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Subject:
From:
Lamin Manneh PF <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Thu, 16 Aug 2001 20:42:08 -0700
Content-Type:
text/plain
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Hey Folks, I think a better compromise would be what PDOIS suggested ealier.
Let the coalition president, if he wins, stay for only one year and
organised a truely democratic election where every party will be free to
participate.
LPF Manneh


>From: Yusupha C Jow <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: The NCP Needs To Be Reengaged
>Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2001 19:26:03 EDT
>
>I sincerely hope that there is time, though not much, for the NCP to
>reconsider her current position and perhaps allow for a renegotiation with
>the Alliance as it is currently composed.
>
>The Alliance, instead of drawing lines in the sand and sharpening their
>swords in preparation for a war of words with the NCP, should make an all
>out
>effort to re-invite S.M. Dibba and his party back to the negotiating table
>in
>the hopes of forging a compromise which would ensure the NCP's direct
>involvement in the Alliance.
>
>The same goes for the NCP. However, from the aforementioned press release,
>it
>appears the NCP is trying to avoid the kind of strife which will create
>more
>schisms between themselves and the Alliance.  This is a very encouraging
>development which should be used as a foundation for future negotiations
>towards a more widely encompassing Alliance.
>
>The NCP and the Alliance should both realize that this arrangement, as
>presently comprised, will simply not suffice when it comes to defeating the
>APRC soundly come October.  At first, I, like many, was of the opinion that
>the NCP's absence would not really hinder the Opposition's chances of
>winning
>in October.  But, the closer I peeked, the more it became evident that is
>not
>the case.
>
>Before the advent of the barbarians and butchers in power, the NCP was the
>main opposition party in The Gambia.  During the last general elections
>before the advent of the APRC, the NCP garnered about 36% of the total
>vote.
>Coincidentally, this is approximately the same percentage of votes which
>the
>UDP garnered during the last post-APRC general elections.
>
>Similarities aside, these statistics show that, before the advent of the
>APRC, the NCP was a force to be reckoned with in the Gambian political
>landscape, and this leads to the million dollar question: Where did all the
>NCP supporters go after Decree 89 was passed?
>
>Some of them joined the ranks of the APRC, while the majority of their
>supporters joined the then newly formed UDP party.  To buttress my point, I
>shall point to the fact that in both parliamentary and general elections
>held
>in formerly strong NCP strongholds, such as Bakau and Baddibou, the results
>still favored the Opposition in the UDP.
>
>Former PPP supporters, on the other hand, mostly joined the ranks of the
>APRC
>after Decree 89.  Save for a few constituencies, previous PPP strongholds,
>i.e., most of the country, have now become APRC controlled regions.  It is
>also to be assumed that some former PPP supporters did vote for the UDP,
>but
>those were probably few and far between, for, to their credit, the APRC did
>a
>good job of attracting supporters who were previously loyal to the former
>ruling party.
>
>The phenomenon which occurred after Decree 89 was the biggest realignment
>of
>political affiliations in post-independence Gambian history, and this was
>solely caused by advent of the APRC, which led to the infamous Decree.  So,
>we know that Yahya was the cause of this occurrence, but what about its
>implications as it relates to the events of August 13 ?
>
>Well, as I see it, another realignment of political affiliations is taking
>place as we speak and depending on the outcome of future Alliance
>negotiations, these changes in party affiliations shall continue to morph.
>
>As a result of the NCP''s current position of refusing to join the
>Alliance,
>the Opposition's core, formerly that of the NCP, will fragment because a
>considerable portion will repledge their alliances to the NCP and S.M.
>Dibba.
>  This said, it will be more difficult to ascertain the portion of UDP
>supporters that will be lost because of this shift of alliances.  But going
>by the strong support the NCP once enjoyed in previous presidential
>elections, that loss might be sizable enough to effectively scuttle the
>Alliance's hopes for a victory in October.  Possibly, the small portion of
>former NCP voters who cast their ballots for the APRC during the last
>election might similarly jump ship, but most likely this particular
>migration
>of supporters will only amount to a few percent of the APRC vote, hardly
>enough to make a sizable dent in their fortunes.
>
>The PPP, by virtue of their participation in the Alliance, will probably
>not
>be a direct cause for the polarization of UDP's supporter base.  Their
>reemergence in the political arena will mean some of its former supporters
>will shift their allegiances from the APRC to the Alliance.  But, again,
>getting a determination an approximate number is tough.  Regardless, at
>this
>rate, this shift will probably go towards offsetting the loss of voters
>created by the polarizing effect caused by the NCP's refusal to go with the
>Alliance.
>
>Please note that PDOIS and the GPP are conspicuously absent from my
>summation.  I must say that I greatly admire PDOIS whose strategies and
>principles, being the best ones out there, can surely move our country
>forward.  Nevertheless, there impact in terms of numbers is negligible when
>compared to, say, a PPP, NCP, or UDP.  The same applies to the GPP even
>though Hassan Musa Camara has been designated elder statesman of the
>Alliance.  This is not to say that PDOIS' or GPP's involvement in this
>Alliance is not welcome, a few percentage points might make all the
>difference this time around and thus they might make the difference, but in
>the grand scheme of things the NCP is currently the bigger fish to fry.
>
>So we have it folks: Nothing but a wider Alliance which includes the NCP
>will
>suffice.  This is not the time for divisive politics.  Personal egos,
>finger
>pointing and a war of words will only further turn off voters who might
>have
>otherwise voted for the Alliance, NCP or PDOIS.  Dibba needs to be
>reengaged
>and this way good will surely triumph over evil.
>
>-Jah Lives,
>Yus
>
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