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Subject:
From:
Momodou Buharry Gassama <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Sun, 6 Dec 2009 18:24:05 +0100
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Thanks for an interesting and enriching write-up Haruna. Have a good 
day.
Buharry.

----Original Message----
From: [log in to unmask]
Date: 2009-12-06 15:47 
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Subj: BBC reports Defense minister &amp; VP captain Sekouba Konate has 
stepped in


to fill the governance void in La-Guinea.

When Lansana passed, the La-Guinea constitution had appropriated the 
head of the National Assembly to be interim governor until elections 
are held. The incumbent government of Souare' either in a haze of 
cluelessness as to what to do, or in a lazy attempt to perpetuate 
themselves, dilly-dallied on election mechanics even while the 
organisation of elections was at a relatively advanced stage with help 
from La-Guinea's partners and the EU. The hodge-podge of military 
encampments became restless and a loose coalition of military factions 
called the CNDD intervened.

This loose coalition of CNDD, although undesirable to govern La-Guinea, 
presented at the time the most viable and credible consortium in La-
Guinea's ethnically-divided population and military. They were able to 
pacify the equally-rifted police and gendarmerie thereby dousing the 
embers of endless mutinies and Police-army conflicts that have marred 
La-Guinea's fragile peace for years.

The alternative and more benign consortium would have been a loose 
agglomeration of opposition political parties and the forces vives of 
La-Guinea forming an interim government while they guided themselves 
toward peaceful and fair elections. That push came all too late when 
they reacted to Dadis' attempts to entrench and perpetuate himself. It 
resulted in the La-Guinea murders and the subsequent resignation of 
some conscientious CNDD members. No effort was made by the remaining 
CNDD members to apprehend those culpable in the murders.

Popular disdain and disgust forced an ECOWAS mediation regime headed by 
Compaore and a parallel UN investigative mission. There was no room for 
Dadis and the CNDD to comb over the heinous acts and as Dadis himself 
admitted he was not in control of the army, he had no choice but to 
accept the mediation by Compaore and the UN investigators. Not only did 
he accept these interventions, Dadis and Prime Minister Komara pledged 
to cooperate fully with the mediators and investigators. As expected, 
the ensuing and inevitable vortex threatened to consume the 
belligerents as they tried to blame each other for the crimes. It was 
later learned that the war on drugs, although sober and commendable, 
had a subplot to emasculate the virulence of foreign fighters who 
formed the bulk of the presidential guard with Diakite at the helm of 
that outfit.

It was common knowledge since the Liberian civil war that drugs were 
the fuel that spinned that war out of control and that a cross-border 
Liberio-Guinean episode threatened to expand that war into neighbouring 
GUinea. As the Liberian rebels fled into border regions of La-Guinea to 
mismanage UN food aid, a crop of fleeing bandits with help from local 
criminals formed into a rag-tag unit to manage drugs and arms 
proliferation. It is this cadre of fleeing soldiers who were originally 
a band of ungoverned border locals belonging to both La-Guinea and 
Liberia, perhaps remnants of earlier expeditions into both countries, 
that now appears to be "foreign Liberian fighters". They have now found 
an expeditious and opportune ally in Dadis in his ill-considered putsch 
to replace Lansana. The two were actually allies but Dadis wished to 
turn the corner for La-Guinea's sakes. His mistake was instead of deny 
Diakite permission to handle the opposition rally at Conakry stadium 
and take his chances with disdain from Diakite's men, his pride got in 
the way and he allowed Diakite to go handle the "intransigent" but 
peaceful rally. We learned that Dadis had personally called opposition 
leader Sidya Toure to encourage him to call off the rally but that Hon. 
Toure had told Dadis that the preparations for the rally were far too 
advanced for he alone to stop. Besides, that it was a peaceful 
demonstration to which the opposition and civic associations had a 
sovereign right.

After the murders by the red-berets, led by Diakite, Dadis was 
genuinely shocked and surprised. The lesson here is that no president 
ought to allow a hot-head to "handle" a peaceful public demonstration. 
Besides, the demonstration was in response to Dadis own ambiguities 
surrounding the high promise that neither he nor any member of the CNDD 
or the interim government would contest any office in the upcoming 
election. Dadis allowed himself to be lured ever so surreptitiously to 
create an atmosphere conducive to the murders. I wouldn't be surprised 
to learn that the presidential guard was the managers of "Dadis Must 
Stay" vociferous lobby.

Now, we learn that while Dadis is away, the defense minister (Sekouba) 
or leader of presidential guards (Claude Pivi) will take over the 
governing of La-GUinea. Why was it not ok for the leader of the 
National Assembly to act as interim governor of La-Guinea as they head 
toward elections that were already in advanced stage and it is now "ok" 
for Dadis' vice president or leader of presidential guard to become 
interim governor as crimes against the people of La-Guinea (that 
involved top echelons of the CNDD) are being prosecuted???????????????? 
Does that make any sense??????????????? If it makes any sense, I 
encourage Captain Sekouba to help a combination of the forces vives and 
La-GUinea's opposition parties form themselves into an interim 
government while he Sekouba and his military forces seek out the 
criminals and help maintain order in La-Guinea so that elections can be 
held with ECOWAS and UN supervision.

Haruna.   

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