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Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2003 1:39 AM
Subject: Zimbabwe - Response to Prof. Chan


> The land question in Zimbabwe
>
>
>
>
> Land seizures, the background
>
> In recent months, more than 23 years after gaining independence and
majority
> rule, the government of Zimbabwe finally expropriated the remaining
> approximately 4,000 surplus[1] commercial farms owned by white people -
the whites
> having had up until now a virtual monopoly over commercial farming in
Zimbabwe.
> According to Stephen Chan[2], "In 1992, 4,500 mostly white farmers owned
11.5
> million hectares. This was one third of the entire country. 7 million
peasants
> lived on 16.4 million hectares of 'communal' farmland." Since
Independence, "the
> government had purchased 3.3 million hectares" (for the resettlement of
> dispossessed black farmers).
>
> It is obvious that this situation was iniquitous. Moreover it was one
which
> was always at the heart of the liberation movement. In fact it is fair to
say
> that the millions of Zimbabwean peasants supported and fought in the war
of
> liberation against settler colonialism precisely because they were cut off
from
> the land and their livelihoods. It is not always realised that for them
their
> expropriation at the hands of white settlers was not a matter of the dim
and
> distant past. As David Blair explains in Degrees in Violence,[3] after
1945
> "thousands of new white settlers were flocking to Rhodesia and many had
been
> promised farms by the British government. Demobilized soldiers were
offered the
> chance to farm in Africa as a reward for service in the Second World War,
and
> Rhodesia opened up new tracts to provide for them … "Quietly, with no
fanfare,
> vast numbers of blacks were moved to make way for the new settlers. … No
fewer
> than 85,000 black families were evicted between 1945 and 1955, totalling
> perhaps 425,000 people. Considering that the black population in 1945
barely
> exceeded 1.5 million, something approaching 30 per cent of all 'natives'
were moved
> from their homes. …
>
> "[A] burning sense of grievance certainly existed. Land had been stolen,
with
> blacks herded into 'Native Reserves' while their white rulers took
possession
> of the most fertile fields."
>
> At the height of the liberation struggle, members of ZANU, the
organisation
> which was most representative of the demands of the peasants and which
> therefore became and has remained, the leading party in the Zimbabwean
people's
> struggle for emancipation, would frequently stress the importance of
solving the
> land question. The reason the peasants could never be satisfied by simply
seeing
> a few black faces sitting in government positions was that for them the
war
> was all about land, and without gaining land, the war would have been
fought in
> vain.
>
> Perfidious Albion
>
> Robert Mugabe, ZANU's leader, was always at pains to point out that he
wanted
> the transfer of land to the majority population to be done consensually,
with
> the white farmers, on the one hand, receiving compensation (to be provided
by
> the British government who had been behind the 19th century expropriation
of
> Zimabwe's soil by British settlers) and on the other being able to retain
> modest-sized holdings that would enable them to sustain their livelihoods.
He duly
> undertook during the Independence negotiations at Lancaster House in
London
> in 1978 that there would be no land expropriation without compensation,
since
> at the time he did not believe forcible expropriation would be necessary.
> Stephen Chan[4] explains: "Mugabe was certain that John Major had
reassured him
> that Britain would indeed assist with funds for compensation. Blair [i.e.,
the
> present prime minister, Tony Blair] … thought that Britain was not
committed to
> such previous understandings. It had been an understanding in principle;
> figures had been loosely suggested, but there was never any formal
document of
> binding agreement. To that extent, Blair was within his rights. However,
from the
> very first great push to resolve the Rhodesian issue in the mid-1970s,
under
> Henry Kissinger, the matter of compensation - subscribed to in hefty sums
by
> the international community - was always an accepted principle. It was
implicit
> in the Lancaster House talks, but Carrington ensured that, although he
> recognised that a future government (of Zimbabwe) would want to widen the
ownership
> of land, it found no formal enunciation in the final agreement. Mugabe was
> asked why he had given way, at Lancaster House, on the land issue. 'We had
to.
> That is the 'giving way' that I talked of, having to compromise on certain
> fundamental principles, but only because there was a chance, in the
future, to amend
> the position' [5] Stephen Chan, who is certainly no friend of Mugabe's,
> nevertheless considers he was a victim of perfidious Albion, i.e., British
> imperialist treachery.
>
> Once it finally became clear that Britain was not going to honour its
> obligations, then Mugabe made it extremely clear that expropriation would
proceed
> without compensation. As early as 1996 he was already saying:
>
> "We are going to take the land and we are not going to pay for the soil.
This
> is our set policy. Our land was never bought (by the colonialists) and
there
> is no way we could buy back the land. However, if Britain wants
compensation
> they should give us money and we will pass it on to their children".
>
> Imperialist hysteria
>
> Even at this point, the hope was that Britain would fulfil its obligations
> once it was made clear to them that expropriation would go ahead. But of
course,
> Britain responded not. The final order to white farmers to surrender their
> surplus farms was not made until August last year, 2002, after giving "the
> international community" more than enough time to do the decent thing.
Since "the
> international community", however, is nothing other than the hyenas of
> imperialism, it was only too happy to see Mugabe, the leader of the
Zimbabwean
> liberation struggle to whom they had had to concede defeat, discomfited.
And although
> he was only doing what was logical and necessary and in accordance with
the
> demands of his people, he was depicted in the western media as a
power-crazed
> despot.
>
> Of course, what really turned him in the eyes of imperialism from what
> Margaret Thatcher called the "perfect African gentleman" into a major hate
figure
> was his intervention in sending troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo
in
> support of the latter's nationalist government against imperialist
determination
> to seize control of its vast mineral wealth through the encouragement of
> secessionist movements and proxy aggression by Rwanda and Uganda. This was
an act
> of tremendous self-sacrifice on the part of Zimbabwe in support of a just
> anti-imperialist cause. Financially there was no way Zimbabwe could afford
to do
> it. Morally there was no way she could afford not to. The cost of military
> intervention was tremendous, and could only be to some extent at the
expense of
> ordinary Zimbabweans. Imperialism saw an opportunity to create a rift
between
> ZANU and the Zimbabwean people and lost no time trying to exploit it by
mounting
> a scurrilous media blitz to demonise Robert Mugabe.
>
> Typical of this media blitz, which has been going on for two or three
years
> now, as if endless repetition could turn lies into truth, is The Guardian,
the
> oh so liberal Guardian, of 25 June 2003 uncritically reviewing the South
> African press, and citing such gems as "Thabo Mbeki knows very well that
Mr Mugabe
> is an unscrupulous dictator" and referring to Mugabe's government as "a
rogue
> government".
>
> Yet we know that Robert Mugabe's only sin is in consistently standing up
to
> imperialism in the interests of his people. This is the reason why when,
as a
> result of the successes of the liberation war of the Zimbabwean people,
the
> second Chimurenga, as it was called, imperialism decided it would be
> counter-productive to continue supporting white minority rule in Rhodesia,
it struggled in
> a determined manner to prevent Mugabe from coming to power. "One of the
few
> points of agreement between white Rhodesians and the British government
was
> that victory for Mugabe was a terrifying prospect. In the words of Lord
> Carrington: 'I viewed it with the greatest possible horror. One felt he
was a Marxist
> and one wondered how awful he was going to be'.[6] Another tactic was to
> proclaim that ZANU intended to abolish Christmas! The details of the
serious
> struggle to keep Mugabe out were documented at the time by a ZANU support
> organisation in London called the Zimbabwe Solidarity Front, and relevant
articles from
> its journal will later this year be published in book form by Lalkar
> Publications. Suffice it to say at this stage, that every effort was made
to sideline
> ZANU by forcing it, for instance, into alliance with 'moderates' in an
effort to
> palm off on the people of Zimbabwe a government that could be guaranteed
to
> put the interests of imperialism above the interests of the people. Then
more
> 'flexible' black leaders - Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Reverend
Ndabaningi
> Sithole - were taken on board by the settler government into a government
of
> 'national unity', in the hope that this would satisfy the masses and
undermine the
> liberation war. All that happened, however, was that these reverend
gentlemen
> lost what little support they had left. Elections were held, and these
were
> won by an overwhelming majority by the ZANU-PF party, which had taken 57
seats.
> ZAPU, the other party that supported the armed liberation struggle, took
20
> seats, ie., all but one of the seats in the Ndebele heartlands of
Matabeleland,
> while "Muzorewa was reduced to the holder of three seats. All the South
> African money that had clandestinely helped to finance his campaign came
to nothing
> in the face of a genuine desire for change".[7] Nothing imperialism or the
> South African white supremacists could do could prevent the
anti-imperialist
> Mugabe from taking power from Independence.
>
> Civil war
>
> Neither imperialism nor white supremacist South Africa reconciled
themselves
> to defeat, and they immediately set about, in their different ways, trying
to
> destabilise the Zimbabwean government. Obviously reactionaries exploit
every
> weakness they can to try and cause difficulties to their enemies. The
obvious
> fault line in Zimbabwe was the traditional tribal rivalries between the
> majority Shona tribe (70% of the population) and the minority Ndebele
tribe (16% of
> the population). The Ndebele were many years ago the rulers of Zimbabwe,
and
> some cherished dreams of becoming so again. Allegedly the ZAPU leader,
Joshua
> Nkomo, was at least to some extent affected by this culture:
>
> "The two large provinces that constitute the west of Zimbabwe are
> Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South. The majority population there
are Ndebele, of
> Zulu ancestry. … Near the provincial capital, Bulawayo, … lie the Matopos
> Hills, an area of great spiritual significance and sweeping beauty. Here,
there
> are natural columns of great boulders sitting on top of one another …
> Lobengula, the last great king of the Ndebele, was deceived and defeated
by Rhodes,
> despite his ambassadors being kindly received by Queen Victoria. Once a
> generation, a female shaman is meant to appear at Matopos to anoint the
spiritual heir
> of Lobengula, the one who would restore his reign and extend it over all
> Zimbabwe. Every year Nkomo would go to the great rock columns, hoping to
be greeted
> by the shaman - who never came to him." [8]
>
> These are just the kind of chauvinistic dregs that reactionaries love to
> exploit to cause their enemies to fight each other, and in the early days
of ZANU
> rule in Zimbabwe, it was by incitement of the Ndebele to rebellion that
South
> Africa, itself still a white supremacist state at that time, was hoping to
be
> able to teach a salutary racist lesson to its own black majority
population,
> i.e., that black majority rule is a recipe for disaster.
>
> Following the victory of the liberation struggle, ZANU, ever with an eye
to
> maintaining the unity of the Zimbabwean people as they fought to better
life
> for themselves in the teeth of opposition from imperialism and white
supremacist
> South Africa, offered Nkomo the post of president of Zimbabwe. He,
however,
> turned that down. He wanted nothing less than to be, so to speak, "king",
> although his own forces were not only smaller but had also contributed far
less
> overall to the liberation struggle. He refused to be "a china ornament
sitting in
> the showcase". Instead he became Home Affairs Minister, responsible for
law
> and order. His sense of grievance meant that within a year of Zimbabwe's
> independence, disgruntled ZAPU members were working to plunge the country
into civil
> war, and in November 1980 fighting in fact broke out between former
guerrilla
> fighters from the two organisations. Clearly this was not a situation that
> could be tolerated. Having failed to maintain law and order, Nkomo was in
> January 1981 demoted to the position of Minister without portfolio. In
February
> 1981, there were further confrontations between the ex-guerrillas from
both
> parties in Entumbane, in which 300 people were killed. After a security
forces raid
> on four farms occupied by former Zipra (i.e., ZAPU guerrilla army)
fighters,
> where "Enough rifles, machine guns, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and
> cases of ammunition to fill 50 railway carriages were found" [9], Nkomo
was
> finally sacked from the government in February 1982, as were all of his
ZAPU allies.
>
> South African involvement
>
> In the meantime, white supremacist South Africa was also intervening in
> several ways. In July 1982, South Africa took it upon itself to destroy
Zimbabwe's
> airforce in an act of cowardly banditry that Chan calls "a superbly
planned
> and executed commando raid"! Chan continues: "At the end of 1982, South
Africa
> began organising, training and recruiting a several-hundred-strong
dissident
> group, comprised mostly of former ZIPRA fighters. These called themselves
> Super-ZAPU, believing their political leaders in ZAPU proper could not
longer help
> their people" (p. 29).
>
> Is it any wonder, then, that Mugabe and his government took swift and
> decisive action to put an end to this rebellion. When you have reached
power through
> the waging of guerrilla warfare, you do not pussyfoot around in the face
of
> organised movements designed to deprive you of your gains. The rebellion
was
> crushed, much to the chagrin of white supremacist South Africa which was
left
> trying to muster what support for its nefarious cause that it could by
denouncing
> the 'atrocities' and 'brutality' of the military campaign through which
the
> rebellion was defeated. This kind of thing impresses bourgeois liberal
> ideologues such as David Blair and Stephen Chan, but does not cut much ice
with those
> who have been subjected to imperialism's real brutality.
>
> What, however, has always characterised Mugabe is his willingness to
embrace
> those he has defeated and welcome them into the fold, on the strict
> understanding, of course, that henceforth their destructive behaviour will
cease. The
> same conciliatory attitude that had been shown towards whites who had
formerly
> been enthusiastically committed to white supremacy was extended to Ndebele
> dissidents, and in particular to Joshua Nkomo. Agreement was reached in
1987 that
> ZANU and ZAPU should merge, and that Joshua Nkomo should become the
country's
> joint vice president, thus putting an end to South Africa's attempts to
use
> the Ndebele to destabilise Zimbabwe.
>
> The Matabeleland rebellion was inspired primarily by white supremacist
South
> Africa, whose interests at that time were to some extent in contradiction
with
> those of imperialism which, as its acceptance of black majority rule in
> Zimbabwe shows, was happy to accept black majority rule in the larger
interests of
> hoping better to promote imperialist exploitation. The liberation struggle
of
> the Zimbabwean people against white settler fascism was not in the
interests
> of imperialism, so it had decided - albeit with bad grace - to accept
black
> majority rule. Not so South Africa. Nevertheless, imperialism was never,
as we
> have seen, comfortable with ZANU because of the latter's commitment to the
> welfare of the masses of ordinary people, a project which in the view of
> imperialism could only make Zimbabwe an unattractive proposition as far as
imperialist
> investment was concerned as the profits to be extracted would be seriously
> reduced by such wanton and, in their view, unnecessary expenditure.
Although the
> imperialist media at the time did not go into overdrive in support of
South
> Africa's efforts to destabilise the ZANU regime, nor did they get
particularly
> hysterical about the means used to suppress rebellion - unlike the
situation
> today - nevertheless they were happy that the Zimbabwe government was
being
> forced to spend a great deal of money and effort dealing with the problems
that
> South Africa had engendered. This was forcing Zimbabwe to apply to
imperialism
> for loans, which imperialism intended to use as leverage against Zimbabwe
to
> bend it to imperialism's will.
>
> Economic reconstruction
>
> From the very start, ZANU set about fulfilling its promises to the
Zimbabwean
> people. On 12 August 2002, at the funeral of Dr Bernard Chidzero, Robert
> Mugabe referred in his funeral oration to the magnitude of the task facing
the
> ZANU government at liberation:
>
> "Here was a war ravaged country in very great need but little resources; a
> people with severe scars of war holding on to a tenuous peace and of
course to
> great expectations and dreams that were not commensurate with available
means
> and prospects of them. We had fighters who needed to be either integrated
or
> demobilized; refugees and war displaced who needed rehabilitation and
> resettlement; school children who needed schools, books and teachers;
workers who
> expected the wand of independence magically to yield fabulous wages and
salaries;
> peasants who needed not just durable peace but their forefathers' lands
and
> traditional systems restored. Roads, schools, homes, clinics and hospitals
needed
> rehabilitation, reconstruction and expansion. Then, of course, we also had
Ian
> Smith's war-related debts to service … We also had apartheid South Africa,
> all the time threatening us, sabotaging our independence and thus forcing
us to
> build on defence capabilities".
>
> In order to meet these needs, as well as to defend its government against
> destabilisation efforts and defend its export routes against the RENAMO
> guerrillas that South Africa was backing in Mozambique, ZANU decided to
borrow from the
> World Bank and IMF - not a huge amount, but nevertheless a debt that would
> have to be repaid. Because it needed to borrow, it also needed to satisfy
the
> lenders of its ability to repay, and this is probably another reason why
ZANU
> did not proceed more speedily with the expropriation of the white farmers,
> feeling that it needed to consolidate its base before taking on the wrath
of
> imperialism. For the white farmers were producing export crops,
particularly
> tobacco, at competitive prices through use of modern technology (as well
as cheap
> labour), and to expropriate them at this juncture would have definitely
involved
> the loss of significant export earnings and inability to pay the debts
> incurred to international finance capital. If the total annual value of
Zimbabwean
> exports is $2.4 billion (1996 estimate), agricultural products account for
about
> $1 billion - tobacco alone for about $800 million. These are clearly sums
> which can only be sacrificed at a price, and at a time when the masses are
ready
> for that price to be paid. To decide that, despite the well-known dire
> economic consequences of borrowing from imperialism, nonetheless for the
moment such
> borrowing was a more viable option than steaming ahead with land
expropriation
> was a very tough decision to make. It is not for nothing that in paying
> tribute to Dr Chidzero, who was responsible for such decisions, Robert
Mugabe
> commented: "It was quite an intimidating Independence menu and one that
would not
> encourage anyone to want to be my Finance Minister". Yet "Bernard came and
took
> on the challenge …"
>
> In all events, the money borrowed was used to good effect. As Angie Todd
> writes in the Cuban English language publication, Granma International in
October
> 2002, "In the first 10 years of independence education absorbed 10-22 per
cent
> of the national budget. Primary education became free and compulsory, and
> schools and hospitals were built in the rural areas. "From 1978 to 1989
infant
> mortality dropped from 130 per 1,000 births to 65 …"
>
> Devastation by SAPs
>
> But then came payback time. Imperialism demanded implementation of a
> programme of structural adjustment that spelt "liberalisation of trade and
capital
> flows, the abolition of food subsidies and cutbacks in the health and
education
> sectors. The result: inflationary pressure due to increased import prices,
> businesses closing due to an inability to compete on the international
market, the
> export of capital funds and increased prices on all staple foods. "In five
> years the IMF destroyed 40 per cent of industrial output. … Zimbabwe was
forced
> to sell its maize reserves for IMF-ordered profits …" (ibid.).
Unemployment
> increased from 45% to 60% and inflation from 100% to 300%. The sale of
maize
> reserves obviously left the country open to famine in years when the crops
fail,
> which in Zimbabwe periodically they do, and they did in 2001, as a result
of a
> drought that engulfed the whole of southern Africa. All this the
imperialist
> press has the gall to attribute to Mugabe's 'economic mismanagement', when
> clearly it is the effect of implementing imperialism's own demands. Every
country
> which implements the IMF's structural adjustment programmes is likewise
> bankrupted - the only difference being that not all countries make efforts
to
> maintain welfare provision for the masses. George Monbiot points out:
>
> "Throughout the coverage of Zimbabwe there is an undercurrent both of
racism
> and of regret that Britain ever let Rhodesia go… Readers are led to
conclude
> that Ian Smith was right all along: the only people who know how to run
Africa
> are the whites. But, through the IMF, the World Bank and bilateral aid
> programmes, with their extraordinary conditions, the whites do run Africa,
and a
> right hash they are making of it. Over the past ten years, according to
the UN's
> latest human development report, the number of people in sub-Saharan
Africa
> living on less than a dollar a day has risen from 242 to 300 million. The
more
> rigorously Africa's governments apply the policies demanded by the whites,
the
> poorer their people become."
>
> Show down time
>
> To add injury to insult, imperialism has, of course, gleefully been taking
> advantage of the discontent aroused by application of its structural
adjustment
> programmes to endeavour to put together a pro-imperialist opposition in
> Zimbabwe - hence the so-called Movement for Democratic Freedom, praised to
the skies
> of course by every 'left-wing' social-democratic toadie of imperialism in
> this country, despite the fact that its programme is one of absolute
surrender to
> imperialism. If the people of Zimbabwe have legitimate grievances, they
would
> certainly never be addressed by a government formed by the Movement for
> Democratic Change! Nevertheless, imperialism poured vast amounts of cash
and
> Trotskyites into endeavouring to build this Movement for Democratic
Freedom into a
> force that could defeat ZANU at the polls - but all to little effect. By
> mobilising the discontent of a significant minority, the Movement for
Democratic
> Change (MDC) certainly creates nuisance value, but recent events have
shown that
> the Zimbabwean people are not so naïve as to support it in large enough
> numbers to topple the Zimbabwean regime. Not only did it lose the 2002
elections in
> Zimbabwe (a loss attributed by the imperialist press to violence and
> poll-rigging on the part of the government - undemocratically interfering
with the
> imperialist cheque-book ballot rigging), but it has been ineffective in
mobilising
> the masses to overthrow the "unrepresentative" ZANU government, which is
the
> least its imperialist masters expected of it. Imperialism was very
> disappointed by the MDC's failure at the beginning of June to achieve its
declared aim in
> a "week of protest billed as a 'final push' to unseat President Robert
> Mugabe" (Financial Times, 7 June 2003). The week of protest merely showed
that the
> MDC had very little support and "a national day of marches planned for
> yesterday [6 June] fizzled out …" (ibid.). Although imperialism naturally
tried to
> blame this on ZANU's 'brutal suppression of dissent', Jono Waters in South
> Africa's Business Week of 20 June 2003 wryly pointed out "the point that
keeps
> getting missed is that most of Zimbabwe's cowed and subjugated population
appear to
> feel the MDC is not worth being beaten up for, let alone dying for." The
> point, we might add, that Jono Waters misses is that the greater part of
> Zimbabweans are not at all "cowed and subjugated" - it is only the
would-be comprador
> class that feels this way, and those who are "cowing and subjugating" them
are
> the majority of the population who continue to support ZANU and would be
> ashamed to do otherwise, especially when the going is tough. In fact, Jono
Waters
> is forced, in the same article from which we quoted above, to admit that
> "people do not see an opposition leadership that struggles and thinks and
feels with
> them. They see a bunch of greedy, US-dollar salaried, Pajero drivers", or
> what might be called in Kenya members of the 'Wa Benzi' tribe, i.e., those
who
> flaunt their comprador status by driving around in Mercedes Benzes
supplied to
> them for their services to imperialism.
>
> Since it is now clear to all that there is little or nothing to be gained
for
> Zimbabwe in co-operating with imperialism and being in a financial
position
> dutifully to pay up on one's indebtedness to imperialism, since in any
event
> there are no more loans forthcoming from imperialism, which has subjected
> Zimbabwe to sanctions in its efforts to overthrow the ZANU nationalist
government,
> then there is nothing to inhibit ZANU from going ahead with land
> expropriations. In fact, to do so is an essential first step in securing
sufficient
> independent food supplies for the people of Zimbabwe during the years of
showdown with
> imperialism that lie ahead. Imperialism, for its part, will try to use
trade
> embargoes and other destabilising tactics - maybe even the kind of bombing
> campaign combined with electoral fraud that finished off Yugoslavia's
attempts to
> preserve its independence - to persuade the Zimbabweans to surrender. In
the
> fight against imperialism, the people of Zimbabwe have to be prepared for
hard
> times ahead.
>
> Understanding this, Robert Mugabe appealed to them at Bernard Chidzero's
> funeral:
>
> "Today we lay Bernard to rest among men and women of his ilk, those men
and
> women who dedicated and lost their precious lives in the service of our
Nation
> and our people …
>
> "Bernard and all who lie buried here worked for the people, sacrificed for
> their well-being and that of our children. Today, in the eerie silence of
this
> sacred acre, they ask you and me many questions. What have you done for
your
> country in your little sphere of activity? What are you doing with your
life for
> your Nation, for your People, for our Children? Or are you negating the
very
> illustrious essence of those proud and venerated men and women of honour
we
> gather yearly to acknowledge?
>
> "If Joshua Nkomo were to rise this hour, would you be fit to hold his hand
> and walk in step with him down the path that emanates from this very
sacred
> shrine and ends in a great future for our country? If Leopold Takwira,
Chairman
> Herbert Chitepo, General Josiah Magama Tongogara, Jason Moyo, Nikita
Mangena
> were here with us today, would you embrace them and greet them in
comradeship;
> would you be found among the trusted cadres they would have proudly
inspected …
>
> "What is your cause today? Does it derive from and connect with the lofty
> ideals of these men and women we honour today? Or are you, through your
actions
> today, a willing traitor and second executioner of these heroes; willing
> posthumous betrayer of their cause, indeed the eager butcher of our
revolution, our
> heritage and the future of our children? …
>
> "Each grave here speaks to our Nation through the undying, immanent spirit
of
> the heroic men or women whose transient remains it keeps. Each one of
these
> lives will tell you a tale of fortitude; will chastise you when your
courage
> and endurance weakens, reminding you that there is not a life too precious
to be
> laid for this Nation; no battle too hard to be fought for this land,
indeed
> no enemy too big, too powerful, too awesome to be fought and vanquished
for
> this land. Each one of these lives will remind you with the harshest of
language
> that there is no price big enough to fetch this Nation; no gold, no
silver,
> precious enough, to buy its sovereignty. We are not for sale."
>
> He added: "Those who lie here struggled and died for a cause and that
cause
> is fundamentally the land which must come back; which is coming back and,
for
> the peasant, which has come back in significant quantities."
>
>
>
> NOTES:
>
> 1. We are never told this, but all white farmers are being allowed to keep
at
> least one good sized farm. What has been confiscated is their second,
third,
> fourth, fifth, etc. farms.
>
> 2. Robert Mugabe - a life of power and violence, I B Tauris & Co Ltd,
London,
> 2003. Stephen Chan was a member of the Common wealth Secretariat at the
time
> of Zimbabwe's independence. As Professor of International Relations at
London
> University's School of Oriental and African Studies, he is, of course,
hostile
> to Robert Mugabe, but is nevertheless surprisingly informative about the
> imperialist-inspired sabotage of ZANU's efforts to build a society
delivering
> social justice to Zimbabwe's population, including its 11 million black
people who
> had before Liberation counted for nothing in the white supremacist regime
> that governed the country on behalf of imperialism.
>
> 3. Continuum, London, 2003, another anti-Mugabe book.
>
> 4. Op. cit. p.112
>
> 5. The quotation from Mugabe was excerpted in Michael Charlton, The Last
> Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia, Blackwell,
Oxford,
> 1990, p.152.
>
> 6. David Blair, op. cit., p.11
>
> 7. Chan, ibid., p. 17
>
> 8. Chan, op. cit., p.25.
>
> 9. Blair, op. cit. p. 30.
>
>
>

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