Rwanda: OAU Report
Date distributed (ymd): 000708
Document reposted by APIC
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Region: Central Africa
Issue Areas: +peace/security+
Summary Contents:
This posting contains a press release on the release of the new
Organization of Africa Unity report on the genocide in Rwanda,
which places the blame on the UN Security Council for failing to
act. It also contains Chapter 10 of the report, which focuses on
"What the World Could Have Done" The report denounces the double
standard which allowed the UN forces to stretch their mandate to
rescue expatriates, but failed to extend the same protection to
Rwandan victims.
The full report is available on the web at:
http://www.oau-oua.org/Document/ipep/ipep.htm
For links to earlier reports and on-line sources, see
http://www.africapolicy.org/docs99/rwan9904.htm
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UN Department of Public Information (DPI)
(http://www.un.org/News)
7 Jul 2000
International community to blame for Rwanda genocide,
says expert panel
An international panel investigating the 1994 genocide in Rwanda
issued its findings today, placing the brunt of the blame on the
United Nations Security Council, the United States, France and
Belgium for their failure to prevent the massacres, and calling for
reparations to be paid by those who failed to stop the bloodshed.
The 296-page report, which was launched this morning at UN
Headquarters in New York, was welcomed by Secretary-General Kofi
Annan as "another important contribution" towards efforts to shed
more light on the Rwanda tragedy. "The Secretary-General hopes that
this report will make an effective contribution to the success of
the international community's ongoing efforts as it continues to
grapple with the complex challenges of preventing genocide," Mr.
Annan's spokesman said in a statement.
Commissioned by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and
prepared by a seven-member International Panel of Eminent
Personalities, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide explores the
circumstances that led to the slaughter by a small group of Hutu
extremists of an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 Tutsi and moderate
Hutu in just over 100 days.
"It is of course true that there would have been no genocide had a
small group among the Rwandan governing elite not deliberately
incited the country's Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority,"
the Panel said. "But this terrible conspiracy only succeeded
because certain actors external to Rwanda allowed it to go ahead."
"Of these, the most important was the United Nations Security
Council. Its members could have prevented the genocide from taking
place. They failed to do so."
Introducing the report at a UN press conference, one of the panel's
members, Ambassador Stephen Lewis of Canada, drew particular
attention to the role of France and the United States.
"We repudiate the position of the Government of France, the
position that asserts that they had no responsibility," Ambassador
Lewis said, speaking on behalf of the panel. "They could have
stopped the genocide before it began. They knew exactly what was
happening." In addition, France facilitated the exodus of a huge
number of genocidaires under the cover of Operation Turquoise,
"thereby ushering in the larger Great Lakes catastrophe" and "even
engaged in the shipment of arms throughout the genocide and after,"
Ambassador Lewis said.
On the role of the United States, Ambassador Lewis said that the
role of the US Government in blocking a more effective UN
intervention force throughout the entire genocide was "an almost
incomprehensible scar of shame" on American foreign policy. "The
United States too knew exactly what was going on," he said.
The Panel also singled out the role of the Catholic and Anglican
churches in the events, noting that the church leaders had done
nothing to discourage the killings. The report said that since the
end of the genocide, several parties have apologized for failing to
stop the massacres, including President Clinton, Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, the Prime Minister of Belgium and the Anglican Church,
but pointed out that no apology had yet come from the French
Government or the Catholic Church.
In accordance with its mandate, the Panel also presented a list of
32 specific recommendations addressed to three distinct audiences
- the people of Rwanda, the rest of Africa and the international
community. Particular "cogency" among the many proposals was the
conclusion that reparations were owed to Rwanda by actors in the
international community for their roles before, during and since
the genocide, Ambassador Lewis stressed. The Panel called for the
establishment a commission to determine a formula for reparations
and to identify which countries should be obligated to pay. The
funds paid as reparations should be devoted to urgently needed
infrastructure developments and social service improvements on
behalf of all Rwandans, the Panel said.
The Panel was chaired by Sir Ketumile Masire (former President of
Botswana), with Amadou Toumani Toure (former Head of State of Mali)
serving as vice-chair. The other members of the Panel are P.N.
Bhagwati (former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India);
Hocine Djoudi (former Algerian Ambassador to France); Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf (former Liberian Government Minister); Stephen
Lewis (former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to
the UN); and Lisbet Palme (Chairperson of the Swedish Committee for
UNICEF, Expert on the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child).
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CHAPTER 10
THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE: WHAT THE WORLD COULD HAVE DONE
10.1. If there is anything worse than the genocide itself, it is
the knowledge that it did not have to happen. The simple, harsh,
truth is that the genocide was not inevitable; and that it would
have been relatively easy to stop it from happening prior to April
6, 1994, and then to mitigate the destruction significantly once it
began. In the words of one expert, 'This was the most easily
preventable genocide imaginable.'[1 - footnotes in on-line version
at http://www.oau-oua.org/Document/ipep/ipep.htm]
10.2. The conspirators may have seemed formidable in local terms,
but in fact they were small in number, modestly armed, and
substantially dependent on the outside world. On the few occasions
when the world did protest against the human rights violations
being perpetrated, the abuses largely halted, if temporarily. This
has been documented thoroughly. Conversely, each time the world
appeased the latest outrage, it enhanced the sense of Hutu Power
impunity. Since no one was ever punished for massacres or human
rights abuses, since the Habyarimana government remained a
favourite recipient of foreign aid, and since no one demanded an
end to the escalating incitement against the Tutsi, why would Hutu
radicals not believe they could get away with just about anything?
[2]
10.3. The plot leaders were in it for the spoils. Even a hint, let
alone a threat that further aid or loans or arms would not be
forthcoming was taken very seriously indeed. Such threats were
invoked with success to force Habyarimana to sign the Arusha
accords. They were rarely made in connection with human rights
abuses or ethnic persecution, however, and when they were, the
threats were never followed up, reflecting the reality that human
rights were not high on the agendas of many foreign governments.
10.4. Beyond this, some outsiders were blinded by their faith in
multipartyism as a panacea for all Rwanda's woes. The atrocities
aimed at the Tutsi were mistaken for more violence flowing from the
civil war. End the civil war and implement the Arusha accords, they
reasoned, and ethnic violence will automatically stop. To forward
the goal of peace, it was necessary to remain engaged. Withdrawal
of aid was therefore seen as counter-productive.
10.5. Few bothered to learn the lesson from Arusha's utter failure
that no agreement mattered unless Hutu Power was shattered.
Precisely the same crucial analytical error was repeated throughout
the period from April to July, when the Security Council and the
United Nations Secretariat consistently took the position that
ending the civil war took primacy over ending the genocide. When
the Nigerian ambassador complained that too much attention was
being paid to cease-fire negotiations and too little to stopping
the massacres, he was largely ignored. The Carlsson Inquiry,
appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 to look into
the role of the UN in the genocide, criticizes the entire U N
family for this 'costly error of judgment.'[3] In fact, this seems
to us too generous an interpretation of the world's failure.
10.6. Here was a clear-cut case of rote diplomacy by the
international community. As the UN's own Department of Peacekeeping
Operations later concluded, 'A fundamental misunderstanding of the
nature of the conflict contributed to false political assumptions
and military assessments.'[4] Security Council members blithely
ignored both the discrete realities of the situation and the urgent
advocacy of the non-governmental agencies who were crying out the
truth to whomever would listen.[5] Instead, the automatic reflex
was to call for a cease-fire and negotiations, outcomes that would
have coincided perfectly with the aims and strategy of the
genocidaires. The annihilation of the Tutsi would have continued,
while the war between the armies paused, and negotiators wrangled.
In reality, anything that slowed the march of the RPF to military
victory was a gift to Hutu Power. In the end, its victory alone
ended the genocide and saved those Tutsi who were still alive by
July. We count Rwanda fortunate that a military truce - the single
consistent initiative pursued by the international community - was
never reached.
10.7. It should only have taken the information at hand to
formulate a correct response. It may well be that the mass media
did not at first grasp the full extent of the genocide, but that
was not true of the world's decision-makers. Eyewitness accounts
were never lacking, whether from Rwandans or expatriates with the
International Committee for the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, the
US Committee for Refugees, or others. Week after week for three
months, reports sent directly from Rwanda to home governments and
international agencies documented the magnitude of the slaughter
and made it plain that this was no tribal bloodletting, but the
work of hardline political and military leaders. At the same time,
the reports spelled how countless people could still be saved,
identifying exactly where they were hiding, and what steps were
needed to rescue them. Yet the world did less than nothing. As
subsequent chapters fully document, the world powers assembled as
the UN Security Council actually chose to reduce, rather than
enhance, their presence.
10.8. The obvious, necessary response was a serious international
military force to deter the killers; this seems to us a
self-evident truth. This Panel wants to go on record as one that
shares the conviction of UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda ( UNAMIR)
Commander General Romeo Dallaire: "The killings could have been
prevented if there had been the international will to accept the
costs of doing so." [6] As we have seen, that will was at best
half-hearted before April 6, and it collapsed entirely in the early
stages of the genocide. Virtually every authority we know believes
that a larger, better-equipped, and toughly mandated force could
have played a critical role, possibly in deterring the conspiracy
entirely or, at the least, in causing the plotters to modify or
stall their plans and in significantly reducing the number of
deaths. It seems certain that appropriate UN intervention at any
time after the genocide began would have had a major role in
stopping the killings.[7]
10.9. Dallaire has always insisted that with 5,000 troops and the
right mandate, UNAMIR could have prevented most of the killings. In
1998, several American institutions decided to test Dallaire's
argument. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict,
the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University
in Washington, D.C., and the US Army undertook a joint project to
consider what impact an international military force was likely to
have had.[8] Thirteen senior military leaders addressed the issue,
and a report based on their presentations as well as on other
research, was prepared for the Carnegie Commission by Colonel Scott
Feil of the US Army. His conclusion was straightforward: "A modern
force of 5,000 troops...sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and
April 21, 1994, could have significantly altered the outcome of the
conflict... forces appropriately trained, equipped and commanded,
and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence
in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside,
and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war
between the RPF and RGF." [9]
10.10. Of course, we understand that this was a strictly
theoretical exercise, and it is easy to be wise after the fact. On
the other hand, we have no reason to question the objectivity of
this analysis or of any of the participants. Neither they nor the
author seem to have had a vested interest in this conclusion.
Moreover, even those analyses that have recently stressed the
logistic complications in swiftly mobilizing a properly equipped
force do not deny that scores of thousands of Tutsi, 'up to
125,000,' might have been saved at any time during the months of
the genocide.[10] By any standard, these American reports stand as
a humiliating rebuke to the US government whose influence was so
great in ensuring that no adequate force ever was sent.
10.11. Rather than respond with appropriate force, the opposite
happened, spurred by the murders of the Belgian Blue Berets and
Belgium's withdrawal of its remaining troops. Exactly two weeks
after the genocide began - following strenuous lobbying for total
withdrawal led by Belgium and Britain, and with American UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright advocating the most token of forces
and the United States adamantly refusing to accept publicly that a
full-fledged, Convention-defined genocide was in fact taking place
- the Security Council made the astonishing decision to reduce the
already inadequate UNAMIR force to a derisory 270 men.[11]
10.12. Today, it seems barely possible to believe. The
international community actually chose to abandon the Tutsi of
Rwanda at the very moment when they were being exterminated. Even
that was not the end of it. The UN Secretariat officials then
instructed General Dallaire that his rump force was not to take an
active role in protecting Rwandan citizens.[12] To his great
credit, Dallaire maneuvered to keep the force at almost twice the
size authorized, and UNAMIR was still able to save the lives of an
estimated 20,000 to 25,000 Rwandans during the course of the
genocide.[13]
10.13. In a sense, the fact that it was possible to save thousands
of lives with 500 troops makes the Belgian and the UN decisions
much more deplorable. The available evidence reveals the
considerable authority exerted after April 6 by even a small number
of Blue Helmets with a UN flag. 'The general rule' was that
'Rwandans were safe as long as they gathered under United Nations
protection ... It was when the United Nations forces left the site
that the killings started'.[14] This rule was most infamously
demonstrated in the case of the Kigali technical school, l'Ecole
Technique Officielle (ETO), where 100 Belgian soldiers kept a horde
of murderers at bay. As the UN troops withdrew through one gate,
the genocidaires moved in through another. Within hours, the 2,000
Tutsi who had fled to ETO for UN protection were dead.[15] We will
return to this shocking incident later in this report.
10.14. With the exception of the deliberate murders of the 10
Belgian Blue Helmets, experiences showed that a few UN troops could
provide significant defense for those under their protection with
little risk to themselves. This "power of presence" was not to be
underestimated. Yet when France sent 500 soldiers to evacuate
French citizens and Akazu members on April 8 and 9, Dallaire's UN
troops were immediately ordered - by the Secretariat in New York,
and under strong pressure from western countries - to work with the
French to evacuate foreign nationals rather than protect threatened
Rwandans.[16] This can only be described as a truly perverse use of
scarce UN resources. No doubt innocent expatriates were threatened
by a conflagration that was none of their making. But exactly the
same was true of Rwanda's Tutsi, who were peremptorily abandoned by
the Blue Helmets.
10.15. Equally startling were the guidelines Dallaire was given.
These seem to have received little notice until documented by the
Carlsson Inquiry report, yet they seem to us of extraordinary
significance. 'You should make every effort not to compromise your
impartiality or to act beyond your mandate,' the April 9 cable from
Kofi Annan and Iqbal Riza stated, 'but [you] may exercise your
discretion to do [so] should this be essential for the evacuation
of foreign nationals. This should not, repeat not, extend to
participating in possible combat except in self-defence.'[17] This
double standard seems to us outrageous. No such instructions were
ever given to Dallaire about protecting innocent Rwandan civilians.
He was never explicitly directed that the Blue Helmets should
protect such civilians and could fight in self-defence if attacked
while doing so. He was never told, 'exercise your discretion...to
act beyond your mandate' when it came to Rwandans. On the contrary,
every time he raised the issue, he was specifically instructed not
to go beyond the rigidly circumscribed mandate approved by the
Security Council under any circumstances. Is there a conclusion we
can draw from this incident other than that expatriate lives were
considered more valuable than African lives?
10.16. The lesson to be learned from the betrayal at ETO and other
experiences was that the full potential of UNAMIR went unexplored
and unused, and, as result, countless more Rwandans died than
otherwise might have. If anyone in the international community
learned this lesson at the time, it was not evident at the UN. For
the next six weeks, as the carnage continued, the UN dithered in
organizing any kind of response to the ongoing tragedy. The
Americans, led by US Ambassador Madeleine Albright, played the key
role in blocking more expeditious action by the UN.[18] On May 17,
the Security Council finally authorized an expanded UNAMIR II to
consist of 5,500 personnel.[19] But there is perhaps no distance
greater on earth than the one between the Security Council chambers
and the outside world. Once the decision to expand was finally
made, as we will soon show in detail, the Pentagon somehow required
an additional seven weeks just to negotiate a contract for
delivering armed personnel carriers to the field; evidently it
proved difficult to arrange the desired terms for "maintenance and
spare parts."[20] When the genocide ended in mid-July with the
final RPF victory, not a single additional UN soldier had landed in
Kigali.
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