Malamin, thanks for your post.  I agree with you that we've got to provide
financial support to the opposition.  We can talk all we want, but without
our financial backing we can forget it.  We have the numbers in the
diaspora, so what seems to be the problem?  I hope we do not repeat the same
mistake in February.

Chi Jaama

Joe Sambou


>From: Malamin Johnson <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: Here is the article I referred to
>Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2001 15:34:00 +0000
>
\ambians Re-Elect Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh
>
>
>President Yahya Jammeh was on Thursday, October 18 re-elected President of
>the Republic of The Gambia with a majority of 52.96%. Jammeh polled 242,302
>votes (52.96% as compared to 55.76 in 1996), Darboe got 149,448 (32.67% as
>compared to 35.84% in 1996), Bah poled 35,671 (7.80% in constrast to 5.52%
>in 1996), Dibba, 17,271 (3.78% compared to 22% in 1992) and Jatta,
`>13,841
>(3.03% in contrast to 2.86% in 1996).
>A close scrutiny of Jammeh’s victory shows that Gambians are still attached
>to the desiderata to hang on to the incumbent as it used to be the case in
>the former Jawara regime. The devil you know is better than the one you
>don’t.
>In addition to this, the incumbency factor, further galvanised by Jammeh’s
>military antecedent, also played in his favour. Another pointer for the
>win,
>which is constantly echoed, is the resources factor as exemplified in the
>mastering of logistics, mobilisation and the donations he made country-wide
>even if argued that they were meant for mosques.
>Another factor that Jammeh constantly employed is the argument that his was
>a government that delivers and which intends to deliver more if re-elected.
>This allowed him and his aides to enumerate their achievements in the areas
>of education, air transport, road construction, etc. etc. The above factors
>helped Jammeh forestall the perceived sanction vote that the opposition
>were
>banking on.
>At this juncture, one must point out that his personal involvement in the
>campaigning saved the APRC. It would be recalled that Jammeh earlier
>announced that he would not campaign. But when echoes of the failures of
>his
>aides to make significant inroads reached him, he had a change of heart.
>According to APRC sources, Jammeh wished for a 70% majority at least when
>the projected 80% was no longer feasible.
>For the UDP/PPP/GPP Coalition, the debacle came as a result of the
>following
>factors: a) The coalition suffered from serious lack of resources, as it
>had
>to contend with both financial and material problems. THE BIG TALK OF
>FUNDING FROM OVERSEAS YIELDED ONLY SOME 2000 DOLLARS, ACCORDING TO SOURCES.
>AND WHAT’S INTERESTING IS THAT SOME OF THE CONTRIBUTORS DEMANDED THEIR
>MONEY
>BACK WHEN DIBBA OPTED OUT OF THE COALITION. OF COURSE ONE WOULD BE
>FOOLHARDY
>TO BELIEVE THAT THE COALITION’S CAMPAIGN RESTED ON THIS INSIGNIFICANT
>OVERSEAS CONTRIBUTION ALONE.(Emphasis mine) But the reality on the ground
>is
>that whereas the APRC was able to move mountains, the coalition could only
>move heaps of sand in terms of logistics and other organisational
>paraphernalia. This led one leading PPP sympathiser to opine that Gambia’s
>future elections results would hinge on the availability of resources to
>the
>contending parties.
>b) Another factor hinges on the poor performance of the coalition in
>erstwhile PPP strongholds like the Jarras, the Serekundas, the Kombos, etc.
>Save Basse where we are told Housainou Njie and Omar Sey made the
>difference, Kiang West where allegiance to BB Darboe came to play and Sandu
>where also the former MP’s community backing was a plus, the former
>strongholds of the PPP became APRC strongholds instead. Observers see these
>shortcomings as deadly blows on the PPP as a former ruling party.
>c) The coalition also seems to have lost supporters on the last days of the
>election as clashes led to the death of a young man and one lady. Crowd
>control punctuated by firing in the air had also its psychological effect
>on
>the peaceful people of The Gambia, leading to options in favour of the
>status quo. For Hamat Bah, Sheriff Bojang recently recalled that when the
>man was dismissed as a non-starter, we recognised his potentials in
>September 1996.
>The last five years have allowed Bah to nurture his charismatic political
>acumen and industry. His powerful oratory output, coupled with his student
>leaders’ verve, strengthened his debating ability and political prowess.
>His
>current national acclaim from almost all quarters is well deserved as he
>retained his constituency and consolidated his gains as a presidential
>candidate as seen above. Hamat also suffered from lack of resources, as he
>was most of the time hosted by the people he visited according to our
>reporter who followed his campaign trail. For our brother Sheriff Dibba,
>from the onset he had to fight with wild rumours peddled about his alleged
>collusion with the APRC. As he himself made clear, his seven years absence
>from the country’s political battlefields affected him very seriously. He
>also had practically no resources as verified by our reporters.
>For the PDOIS, Halifa Sallah has himself over GRTS painted the situation as
>Sarja Taal did in 1996. Sallah emphasised that the PDOIS dealt with issues
>in their campaign contrary to the others who were bent on politics of
>sentiments.
>Our own view is that the PDOIS does not engage in usual campaign techniques
>where rhetorics mesmerise people and this affected their scores which
>however increased compared to 1996. Voters like to be cajoled and coaxed
>for
>their votes. The PDOIS candidate told the people to vote for the person
>they
>viewed as the right man for the job. The party had also limited resources.
>All said and done one important element that was beneficial to Gambians was
>the party’s great contribution in the sharpening of the awareness of the
>Gambian people regarding governance and other issues.
>
>
>
>
>_________________________________________________________________
>Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
>
><<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>
>
>To view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface
>at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
>To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to:
>[log in to unmask]
>
><<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>


_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp

<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>

To view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface
at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to:
[log in to unmask]

<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>