Ohhhh!  Go to school and learn and stop being the idiot you are.  Even your
only employment in your life - the military, you still do not understand, so
go figure.


>From: Ebou Jallow <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: [log in to unmask]
>To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>,   [log in to unmask]
>Subject: [>-<] IMF does not rule the Gambia
>Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 18:36:16 -0700 (PDT)
>
>Musa Jeng,
>
>Relax the hype...the world is not going to end tomorrow my brother.  Jammeh
>appointed some people to run the Central Bank and they evidently failed
>their duties to the Gambia.  Consequently, Jammeh applied the rule of law
>on this very issue, and today some admitted guilt to corruption charges in
>a court of law and none of them mentioned Yaya Jammeh's name in court.  The
>Gambia is a sovereign state with a democratically elected president who is
>accountable to the Gambian people and not the IMF.  The Gambian
>constitution grants him the rights of executive privilege on matters of
>national security, state secrets and the execution of the people's business
>which is none of the IMF's or any damn auditor's business.
>Some of you simply live in Laputa and love creating a storm out of a
>teacup.  Even if Jammeh steals from the Gambia Government ( which I doubt
>has ever happened) you fools shall never ever know about it.
>
>Monsieur Dieng, I suggest you focus on raising some nickles/dimes for your
>desperate/dysfunctional party the PPP aka NADD. Better still you might try
>begging the Gambian opposition's friend Monsieur Wade  for some of his loot
>from the Senegalese people.
>
>
>Ebou Jallow
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Musa Jeng <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>Joe:
>
>In layman's parlance, what this report simply put is that APRC has
>mismanaged the Gambian economy and everything in the country. Folks, they
>have stolen our country's resources and anyone who really believe that the
>APRC can seriously develop our country, I am the owner of the Brokyln
>Bridge and I would not mind to sell it to you. Now, I know some of you
>support them for some crazy reason, but bottom line they will never be able
>to put it together, and I mean never.
>
>Thanks
>
>Musa Jeng
> >
> > From: Joe Sambou
> > Date: 2005/09/27 Tue PM 05:44:11 EDT
> > To: [log in to unmask]
> > Subject: IMF on Gambia
> >
> > Below is the IMF report on Gambia. I wonder how they accounted for Lang
>and
> > Jammeh's heist from the Bank.
> >
> > "The Executive Directors urged the authorities, during the Article IV
> > consultation in 2004, to commission a reaudit of the Central Bank of The
> > Gambia's (CBG's) 2001 and 2002 financial statements on terms of
>reference
> > agreed with Fund staff. The Directors also stressed the need for a
>special
> > audit of foreign exchange transactions between 2000 and 2003. These
>audits
> > have now been completed and confirm the breakdown of internal controls
>at
> > the central bank that were observed during the IMF's Safeguard
>Assessment
> > mission conducted in November 2003. The audit reports restate general
>ledger
> > balances for external reserves for various test dates between
>end-December
> > 2000 and end-December 2003, which are significantly lower than the
> > originally recorded balances. The auditors have issued a disclaimer
> > indicating that they were unable to express an opinion on the 2001 and
>2002
> > accounts largely because of the lack of documentation supporting several
> > foreign exchange transactions."
> >
> > Simply put, they cooked the books. Nothing has changed and the theft
>will
> > continue as long as Yaya is presiding over the criminal activity. Please
> > read on.
> >
> >
> > Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 05/121
> > September 8, 2005 International Monetary Fund
> > 700 19th Street, NW
> > Washington, D.C. 20431 USA
> >
> >
> >
> > IMF Executive Board Concludes 2005 Article IV Consultation with The
>Gambia
> > Public Information Notices (PINs) form part of the IMF's efforts to
>promote
> > transparency of the IMF's views and analysis of economic developments
>and
> > policies. With the consent of the country (or countries) concerned, PINs
>are
> > issued after Executive Board discussions of Article IV consultations
>with
> > member countries, of its surveillance of developments at the regional
>level,
> > of post-program monitoring, and of ex post assessments of member
>countries
> > with longer-term program engagements. PINs are also issued after
>Executive
> > Board discussions of general policy matters, unless otherwise decided by
>the
> > Executive Board in a particular case. The staff report for the Article
>IV
> > consultation with The Gambia may be made available at a later stage if
>the
> > authorities consent.
> >
> >
> > On July 18, 2005, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund
> > (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with The Gambia.1
> >
> > Background
> >
> > The Gambia's economic performance since the mid-1980s has been uneven
>owing
> > to exogenous shocks, macroeconomic and structural policy slippage, poor
> > governance, and weak institutions. The economy's vulnerability to shocks
> > stems from a lack of economic diversification. In addition, economic
> > performance has been constrained by policy distortions and by recurrent
> > weaknesses in fiscal policy. Expansionary policies have increased the
> > government's recourse to domestic bank financing, which, in turn, has
>raised
> > real interest rates, increased the domestic debt burden, and tended to
>crowd
> > out private investment.
> >
> > In 1998, the authorities entered into a three-year program under the
> > Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which was converted into
>a
> > Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement. In July 2002,
>the
> > Board approved a new three-year PRGF arrangement (See News Brief No.
>02/74
> > and Press Release No. 02/32), but the first review was not completed
>because
> > of weak policy implementation and governance problems. It was discovered
>in
> > 2003 that The Gambia had misreported to the Fund net international
>reserves
> > by US$38.8 million at end-December 2001 and failed to record US$28.5
>million
> > in government expenditures. The Executive Board concluded that The
>Gambia
> > had received two noncomplying disbursements, equivalent to SDR 3.435
>million
> > each in July and December 2001 (See Press Release No. 04/49). The
> > authorities repaid these disbursements in 2004 in four equal
>installments,
> > with the last payment made ahead of schedule.
> >
> > The Executive Directors urged the authorities, during the Article IV
> > consultation in 2004, to commission a reaudit of the Central Bank of The
> > Gambia's (CBG's) 2001 and 2002 financial statements on terms of
>reference
> > agreed with Fund staff. The Directors also stressed the need for a
>special
> > audit of foreign exchange transactions between 2000 and 2003. These
>audits
> > have now been completed and confirm the breakdown of internal controls
>at
> > the central bank that were observed during the IMF's Safeguard
>Assessment
> > mission conducted in November 2003. The audit reports restate general
>ledger
> > balances for external reserves for various test dates between
>end-December
> > 2000 and end-December 2003, which are significantly lower than the
> > originally recorded balances. The auditors have issued a disclaimer
> > indicating that they were unable to express an opinion on the 2001 and
>2002
> > accounts largely because of the lack of documentation supporting several
> > foreign exchange transactions.
> >
> > Macroeconomic performance has strengthened over the past 18 months,
> > particularly through end-2004, in response to strong financial policies.
> > Despite an increase in groundnut production, real GDP growth slowed in
>2004
> > to 5.1 percent (from 6.9 percent in 2003) due to lower growth in
>industry
> > and services. Inflation reached 18 percent at end-2003 and declined to 5
> > percent by March 2005. The central bank's rediscount rate (policy rate)
>was
> > reduced by 5 percentage points from September 2004 to 29 percent in
>March
> > 2005.
> >
> > The overall fiscal deficit (including grants and on a commitment basis)
> > increased to 5¾ percent of GDP in 2004 from 4¾ percent in 2003, mainly
>due
> > to much higher externally-financed capital expenditures. However, the
>basic
> > primary surplus more than doubled to 9½ percent of GDP, indicating a
> > significant tightening in domestic fiscal operations. Broad money growth
> > declined from a peak of 43 percent on a 12-month basis in 2003 to 18
>percent
> > in 2004. The nominal exchange rate has been stable since 2003 when it
> > depreciated by 25 percent in U.S. dollar terms.
> >
> > The relatively high interest rates that were necessary to reverse the
> > deterioration in the macroeconomic environment have, however, placed a
>heavy
> > burden on domestic debt service, and on credit markets. The total
>domestic
> > debt stock increased from around 25 percent of GDP in 2003 to 31 percent
>in
> > 2004 and domestic interest payments have risen from 4½ percent in 2003
>to 5¼
> > percent of GDP in 2004. The tightening in domestic financial policies
>has
> > also severely depressed credit to the private sector. In 2004, the stock
>of
> > such credit is estimated to have fallen by 6 percent.
> >
> > The external current account deficit (including official transfers)
> > deteriorated from 5 percent of GDP in 2003 to 12 percent in 2004, partly
> > reflecting the worsening in the balance of trade, as strong import
>growth
> > was driven by the recovery in output, the surge in donor-financed
>capital
> > expenditures, foreign direct investment, and higher international oil
> > prices. Gross international reserves rose by more than US$22 million or
>by
> > over 30 percent in 2004 as increased foreign inflows and a stabilizing
> > exchange rate allowed the central bank to increase its purchases in the
> > interbank market.
> >
> > Policies, however, weakened in the first quarter of 2005. There have
>been
> > significant fiscal slippages owing primarily to unbudgeted expenditures
>of D
> > 101 million (¾ percent of GDP). These expenditures have led to a
>substantial
> > increase in the net debt of the government. Accommodating policies by
>the
> > central bank led to excessive growth in monetary aggregates. Prospects
>for
> > 2005 are further jeopardized by the decision to license a monopoly
> > quasi-public enterprise, the Gambian Agricultural Marketing Corporation
> > (GAMCO), to market and process groundnuts. This has had a near
>disastrous
> > effect on exports of processed groundnuts, as GAMCO has been unable to
>raise
> > the finances to purchase what was a bumper harvest for groundnuts. The
> > mission estimates that a substantial proportion of groundnut exports
>could
> > be lost in the 2004/05 crop season.
> >
> > After a long delay, the authorities recently completed the first annual
> > progress report of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper covering the
>period
> > July 2002-December 2003. Progress on structural reforms has been mixed.
>The
> > authorities have fallen behind in their schedule to privatize the Gambia
> > Groundnut Corporation. On the fiscal side, the National Emergency Fiscal
> > Committee (NEFCOM) had some positive effects in ensuring greater control
> > over expenditures. Further, steps are being taken to strengthen the
>public
> > expenditure management system. A new organic budget law has been passed
>and
> > the financial regulations are currently being implemented. The
>authorities
> > are in the process of developing a statistical strategy to be presented
>to
> > donors. However, basic macroeconomic statistics remain weak.
> >
> > Executive Board Assessment
> >
> > Executive Directors observed that The Gambia's economic performance in
> > recent years was marked by inconsistent implementation of sound
> > macroeconomic policies, poor governance, exogenous and policy-induced
> > shocks, and inappropriate policy responses to those shocks. Directors
> > concurred that the main medium-term challenge for The Gambia is to make
>a
> > decisive break from the past "stop-go" policies, and embark on a
> > comprehensive economic program that would establish the conditions for
> > sustainable growth and poverty reduction. Key elements of such a program
> > should include measures to preserve macroeconomic stability and to
>achieve
> > debt sustainability. The program should also incorporate reforms aimed
>at
> > promoting faster growth and poverty reduction through improvements in
>the
> > investment climate, and the strengthening of public expenditure
>management,
> > governance, and accountability.
> >
> > In this context, Directors commended the authorities for their
> > implementation of strong financial policies over the past 18 months,
>which
> > has led to an improvement in the basic primary fiscal surplus, a
>reduction
> > in inflation, the stabilization of the exchange rate, and the rebuilding
>of
> > international reserves. Directors noted that the improved macroeconomic
> > conditions had paved the way for the recent easing in interest rates.
> >
> > While welcoming this progress, Directors expressed disappointment with
>the
> > fiscal slippage—stemming from extrabudgetary expenditures—that occurred
>in
> > the first quarter of 2005. They urged the authorities to address it by
>fully
> > implementing the proposed quarterly ceilings on nondiscretionary
> > expenditure, improving cash management, and enforcing the public
> > enterprises' repayment of government loans. In this process, it will be
> > important to avoid adverse effects on pro-poor spending. Directors also
> > urged the authorities to phase out the subsidization of petroleum
>products
> > by adjusting prices and enforcing the terms of the petroleum price
> > mechanism, bearing in mind the social implications of the adjustment. In
> > addition, they recommended strengthening revenues by improving tax
> > administration, and broadening the tax base by phasing out tax
>exemptions.
> >
> > Directors were encouraged by the recent implementation of reforms to
>promote
> > enhanced fiscal transparency. They welcomed the passage of the organic
> > budget law and encouraged the authorities to finalize implementation of
>the
> > supporting financial regulations. They also noted the progress being
>made in
> > auditing the government accounts, and urged the authorities to intensify
> > efforts to bring the accounts up to date.
> >
> > Directors commended the progress made in reducing inflation, and
>stressed
> > that further fiscal consolidation would provide room for easing monetary
> > policy and permit further reductions in interest rates. Directors
>concurred
> > with the use of broad money as a nominal anchor for prices. They
>welcomed
> > the progress made to enhance the conduct of monetary policy, and
>encouraged
> > the authorities to move ahead with the introduction of new instruments
> > designed to separate monetary operations from the financing of the
>budget,
> > and by adopting other key recommendations made by recent Fund technical
> > assistance missions. Also, Directors welcomed the increased attention
>being
> > paid to better coordination of fiscal and monetary management, and saw
>the
> > creation of the Monetary Policy Committee and Treasury Bill Committee as
> > important first steps in this regard. Efficient use of Fund technical
> > assistance in public expenditure management and in the domestic and
>foreign
> > operations of the central bank, together with the strengthening of the
> > authorities' statistical capacity, should help to further improve The
> > Gambia's macroeconomic management capacity.
> >
> > Directors expressed disappointment with the continued weaknesses in
>internal
> > controls at the Central Bank, and stressed the need for the prompt and
> > effective implementation of appropriate remedial measures. In this
>regard,
> > they welcomed the recent adoption by the Central Bank of an Action Plan
>to
> > strengthen internal controls drawing on the report of the new external
> > auditors. The establishment of an Audit Committee, drafting of
>guidelines
> > for foreign reserves management, as well as the recent reorganization of
>the
> > Bank were also welcomed. In addition, Directors encouraged the
>authorities
> > to fully implement the recommendations from the recent Safeguards
> > Assessment, including the passage of the revised Central Bank Act
>designed
> > to strengthen the Bank's operational independence.
> >
> > Directors observed that the fundamentals of the financial sector appear
> > sound with adequate capitalization and high profitability and liquidity
> > ratios. They welcomed the reduction in nonperforming loans, and urged
>the
> > authorities to pursue the further deepening of the financial sector,
> > including by enhancing the legal framework and reinforcing creditor
>rights.
> >
> > Directors agreed that the current level of the real effective exchange
>rate
> > is appropriate, and that improvements in external competitiveness should
>be
> > addressed through the removal of structural bottlenecks, which currently
> > constrain productivity.
> >
> > Directors concurred that The Gambia's external competitiveness and
>growth
> > prospects would be enhanced by the adoption of a comprehensive
>structural
> > reform strategy designed to reduce the costs and risks of doing business
>in
> > the country, and removing key structural bottlenecks in the agricultural
> > sector. They encouraged the authorities to accelerate the privatization
> > program, and enhance the investment climate through fiscal, judicial,
>and
> > legislative reforms, as recommended by the Foreign Investment Advisory
> > Service and the World Bank's Diagnostic Assessment of the Investment
>Climate
> > in The Gambia. In this connection, strengthening institutions and
>improving
> > governance would be major priorities. In the groundnut sector, Directors
> > expressed disappointment with the decision to license a public monopoly,
>The
> > Gambia Agricultural Marketing Corporation to market and process
>groundnuts.
> > They noted that the authorities had agreed to license firms to compete
>with
> > the Gambia Agricultural Marketing Corporation, but emphasized that it
>will
> > be essential to avoid further government intervention and accelerate
> > implementation of the sectoral strategy agreed with major donors.
>including
> > the privatization of the Gambia Groundnut Corporation.
> >
> > Directors concurred that clear steps would be needed as part of a
> > staff-monitored program (SMP). Directors agreed with staff that the main
> > elements of an SMP should include implementation of an action plan to
> > address the external auditor's recommendations to improve internal
>controls,
> > and in that regard they welcomed the authorities' intention to conduct
> > quarterly audits of the Central Bank's foreign reserve balances. They
>also
> > agreed that emphasis will need to be placed on public financial
>management
> > and accountability. Successful performance under an SMP could be
>expected to
> > lead to a new PRGF arrangement and debt relief under the HIPC
>Initiative.
> >
> > Directors welcomed the ex post assessment report and generally agreed
>with
> > its main findings. They identified as key lessons to be learned for
>future
> > program design the importance of structuring conditionality so as to
>give
> > greater emphasis to the resolution of problems in public expenditure
> > management and in the internal controls at the central bank. A few
>Directors
> > noted the authorities' view that over ambitious targets may have
>contributed
> > to program failures, and they saw a possible need for greater realism
>and
> > streamlining of program conditionality. Directors also observed that
> > governance problems and insufficient commitment to reforms had hampered
> > program implementation over the course of the last two arrangements with
>the
> > Fund and emphasized the need to continue strengthening transparency in
>the
> > use of public resources.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > The Gambia: Selected Economic Indicators
> >
> >
> >
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > 2001
> > 2002
> > 2003
> > 2004
> >
> >
> >
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > (Annual Percentage changes, unless otherwise indicated)
> >
> > Domestic economy
> >
> > Real GDP
> > 5.8
> > -3.2
> > 6.9
> > 5.1
> >
> > Nominal GDP
> > 21.8
> > 12.3
> > 36.1
> > 20.1
> >
> > GDP deflator
> > 15.2
> > 16.1
> > 27.4
> > 14.3
> >
> > Consumer price index (period average)
> > 4.5
> > 8.6
> > 17.0
> > 14.2
> >
> > Groundnut production
> > (in thousands of metric tons)
> > 151.0
> > 71.5
> > 92.9
> > 120.5
> >
> >
> > (In percent of GDP)
> >
> > External sector
> >
> > Current account balance
> >
> > Excluding official transfers
> > -10.1
> > -13.4
> > -13.6
> > -21.6
> >
> > Including official transfers
> > -2.6
> > -2.8
> > -5.1
> > -11.8
> >
> >
> > (Annual percentage changes, unless otherwise) indicated)
> >
> > Exports, f.o.b. (in U.S. dollars)
> > -19.4
> > 7.1
> > -7.6
> > 25.8
> >
> > Imports, c.i.f. (in U.S. dollars)
> > -19.9
> > 12.8
> > -6.2
> > 46.2
> >
> >
> > Money and credit (end-of-period stocks)
> >
> > Broad money
> > 19.4
> > 35.3
> > 43.4
> > 18.3
> >
> > Credit to the private sector and public enterprises
> > 12.8
> > 72.3
> > 48.0
> > -15.1
> >
> > Reserve money
> > 21.0
> > 34.1
> > 62.7
> > 11.0
> >
> > Treasury Bill rate (in percent; end-of-period)
> > 15.0
> > 20.0
> > 31.0
> > 30.0
> >
> >
> > (In percent of GDP)
> >
> > Central government budget 1/
> >
> > Balance, excluding grants
> > -16.0
> > -9.1
> > -7.2
> > -10.2
> >
> > Balance, including grants
> > -13.9
> > -4.6
> > -4.7
> > -5.7
> >
> > Total expenditure and net lending
> > 31.1
> > 25.4
> > 22.9
> > 31.2
> >
> > Domestic revenue
> > 15.1
> > 16.3
> > 15.7
> > 20.9
> >
> > Stock of domesti debt
> > 38.1
> > 36.6
> > 25.2
> > 30.7
> >
> >
> > (In millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)
> >
> > Current account balance
> >
> > Excluding official transfers
> > -42.2
> > -49.6
> > -48.0
> > -86.7
> >
> > Including official transfers
> > -10.8
> > -10.4
> > -18.0
> > -47.1
> >
> >
> > Gross official reserves 2/
> > 63.0
> > 67.2
> > 62.3
> > 84.6
> >
> > In months of imports, c.i.f.
> > 5.0
> > 4.5
> > 4.4
> > 4.1
> >
> >
> > (In percent of exports and travel income)
> >
> > External debt service 3/
> > 16.4
> > 16.9
> > 8.5
> > 15.9
> >
> >
> >
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Sources: The Gambian authorities; and IMF Staff estimates.
> > 1/ Adjustment have been incorporated for previously unrecorded public
> > spending and borrowing in 2001, financed by the Central Bank of The
>Gambia.
> > 2/ Adjustments have been incorporated for previously unrecorded
>depletion of
> > foreign exchange reserves in 2001-03, as reported by the authorities on
> > October 28, 2003.
> > 3/ Servicing of public external debt after HIPC grants in percent of
>exports
> > and travel income. In 2001, the increase in debt service reflects in
>part
> > payments to Alimenta. Any accumulation of arrears is excluded.
> >
> >
> >
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > 1 Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds
> > bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team
>visits
> > the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses
>with
> > officials the country's economic developments and policies. On return to
> > headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for
> > discussion by the Executive Board. At the conclusion of the discussion,
>the
> > Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of
> > Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's
> > authorities.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > IMF EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
> > Public Affairs: 202-623-7300 - Fax: 202-623-6278
> > Media Relations: 202-623-7100 - Fax: 202-623-6772
> >
> > ¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤
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> >
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