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Subject:
From:
omar joof <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Mon, 20 Oct 2003 05:44:25 +0000
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Sister Jabou,
Thank you once more for your very inspiring comments and questions. I agree
with you pertaining to the type of interventions you envisage from the
international community. But all that will require building contacts, making
representations and presentations all of which will require resources. The
fact is I do not envisage the opposition being abled to do this on its own.
From the look of things, opposition parties in the Gambia since indepedence
have basically depended on the generosity of few individuals to survive from
election to election. Exceptions to this rule are almost non-existent. If
this international dimension of the struggle is to be waged effectively, we
need to have a large input of cash from somewhere. This is the reason I
strongly feel the coalition machinery should be put in place immediately.
Gambians in the diaspora can play a crucial role in this connection. In the
absence of cash, a lot of things can be done in the spirit of volunteerism.
But even here you would need something to atleast cover your basic
operational costs. Money would therefore still prove to be imperative. If
the requisite impact is to be made on the international scene within the
type of timeframe available, there is need to attract to coalition efforts
persons who have international connections. To effect this, the prime movers
of the coalition efforts must be prepared and willing to give out
responsibilities to other persons who deserve them. Inview of the high
number of Gambians living in the diaspora, perhaps this would be the easiest
huddle to overcome. The crucial starting point would be to bring the right
type of persons together.
With regard the issue of giving the vote to the Gambians in the diaspora, a
member of the IEC has already stated that they may be giving Gambians in the
diaspora the opportunity to vote in elections subject to the availability of
resources. As matters stand at the moment, political will on the side of the
goverment in Banjul, is of paramount importance in effecting this long
overdue enfranchisement. In such matters of national interest, it is always
easier for the governing national authority to look around for resources if
they are unavailable. A willing government that gives its backing to such
efforts, even if they are spearheaded by non-governmental organisations,
still makes the acquisition of such resources easier. Taking into cognisance
the fact that the electoral authority is already suspected of having biases
infavour of the ruling party, it is advisable for those involved in the
coalition efforts to garner resouces and make them available to the IEC so
that the enfranchisement process can be put on course immediately.
All our bottlenecks in this connection, are basically due to the absence of
permanent institutions that should foster the development of democracy
through the empowerment of the people. My friends in the Gambia used to make
some funny remarks about Senegalese democracy. Most of them were true, so I
was shocked to discover the huge gap that had evolved between the state of
democracy in the two countries, particularly during six years of A(F)PRC
rule. Indeed, the Senegalese have developed the state of democracy in their
country far ahead of ours that it would be disgraceful to compare them here,
considering that we were ahead of them at some point. Thus I would endeavour
to share my take on what I consider to have been the basic factors that led
to "the Senegalese miracle".
The Senegalese miracle has been attained basically through three factors.
Firstly, a vibrant private media  evolved in the 1990s, which posed a
formidable challenge to the public media's monopoly over the flow of
information. As at the time of the 2000 presidential elections, there were
more than ten private radio stations in and around the capital city Dakar.
Atleast five of them were involved in news broadcast. This generated a
competition for audience attention within the broadcast medium, which inturn
led to improved standards in terms of broadcast quality and newsworthiness.
A marked improvement in terms of transparency was recorded as the political
leadership of the country was forced to speak publicly on issues it had
previously been reticent about, and also gave the opposition parties outlets
through which they could criticise government policy and performance.
Secondly, there emerged during the same period, a plethora of human rights
organisations highly committed to advocacy work. These organisations played
a vital role in the promotion of people's rights which had a positive impact
on the development of democracy in the country. Thirdly, the existence of a
large unemployed youthful population, meant the opposition parties could
galvanise potent vanguards.
To date, perhaps with the exception of the latter, none of the above factors
have yet to make a prominent presence in the Gambia. Our human rights
organisations still lack the requisite resiliance. The private media has
never been given a chance to flourish, as the Jammeh regime persistently
works to undermine their operational efficiency through draconian
legislation. So in the absence of a vibrant civil society to advocate for
improvements in our state of democracy, what amount of democracy Gambians
enjoy, has always depended on what political conveniece it affords the
ruling cabal in Banjul. In the area of awareness pertaining to political
rights, PDOIS has done tremendous work. This work could have been even more
effective if it were done by some apolitical civil society organisation,
considering the amount of political criticism PDOIS's agenda was subjected
to, particularly by the former ruling PPP.
Finally, solutions to the shambled state of the electoral process will be
the most diffucult. Here one is talking about fraudulent practices
sanctified by bad laws. Like most things in a country under a political
dictatorship, your best opportunity is always when the dictator all of a
sudden, finds himself in a sudden goodwill for the people, and in a feat of
self-abnegation, throws away all his draconian and dictatorial laws. for
example if all of a sudden Yaya Jammeh realises that he does not have Godly
characteristics, and starts to think about normal life for himself after the
presidency; and do things that may make life peaceful for himself, a massive
opportunity will become available to undo  most of this electoral mayhem.
Otherwise, rectifying the messy electoral process will prove a herculian
task. In the first place, most of the "international voters", vote in the
presidential election only. For example, an international voter may be
registered as: name: Samba Jallow; address: Galleh Mandaa, Upper Fuladu
constituency, URD. Samba can go to Bakoteh in Serre kunda west constituency,
and will be allowed to vote. The example can be repeated all over the
country. The most potent key to resolving this problem would be to have
exact addresses for all those on the electoral register. This means having
street names and compound numbers in even the smallest village in the
country. This would facilitate tracking each voter down to his or her exact
location in the country. This inturn will require tremendous resources.
Secondly, since most of the international voters are alledged to be
Senegalese, the coalition can make direct contacts with the Senegalese
authorities so that they pre-empt their nationals taking part in Gambian
elections. Here is one area in which perhaps international pressure can pay
great dividens.
In the past opposition parties have done their best to take cases of
fraudulent acquisition of the vote to court. But am not aware of any
meaningful success case which led to the courts nullifying any election
result.
In conclusion, it should be noted that there are certain issues that
definitely cannot be discuss on a public medium like this. I am sure that
whenever the coalition is ready to research into these problems and their
possible solutions, there are many Gambians both at home and in the diaspora
who are better qualified than I to be resource persons. And you will never
find them short of adequate supply, if you make youselves worthy of their
services.
OmarJoof.




>From: Jabou Joh <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: Re: Why the silence/Sanusi/Omar
>Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2003 11:21:39 EDT
>
>Omar,
>
>Thank you for your very on the spot analysis of the current political
>situation in The Gambia, and how it is conducive to vote rigging.
>I think though you misunderstad the point I am trying to make when I talk
>about international involvement. You wrote:
>
>"The international community can indeed play a vital role in resolving the
>political mayhem we presently have in the Gambia. It may however be
>dangerous if  multilateral institutions, as alluded to in your write-up,
>are
>allowed to play a lead role. We have seen instances where international
>observers have endorsed doubtful election results. This normally emanates
>from the fact that they concentrate on elections rather than election
>processes. I agree they can be involved but this should be to complement
>national efforts."
>
>Indeed there were observers in the last elections and they declared that
>the
>voting process was free and fair when Gambians knew there was tampering
>with
>the process long before the voting started and  also that non-Gambians
>voted.
>
>If you read what I wrote carefully, I am not talking about involving the
>international community as observers in the election process only, but as a
>vehicle through which the reforms necessary to ensure a free and fair
>election are
>put into place such as determining the composition of the IEC and taking
>steps
>to correct or avoid the possibility of all of the things you mentioned as
>avenues of cheating to be eliminated.
>
>The APRC simply ignored everyone and went on to determine the composition
>of
>the IEC and had them bend the rules in their favour and absolutely nothing
>was
>done about it. They also engaged in all of the other things you mentioned
>to
>steal votes, and they tamper with the constitution to protect themselves.
>
>The big question is, if  they will put obstacles in the way of reforms,
>which is a given based on their record, what options are available to the
>opposition parties and the people so that pressure is brought to bear on
>the regime to
>let these reforms take place without interference from them? This
>intervention by the international community does not have to mean that they
>will take
>full control, I envision it as pressure being applied on the regime to
>comply
>with the charters of these organizations and here I am assuming that not
>tampering with all the processes that will affect a free and fair election
>and
>tampering with the constitution to protect themselves. are one of them but
>perhaps I
>am wrong although it certainly warrants looking into.
>I have no idea if such a thing is possible, this is simply a suggestion and
>question in one.
>
>At this point, I think the key is that the APRC is in charge and I think
>that
>anyone who assumes that all these measures can be implemented with their
>cooperation is naive. They will put obstacles in the way for sure and my
>suggestions were meant to be a possible solution to prevent them from being
>able to do
>this in view of the fact that no one in the country made any attempts to
>stop
>these practices prior to the last election, or if they did, it was not
>effective.
>
>I have asked the question several times as to how these measures you
>mention
>here can be tackled by the opposition parties and the Gambian public
>without
>the interference of the regime making any difference. Perhaps there is a
>way
>that i am not aware of, if this can be elaborated upon, that would be
>helpful.
>
>You also wrote:
>
> > "As for the factional interests you made mention of, if you are
>referring
> > to
> > the individual political organisations, I am afraid most of that will be
> > around as long as we continue to have a multiparty political culture.
>That
> > has a lot to do with the nature of multipartism."
> >
> > This is well understood by me and indeed, I am not advocating for a one
> > party state which would defeat the argument for a democratic form of
>government
> > which is what we are fighting for.
> > Again, my reference to the need to put factionalism aside is to do this
>as a
> > temporary  emergency measure so that the necessary unions can be
>established
> > with one goal in mind, to  form a non-partisan coalition that will have
>one
> > candidate behind whom all will rally to defeat the APRC, instead of the
> > opposition parties engaging in the usual rivalry factionalism which will
>not help
> > any of the opposition parties singly to defeat the APRC. If the
>coalition
> > wins the elections, this would then require the formation of an interim
> > government for a specified period until all the additional reforms to
>ensure that all
> > political parties can come forward and compete in an election process
>that
> > is free and clear of all forms of tampering
>is completed.
>I think that we do not differ in this view, perhaps you just did not
>understand my reference to factionalism as well as my suggestion as to what
>role the
>international community's intervention can be tapped into by the opposition
>should the APRC put obstacles in their way in this effort.It would be ideal
>if
>these reforms can be put into place by Gambians without outside help, but
>the
>question is how, and will it be possible under the regime.
>Factionalism and political maneuvering was also one of the reasons that a
>united coalition never happened in the last election and the opposition
>simply
>cannot defeat Jammeh if everyone concentrates on strategies to promote
>their own
>party interest at this time. The idea of a coalition in itself already
>means
>that these are all emergency strategies to solve a major problem we have
>right
>now, namely the APRC regime. Otherwise, under a democratic system, one
>would
>not necessarily even consider having all opposition parties in the country
>form one coalition.
>
>Perhaps if we can now shift the discussion to some of the possible
>solutions
>the Gambian public and the opposition parties can undertake  to correct
>electoral fraud by correcting the problems you mentioned,  and should they
>face
>obstacles from the APRC regime,  what options are available to them from
>outside
>international bodies to which The Gambia is a subscribing member, that
>would be
>a very helpful discussion indeed.
>I wish that some of the opposition politicians in The Gambia  and all
>Gambians who are knowledgeable on these issues can also join this
>discussion to let
>the people know what our options are.
>The third part of this discussion should also deal with Gambians in the
>disapora being able to register to vote in the upcoming election. What
>protection
>under the constitution do we have regarding this and how can it be
>implemented?
>
>Jabou Joh
>
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