Fellow Citizens,
After reading Ebou's revelations, I hold my head between my hands and cry
out: Where do we turn to? I call out: THE HAGUE? AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL?
CHAMPIONS OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICA, ETC... What would YOU do? One thing is
certain though: ATE YALLA DI NA NYOW!!!
I'm too emotionally spent right now... Sorry, I'll write something more
coherent later..
Edrissa


>From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA THREE
>Date: Sun, 6 May 2001 19:05:33 -0700
>
>                                          COUP IN
>GAMBIA THREE
>KB Dampha, I am pleased but equally saddened that you
>asked about Gibril Saye or Lieutenant Saye. Pleased in
>the sense that his case needs to be told which I shall
>attempt to do the way I understand it. But am also
>quite sad to remember every thing about this fine
>soldier who was too good to die the way he did.
>Everything you mentioned about this soldier,
>especially his devotion and love to promote sports in
>the GNA-had a keen hand in football, basketball,
>volleyball and everything-made him more so a victim to
>be mourned and wept for until that day when his body
>is exhumed from that toilet pit and given a decent
>burial. We can classify Saye as the real soldier with
>difference. He was nice, respectable and highly
>competent. But above everything, the young man was
>soft hearted, couldn't hurt a fly when it comes to
>killer instincts that we saw among the ranks of the
>army since 1994. The guy had conscience and would
>rather die than see the truth twisted and remain
>indifferent to it like so many APRC lackeys we see
>today. One of the reasons I later learnt for the
>AFPRC's decision to eliminate him was among other
>things his constant challenge to all of them over our
>detention at the central prisons without any credible
>reason or explanation for it. I understand he had
>openly and constantly protested to the council members
>to try us if they had anything against us or set us
>free. But death row at Mile Two prisons was not, as
>far as he was concerned, a place for good officers
>like us. He had even gone against all odds one day by
>coming to the prisons to see us with encouraging words
>to the effect that they were working hard for our
>freedom. He had brought us provisions and toilet
>articles as well. It was shocking to learn few days
>later that Saye was dead.
>So you were right Dampha in stating that the 11th
>November event found me in jail. About thirty-five of
>us were detained for nothing we did.  But I can still
>remember how devastated Saye's family was over the
>death of the man who solely provided for them. They
>even had to send a secret inquirer at Mile-Two prison
>to find out whether Saye was detained with us. His
>father cannot still get over what he new was a murder
>of his son, because he saw his son when he was leaving
>for work the morning after the so-called abortive
>counter coup. Soldiers who were present at the camp
>that day also took the trouble to go to the family
>house and explained to them what happened at Yundum
>that weekend afternoon.
>I personally conducted my private investigation over
>the case and came out with the concrete evidence that
>these men were murdered when they least expected it
>from these cowards. A man like Saye would have never
>dreamt about Sana Sabally taking a direct role in his
>slaughtering. They were very close job associates,
>sharing the same office where Saye was his deputy in
>the heavy-weapons platoon. They were always together
>in their small office by the fuel storeroom. Before
>the coup one would easily mistaken them for brothers
>given the way they used to hang closely together.
>On the flip side however I think that was the reason
>why Sabally freaked out after the 11th November
>massacre. Killing a human being out of no justifiable
>reason could be psychologically very traumatic to the
>mind of the killer but when the relationship between
>the killer and the victim was bonded by that human
>factor bordering on friendship and love, the tragedy
>turns into a clinical nightmare.
>Anyway, that's another trivial story that I may come
>back to in later discussions.
>But as I said I started my investigation about 11th
>November in the jail with special interest in Saye's
>case. The first opportunity I had to know what exactly
>happened was when in February surviving soldiers
>arrested and accused of complicity in the counter coup
>were brought to Mile-Two prisons under heavy armed
>guard. The notorious Staff Sergeant Kanyi was part of
>the guards. They had to be transferred from the Yundum
>cells to death row at Mile Two. They were WO-2 A
>Trawelleh, Sgt. N kabareh, Sgt. S. Manjang Cpl.
>A.Jallow, Cpl. M. Saidykhan, L/CPL M.O. Njie, L/CPL K.
>Kamara and PTE. B. Manneh.
>When they were first brought in, they were so much
>convinced of being lesser criminals than we were that
>for a while they refused to say anything pertaining to
>what bought them there. Every one of them thought his
>arrest or detention was a mistake because, as far as
>they were concerned, they did not have a clue about
>any organized counter coup as such. As a result they
>all thought sooner rather than later they were going
>to go home.
>Then on the22nd February, 1995, each of them received
>a letter from Baboucarr Jatta's office (then army
>commander) warning them to brace up for a general
>court martial scheduled to start on 25th February
>1995. That was to say that they had barely thirty
>hours to face a court martial on charges of treason.
>For their defense, they were not allowed to have any
>representation from professional legal officers or
>practitioners. The following officers' names were
>forwarded to them as the only available persons they
>could choose their legal representatives from: Captain
>M.B. Sarr, Captain S. Fofana, Captain JP Jasseh and
>Lt. Seckan. These were men who were big time legal
>illiterates. For the prosecution however, Justice B.
>Akamba a Ghanaian solicitor was the head of the team.
>It was clear to all the accused that it was after all
>a kangaroo court martial that awaited them and they
>also knew that Baboucarr Jatta was a genius at it. It
>was a lost course to all of them.
>That was the time they really started talking. By the
>time they were hastily tried, found guilty and all
>sentenced to nine years imprisonment with hard labor,
>they had told us everything they witnessed and knew
>about the murder of their colleagues.
>Most of them were arrested after Barrow, Faal and
>Nyang were killed but well before Saye was arrested.
>They were in the Yundum cells when Saye reported for
>work the following morning and was placed under arrest
>by the military police. Every clothes he was wearing
>(he was in working uniform) was taken off him and was
>left with only his underwear before the military
>police forced him to join them in the cells. He was
>stunned and tried to ask for explanation but was
>simply told that the orders came from the council
>members of the government. Who were they? Of course
>the cowards: Yaya Jammeh, Sana Sabally, Edward
>Singhateh, Sadibou Haidara and Yankuba Touray.
>Anyway like all of them who were detained Saye had
>felt that the error would be corrected and that he
>would soon be set free.
>Then the next day while Major Frazer Joof, commander
>of the military police unit was taking their
>statements at the military police office, they
>received orders to stop the investigation and send
>them back to the cells. They were informed that the
>council members were at the officer's mess discussing
>their fate. It was lunchtime, so they decided to have
>their meals. Half way in their eating they heard some
>strange movements out side. Then a voice they could
>not recognized started calling for all those officers
>arrested to come out now. Sorting out the officers
>from the other ranks was, according to them, very
>scary.
>All the officers were handcuffed the moment they
>stepped outside. Then they loaded them like sheep in
>the back of an army Land Rover and covered them with
>tarpaulin.
>The windows of the cells at Yundum were not quite
>high, so those in the cells could clearly view the
>activities going on outside. It was from there that
>they saw the convoy of council members departing with
>the officers including Saye. Baboucarr Jatta was with
>them too.
>For two to three hours they sat in silence praying and
>hoping that things were not really what they thought
>they were, until they heard the convoy roaring back
>into the camp with the green tarpaulins all soaked in
>blood. They drove them back to the toilet area where
>they stayed for another twenty to thirty minutes. Then
>they came back and called for Sgt. E.M. Ceesay and
>Sgt. Basiru Camara to follow them to the back. Few
>minutes later they heard burst of automatic gunfire
>twice. They were the last two to be murdered. It was a
>nightmare of unprecedented proportion that shocked
>every person with human emotion that evening.
>The second part of my investigation, which filled in
>the blank spaces left by the accused men, was
>completed when I was freed from detention after ten
>months. After being released and reinstated back to
>the army, I eventually became very close to Baboucarr
>Jatta who in his non-stop effort to clear himself of
>any wrong doing that day told me the missing details.
>Anyhow taking stock of what Jatta had in mind could be
>extremely elusive. Sometimes he would echo as if Lt.
>Barrow had really planned a coup; but at other time it
>is as if, the AFPRC government, in order to eliminate
>the officers and soldiers who felt they betrayed the
>nation and the army, framed everybody. For example
>when Lt. Barrow was arrested that night, Jatta's
>explanation was that he had found him surrounded by
>Sabally and his guards after he was severely beaten
>up. He said that Sabally showed him a list of names of
>government officials Barrow and his partners had
>planned to execute if they had succeeded. His name
>Jatta was on top of the list.
>But he said upon scrutinizing the paper he had
>discovered that the list was forged to justify their
>desire to execute them. As a matter of fact, he
>confirmed the forgery in the paper when he noticed
>that his own name on top was quickly scribbled in
>pencil while the whole list was in ink. He said he
>took the list from Sabally and walked up to Barrow and
>asked him why he wanted to kill him. But as soon as
>Barrow started swearing that he did not mean to kill
>anybody, Sabally turned around and hit him on the
>mouth with the wooden butt of his AK47 rifle, breaking
>all his front teeth.
>"The torture they subjected Barrow and Faal to", Jatta
>had said, "even if they were not shot and killed
>finally, they would have most likely died from their
>injuries".
>Jatta also explained how all those arrested were later
>taken to Mile-Two prisons first and then to Fajara
>Barracks that night for execution during which a good
>number of them took the risk and ran away into the
>dark. Almost all of them escaped to Cassamance
>including Lt. Minteh, Lt. Jarju Lt. Bah Lt. L.F.
>Jammeh, Sgt Jadama, Sgt. Joof and others. The dash for
>freedom happened when the captives were forced in line
>at the middle of the field and then ordering some
>selected soldiers to open fire on them in a typical
>military execution style. Three times the order was
>given, and three time the soldiers aimed and fired
>above the heads of the victims. Then Edward Singhateh
>soon got frustrated with the firing team, walked up to
>where Barrow was standing, held him by the wrist,
>pulled him away from everyone and then fired two shots
>at him. One bullet hit Barrow on the leg and the fatal
>one went through his ribs. He fell down on the ground
>kicking and moaning until his whole body was reduced
>to weak involuntary twitching of his muscles here and
>there.
>"It was then that everybody woke up to the reality
>that they were dealing with real killers", said Jatta.
>
>There was total chaos. Some running for their lives
>others dumb founded by Singhateh's action while most
>of the soldiers suffered total shock. However, Faal
>was unable to move because of the injuries he had
>sustained that crippled him altogether. The bullet
>that finished him was fired from the late Sadibou
>Haidara's handgun. After that Staff Sergeant Kanyi was
>left with his sadistic pleasure of pumping more brass
>into poor Faal's body.
>However let us not forget that in the heat of all this
>commotion, Lt. Gibril Saye was at home perhaps helping
>his wife nurse the three-week old son they just had.
>So to even say that he was seen that night around
>anywhere the coup was staged was ridiculous much more
>being killed in a firefight that night as the cowards
>tried to sell to the world. With the number of
>soldiers supposedly killed in that single incident
>that night, it is practically impossible or mind
>boggling to imagine that it was a fire fight where all
>the enemies were shot and killed while no one in the
>friendly forces got a scratch on him. That must have
>been the cause of the bitterness from Saye's family
>members especially from his dad.
>It should have also been a wake up call to the entire
>Gambian population that the so-called soldiers of
>difference were nothing but sadists with death. But as
>Dampha rightly put it the civilian population in most
>cases hardly show any interest in what happens in the
>army or have little sympathy to the soldiers in active
>service. The general concept is that they are all the
>same, so whatever may happen among them good or bad is
>their own business. On the contrary, most soldiers are
>ordinary people, the typical Gambian type who sees his
>work as a source of earning income. Although the
>salary is very limited, the majority work hard to
>manage their lives with it, get married, raise and
>support good families hoping to survive the danger of
>being killed in the job or avoid the evil of killing
>unnecessarily until such time when they finish their
>signed contracts and leave for something better.
>However, talking about the summarily execution at
>Yundum in which Saye was murdered Jatta had explained
>it all in the way he experienced it. As it was
>weekend, he said he was at home when he received a
>call from an officer at Yundum Barracks reporting the
>presence of the council members at the officers' mess.
>And the way things appeared they did not seem to mean
>any good towards the arrested officers and soldiers in
>the cells. He immediately drove to the camp and found
>them in the mess as reported. When he entered, they
>instantly stopped talking. But after a short while
>they informed him of their decision to execute
>everybody in the cells for their role in trying to
>overthrow their government.
>According to Jatta, he tried to talk them against the
>idea in every way to no avail. At one time he said he
>almost got Sabally, the vice-chairman then, to
>understand, but Singhateh called Yaya at the state
>house to inform him about the situation. When
>Singhateh returned from making the call at an office
>close to the mess, he said that Yaya's decision was
>final-death for all the officers.
>That was when everybody moved out to get the officers
>from the cells. It was lunchtime just like the
>survivors inside the cells explained it later at Mile
>Two.
>Anyway everything was the same except that those in
>the cells missed what happened in the killing process.
>When the officers were handcuffed and covered with
>tarpaulin in the back of the Land Rover, Staff
>Sergeant Kanyi was ordered to ride with them at the
>back.
>By the time they arrived at the execution ground
>behind Njamby Forest, Kanyi had severely hurt most of
>them with bayonet stabs all over their bodies. He was
>that instruction to Kanyi originated from Singhateh.
>Jatta had claimed to have followed them all the way to
>the killing field to put more pressure on them and to
>still try to talk them out of it.  Well, he must have
>done a perfectly disgusting job in convincing them not
>to kill, anyway.
>The officers were as soon as they arrived at the
>ground lined up in a firing-squad formation to be
>shot. It was another tense moment where it appeared as
>if everyone was waiting for the other person to
>commence the shooting. Then as if it was an accidental
>discharge from Kanyi's weapon who was standing very
>close to Singhateh, he fired straight at the officers
>hitting Saye and killing him instantly. After that, it
>was a matter of finishing the rest since one had
>already died. It was the final green light for the
>butchering orgy to start.
>Jatta went on to explain how confused the council
>members felt when the killing was all over. They were
>altogether confused with what to do with the bodies.
>They finally arrived at the stupid decision to have
>their guards bury the corpse in the bushes somewhere.
>Jatta said he talked them against that for fear that
>people will soon find the bodies. That was how they
>were eventually taken to Yundum Barracks, to the
>toilets.
>He talked about how Sgt. E.M.Ceesay and Sgt. Basirou
>Camara were also killed that day. He could
>particularly remember Lance Corporal Batch Jallow,
>Singhateh's driver at the time pulling the trigger on
>those two.
>He further gave the gruesome details of how Saye's
>long legs (he was about 6ft. 8ins. tall) could not fit
>in the ditch together with the others and how Kanyi
>and co used a machete to cut off his legs before
>force-fitting the body in the mass grave. It was the
>mother of all evil that I know the culprits will
>account for someday. It is hard to comprehend how
>brutal these demons were on people who did not hurt
>anyone in their existence. Why was it impossible for
>anyone among them to stand up and say that this must
>stop, for it is all-wrong? Where was god in the hearts
>of these GAMBIANS?
>Jatta said Saye's father made a final attempt to know
>about the fate of his son after Sana Sabally and
>Sadibou Haidara fell victims of their own creation on
>the 27th of January 1995. He had gone to the ministry
>of defense to ask Singhateh but the old man was
>referred to his office at the army headquarters. All
>that the father wanted to know was whether his son was
>dead or alive. He said he frankly told him to give it
>up in ever seeing his son alive again because he was
>really dead.
>The old man, he said, thanked him for the information
>and left with high emotions.
>Now back to where I stopped in my last piece COUP IN
>GAMBIA.
>For a brief flashback, I was part of the team of the
>American guests visiting the vice president's office
>when a GNA officer at the state house told me about
>the soldiers at Yundum Barracks on their way to Banjul
>to overthrow the PPP government. However, because of
>my duty that day to escort the guests upstairs to Mr.
>Sahou Sabally's office, I tried to calmly perform it
>without raising any alarms. Yet I was very worried.
>The whole thing was really scary.
>Upstairs, Mr. Sabally welcomed the team in few nice
>words and then said. "Gentlemen, I am afraid to inform
>you that we just received a report that the soldiers
>at Yundum Barracks were on a rampage again".
>He had sounded as if the matter was a familiar thing
>that may die out soon. It was pretty much possible
>that Mr. Sabally had thought that it was one of those
>demonstrations from Yundum again which the TSG could
>stop like they did before. Whether Mr. Sabally
>understood the imbalance of power between the two
>forces caused by the Nigerians lately could be
>anyone's guess. Whatever he was thinking at that
>moment, he appeared very calm about the matter.
>Anyway Mr. Winters the ambassador before stepping into
>the office immediately asked whether it was not better
>for them to go back to the ship until the situation
>was under control then they come back. The vice
>president insisted that there was no need for that. He
>told them to stay indicating that it was possible that
>their help may be needed. While they stepped into the
>office, I took permission to go and find out what was
>going on. It was granted.
>Downstairs, the same officer who first announced the
>trouble at Yundum was still at the spot I left him. I
>wanted him to tell me more about what he had heard and
>whether it was not mistaken for the exercise rehearsal
>the GNA was supposed to hold with the American marines
>that morning.
>It was not a rehearsal or anything like that. The way
>they got the report, the soldiers had broken into the
>armory sharing all the weapons among them and were
>coming down to Banjul. Asked whether names of any
>leaders were mention in the report, he said no. I did
>not know whether it was only the other ranks again
>like the past two demonstrations before or whether the
>officers were part it this time.
>I looked at the state house environment again
>especially the security situation and felt very
>insecure there. I had my office there and had been
>working there for almost two years but the officers
>and other ranks of the presidential guards were like
>clowns. These people never trained, did not understand
>section, company or battalion battle drills. They did
>not know the difference between camouflage and
>concealment in the language of battlefield tactic.
>Combat fitness did not exist in their vocabulary. They
>were overfed, better paid than all the security forces
>in the country, spoiled and generally very rude
>towards GNA officers. Their only reserved powers were
>linked to the crazy "jujus" they carried in abundance
>making think that they were bulletproof charms. The
>charms were only for bluffing, because if they had
>strongly believed in those powers the majority would
>not have thrown their weapons at the last minute and
>jumped over the tall state house fence and disappeared
>into Banjul. Those who remained, Musa Jammeh and
>others, simply opened the gates and surrendered. But
>how could we blame them if their main commander who
>should have taken charge of the critical situation
>Captain Lamin Kaba Bajo chose to abandon the camp and
>joined former president Jawara on board the USS Lamour
>County? What was there to protect in a president who
>had lost his nation? Perhaps if he had stayed the
>majority of his men would not have had the nerve to
>run away with their tails between their legs. What
>else would you expect from such men, anyway? I knew
>that staying with the state guard was unwise or even
>suicidal. Beside, they only had AK47 rifles and most
>of them hardly used their weapons for training or
>anything.
>If it was true that the soldiers had actually broken
>into the armory, I thought, and were bent on taking
>the country by force, there was no force that could
>challenge them in the country. The GNA armory was jam
>packed with super deadly weapons such as the RPG-7s,
>AAMGs, 81MM and 60MM mortars that excluded the medium
>range machine guns and the Chinese-type LMGs.
>Truthfully the GNA was not quite trained on how to
>employ these weapons in combat, but I know by merely
>firing them at the direction of any enemy force not
>exposed to even the sound that comes out of their
>barrels was enough to chase them away or make them
>surrender.
>I therefore told the officer what I believed could
>have been a possible way of pulling something. The
>Gambia Marine, commanded by Major Antouman Saho had
>new 50 Caliber machine guns delivered by the Americans
>that very morning for the patrol boat. The firepower
>of those weapons were enough to make the soldiers from
>Yundum to listen if fired back to them out of
>necessity. The ballistics of their projectiles has the
>capability of piercing six inches of homogeneous steel
>and was meant to kill armor in battlefields. They are
>so deadly that there in an international law
>forbidding anyone from shooting it directly at humans.
>With the men at the Gambia Marine who had some pretty
>good experience with similar weapons of the Chinese
>type mounted on some of their other patrol boats, it
>was possible to assemble a counter force that could
>challenge the soldiers from Yundum.
>The gentleman agreed with my analogy; hence I took off
>to the Marine Unit base.
>Major Saho was there, but he would not buy my idea. He
>was in his office and was fully aware of what was
>going on but had put it to me that he did not even
>want his men to know about the coup situation because
>he did not trust them.  " I don't want to have
>anything to do with this trouble", he had continued.
>"Was it not the Nigerians who were being paid fat
>salaries to defend the country? Let's leave things
>with them to solve."
>Nothing was going to make him involve himself in the
>problem or his men or weapons for that matter.
>Anyway when I heard him talking to the concerned
>citizens calling him from various offices in the
>country asking to know what was going on, and he kept
>on assuring them that special plans were underway to
>arrest the situation, then I realized that I was at
>the wrong place. Banjul was an island and the last
>thing I wanted was to be cornered in the city in an
>armed conflict. After all most of our family members
>were at the other side of the bridge. I decided to
>drive alone via Bond Road towards Yundum. I had had no
>reason to fear any soldier from there. As for the
>officers, leaving the Nigerians out, there were Major
>Davis, second in command of the battalion, Captain
>Badjie (now colonel) commanding "C" company, Captain
>Sonko Commanding "B" company, Captain Johnson, AHQ
>Camp, Captain Dibba Band, the late Captain Baldeh
>Band, Lt. Ndure Cham (now major) engineering section,
>late Lt. Barrow MT section, Lt. Sheriff Gomez,
>battalion adjutant, Lt. Yaya Jammeh MP commander, Lt.
>Mbye platoon commander, 2LT Haidara platoon commander
>and 2lt Singhateh, platoon commander. 2Lt Sabally was
>supposed to be at Farafenni at his new parent unit.
>Going by anything in the past present or even future,
>I could not see what I could have done wrong to any
>soldiers or officers for me to be treated otherwise
>than with respect and understanding. Terrible thinking
>in a coup situation, as I learnt later.
>In the first place, I was later made to understand
>that Major Antouman Saho had reported me to all the
>council members that I went to the marine unit to get
>his weapons to counter the coup but that he drove me
>away because the coup was an absolute necessity. That,
>I suspect, contributed to my arrest and detention four
>days later. Betrayal by people you trust is another
>coup malady. So in trying to draw some basic
>principles for any soldier caught in a coup situation,
>my first ones will include this one: NEVER TRUST ANY
>PERSON IN UNIFORM AROUND YOU.
>However, my trip to Yundum stopped at Denton Bridge,
>where the TSG commanded on the ground by Majors
>Chongan and Swareh were making frantic efforts to
>prevent the soldiers from crossing over.
>I will deal with that crucial encounter next week.
>In the mean time I want to commend all of you in the
>struggle for your tireless efforts to liberate the
>Gambia. This is a fight for freedom, and I know that
>we are winning one battle after another but the war is
>yet to be finished. Dampha, Saul, Kujabi, Hamjatta,
>Jabou, Conteh, Joe, Ebrima, edrissa, Jobe, the
>Movements in NY and Uk and all those combatants in the
>front line, I salute you for your diligence and
>endurance to sustain the struggle. I also want to take
>a special moment to welcome an impressive new member,
>abdou touray, whose contribution is so far fantastic.
>Keep up the great work. We shall win.
>
>Ebou Colly
>
>
>
>
>
>__________________________________________________
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