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From:
Tony Cisse <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Wed, 22 Mar 2000 17:29:27 +0000
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Jaajef Arona, and all on G-L,

Thanks for your posting. Yes the *overstay effect* certainly played a role in Diouf*s defeat, however there are a lot more lessons to be learnt from these events.

First, your comment that Senghore left power when *he had delivered his service to his nation but at the same time most needed by the Senegalese people*. I*m not sure I can agree with this historical analysis. Whilst Senghore now looks better in retrospect, he was also partly responsible for setting up the network of corruption, patronage and power barony that has ultimately resulted in the humiliation of the PS. The events surrounding Zeng*s departure have never been adequately explained, but it was a time of widespread dissatisfaction strikes and protests which threatened to engulf the whole country. There are theories (linked to his *disappearance* at the time) which said that his *handover* to Diouf was basically a hidden coup d*etat by the French secret services who foisted Diouf into the presidency to avoid what to them would have been a political disaster. There were rumours at the time that the loyalty or the army was not to be relied apon to defend Zeng against the popular will. The author Ousmane Sembene wrote a novel about this period called *Le dernier de l*empire* which I think might have been translated and published in English as  *the last emperor*. Although a *novel* it contains, by popular opinion, more than one grain of truth.

Another major contributory factor in Diouf*s defeat is the previous widespread practice of electoral fraud that had taken place in previous elections. It is widely believed that without this practice Wade would have been president before now.

What were the factors in the opposition victory?
Role of the press. Many political observers and activists on the ground have applauded the crucial role played by the press, and in particular the private radio stations SUD FM and WALF FM. Because they had correspondents on the ground at the vote counting (for the first time), as soon as a count was announced it would be on air, and indeed broadcast on web radio stations. This meant it would be almost impossible to alter results, as people all over the world we able to hear them blow-by-blow. Compare this to last time when it took 3 weeks for official results to come out and the head of the electoral commission was assassinated. The role the press played was seen in the victory celebrations outside Wade*s house on Sunday evening when journalists (including the BBC cameraman) were hailed as heroes and carried should high through the crowd.

The role of the Youth
This election was more than anything a victory for the youth mobilised by the opposition. High levels of mobilisation meant that where-ever there were attempts to subvert the democratic process these were neutralised. And there were many attempts to derail the democratic process, i.e. voter card buying, stuffing of ballot papers in envelopes, delaying or preventing polling stations being set up, setting up of bogus polling stations, intimidation and event outright stealing of ballot boxes (see my posting on 19/20 March..Diouf is History and reports by Wal Fadjri 20/3/00). The mobilised youths maintained high levels of vigilance and prevented these incidents in having a major effect on the outcome. They made citizens arrests of fraudsters and acted as guards on polling stations, defending them physically where necessary. This meant high levels of discipline, political awareness and an advanced sense of social duty. It was also this mobilisation that helped to protect the journalists mentioned above, in the face of threats and intimidation by the PS *goon squad*.

The role of the *forces of order*. 
This election revealed a phenomenon unheard of before. The police and gendarmerie acting on the side of the youths in preventing fraud. Arresting those fraudsters *arrested* by the youths. Example (from the first round), a bogus polling station was established by PS elements in Parcelle Assenie. The youths found out about it, surrounded the house, preventing the occupants from escaping. The gendarme were called and sent a unit of the GMI (riot squad) to arrest all the members of the ruling party participating in the fraud. Even in Touba, where youths surrounded a vehicle of a high ranking PS official, whose wife had been found with over a hundred voting cards in her house, the Gendarme arrested the PS body guards who were using machetes against the youths.

The role of the opposition parties.
Despite the face that in the 1st round, parties were competing for votes, unity was achieved around the Front for free and fair elections. Indeed there was an unofficial agreement not to attack each other. For the second round, politicians were able to suppress their egos by uniting around the Wade candidature (with the notable exception of Djibo Ka). Differences in political programme were able to be ignored around the common goal. As one party militant put it, *we were no longer members of our respective parties.*

Truly the elections was an example of democracy in action, and puts in their place all those *afro-pessimists* who see the continent doomed to chaos. We should however not be under any illusion that it was an easy victory, or just the result of what happened on the day. The victory was the result of long-term political mobilsation and political education on the ground by dedicated activists, by long-term and consistant work at village level and in trade unions, student associations etc. The age old politicians* strategy of rushing from place to place, holding a rally, making promises and moving on was not what won this election. To defeat a strategy that offered voters 2000 CFA more in order to be able to tear up their voting cards is not defeated by promises, (especially when people are wondering where that day*s *depanss* will come from) it was only by building the political trust through local political actions that could win. The same goes for building the level of clarity of vision, and self confidence that allows voters to ignore the *ndigeul* of certain marabouts who called on their talibes and followers to vote for Diouf.


Yeenduleen ak jaama

Tony

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Date:    Mon, 20 Mar 2000 20:51:56 PST
From:    arona john <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: DIOUF AND THE OVERSTAY EFFECT

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