Doc this a well reasoned account and I would asked; what promises were
made?, If the coalition emerge victorious, who among the PPP would be
second to Darboe? or would Darboe be a caretaker for whomever? Yes I agree
with your assessment of the under handedness with which the meeting was
conceived and held It begs the question who's fooling who?
Keep Up The Good Work

Daddy Sang


> [Original Message]
> From: Abdoulaye Saine <[log in to unmask]>
> To: <[log in to unmask]>
> Date: 8/28/2001 7:50:43 PM
> Subject: TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE!!
>
> To:  All Leaders of Political Parties in The Gambia;
>        Editor, Point Newspaper;
>        Editor, The Independent;
>        Editor, The Observer
>
>
> The impending 2001 presidential election: An Editorial Comment
>
> On July 22, 2001, Jammeh was forced to lift the ban on political
activity, political parties and politicians
> in preparation for the October 2001 presidential election.  Again, just
like the two-year timetable back to
> "civilian" rule, combined international and domestic pressure compelled
the incumbent president to partially
> open the political process.  This, to enable pre-coup, and other parties,
formed shortly before the
> presidential election of 1996, to contest the election.  The process,
however, still remains managed with the
> help of an Electoral Commission whose hand picked leader(s), except for
the recently fired Chairman, Johnson,
> dance to Jammeh’s tunes.  Predictably, a level playing field does not
exist as the conditions are stacked
> against the opposition.
>
> Jammeh, meanwhile, continues to have monopoly over the television, and
national radio stations.  With state,
> and other ill begotten wealth, Jammeh’s war chest is indeed formidable.
Consequently, he has used it, to
> dish out gifts to students, given tickets to pilgrims to perform the hajj
in Mecca, and seeks to buy the
> loyalty of those who oppose him.  He boasts of being the wealthiest
person in The Gambia, enjoys the services
> of a personal airplane and is alleged to own mansions in Morocco and
Lybia.  In addition, he built a second
> State House in his birth village of Kaninlai, where provisions are in
abundance and sold at discounted
> prices.
>
> Jammeh remains convinced that he can win the next elections, even in the
face of an alliance of the former
> ruling PPP/UDP and support of  GPP's leader.  Despite the fact that the
UDP, and PPP represent the two
> largest opposition parties and enjoy widespread popular support, four
smaller opposition parties have so far
> declined to join the UDP/ PPP alliance.  The NCP leader, suspicious of
the UDP/PPP alliance walked out of a
> meeting at which an alliance of the two was being announced.  A splinter
party of the PPP, NCP fears of a PPP
> comeback are not entirely baseless, as it has been suggested since the
alliance that the UDP is but a front
> for the PPP.  These allegations, however, appear less convincing today
than they were in the last
> presidential election of 1996.
>
> Today, the UDP leader, and presidential candidate of the UDP/PPP
alliance, Ousainou Darboe, has emerged as a
> national leader with considerable support capable of beating Jammeh under
free and fair elections.  In fact,
> many believe that Jammeh stole the 1996 presidential election from
Darboe.  PDOIS, a socialist leaning party
> would join an opposition coalition only on condition that the prospective
coalition presidential candidate be
> chosen outside of the existing political parties.  In addition with a
mandate to preside over a one year
> transition program and put in place other mechanisms for free and fair
elections.
>
> But perhaps the most nettlesome issue about the UDP/PPP alliance remains
what appears to many as a sweetheart
> deal between the two parties, especially at a time when the leader of NRP
was out of the country, and PDOIS
> not invited to the meeting.  It appears that the alliance was hastily
concluded when many matters were
> unresolved.  Many wondered why a meeting was held when the NRP leader was
out of the country, and why the
> request for a delay by PDOIS was politely rejected.  It again raised the
lingering impression that the PPP is
> likely to come back to power riding on the coattails of the UDP.
>
> The fear over a PPP return to power has to do with the politics of
patronage, corruption and its relatively
> mixed performance of thirty years.  Many Gambians, not withstanding the
alliance’s popular support, may not
> wish to see a return of the PPP to power and that the sweetheart deal was
underhanded at best.  This is
> because the PPP delegates were perceived as too eager to win Darboe the
nomination.  In the end, the long
> hoped for opposition coalition did not materialize to the disappointment
of many.  It is felt that only a
> united opposition of all opposition parties stands the best opportunity
of unseating Jammeh and that the time
> had come for the opposition politicians to put aside their philosophical
and ideological differences to send
> Jammeh packing.
>
> Predictably, opposition coalitions as Ghana’s 1992 presidential election
showed are difficult to build, and
> maintain.  While there could exist an overarching interest in ousting the
incumbent, party modalities,
> interests, and personalities may in fact, conflict.  This led some
observers to term the lifting of the ban
> on political activity, “ as a blessing in disguise” for Jammeh, who
expects that the time left for
> campaigning may not be enough for the opposition parties to resolve their
differences, and in time, to mount
> an effective challenge against his rule.  The prospect for another five
years of Jammeh, therefore, looms
> large in the minds of opposition party leaders, and dissidents.
>
> Yet, the alliance’s popular support in major urban centers, coupled with
the regime’s perceived unpopularity
> could avert this outcome.  This is because the alliance, under Darboe,
could in all likelihood win the
> presidency, with or without the support of the other opposition parties,
but only if the election is free,
> and fair with “on the spot counting.”  Failing this, the ballot boxes
would be stuffed as was alleged in
> 1996.  As of now, Jammeh is vehemently opposed to “on the spot counting”
and perhaps for good reasons.  And
> while it is desirable for all the opposition parties to be on a single
ticket backing Darboe, or whoever else
> is decided upon, the absence of PDOIS, NCP and NRP endorsement may not in
the end make or break the alliance
> at the polls.  PDOIS and the NRP are relatively small parties with weak
though growing support bases, yet not
> essential to a UDP/PPP alliance victory.
>
> The NCP could have given a major boost to the alliance, however, because
it had a larger support base than
> either PDOIS or NRP.  This support base was eroded during the seven-year
ban when many of its supporters
> joined the ranks of the UDP.  Yet, despite Dibba’s astuteness and
political appeal as a founding father of
> the PPP and The Gambia as a nation, his political hiatus from the
political scene in the last seven years,
> leaves him unelectable and vulnerable to charges of grandstanding and
opportunism.  It is also unlikely that
> PDOIS, NRP and NCP supporters would rally to Jammeh just because their
party leaders do not support the
> UDP/PPPalliance.  If they vote at all, the majority is more likely to
support the alliance, not Jammeh.
>
> This may, in fact, account for the UDP/PPP presidential candidate’s
failure, so far, to reconvene another
> meeting or try to bring these parties to his camp.  Trying to win without
the support, and goodwill of PDOIS,
> NRP and NCP could have high costs, however, and could be downright risky.
Yet, as in other places, politics
> is risky business and revolves around alliances, coalition building, deal
making and the art of compromise.
> Not to be left out of the loop, it is important that those parties
outside the alliance be courted and
> included.  Darboe must take the initiative and be the presidential
candidate to be reckoned with come October
> 2001.
>
> PDOIS must also show flexibility for its preconditions for joining the
alliance, in that the task of civic
> education is not a one shot deal, but an ongoing historical process that
could, under the best of
> circumstances, take years if not decades to accomplish.  Similarly,
choosing a presidential candidate outside
> the existing political parties could and is indeed perceived in some
circles, as unnecessary, perhaps a tacit
> endorsement of Jammeh and a cry of sour grapes.  That is, if PDOIS’
chosen candidate, politician or civilian,
> does not head the coalition ticket, then no current politicians are
worthy of and qualified to head that
> ticket.  If PDOIS insists on this precondition, it may very well remain
outside on the sidelines of the
> alliance for sometime to come.
>
> Regarding the NRP, and NCP leaders, there still remains an opening for
them to join the coalition.  Dibba has
> not, in fact, shut the door completely for compromise and NRP’s Hamat Bah
could be induced into joining the
> coalition.  It will take flexibility, and perhaps another meeting to have
all the parties come on board.
> This is the challenge that Darboe must rise up to.  And Time is of the
Essence!
>
> Abdoulaye Saine
> Oxford, OH, U.S.A.
>
>
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