Releases on The Gambia (1996 -
present)(http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/countries/indx127.htm)
International Press Institute.  1999 World Press Freedom Review - Gambia.
(http://www.freemedia.at/archive97/gambia.htm)
Saine, A.  The military and "democratization" in The Gambia: 1994-2000 in
"Liberalization and Democracy in Africa." John Mbaku (Editor) (forthcoming)
U. S. Department of State.  Human Rights Reports for 1999 - Gambia.
(http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/gambia.html)
United Nations Development Programme.  Human Development Report 1999.
(http://www.undp.org/hdro/99.htm)

6.      Signatory Organizations

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