Musa, Great indeed, but I hope others would look into the contributions of non-party organizations like the STGDP, as well as The "Teri-kafo" and The Banjul Mafia. If all play their parts, this would be a useful post-mortem.Omar Joof.> Date: Sun, 25 Feb 2007 02:56:13 +0000> From: [log in to unmask]> Subject: Truth behind the NADD break Up- CONTINUES> To: [log in to unmask]> > OJ’s role in the NADD breakup:> > The reality was that the idea of a coalition was not a new phenomenon in the Gambia, but for us living in the Diaspora we were convinced that a total coalition including all the parties, if done right could remove Jammeh and usher in a new beginning. For years, Gambians in the Diaspora continued to participate in the debate about development issues and how to bring real change to the lives of all Gambians; notwithstanding living thousands of miles away from home. The internet provided us with the medium to debate and sometimes these debates looked more like slugfest.  It was becoming clear that if we want real change, there is the need to get involved and get our hands dirty, lip service alone would not suffice... In that spirit, a coalition as a concept became a reality. Boy, did we come so close.> > OJ Jallow was one of our partners who played a very instrumental role, especially at the beginning of the planning stages. He really helped and guided us in our effort to put such a difficult task together. It was a fact that all we had was a vision, and most of us have lived in the US, outside of Gambia for so long and left the Gambia as student in our early twenties. Clearly, we were not very informed in the nuances of the local political terrain, and it was really needed to have somebody like OJ, who not only understands Gambian politics but was one of the political players. He was not only committed, but wanted us to succeed.  At the coalition talks in Atlanta, all the party leaders were opened to the idea, but it took someone like OJ, taking concrete steps in making sure that the idea and vision are implemented. A coalition process, involving all political parties was going to take leadership, commitment and leg work on the ground to get it going. To make sure that the process>  get jump started before they left Atlanta, OJ made the proposal nominating Halifa Sallah to be the coordinator of the effort, and informally all the party leaders endorsed the nomination. Interestingly, when they returned back to Banjul, things got back to business as usual, even conducting a meeting among the leaders was difficult, but with resilience he managed to bring them together. Remember, the reality was that it was in Atlanta that for the first time, the leaders sat on one table discussed issues affecting country. The meeting alone was a huge accomplishment, but putting together a coalition of all the parties was still a steep hill to climb. Folks, at this critical and initial stage of the effort, the best friend of the coalition idea had been OJ, and without a doubt he was a very important conduit for STGDP during these trying times.> > OJ with his hearth and soul was committed to the coalition idea, and was the most opened person among all the leaders. For STGDP, it was important to have the inside track in order to at least do whatever it takes not to allow the effort to fall off a cliff. And there were numerous times that the effort faced some difficult times. We relied on OJ, and the UDP connection within STGDP to foil lots of potential problems that could have derailed the effort. In fact, OJ’s role led to some sort of suspicion among some of the leaders that maybe STGDP was in bed with him, and the whole effort was geared to anoint him the leader. But the real truth was that STGDP never considered OJ as a serious contender for the leadership. He had on several occasions reinforced the reality that he was not really driven by becoming the leader, and all he wanted to see is to remove Jammeh and begin the arduous task of bringing democracy to the Gambia... In fact, when he actually became the potential nominee>  in that fiasco selection process, we were taken by surprised. Some in the group actually started questioning whether OJ had this planned out all along, and had always been interested in the leadership.> > In the final analysis, OJ did not leave up to what he promised that was his ultimate goal, to make the coalition a reality. He understood the dynamics, anticipated difficulties with all the land mines that could detonate the effort; unfortunately, he still succumbed to the politics of the moment and threw his hat in the ring... For STGDP, the focus was to have a coalition, create the necessary excitement, and ultimately raise the finances. Fairly or unfairly, the anticipated role for OJ was to expedite the effort and be the glue that would keep this marriage of convenience together. But when he became a serious contender, the coalition lost the most suitable insider from within to bail the process out. Interestingly, OJ came into the coalition without a well organized political party, outside of the PPP name recognition, and the best days for the party was in its past.  At the end even his own PPP dormant partners were not even willing to give him the mantle of leadership. He was o> nly an Interim Leader, whatever that means. Also in the US, especially political militants of the seventies living outside still viewed OJ with suspicion and as one of the politicians of yester year who actually contributed to our political predicament. There is indeed in some quarters in the Diaspora, OJ’s candidacy was always received in a negative way, indicating that it will be PPP all over again. When he was nominated and became the front runner, there was the talk that some of his sidekicks living in the US might have finally got to him, and convinced him that he is indeed the right person for the job... OJ vying for the top ticket complicated things, and really more than anyone else in the group, his role was unique. We have always said that OJ is one person that wanted the coalition period, and understood the complete strategy, and is willing to do whatever it takes to see it happen. He was indeed the important glue to the group, and should have known the cost associated wi> th him actually throwing his hat in the ring. By default, it was his role to bring the other parties home, and manage the agendas of the different party leaders to make these difficult challenges a reality. > > Looking back, I believe that OJ must have convinced hemself that the NADD concept has become a household name, and that anyone who walked away from it will be committing political suicide and will never be forgiven by the Gambian people... This I believe added to his complacency, and helped him justify the risk of getting in without putting the marriage of convenience in jeopardy. Indeed, his candidacy complicated the situation, and that is not to say he did not have the right to vie for the leadership. Again and again, he has assured us that the most important thing is to get rid of Jammeh, and then we will have the time to build a real democracy. We were counting on him to make the necessary deal among the parties to see it to the end. Without a doubt his vying for the leadership eliminated the moral righteous voice and the very glue that the group needed.> > At the critical juncture when the coalition was on its death bed, OJ was playing a different role. In addition, the PPP fall out and betrayal left a sour taste in his mouth. He was no longer the same and was not as enthusiastic in finding solutions when we really needed it... If anyone of them had influence on Waa it was OJ, and why didn’t he lean on him to make sure that his problem with Ousainou would not affect the success of the coalition? There are lots of unanswered question. In the final analysis, OJ was the insider that STGDP needed to make the necessary deal for an all opposition coalition, and with the excitement of the hope for victory we will raise the funds. When it became obvious to him that his candidacy was a problem, he made the right decision but >  was too little too late to bring all the players back.  He was without a doubt the savviest politicians among them, and it was not a coincident that he was able to out fox them when the stakes became high. Our final attempt to rescue the chances for a coalition became much more of a challenge because our insider was disappointed by the withdrawal of his partners and the OJ we knew was gone and proposals for any deal felt on deaf ears.> > MUSA JENG> > Note: Next, I will delve into Halifa's and Ousainou's contribution into the fiasco.> > Thanks> > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤> To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface> at: http://listserv.icors.org/archives/gambia-l.html> > To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?S1=gambia-l> To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to:> [log in to unmask]> ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤
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