To:  All Leaders of Political Parties in The Gambia;
       Editor, Point Newspaper;
       Editor, The Independent;
       Editor, The Observer


The impending 2001 presidential election: An Editorial Comment

On July 22, 2001, Jammeh was forced to lift the ban on political activity, political parties and politicians
in preparation for the October 2001 presidential election.  Again, just like the two-year timetable back to
"civilian" rule, combined international and domestic pressure compelled the incumbent president to partially
open the political process.  This, to enable pre-coup, and other parties, formed shortly before the
presidential election of 1996, to contest the election.  The process, however, still remains managed with the
help of an Electoral Commission whose hand picked leader(s), except for the recently fired Chairman, Johnson,
dance to Jammeh’s tunes.  Predictably, a level playing field does not exist as the conditions are stacked
against the opposition.

Jammeh, meanwhile, continues to have monopoly over the television, and national radio stations.  With state,
and other ill begotten wealth, Jammeh’s war chest is indeed formidable.  Consequently, he has used it, to
dish out gifts to students, given tickets to pilgrims to perform the hajj in Mecca, and seeks to buy the
loyalty of those who oppose him.  He boasts of being the wealthiest person in The Gambia, enjoys the services
of a personal airplane and is alleged to own mansions in Morocco and Lybia.  In addition, he built a second
State House in his birth village of Kaninlai, where provisions are in abundance and sold at discounted
prices.

Jammeh remains convinced that he can win the next elections, even in the face of an alliance of the former
ruling PPP/UDP and support of  GPP's leader.  Despite the fact that the UDP, and PPP represent the two
largest opposition parties and enjoy widespread popular support, four smaller opposition parties have so far
declined to join the UDP/ PPP alliance.  The NCP leader, suspicious of the UDP/PPP alliance walked out of a
meeting at which an alliance of the two was being announced.  A splinter party of the PPP, NCP fears of a PPP
comeback are not entirely baseless, as it has been suggested since the alliance that the UDP is but a front
for the PPP.  These allegations, however, appear less convincing today than they were in the last
presidential election of 1996.

Today, the UDP leader, and presidential candidate of the UDP/PPP alliance, Ousainou Darboe, has emerged as a
national leader with considerable support capable of beating Jammeh under free and fair elections.  In fact,
many believe that Jammeh stole the 1996 presidential election from Darboe.  PDOIS, a socialist leaning party
would join an opposition coalition only on condition that the prospective coalition presidential candidate be
chosen outside of the existing political parties.  In addition with a mandate to preside over a one year
transition program and put in place other mechanisms for free and fair elections.

But perhaps the most nettlesome issue about the UDP/PPP alliance remains what appears to many as a sweetheart
deal between the two parties, especially at a time when the leader of NRP was out of the country, and PDOIS
not invited to the meeting.  It appears that the alliance was hastily concluded when many matters were
unresolved.  Many wondered why a meeting was held when the NRP leader was out of the country, and why the
request for a delay by PDOIS was politely rejected.  It again raised the lingering impression that the PPP is
likely to come back to power riding on the coattails of the UDP.

The fear over a PPP return to power has to do with the politics of patronage, corruption and its relatively
mixed performance of thirty years.  Many Gambians, not withstanding the alliance’s popular support, may not
wish to see a return of the PPP to power and that the sweetheart deal was underhanded at best.  This is
because the PPP delegates were perceived as too eager to win Darboe the nomination.  In the end, the long
hoped for opposition coalition did not materialize to the disappointment of many.  It is felt that only a
united opposition of all opposition parties stands the best opportunity of unseating Jammeh and that the time
had come for the opposition politicians to put aside their philosophical and ideological differences to send
Jammeh packing.

Predictably, opposition coalitions as Ghana’s 1992 presidential election showed are difficult to build, and
maintain.  While there could exist an overarching interest in ousting the incumbent, party modalities,
interests, and personalities may in fact, conflict.  This led some observers to term the lifting of the ban
on political activity, “ as a blessing in disguise” for Jammeh, who expects that the time left for
campaigning may not be enough for the opposition parties to resolve their differences, and in time, to mount
an effective challenge against his rule.  The prospect for another five years of Jammeh, therefore, looms
large in the minds of opposition party leaders, and dissidents.

Yet, the alliance’s popular support in major urban centers, coupled with the regime’s perceived unpopularity
could avert this outcome.  This is because the alliance, under Darboe, could in all likelihood win the
presidency, with or without the support of the other opposition parties, but only if the election is free,
and fair with “on the spot counting.”  Failing this, the ballot boxes would be stuffed as was alleged in
1996.  As of now, Jammeh is vehemently opposed to “on the spot counting” and perhaps for good reasons.  And
while it is desirable for all the opposition parties to be on a single ticket backing Darboe, or whoever else
is decided upon, the absence of PDOIS, NCP and NRP endorsement may not in the end make or break the alliance
at the polls.  PDOIS and the NRP are relatively small parties with weak though growing support bases, yet not
essential to a UDP/PPP alliance victory.

The NCP could have given a major boost to the alliance, however, because it had a larger support base than
either PDOIS or NRP.  This support base was eroded during the seven-year ban when many of its supporters
joined the ranks of the UDP.  Yet, despite Dibba’s astuteness and political appeal as a founding father of
the PPP and The Gambia as a nation, his political hiatus from the political scene in the last seven years,
leaves him unelectable and vulnerable to charges of grandstanding and opportunism.  It is also unlikely that
PDOIS, NRP and NCP supporters would rally to Jammeh just because their party leaders do not support the
UDP/PPPalliance.  If they vote at all, the majority is more likely to support the alliance, not Jammeh.

This may, in fact, account for the UDP/PPP presidential candidate’s failure, so far, to reconvene another
meeting or try to bring these parties to his camp.  Trying to win without the support, and goodwill of PDOIS,
NRP and NCP could have high costs, however, and could be downright risky.  Yet, as in other places, politics
is risky business and revolves around alliances, coalition building, deal making and the art of compromise.
Not to be left out of the loop, it is important that those parties outside the alliance be courted and
included.  Darboe must take the initiative and be the presidential candidate to be reckoned with come October
2001.

PDOIS must also show flexibility for its preconditions for joining the alliance, in that the task of civic
education is not a one shot deal, but an ongoing historical process that could, under the best of
circumstances, take years if not decades to accomplish.  Similarly, choosing a presidential candidate outside
the existing political parties could and is indeed perceived in some circles, as unnecessary, perhaps a tacit
endorsement of Jammeh and a cry of sour grapes.  That is, if PDOIS’ chosen candidate, politician or civilian,
does not head the coalition ticket, then no current politicians are worthy of and qualified to head that
ticket.  If PDOIS insists on this precondition, it may very well remain outside on the sidelines of the
alliance for sometime to come.

Regarding the NRP, and NCP leaders, there still remains an opening for them to join the coalition.  Dibba has
not, in fact, shut the door completely for compromise and NRP’s Hamat Bah could be induced into joining the
coalition.  It will take flexibility, and perhaps another meeting to have all the parties come on board.
This is the challenge that Darboe must rise up to.  And Time is of the Essence!

Abdoulaye Saine
Oxford, OH, U.S.A.

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