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Subject:
From:
Dampha Kebba <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Mon, 7 Aug 2000 15:55:13 EDT
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Find below, the reaction of the IMF to the bogus letter of intent the
Finance ministry sent them in July 2000. This just goes to confirm my belief
in the ineptitude of these mammoth institutions. To justify releasing these
funds, the IMF basically regurgitated the garbage Jatta and Clark fed them.
Like Ebrima's source, I sincerely hope that people like Hamjatta takes up
this cause. I believe they can articulate the reality back home vis-a-viis
this letter of intent in better language. It would be interesting to know
what kind of 'review' the IMF did between July 7 (when the letter from
Gambia was dated) and July 19. What marked development are they talking
about regarding the privatization of the financial sector? Sale of Trust
Bank? If IMF is really serious about knowing what goes on in the commercial
banking sector in The Gambia, they should talk to the Standard Bank. Why did
the Standard Bank refuse to finance the groundnut purchase? Why did the
Standard Bank in 1994/95 refuse to participate in the government's risky
scheme to import rice into the country? There is also more than meets the
eye in the government's local borrowing through Central Bank and Treasury
Bills. This will be attacked in due course. If the government is worried
about making interest payments, think about what will happen if they are
called upon to pay the principal in some of these loans. Investors in
government bills can ask for all their money after six months if they want.
If some commercial banks that invest in government bills were to ask for
their principals, the government will go bankrupt. Guys, this economy is in
tatters. It is mind-boggling that IMF economists with their Ivy League
degrees cannot figure that out. No wonder they were kicking and screaming
before they agreed to be more transparent themselves. Some of the lies in
that letter of intent can be verified by the minimum research and
application of commonsense. Again what did these economists talk about? GDP
and lower inflation rates. This is meaningless to the average Gambian. We,
in The Gambia have a higher growth rate than the U.S. I wonder what good
that does for us. One would have thought that the IMF would grill the
Gambian authorities on the 'below the line accounts'. Little mention was
made of that. Just urging the government to be more transparent in their
reporting. These accounts distort the whole Gambian budget. What the IMF
does not get is that the country is being ran by illiterate criminals. These
people are incapable of publicizing their criminal activities. No amount of
urging will make them transparent. The only way they can live by the rules
of civilized societies, is if their life line is cut. If IMF withheld some
cash, they might rethink some of their illegal postures. Again, I
respectfully urge people to participate in this debate and think of ways of
contacting the IMF formally to register our disgust. These shameless
low-lives will even use the massacre of innocent children to get more cash
for the illegal regime. Money that Yaya is going to steal to build up his
Swiss and Caribbean bank accounts.
KB

_____________________________________________________________________
News Brief No. 00/57July 19, 2000       International Monetary Fund700 19th
Street, NWWashington, D.C. 20431 USA
IMF Completes First Review of The Gambia under PRGF-Supported Program and
Approves US$ 4.51 Million Disbursement
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed its
first review of The Gambia's second annual arrangement under the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)1 (see Press Release 98/28). The
completion of this review enables the release of a further SDR 3.43 million
(about US$ 4.51 million), which brings total disbursements under the three
year program to SDR 10.3 million (about US$ 13.5 million).
After the Executive Board's discussion, Eduardo Aninat, Deputy Managing
Director, made the following statement:
"The Gambian authorities are to be commended for achieving a broadly
encouraging economic performance over the past one and a half years of the
PRGF arrangement. There has been sustained per capita GDP growth, low
inflation, and some reduction in the fiscal deficit. There were also marked
structural reforms, including progress in privatization and reform of the
financial sector, and a significant reduction and rationalization of the
external tariff system was attained.
"However, the midterm review of the second annual arrangement has
highlighted the need to strengthen budgetary performance and to enhance
transparency and good governance. In the fiscal area, the authorities need
to press on with reforms to improve coordination and the efficiency of the
tax departments, including through computerization. On the expenditure side,
the challenge remains to complete the reforms initiated with Fund technical
assistance aimed at improving expenditure reporting and control. Governance
issues need to be addressed with an expeditious settlement of the Gambia
Groundnut Corporation (GGC) property dispute and timely implementation of
the comprehensive program that the government adopted in 1999.
"Other structural reforms, with an emphasis on promoting private sector
activities, will also help to reduce poverty. A more direct effort in this
regard requires measures that would enhance the participatory process and
facilitate the preparation of an interim PRSP before the end of the year,
and full-fledged PRSP during 2001. At the same time, implementing the broad
range of the program- and PRSP-related measures remains a major test of the
authorities' limited economic management capacity, which should be addressed
with timely access to technical assistance.
"The preliminary debt sustainability analysis (DSA) indicates that The
Gambia may qualify for assistance under the HIPC Initiative. It is expected
that a full DSA will be undertaken leading to the preparation of a HIPC
document to establish a decision point for The Gambia," Aninat said.

1 On November 22, 1999, the IMF's concessional facility for low-income
countries, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, was renamed the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, and its purposes were redefined. It
was intended that PRGF-supported programs will in time be based on
country-owned poverty reduction strategies adopted in a participatory
process involving civil society and development partners, and articulated in
a poverty reduction strategy paper. This is intended to ensure that each
PRGF-supported program is consistent with a comprehensive framework for
macroeconomic, structural, and social policies to foster growth and reduce
poverty. PRGF loans carry an annual interest rate of 0.5 percent, and are
repayable over 10 years with a 5 ½-year grace period for principal payments.
IMF EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
Public Affairs: 202-623-7300 - Fax: 202-623-6278
Media Relations: 202-623-7100 - Fax: 202-623-6772

________________________________________________________________________
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