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Subject:
From:
saiks samateh <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Mon, 17 Jan 2000 15:15:30 PST
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Thank you Foroyaa,yours gave me a better picture of the Situation.Hope to hear
more from you.Keep on the good work down there.

For Freedom
saiks














Published in FOROYAA of 17-20 January, 2000


BLOOD AT THE DOOR STEPS  OF POWER

Events of tremendous political significance are unfolding in The Gambia.
Questions are being raised and answers are being demanded.

FOROYAA has been conducting investigation on the alleged foiled conspiracy
and attempt to overthrow the Government of The Gambia.
It was in the month of December 1999 that a group was reported to have made
attempts to enter the premises of either the AMRC or the Central Bank.
According to reports, they wore camouflage uniforms. This led to speculation
that they could be soldiers.

In FOROYAA's investigation, we discovered remnants of gun powder on the
fence of the AMRC and  traces of bullet marks on the walls of Saint Mary's
School. We later confirmed that the assailants had a shot gun. We  traced
blood from the Guard Room to the cover of the drains in front of the Central
Bank. We also discovered that those who were trying to gain entry had left
before assistance came.

This raises many security questions. Was there a radio or telephone link
between the security at the Central Bank and other security units? What were
the intruders up to? If their objective was to collect weapons, what type of
transport did they have to carry the weapons? If their objective was to show
that the country did not have a security, then what would have been their
strategic objective since such an action would undoubtedly provoke greater
security alert. Moreover, why would such a risk be taken such as carrying a
shot gun when the guards were armed with AK47s? Was the attempt geared
towards taking monies that were to be burnt since where they were allegedly
heading to was an incinery for the burning of paper monies put out of
circulation?

What is the connection between this event and the event of Saturday, 15
January 2000? Did this event create suspicion within the security forces? Is
it seen as the work of insiders or outsiders? Have sufficient investigations
been done to allay suspicion? Have the security lapses been identified?

Furthermore, prior to the incident of 15 January 2000, a letter was read
over the BBC threatening an attack on the State House. The Secretary of
State for the Interior did not dismiss the threats, but asserted that
anybody was free to come+ADs- that they were waiting for them. Did the events
of
15 January 2000 have anything to do with the letter?

These are all questions waiting for answers.

THE EVENTS OF 15 JANUARY 2000

On Saturday morning, FOROYAA received information which was somehow cloudy
that there had been  an attack on the State House and that a soldier by the
surname of Sanneh was injured+ADs- that one person had been killed. It was
not
at all clear who the assailants were and what happened to them.

We made enquiries and nobody in Banjul seemed to have heard any gun shot.
People who travelled to and from Banjul did not indicate anything strange at
the bridge or close to the State House.

The only other information we received was the mounting of some security
searches in Bakau on Friday night. Everything at the Yundum, Fajara Barracks
did not show any mass mobilisation of troops towards the State House.

We continued to monitor the situation by telling everyone who could give us
information to transmit everything they heard irrespective of whether they
believed it to be true or not. We were informed of the arrest of the
National Assembly member for Kombo North, Mr Musa Suso. It was not made
clear until later that it had nothing to do with the information we received
earlier regarding an alleged attack of the State House.

By 3 p.m. on Saturday, a press release was issued over Radio Gambia. It was
indicated that the press release came from the Department of State for the
Interior. The contents are as follows:

+ACI-The Department of State for the Interior wishes to inform the general
public of a foiled conspiracy and attempt to overthrow the Government of the
Republic of The Gambia by unlawful means.
The Intelligence Agency has for the past few months been investigating
information relating to a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of The
Gambia involving Lt. Almamo Manneh, Ordinance and Logistics Officer - State
Guard and Lt. Landing Sanneh (State Guard Commander) as ring leaders.

+ACI-Several indicators, including an unauthorised and systematic harassment
of
civilians at the Denton Bridge and elsewhere, intended to sow seeds of
discord amongst civilians under the direction of these two Officers
confirmed the information already received. This led the Intelligence Agency
to further monitor the activities of certain members of the State Guards
under the leadership of these two Officers.

+ACI-By Friday 14th January 2000, after their last meeting at the office of
the
State Guard Commander, Lt. Sanneh, adequate evidence was gathered to cause
the security unit of the Presidential Guards to be on full alert. After
gathering evidence that preparatory activities leading to the attempt were
to commence in the early hours of Saturday 15th January 2000, a security
team was dispatched to move in with a view to arresting the leaders - Lt.
Almamo Manneh and Lt. Sanneh.

+ACI-Lt. Manneh was intercepted by the team at Stink Corner on his way to
Fajara
and Yundum Barracks where according to the plan he was supposed to take
control and mobilise support for the operation. After stopping him, the
security team informed him that he was under arrest. He immediately jumped
out of his vehicle and opened fire. A shoot-out ensued leading to his
instant death.

+ACI-The security team proceeded to the residence of Lt. Sanneh at Mile 7.
Upon
reaching the house, he was requested to open his door and come out. He
refused to comply upon realising that it was the security officers. He
thereafter switched off his house lights and tossed a grenade at them from
within the house, which exploded. The security Officers took cover and still
insisted that he comes out of the house. He still refused to comply and
opened fire from within the house. There was a shoot-out in which he
sustained injuries. He was eventually overpowered and arrested.

+ACI-He is presently under the custody of the security officers and is
helping
in the investigations.

+ACI-The general public is assured that the situation is completely under
control and there is no cause for alarm or panic.

+ACI-Meanwhile investigations are under way with a view to bringing everyone
involved within the full scale of the law.+ACI-

Our reporters went to Old Jeshwang, parts of Bakau and the Kanifing area as
close to Mile 7 in order to find out what people have heard or seen. There
was total information blank.

According to the press release issued by the department of State for the
Interior, a shoot-out ensued between Lieutenant  Manneh and the security
officers. It was also indicated that Lieutenant Sanneh tossed a grenade at
them which exploded+ADs- that a shoot-out also took place and that he
sustained
injuries.

We find it difficult to know what time of the night the incident occurred.
We would also be grateful if anybody who has heard anything at the early
hours of the morning of 15 January 2000 could contact our Information
Bureau. We would also request the Secretary of State for The Interior to
accompany journalists to make a conducted tour of the places where the
incidents occurred to help give greater clarity on the issue.

ON THE ALLEGED PLOT AND PLOTTERS

It is alleged that the plot was to be orchestrated in the early hours of
Saturday, 15 January 2000. Preparatory activities were said to be in the
making. It is not clear what these preparatory activities were. Where there
soldiers at Fajara and Yundum Barracks who were actually ready to move? This
is not clear.

The link between Lieutenants Sanneh and Manneh with the other alleged
plotters during the morning of the would-be-operation is also not clear.

Our reporters have visited all the places of interest but everything seem to
be calm. The events of 15 January 2000 appear to be a mere episode. When we
enquired about the alleged plotters, we gathered that Lieutenant Manneh is
from Sitanungku, Upper Niumi. He is married and has been among the earlier
intakes of the army. He is said to have finished his primary education at
Sitanungku Primary School and did his secondary education at Berending
Secondary Technical School. He is said to have played a key role in the 1994
coup d'etat, as far as the keys to the armoury are concerned. He is said to
be a soldier with skills.

Many viewed the information that he is disloyal to Jammeh with disbelief. He
is said to have been very close to President Jammeh. He is not known to
assert any dissent in terms of politics or way of life. The information we
receive is that many soldiers are still waiting for further information
because of their disbelief that he could be disloyal to President Jammeh.

As for Lieutenant Sanneh, he is said to be from Bondali, Foni, and is said
to be related to the National Assembly Member for Foni Bondali. He is said
to have been in Liberia, but did not complete his term because of conflict
with his seniors. He is said to have experience in security matters+ADs- that
he
is reserved and that his promotion in the army has been slow because of his
tendency to exercise dissent. He is said to have been very close to Jammeh
who often called him 'uncle'.

THE SPECULATIONS
Speculations are rife as to whether there was a real coup attempt or not.
The State has to be very transparent in this matter to help the nation to
know the truth. The opportunity given to the Farafenni  attackers to speak
before the television and the press, in general, should also be accorded to
Lieutenant Sanneh. If a court-martial is held, it should be made public. It
should not be in camera. The media should have opportunity to witness to the
testimonies.

FOROYAA has many questions and in the next issue, we will try to reach the
authorities for further clarification.

OUR OBSERVATION

What the incident reveals is that the security forces do not constitute a
homogenous group. There are diverse interests which could lead to mutual
suspicion. Those who hold power are always looking for loyalties. It is also
difficult to know who is loyal and who is not.

This is why fairness in giving promotion and  professionalism instead of
personal loyalty becomes essential. This is the only way to minimise such
tragedies.

In our view, as long as there is struggle for power between a few, such
tragedies cannot be completely eliminated. The real solution is the transfer
of power to the people. In that way, all servants of the people will simply
learn how to efficiently and effectively perform their responsibilities and
leave the people to decide who to put in office.

In the mean time, Lieutenant Manneh's body should be subjected to
post-mortem. The body should be given to his family so that he can have a
decent burial. The family should be given due respect and all the support
necessary. They should not suffer any ostracism from the encounter.

The investigations that are on should not become a witch-hunt which is
likely to create greater insecurity.

Lastly, the head of state must constantly ask himself the question: What
price would have to be paid to maintain him in office, and whether his
conscience will permit him to pay that price.

In our view, if a person's term in office can only be sustained by
uncovering coup plots after coup plots leading to killings after killings,
then it is best for a person to call it a day than to leave such a
historical record. A nation which cannot be governed under a climate of
peace is an ungovernable nation. A nation which requires massive security
machinery to be governed is a nation that cannot be at peace with itself.
Every head of state has the duty not to govern a country under a permanent
state of security alert.

We envisage the day when soldiers will see themselves as part of the
division of labour of society and their functions as national service which
one does for sometime and be given all the opportunity to develop one's
potentialities to the fullest so that one would be able to move into another
area of civilian life and earn one's means of survival in dignity and
prosperity. This is the way to put an end to blood being poured on the door
step of power.

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