-----Ursprungligt meddelande-----
Från: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
Till: [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]>
Datum: den 30 juli 2001 05:35
Ämne: COUP IN GAMBIA ELEVEN


>COUP IN THE GAMBIA ELEVEN
>My program for this week and next is so tight that I
>almost cancelled this posting. But on a second
>thought, and especially not to disappoint my readers I
>decided to come up with a short one.
> However there are some comments I like to make on two
>special issues; i.e., the opposition's great boost to
>finally boot the Yaya dictatorship out of power in
>October, in the wake of the death of Decree 89 and the
>role the armed forces is expected to play in the
>campaign, voting and final declaration of the end of
>the APRC government.
>To start with there is no doubt in my mind that the
>repealing of the decree added more firepower to the
>arsenals of the opposition force. With or without the
>decree, I was positive that the Gambia had had enough
>with "Yaya Bokassa Jammeh" the second dictator in the
>history of modern African politics to order the
>massacre of armless school children on ordinary
>demonstration. That crime alone, forgetting all the
>other heinous crimes committed by Yaya during his
>reign of terror is enough to see him gone for good.
>And I know for sure that the Gambian people as a
>result would not allow him to remain another minute
>that day in October when the people's votes show it
>clear and indisputable to the whole world.
>What the Gambian electorate should brace up for is the
>possible futile resistance Yaya would attempt to put
>up to stay in power by force. General Guai of Ivory
>Coast tried it; Milosovic also tried it; but as
>typical of dictators in their last moments, they
>always end up being victims of the very forces they
>built to protect them. For instance, in the cases of
>Ivory Coast and Yugoslavia, the tyrants became wimps
>when the security forces realized that the future of
>the nation far outweighed the interest of one person
>whose record as their leader merely brought them
>embarrassment, horror and death. So they turned the
>cannons on their master and stood by the popular
>voices of the people.
>To think that Yaya abrogated this decree out of
>logical analysis and politically-fair conclusion, and
>that he deserved to be commended for it is at best a
>seriously misplaced judgement. Yaya's decision on this
>one came out of a no-other-choice option. Anything
>otherwise would have pitted him against the wrath of
>the Gambian opposition forces and the international
>community at large. He was aware of the intolerance of
>everybody towards his intransigence on this decree. He
>had "bilahi and walahi" the world on numerous public
>forums swearing never to compromise the decree or
>allow the banned politicians to participate actively
>again. He had also threatened them with more verbal
>terror, with his notorious six-feet-deep warning. But
>when he realized that the likes of Mr. Omar Jallow (
>O.J.) were no longer intimidated by his childish
>threat, coupled with the fact that the international
>community was no longer prepared to accept his
>stonewalling attitude in this issue, the dictator
>bowed down in fear. Yes, it was nothing but fear that
>drove him to such a decision. For that reason I
>believe all commendations should be saved for the
>international-pressure forces and those dynamic
>opposing elements that kept up the heat on Yaya to the
>end.
>O.J. was awesome in this battle for reasons genuinely
>justifiable. Despite his total innocence of any given
>crime other than being a former minister in the former
>PPP government-if that was a crime at all- like Buba
>Baldeh was, O. J. on numerous occasions was arrested,
>tortured, incarcerated and humiliated in every way
>imaginable. But like Mr. Lamin Waa Juwara, every ill
>treatment they received from the hands of the bandits
>merely galvanized their fortitude and determination to
>fight harder for their holy course. These are the men
>who deserve the special commendation. For Yaya, he was
>like a wanted psychopath on an evasive trail until
>cornered at a dead end and given an ultimatum to
>either surrendering or faced the risk of being smoked
>out with lethal gas (a classic fate of a fat "dirmo"
>with a relentless hunter). The guy therefore should at
>most be laughed at and classified as nothing but the
>coward he is.
>It was also funny to learn that the six-feet-deep
>threat was repeated at the time of his unhappy
>abrogation statement to those opposition elements
>affected. Well, that was a good tactic to reassure his
>blind followers and give them the hope that he was
>still the same tough idol they should continue to
>worship. That was the child in him entertaining his
>hopeless ego.
>As I said earlier, I was left with no doubt that, come
>October, the Gambians will get rid of Yaya even with
>Decree 89 in place; but now that the moron has been
>forced to abrogate it, I would say that the die is
>finally cast. Yaya has put the last nail on his
>coffin.
>My warning to him now is to be mindful of his last
>days. They are as dangerous as things were in the
>beginning when treachery, betrayal and individual
>interest characterized the actions of those very close
>to him. It would be a costly mistake if he tries to
>use the armed forces against the popular desire of the
>Gambian people. So the easier he tries to leave the
>scene with minimal trouble the better for him and of
>course for those blindly loyal to him who could be
>dragged along with him to the abyss of doom.
>Come October, the majority of the soldiers will not be
>part of any ill-conceived plan to force the APRC
>government onto the Gambian people. It is now evident
>to most of them that Yaya's administration is for the
>benefit of few but not the majority of them. Those few
>ones would however try few tricks that they would live
>to regret in the end. In the end, those soldiers with
>the positive thought of taking the Gambia forward
>would prevail.
>As for those of you who think that Yaya is a
>dependable ally, just stop for a moment and reflect on
>those who had once committed their lives to protecting
>him with blind zealotry, and the way he rewarded them
>in the end. Take for instance the case of the late
>Almamo Manneh who used to say that for anyone had
>intended to hurt Yaya that person must step over his
>dead body first before reaching "Boss". Remember the
>special and close relationship that had existed
>between Landing Sanneh and Yaya. They were like blood
>brothers. Sanneh would have done anything to keep Yaya
>in power. Now Sanneh is facing charges of treason in a
>kangaroo court martial while Almamo was sent six-foot
>deep. Consider the number of soldiers murdered under
>Yaya's rule without serious evidence to motivate the
>killing. If these men had been a little more cautious
>in their actions to satisfy his whims, perhaps Yaya
>would have also been careful in the manner he
>eliminated them. But because he had given them bad
>names by manipulating them into committing all kinds
>of political and social crimes, he relied on their
>unpopularity and delivered them his killer blows
>When Yaya ordered the shooting of the school children
>last year, he came back from Cuba pretending not to
>know how it happened. When Koro Ceesay was murdered in
>1995, Yaya as usual, tried to give the impression to
>the Ceesay family that he had had nothing to do with
>it.
>When most of your colleagues were cold-bloodedly
>executed in November 11th 1994 on his orders and
>dumped latrines pits, Yaya later claimed innocent of
>that crime. In most of the crimes committed under
>Yaya's directive, it had always been the ordinary
>soldier who had been blamed for them.
>In October, however all crimes committed by Yaya would
>be brought to the open, and there would be competent
>judges to look at each case one by one.
>Take it from me. The forces that have now been
>assembled to get rid of Yaya this time could destroy
>his equals ten times and more. The need to dismantle
>the fabric of the APRC is of both national and
>international concern now. It will therefore be done
>either from the inside or outside. But October would
>not miss. You could bet on that statement.
>Going back to my usual narrative of the events of the
>July 1994 coup, I remember the end of my last piece on
>the torturous night of that September night. It was
>one of the most frightening incidents we experienced
>in jail. Anyway after the police C.I.D. took our
>statements for possible submission to the reviewing
>board, we became fairly faithful that there would be
>something done about our detention situation after
>all.
>At the end of September, for reasons we really could
>not understand, word came from the army headquarters
>letting us know that our monthly salaries were still
>being paid, and that we could withdraw the money
>anytime we wanted it. How that decision was made was
>anybody's guess. It was a life-saving gesture with a
>positive boost to our images in the eyes of the prison
>authorities that showed total dismay over the matter.
>They could not understand the logic in our cases
>anymore. As a matter of fact, a good number of them
>began to genuinely sympathize with us. They started
>talking to us about their personal problems laden with
>financial burden and career disorientation. As prison
>guards, most of them thought they were harder workers
>than the police who earned more than they did; yet
>they had greater preference to military career than
>any security work available in the country.
>So with money in our hands we began to buy favors from
>them. With D5.00, we could keep forks and knives to
>eat with instead of the only acceptable bare hands.
>For D25.00 we could write letters to our family
>members which they would deliver, bring back replies
>and smuggle in the daily newspapers. With D2.50, they
>would be willing to take any letters to the post
>office and mail them to any part of the world without
>asking a question, even if it was boldly addressed to
>the BBC, Focus on Africa or the editor of the Daily
>Observer. From that time on up to the time I was set
>free in 1995, we kept constantly writing to every news
>media we thought could help by making our helpless
>position known to the world. Ebou Colly was our pen
>name. We wrote some foreign embassies in The Gambia
>asking for their help.  Interestingly, some time
>later, the American Ambassador Andrew Winters secured
>a permit with his aid, Mr. Knight and paid us a visit
>in jail. By then the rules were so relaxed that we
>were allowed to read books openly without fear of
>having it confiscated and or destroyed. So the
>Americans, after their visit, sent us sufficient
>reading materials that reduced our boredom
>tremendously. Anyway they were very upset with the
>government's action to keep us where they found us
>without charges or trial. They just could not
>understand why, but they left us with encouraging
>words that the whole world was watching our cases, and
>that they had been warning the AFPRC government over
>our final fate.
>In October, we began for the first time to enjoy
>having visitors from our family members. Those who
>wanted to visit us were to get their permission from
>Sana Sabally, at his office in Banjul.
>At the end of October, the AFPRC government released
>the following officers:
>1. Captain Momodou Sonko
>2. Captain Alieu Ndure
>3. Lieutenant Sonko (former presidential guard
>commander)
>4. Second Lieutenant Alagie Kanteh
>5. Second Lieutenant Alpha Kinteh
>6. Second Lieutenant Yankuba Drammeh
>Captain Sonko and Lieutenant Sonko were retired from
>the armed forces while the rest were reinstated back
>to their jobs. None of them had to face any review
>committee or anything to determine their eligibility
>for freedom.
>Sabally was interviewed over BBC about the first
>release and he said that those remaining under
>detention could be released soon. The prison guards
>misunderstood the statement and came telling us that
>Sabally had said that we were to go home by next week
>or so. And most of us believed it. The guards became
>super friendly and started to address some of us with
>compliments like sir and boss. Anyway in most cases
>their politeness or friendliness was indirectly wired
>to the Dalasis in our pockets.
>Hopes of gaining our freedom soon kept us in a highly
>euphoric mood. We thought our release was going to be
>done in an eventful manner, most probably by the
>second week of November, exactly on Remembrance Day.
>Our hopes were short lived. In the early hours of
>November 11th, 1994, the unusual voices of men in a
>state of what sounded like serious distress woke some
>of us up. I think it was Lieutenant Gomez who called
>my attention to the voices outside. It reminded us of
>the 6th of September. But after what seemed to be a
>short but heated argument among the mysterious voices,
>they boarded a vehicle and drove away towards the
>Kombos.
>The quietness that followed plus the relief that it
>was after all nothing to do with us seemed to have
>sedated me into a very deep sleep.
>The sermon for dawn prayer that always came from the
>main yard where the common criminals lived added some
>element of assurance to my hope that things were as
>normal as ever.
>However at 8:00 a.m., the guards failed to show up for
>their routine morning duties. That included opening
>the main door to the block to check for everyone's
>presence and later let us out to have our morning
>showers and do other cleaning and washing. But that
>morning the guards arrived very late. And when they
>arrived they stayed outside talking to themselves and
>refused to talk to us.
>Soon the whispers began to circulate about the
>presence of heavily armed guards in large numbers
>mounting the four watchtowers above the prison
>facility. The guards were identified as State Guard
>personnel-Yaya's guards. It was a state of full alert
>until Sana Sabally passed with his irritating siren
>from the Kombos towards Banjul. That was around 9.30
>a.m.
>Shortly after, the guards climbed down and went back
>to duty at State House. We were finally allowed few
>minutes each to do all our cleaning , took our showers
>and returned to our cells. Nothing like going out
>under the sun to feel its heat and breathe the fresh
>air was allowed.
>There was an absolute conspiracy of silence among the
>guards about what had happened. Evidently the
>atmosphere was charged with an eerie tension full of
>doubt and fear. As financially needy as they were the
>guards soon started talking when we paid for the
>information. With D15.00, they narrated the story they
>witnessed the previous night.
>According to the guards who strongly believed that the
>soldiers had attempted an abortive coup, all of those
>arrested were brought over to the prisons and
>remanded. The late Lt. Barrow, Lt. Faal et al were all
>there. But shortly after they were locked up, the
>council members met among themselves and argued for a
>moment. Then they made a telephone call to the State
>House before asking them to get the men out again and
>hand them over. They did as they were told, and they
>left with them back from where they came. Lt. Barrow
>and Faal were killed upon their arrival at Fajara
>Barracks. Some escaped to Cassamance and the rest were
>summarily executed during the next two days. Lt. Saye
>was among the ones killed on Sunday the 13th of
>November.
>We were at first told that Captain Sonko was among
>those who took part in the abortive coup and that he
>was arrested somewhere. The information killed our
>spirits for a good whole day until a second report
>reached us that none of the released detainees from us
>was involved. As to when we were going to be set free
>again, the hope of it being soon died in our minds. We
>simply began to pray that the monsters would not one
>day get bloodthirsty and come for us again. The
>feeling that the GNA soldiers had for the first time
>slaughtered one another in such a barbaric manner gave
>us the final wake-up call about the animals we were
>dealing with. I can't remember who it was but one of
>us put it this way: "The GNA has now lost its
>innocence".
>As for Sana Sabally, that was the time he started
>showing signs of losing his mental stability up to
>when the AFPRC members decided to frame and
>incarcerate him with his most trusted comrade, the
>Late Sadibou Haidara.
>I will deal with the arrest and detention of these two
>men next time. I spent four months with them in jail.
>The torture they were subjected to was unacceptable,
>regardless of what. It definitely contributed to the
>death of Haidara.
>
>
>Ebou Colly
>
>
>
>
>__________________________________________________
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