Inga,
Please can I have Alhagi's telephone number. I misplaced the one I had from
him. I will talk to Alhagi personally.
Adama.
-----Original Message-----
From: MOMODOU BUHARRY GASSAMA <[log in to unmask]>
To: [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]>
Date: Thursday, August 10, 2000 12:57 AM
Subject: Re: Taking Stock


>Hi Hamjatta!
>                    There is a typing omission in my previous mail. A
>sentence in paragraph 3 should read: "Even though the political option is
>not the panacea to The Gambia's ills or some might even argue a likely
>solution given Yaya's behaviour ..."  Thanks and sorry for forgetting to
>sign the earlier posting.
>
>Buharry.
>----- Original
>Message -------------------------------------------------------------------
-
>--------------------
>From: MOMODOU BUHARRY GASSAMA <[log in to unmask]>
>To: <[log in to unmask]>
>Sent: Thursday, August 10, 2000 4:17 AM
>Subject: Re: Taking Stock
>
>
>Hi Hamjatta!
>                  When you wrote "over to you gentlemen", I assumed as one
>of those who has recently praised Halifa and co. that your invitation
>included me. Before going to the issues you raised, I don't think there is
>anything wrong with expressing one's appreciation of the personalities
>behind PDOIS and the personal sacrifices they have made for our country.
>That is a prerogative we are within our rights to enjoy. I for one am truly
>impressed by Halifa and co. and I take pride in making it known. In fact,
>you impress me and I have made it known on a number of occasions on this
>list and the first time I made it known was during your first debate with
>none other than Halifa. I had and still have the prerogative to declare
that
>Halifa, you and anyone else impress me. Declaring such is in my opinion a
>better alternative to what we have seen lately on the L.
>
>            That aside, you wrote: "Indeed, writer after writer merely
>stresses the point the Geat Leader, Halifa himself, makes in his missives
to
>the Jammeh since the April murders. They claim there is no credible
>alternative to the Great Leader sitting in his Churchill's Town HQs penning
>letters which implore the dictator to have a rethink on his strangle hold
on
>the Gambian people and advocating that elections [even if as their
>deliverance are being muddled by throw-away threats by the gov't which cast
>question marks over them ever taking place] and the political process are
t!
>he only viable options existing to the Gambian people to deal with Jammeh."
>
>     Maybe other writers claimed that there is no other option to Halifa
>penning letters. I can therefore not comment on that because I don't agree
>with the statement. As to whether the political process is the only viable
>option, I feel that the political process coupled with continuous internal
>and external pressure is a much better alternative than the repeated calls
>for violent means of bringing about change. Whereas change that is brought
>about politically can offer tested leaders who have had a chance to explain
>their policies and programs to the people, change that is brought about by
>violent and sudden means offers a Russian roulette alternative. It is
>granted that there is a possibility that such a change of government can be
>effectively and efficiently executed without loss of life and destruction
of
>property and that such a change can produce a leader who has the interests
>of the nation at heart. However, the dangers associated with that method
are
>plenty and cannot be ignored. Something can always go wrong even with the
>most carefully planned operation and the result can be devastating for our
>country. Another risk, given that the people executing such operations can
>be any Tom, Dick or Harry, is that we might have someone who is worse than
>Yaya. Much, much, much worse. What do we do then? Pray that someone else
>violently removes him? Isn't that akin to creating a coup industry whereby
>anyone with guts and the blessings of a marabout can attempt to overthrow a
>government? What are the implications of such an industry on the stability
>and security of our country? Another risk is that people propagating for a
>violent change of government might be doing so out of a wish to revenge
>personal wrongs meted out by the government or by Yaya. Instead of
"praying"
>Yaya to "Tan" (just joking) and getting on with it, they might use the
>Gambian people as pawns in an endeavour that could go wrong with horrendous
>consequences. What would happen if such people succeed? Would they kill and
>imprison everyone associated with Yaya? Is that good for the continuity of
>our country as a viable entity? Even though the political option is not the
>panacea to The Gambia's ills or even a likely solution, the risks
associated
>with the violent option are many. (On a less related note, acquire IP
>tracing software and trace some of the IP addresses of some of the people
>propagating violent change in The Gambia and claiming to be in The Gambia,
>"on the ground", "in the this" or "in the that" and you'll be really
>surprised when you see some writing from Russia, England, US etc.)
>
>            You also wrote: "If as these Alumni of PDOIS/Foroyaa are
>gloating about the success or inevitability of success of the strategy of
>their party, surely it's about time one takes them to task and ask them to
>empirically state how the aforesaid strategy has made any concrete
>difference since the gruesome murders of April 10 and 11. It is time we ask
>ourselves what is working or practically workable as we struggle with the
>dictator."
>
>     It is empirically impossible to measure whether PDOIS' strategy
>vis-à-vis the April massacre has had some effect just as it is empirically
>impossible to determine if it didn't have an effect. Why? Because even if
>one were to institute a study, the available variables would render coming
>to a conclusion practically impossible due to, among other reasons, the
>multi-pronged reaction and handling of the massacre. That aside, one can
see
>that the total and universal condemnation, including but not limited to
>PDOIS' approach, has had an effect no matter how small. Yaya could have
>reacted when he came back from Cuba in his usual fashion and picked up the
>line of his officials, which so infuriated the Gambian people. He didn't. A
>commission was instituted. That also is an indication of the effect the
>pressures had. The Government's fear in releasing the Coroner's Report also
>indicates a fear of the reaction of the people assuming that the report is
>damning. I am not saying that all this is the panacea to the issue of the
>April massacre. It might even be counter-productive to the desire to get to
>the truth but at least giving in to the pressures levied by among others,
>PDOIS, is an indication of the effect that penning letters at Churchill's
>Town or strongly condemning brutal acts from Oxford can have. The letters
of
>PDOIS and the actions of others made it possible for the ban on the UDP to
>hold rallies to be lifted. That also is testimony, no matter how small,
that
>the PDOIS strategy is having an effect.
>
>            On the issue of the political parties staging civil
disobedience
>measures, maybe all the political parties can give you an answer. I
>personally respect the decisions of the parties to either engage in such or
>not, given that they are more in tune with the realities on the ground than
>I am. I respect the fact that such a move is a strategic one that has to
>consider timing,practicability, risk not only to one's self but also to
>supporters, resources and a host of other variables and has to be done
after
>the parties feel that they do not have any other option. Whilst I can see
>the benefits of such a move, I can also see risks involved which include
>giving Yaya the opportunity to declare a state of emergency, rounding up
all
>the political leaders and indefinitely postponing the elections. It has
>happened in other countries.
>
>     Hamjatta, I have tried to deal with the issues you raised. I however
>have some questions for you if you don't mind, given that you wrote: "It is
>time we ask ourselves what is working or practically workable as we
struggle
>with the dictator." The questions are:
>
>  1.. What has been your strategy since the April massacre as a concerned
>citizen to ensure that justice is served?
>  2.. How is it different from PDOIS'?
>  3.. How have you implemented the strategy or how do you intend to
>implement the strategy?
>  4.. Can you guarantee or at least gauge whether the results of your
>strategy will have a higher success rate than PDOIS'?
>  5.. What do you base such predictions or pronouncements on?
>  6.. What alternative approach can you proffer to deal with the current
>political impasse in The Gambia given that PDOIS' approach is not, in your
>opinion, working?
>  7.. How do you intend to institute your alternative?
>  8.. What do you expect PDOIS and the other political parties to do in the
>meantime?
>  9.. Given that you feel that the political process is not a workable
>alternative, do you believe that the only available or workable option
would
>be a violent overthrow of the Government?
>  10.. When? What if that is not possible in the next one, two, five, ten
>years?
>  11.. Should the political parties stop all operations and wait for the
>alternative you propose or do you believe that they are obliged under the
>Constitution of The Gambia and their own to propagate by lawful means their
>beliefs?
>     Sorry for the long list of questions. Anyway, The Gambia is in a
>quagmire and I don't think that PDOIS or their supporters claim to have the
>universal remedy for the country's woes. What they claim is to have small
>steps which are pursued through pressure be it in the form of letters or
>otherwise. PDOIS and their supporters are however not the only people to
>have a claim to The Gambia. If the other stakeholders, in the form of
>political parties and concerned citizens, contribute in their small ways a
>cure will eventually be found when all adds up. Thank you and have a good
>evening.
>
>
>Buharry.
>
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
>
>To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
>Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
>You may also send subscription requests to
>[log in to unmask]
>if you have problems accessing the web interface
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
>
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
>
>To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
>Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
>You may also send subscription requests to
[log in to unmask]
>if you have problems accessing the web interface
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
>

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask]
if you have problems accessing the web interface
----------------------------------------------------------------------------