*Amadu Kabir Njie <[log in to unmask]> *
------------------------------
*Zimbabwe Under Siege*
------------------------------
  *Yusupha Jow <[log in to unmask]> * *Mon, Apr 2, 2007 at 6:33 PM *  To:
Amadu Kabir Njie <[log in to unmask]>

Rather long article but it illustrates how important it is to sift through
the sometimes blatant falsehoods perpetrated by the Western media. Swallow
everything they write at your own peril.
Thanks!
Yusupha

http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004.html

Zimbabwe Under Siege by Gregory Elich

*August 26, 2002*


       *A*s Zimbabwe descends into anarchy and chaos, land is irrationally
seized from productive farmers, we are told. President Robert Mugabe of
Zimbabwe is portrayed as a dictator bent on driving his nation into
starvation and economic disaster while benevolent U.S. and British leaders
call for democracy and human rights. These are the images presented by
Western news reports, intended to persuade the public to support an
interventionist policy. As always when the West targets a foreign leader for
removal, news reports ignore complexity and context, while the real
motivations for intervention remain hidden. Concern for democracy and human
rights is selective and it is always the nation that displays too much
independence that evokes concern, even in cases of a functioning multiparty
system and wide ranging media. On the other hand, no one calls for democracy
and human rights in oppressive nations as long as the political environment
is conducive to Western investment. Saudi Arabia, for example, holds no
elections and imposes an abusive oppression on the lives of its women. The
pattern is consistent. Any nation that embarks on a path diverging from
Western corporate interests and places the needs of its people over the
demands of Western capital finds itself the target of destabilization,
sanctions and intervention. History and context are essential for
understanding political events, and it is precisely these aspects that are
lacking in Western news reports.

*The Legacy of Colonialism and Land Reform*

     In 1888, representatives from Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa
Company induced Lobengula, king of the Ndebele people, to sign an agreement
allowing the company to mine gold. This agreement granted the company "the
complete and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals" in the region,
as well as "full power to do all things that they may deem necessary to win
and procure the same," which the company was to interpret as permission to
seize land. Unable to read the document he had signed, a dismayed King
Lobengula sent a protest letter to Queen Victoria in which he objected that
he was deliberately misled by British negotiators. "A document was written
and presented to me for signature. I asked what it contained, and was told
that in it were my words and the words of those men. I put my hand to it.
About three months afterwards I heard from other sources that I had given by
that document the right to all minerals of my country." Lobengula declared
that he would "not recognize the paper, as it contains neither my words nor
the words of those who got it." The unsympathetic response from the Queen's
Advisor to Lobengula was that it was "impossible to exclude white
men." (1)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#1>

     It soon became apparent to the British South Africa Company that little
gold was to be had and the company's outpost in Mashonaland found itself in
financial straits. Land seemed a more promising venture, and in October 1893
British troops and volunteers crossed into King Lobengula's core territory
of Matabeleland. The entire region rapidly fell into their hands as they
inflicted heavy casualties on the Ndebele. Under terms of the resulting
Victoria Agreement, each volunteer was entitled to 6,000 acres of land.
Rather than an organized division of land, there was instead a mad race to
grab the best land, and within a year 10,000 square miles of the most
fertile land had been seized from its inhabitants. White settlers
confiscated most of the Ndebele's cattle in the process, a devastating loss
to a cattle-ranching society such as the Ndebele. The large tracts of land
now run by relatively few white settlers required workers, and the Ndebele
became forced laborers on the land they once owned, essentially treated as
slaves. The Shona also saw their cattle confiscated by white settlers, and
were driven into poverty through the imposition of onerous taxes by the new
British rulers. (2) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#2> The
inevitable uprising by the dispossessed Ndebele and Shona in 1896 was
finally crushed over one year later by the British at the cost of 8,000
African lives. The region was established as a new colony in the British
realm and named Rhodesia in honor of Cecil Rhodes.

     Passage of the Native Reserves Order in 1899 created reserves on the
most arid land, on which the indigenous inhabitants were to be herded. By
1905, nearly half of the indigenous population was confined to reserves.
From 1930 onwards, Africans were not allowed to own land outside of the
barren reserves. During the twenty-year period beginning in 1935, the
Rhodesian regime forced an additional 67,000 African families from their
homes and transported them to the reserves. As the Africans were beaten and
herded into trucks at gunpoint, their homes were levelled by bulldozers. The
reserves soon became overcrowded with people and cattle, and the colonial
government decreed in 1944 that 49 of the reserves were overstocked. During
the next thirty-some years, well over one million cattle in the reserves
were either killed or confiscated for use by white settlers. As the long
liberation struggle grew, Rhodesian Security Forces became increasingly
repressive, executing civilians, burning villages and crops and shooting
cattle. (3) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#3>

     When it was clear that the apartheid Rhodesian government could not
long remain in power, the Lancaster House Conference was convened in 1979.
Land was the core issue for the liberation struggle, and British and
American negotiators ensured that independence would not be granted without
the imposition of certain conditions. One provision stipulated that for a
period of 10 years, land ownership in Zimbabwe could only be transferred on
a "willing seller, willing buyer" basis, which effectively limited the
extent of land reform. Whites were also allotted a parliamentary quota of 20
seats, far exceeding their actual percentage of the population.

     Passage of the Land Acquisition Act in 1992 finally permitted a more
flexible approach to land reform, but progress continued to be constrained
by outside pressure. Despite real progress, by the time the latest round of
land reform was launched, 70 percent of the richest and most productive land
still remained in the hands of a mere 4,500 white commercial farm owners.
Meanwhile, six million African peasants eke out a precarious existence on
small farms averaging 3 hectares [1 hectare = 2.47 acres] in the "communal
areas," formerly native reserves. Due to the historically imposed
overcrowding in the communal areas, the already barren land was further
depleted by deforestation and over-grazing.
(4)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#4>Over one
million landless blacks were engaged as hired labor on white
commercial farms, condemned to work for low wages on the land their
ancestors once owned.
(5)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#5>Agriculture is
the most significant sector of Zimbabwe's economy. Western
news reports encourage the view that land reform is harming economic
performance, implying that efficient farming is best left in the hands of
4,500 wealthy white farmers, while ignoring the millions of blacks barely
able to survive. The unspoken assumption is that only white farmers are
capable of efficiency. The concern expressed in the West for "efficiency" is
in reality a mask for the preservation of white privilege. Temporary
economic dislocation is an unavoidable byproduct of land reform, but genuine
and lasting progress can only be achieved through land redistribution. In
the West, the gross imbalance imposed by colonial theft is accepted as the
natural order in Zimbabwe, with the indigenous population lacking any claim
to the land. Fast track land reform is intended to rectify historical
injustices and to ensure a more equitable division of the land.

*When Zimbabwe had a Model Economy*

     There was a time when the management of the economy in Zimbabwe was
highly regarded in Western circles. Throughout its first decade of
independence, Zimbabwe's economy grew at an average of 4 percent per year,
and substantial gains were made in education and health. Zimbabwe was
handling its finances well, and between 1985 and 1989 had cut its
debt-service ratio in half.
(6)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#6>However, the
demise of socialism in Europe resulted in an inhospitable
environment for nations charting an independent course, and Zimbabwe felt
compelled by Western demands to liberalize its economy. In January 1991,
Zimbabwe adopted its Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), designed
primarily by the World Bank. The program called for the usual prescription
of actions advocated by Western financial institutions, including
privatization, deregulation, a reduction of government expenditures on
social needs, and deficit cutting. User fees were instituted for health and
education, and food subsidies were eliminated. Measures protecting local
industry from foreign competition were also withdrawn.

     The impact was immediate. While pleasing for Western investors, the
result was a disaster for the people of Zimbabwe. According to one study,
the poorest households in Harare saw their income drop over 12 percent in
the year from 1991 to 1992 alone, while real wages in the country plunged by
a third over the life of the program. Falling income levels forced people to
spend a greater percentage of their income on food, and second-hand clothes
were imported to compensate for the inability of most of Zimbabwe's citizens
to purchase new clothing. A 1994 survey in Harare found that 90 percent of
those interviewed felt that ESAP had adversely affected their lives. The
rise in food prices was seen as a major problem by 64 percent of
respondents, while many indicated that they were forced to reduce their food
intake. ESAP resulted in mass layoffs and crippled the job market so that
many were unable to find any employment at all. In the communal areas, the
rise in fertilizer prices meant that subsistence farmers were no longer able
to fertilize their land, resulting in lower yields. ESAP also mandated the
elimination of price controls, allowing those shop owners in communal area
who were free of competition to mark prices up dramatically. In 1995, the
IMF cut funding to the program when it felt that Zimbabwe wasn't cutting its
budget and laying off civil service employees fast enough. Furthermore, the
IMF complained, the pace of privatization wasn't rapid enough. But
implementation of ESAP was quite fast enough for the people of Zimbabwe. By
1995, over one third of Zimbabwe's citizens could not afford a basic food
basket, shelter and clothing. From 1991 to 1995, Zimbabwe experienced a
sharp deindustrialization, as manufacturing output fell 40 percent.
(7)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#7>According to an
economic writer from the ruling Zimbabwe African National
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), "There is a general consensus among the
people of Zimbabwe that ESAP has driven many families into poverty. The
program only benefited a privileged minority at the expense of the
underprivileged majority."
(8)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#8>As intended by
Western financial institutions, one could argue.

*Ditching ESAP*

     The government of Zimbabwe felt it could no longer endure this debacle,
and by the end of the 1990's, started moving away from the neoliberal
program. Finally, in October 2001, the abandonment of ESAP was officially
announced. "Enough is enough," declared President Mugabe. "ESAP is no more."
A press release issued by the governing ZANU-PF declared, "The termination
of ESAP brings to an end the era of control of our economy by the IMF and
the World Bank. While we must continue to work with these organizations on
agreed projects, they will no longer dictate the direction of policy and the
country." Price controls were implemented for basic commodities that soaring
prices had made all but unattainable for many poor Zimbabweans, including
bread, maize meal, flour, sugar, cooking oil, beef, chicken, pork, milk,
soap and generic drugs. To counter the threat of companies closing in
protest against price controls, President Mugabe announced, "The State will
take over any businesses that are closed. We will reorganize them with
workers, and at last that socialism we wanted can start again." Mugabe
dismissed claims that government should not interfere with the market as
"absolute nonsense," and stated that the nearly hourly price increases
forgoods and commodities had been unjustified.
(9) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#9> The 1997 launch of
a new phase in the land reform program, in which 1,471 farms were listed for
compulsory purchase, triggered British intervention in Zimbabwe. The
jettisoning of ESAP four years later, coupled with the statement that
sectors of the economy would be placed on a socialist path, only increased
the sense of outrage among Western leaders.

     The establishment of a new opposition party, the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC), in September 1999, found instant support from
Western leaders. Significant funding from Western sources enabled the party
to rapidly grow to the point where it won 57 out of 120 seats in the June
24-25 2000 parliamentary election, less than one year after its creation.
Ostensibly based in the labor movement, the program of MDC reads like a call
for a return to ESAP. A policy paper issued by the party spelled out its
plans for privatization. Upon taking power, the party plans to appoint a
"fund manager to dispose of government-owned shares in publicly quoted
companies." The boards of all public enterprises would be "reconstituted,"
and the new boards would be "required to privatize their enterprises within
specified timetables...with an overall target of privatizing all designated
parastatals [public companies] within two years." The interests of Western
capital would not be ignored. "In areas where a high level of technical
skill is required, foreign strategic investors will be encouraged to bid for
a majority stake in the enterprises being privatized." A primary principle
of the program would be that "all sales of major state assets will be
conducted through open, international [that is, Western], competitive
bidding." In order to counter opposition from workers made redundant, the
National Privatization and Procurement Agency would be instructed to "carry
out public awareness campaigns regarding the privatization program in order
to generate public awareness and support for the exercise." Implementation
of its program, the MDC feels, will mean "that foreign direct investment
will take place on a substantial scale." (10)
<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#10>As a further incentive
for Western investors, the MDC plans to review income and corporate
taxlevels "for regional competitiveness."
(11) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#11>

     The MDC appointed an official of the Confederation of Zimbabwe
Industries, Eddie Cross, as its Secretary of Economic Affairs. In a speech
delivered shortly after his appointment, Cross articulated the MDC economic
plan. "First of all, we believe in the free market. We do not support price
control. We do not support government interfering in the way people manage
their lives. We are in favor of reduced levels of taxation. We are going to
fast track privatization. All fifty government parastatals will be
privatized within a two-year frame, but we are going far beyond that. We are
going to privatize many of the functions of government. We are going to
privatize the Central Statistics Office. We are going to privatize virtually
the entire school delivery system. And you know, we have looked at the
numbers and we think we can get government employment down from about
300,000 at the present time to about 75,000 in five years."
(12)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#12>

     A press release issued by ZANU-PF presents a contrasting vision for
Zimbabwe. "For ZANU-PF, the central question was and still is who benefits
from the management of the economy? The answer is simple; it must be the
broad masses of our people. That is where we differ with the MDC and with
other parties. They want to benefit the employers and the capitalists.
Wesay no, no, no."
(13) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#13>

*Western Response*

     As Zimbabwe moved away from the neoliberal path dictated by Western
financial institutions, Western hostility grew. On September 24, 2001, the
IMF "declared Zimbabwe ineligible to use the general resources of the IMF,
and removed Zimbabwe from the list of countries eligible to borrow resources
under the Poverty and Growth Facility." The stated motivation for the cutoff
was that Zimbabwe had fallen $53 million in arrears on payments. Rather than
work with Zimbabwe, as the IMF had elsewhere in similar circumstances, the
IMF "urged the Zimbabwean authorities to adopt the economic and financial
policies needed to enable Zimbabwe to achieve economic recovery as soon as
possible." In other words, the IMF felt nervous at indications that ZANU-PF
was abandoning ESAP, and was demanding a return to the neoliberal agenda.
The IMF added that it "stood ready to cooperate with the authorities in
support of efforts to adopt and implement a comprehensive economic recovery
program." (14) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#14>

     Three months later, on December 14, the IMF issued a statement
regarding recent consultations with authorities in Zimbabwe. The IMF
characterized Zimbabwe's efforts to reverse the ESAP-induced economic plunge
as "deterioration," and worried that Zimbabwe's "inappropriate economic
policies" had "undermined investor confidence." During consultations in
Zimbabwe, IMF officials had advocated "significant changes in the
government's economic policies," and "underscored the importance
ofsustained structural reforms aimed at liberalizing the economy."
(15) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#15>

     IMF policy was only one component in a broad-based Western effort to
discipline Zimbabwe and force it to return to a neoliberal economic model in
which the interests of Western capital would have primacy over the needs of
its people. On December 21, 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law
S. 494, the "Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001." The law
instructed American officials in international financial institutions to
"oppose and vote against any extension by the respective institution of any
loan, credit, or guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe," and to vote
against any reduction or cancellation of "indebtedness owed by the
government of Zimbabwe." The law also authorized President Bush to fund "an
independent and free press and electronic media in Zimbabwe," referring to
media opposed to the government of Zimbabwe. Six million dollars were
granted for aid to "democracy and governance programs," a euphemism
forgroups seeking to topple the government.
(16) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#16> The bill was
sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, who had been a supporter
of Ian Smith's apartheid Rhodesia. After the bill passed the House of
Representatives by a vote of 396-11, an African diplomat in Washington
remarked, "The passing of the Bill is a triumph of right wing people who
have always been against Zimbabwe and do not understand the land issue but
would want to safeguard the imperial rights of Britain."
(17)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#17>

     Zimbabwe's path ran counter to Western efforts to integrate the
economies of sub-Saharan Africa in the interests of Western capital. The
African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), designed to primarily benefit
U.S. textile producers wanting to take advantage of cheap labor in Africa,
offered the prospect of expanded trade with African countries the President
designates as establishing "market-based economies" and "elimination of
barriers to U.S. trade and investment." At the first meeting of the AGOA
Forum on October 29, 2001, President Bush announced the "creation of a $200
million Overseas Private Investment Corporation support facility that will
give American firms access to loans, guarantees and political risk insurance
for investment projects in sub-Saharan Africa." In addition, Bush announced
the establishment of a "regional office in Johannesburg, to provide guidance
to governments and companies which seek to liberalize their trade laws" and
to "improve the investment environment" for U.S. corporations.
(18)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#18>

     In the period leading up to the March 2002 elections, Western leaders
attempted to tighten the screws on Zimbabwe, hoping to affect the outcome.
Already a sort of de facto sanctions regime was in place, in that Western
officials were actively discouraging trade with Zimbabwe, while overheated
news reports painted a picture of instability and unreliability, which also
tended to deter trade. In November 2001, British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw revealed that during the past few months he had been "building
coalitions" against Zimbabwe.
(19)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#19>

     As the Extraordinary Summit of the South African Development Community
(SADC) opened in Blantyre, Malawi on January 14, 2002, Great Britain
threatened to withhold $18 million in budgetary support from Malawi, the
chair of the SADC, unless it agreed to direct the SADC towards the
imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe. This was a significant portion of
Malawi's budget. Some sources also indicate that Great Britain held the
threat of withholding aid for Malawi's food crisis. Similar threats to
withdraw budgetary support were wielded against Mozambique.
(20)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#20>At the
summit, President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania announced that British
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Baroness Amos telephoned him directly
and urged him not to support Zimbabwe at the SADC and at the upcoming
meeting of the Commonwealth. When that call failed, British Foreign
Secretary Jack Straw then telephoned and attempted to bully him.
(21)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#21>

     Emotions were running high in Zimbabwe itself, as the fate of the
nation rested on the outcome of the election. Supporters of both ZANU-PF and
the MDC engaged in violent acts against each other, including a few cases of
murder. (22) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#22>Complaints
from both Zimbabwe and the SADC concerning hostile Western
intervention in the political process in Zimbabwe were sent to the European
Union. Under Article 98 of the Cotonou Agreement, disputes between the
European Union and African Pacific Caribbean (ACP) countries must be taken
to the joint EU-ACP Council of Ministers for resolution or arbitration
proceedings. Zimbabwe's invocation of Article 98 was simply ignored by the
European Union, prompting President Bakili Muluzi of Malawi to write to the
EU on behalf of the SADC. Muluzi complained that Zimbabwe's "legitimate
concerns had received neither a response nor an acknowledgment from the EU,"
and that the EU had instead threatened to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe.
(23) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#23> Zimbabwe remained
steadfast and President Mugabe declared, "We will resist the sanctions. We
cannot bow to them. I know Tony Blair and the British are waging war against
me and my government. I will fight against their colonialistic attitude
without giving up."
(24)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#24>Mugabe's firm
resolve disappointed British officials, who hoped to make him
grovel, and on February 18, 2002, the European Union's foreign ministers
voted unanimously to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe. Under terms of the
sanctions, The European Union suspended budgetary support to Zimbabwe and
terminated "financial support for all projects" except "those in direct
support of the population." All financial aid would be "reoriented in
support of the population, in particular in the social sectors,
democratization, respect for human rights and the rule of law," by which the
EU meant that financial support would be funnelled to groups seeking
tooverthrow the government of Zimbabwe.
(25) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#25> Additionally, a
visa ban was imposed on 20 Zimbabwean government officials and their
spouses, forbidding travel within the European Union, and overseas assets
held by the targeted officials were frozen.
(26)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#26>Zimbabwe
Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, among those listed in the EU's
sanctions, sharply criticized the EU. "It is very clear that what we are now
dealing with is organized economic terrorism whose aim is clear and is to
unseat a legitimately elected government which has decided to defend
itsnational independence and national sovereignty."
(27) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#27>

     Four days after the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe the United States
followed suit, expanding the list of targeted individuals to include not
only Zimbabwean government officials, but prominent businessmen as well. The
Bush Administration even added church leaders to the sanctions list,
including Anglican Bishop Nolbert Kunonga, who had merely praised President
Mugabe. (28) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#28>

     Despite intense pressure from Great Britain, African leaders at the
March 2002 Commonwealth meeting rejected the demand for sanctions against
Zimbabwe. President Mkapa of Tanzania revealed that members of the
Commonwealth had endured a "bombardment for an alliance against Mugabe."
(29) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#29> British Prime
Minister Tony Blair petulantly insisted, "There can be no question of Mugabe
being allowed to stay in power with a rigged election," considering any
result other than a win by the MDC as "rigged." In response to the British
propensity for constantly lecturing its former colony on "democracy,"
President Mugabe pointed out, "There is no one who can teach us about
elections. There is no one who can teach us about democracy and human
rights. There was no democracy here, no human rights at all until the people
of Zimbabwe decided to fight."
(30)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#30>

     After the polls closed at the end of the March 9-10, 2002 election in
Zimbabwe, there were still people in Harare who had not yet voted, so voting
was extended for a third day to accommodate them. The MDC's base of support
is largely urban and ZANU-PF's rural, thus the extension of the voting
period benefited the MDC. Although the election law was bent in favor of the
urban vote, President Mugabe won the presidential election by a convincing
margin of over 400,000 votes. Predictably, Western leaders cried "foul,"
outraged that the millions they had poured into the MDC's campaign failed to
pay off. While President Bush was saying, "We do not recognize the outcome
of the election," the South African Observer Team, which monitored the
election, concluded that the "elections should be considered legitimate."
Namibia announced that its observers judged the election "watertight,
without room for rigging," while Nigerian observers claimed that they had
not witnessed anything that would affect the integrity of the vote.
Similarly, an observer from the Organization for African Unity characterized
the election as "transparent, credible, free and fair." The first-hand
reports by observers were simply dismissed out of hand, as U.S. and British
officials loudly accused President Mugabe of fraud, motivated by their
desire to use the accusation as ammunition on their continuing campaign
against Zimbabwe. (31)
<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#31>Great Britain
wasted no time in acting. A three-member panel representing
Australia, Nigeria and South Africa decided to suspend Zimbabwe from the
Commonwealth for a period of one year. The vote came as a startling
surprise, given the assessment of the South African Observer Team. Behind
the scenes, Tony Blair had subjected South African President Thabo Mbeki to
intense pressure, threatening to kill plans for the New Partnership for
African Development (NEPAD) if Mbeki did not vote as instructed. Mbeki
harbored great hopes that NEPAD would become the engine of African
development, and could not bear to see his dream shattered. Tony Blair,
aware of his sentiments, extorted Mbeki's compliance, telling him that NEPAD
would be "dead in the water," unless he voted against Zimbabwe.
(32)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#32>

     If British diplomatic behavior appeared overweening, it was not
unconsciously so. Shortly after Tony Blair's hijacking of the March
Commonwealth meeting, an essay was published by his foreign affairs advisor,
Robert Cooper, calling for a new imperialism. "The challenge of the
postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards," wrote
Cooper. "Among ourselves," by which he meant the West, "we operate on the
basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more
old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we
need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era -- force, preemptive
attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live
in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves,
we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use
the laws of the jungle." Rather than charting a new course, Cooper's bluntly
stated paper merely provided the ideological underpinning for Western policy
as it is actually practiced. The citizens of Iraq, Yugoslavia, Cuba,
Zimbabwe and others who attempted to defend their sovereignty against the
imperial onslaught would no doubt feel that it is Cooper who is living in
the nineteenth century. "[T]he opportunities, perhaps even the need for
colonization is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century," suggests
Cooper. "What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to
a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values." Only the haughtiest
imperial mind could claim "human rights and cosmopolitan values" only for
the West and "force, preemptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary"
for subject peoples in the Third World and Eastern Europe.
(33)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#33>

     Reports from Zimbabwe claim that the British government was involved in
planning a mass action to force President Mugabe from office, following the
scenario that was implemented against former Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic. The British High Commissioner to Zimbabwe, Brian Donnelly, was
said to be instrumental in formulating the plan, and it should be noted that
he had been the ambassador to Yugoslavia for two years and undoubtedly
played a role in Western covert operations there.
(34)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#34>It is highly
probable that he was selected to the position in Zimbabwe
entirely because of the experience he gained in undermining the Yugoslav
government. Local security forces uncovered attempts by members of the MDC
to smuggle weapons into Zimbabwe at three border crossings in preparation
for a plan to stage incidents. Communications with an armed MDC group
calling itself Mumvuri waDavid Coltart were intercepted by government
security forces and revealed that the group was planning to murder MDC
officials and members of the MDC youth organization in order to create
disorder and affix blame on the ruling ZANU-PF. Other armed MDC groups were
believed to be planning to assassinate ZANU-PF district leaders. White
activists close to large landowners and former members of the Rhodesian
security forces were said to be tasked with coordinating the murders, and
they were supplied with mobile communication stations by the British. (35)
<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#35>The plans never came to
fruition, though, as the MDC was forced to back down in the face of a show
of force by the police and National Guard.

     There is always more than one arrow in the Western quiver, and when the
mass uprising failed to materialize, moves were made to exert increased
economic pressure and to broaden sanctions against Zimbabwe. On June 13,
2002, the IMF issued a declaration of non-cooperation and announced that it
was suspending "the provision of technical assistance" to Zimbabwe and
"urged the Zimbabwean authorities to adopt an economic adjustment program."
Once again, the IMF was urging Zimbabwe to revive ESAP. As usual, the IMF
was all too eager to offer "to assist the authorities in designing
thenecessary policy measures."
(36) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#36> The following
month, the European Union announced that it was adding the names of a
further 52 Zimbabwean officials who would be banned from travel in the EU,
and whose assets abroad would be frozen, or in effect, seized. The wanton
nature of the list can be gauged by its inclusion of such persons as the
Health and Child Welfare Minister; the Education, Sports and Culture
Minister; the Secretary for Gender and Culture; the Deputy-Secretary for
Disabled and Disadvantaged; and others who had little if any influence
oneconomic policy in Zimbabwe.
(37) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#37>

     Meanwhile, de facto sanctions continued to press Zimbabwe, as foreign
trade continued to slump. Rapidly dwindling foreign currency reserves
severely restricted the import of fuel, causing manufacturing and mining
operations to go into a tailspin.
(38)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#38>Zimbabwe,
which has no natural gas or oil reserves, must rely entirely on
imported fuel supplies, leaving it vulnerable to economic pressure. At the
end of June 2002, the black-market exchange rate for the Zimbabwe dollar
went into free fall.
(39)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#39>Zimbabwe
Financial Holdings Limited, a commercial bank, reported that the
nation's entire foreign currency supply was sufficient to cover only three
days of imports, and that "shortages have worsened in the past few weeks."
The IMF's declaration of non-cooperation was expected to discourage lending
by other financial institutions, resulting in a further squeezing of
Zimbabwe's economy.
(40)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#40>Due to the
evaporation of foreign trade and the denial of credit,
unemployment in Zimbabwe has soared to 70 percent while three fourths of the
population is classified as poor. Finance Minister Simba Makoni reports that
since 2000, one third of the jobs in Zimbabwe have vanished. "Workers are
living from hand to mouth," says Lucia Matibenga, vice president of the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. "Business people are struggling in a
collapsing economy and employees can't survive with the current high
prices." (41) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#41>

     By the end of June, there was a wave of panicked withdrawals from
foreign currency accounts at banks, further depleting reserves.
(42)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#42>In an effort
to raise foreign currency for the purchase of food to feed its
people, Zimbabwe was compelled to seek money in the black market, which
exacerbated its economic difficulties. A Zimbabwean economic analyst pointed
out, "The recent decline of the Zimbabwean dollar and the massive escalation
of the black market has been necessitated by the government which is
sourcing forex (foreign exchange) on the black market. It has sourced over
US$55 million for the Grain Marketing Board to import maize over the last
three weeks." (43) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#43>

     On July 30, 2002, Daniel Maviva, management services officer at the
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, reported that sanctions had caused
the firm to lose $18 million. The elimination of foreign funding by the
World Bank, the European Investment Bank and other institutions had dealt a
crippling blow, forcing the firm to use its "own resources due to the
withdrawal of those financiers under targeted sanctions."
(44)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#44>As sanctions
continue to tighten the noose around Zimbabwe, electrical power
blackouts may become a frequent occurrence.

*A Plague of NGOs*

     British and American foreign policy has increasingly come to rely on
the use of proxy organizations to carry out specific tasks involved in
destabilizing other nations. The use of Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) was a very effective tool in the campaign to overthrow the government
of Yugoslavia, and much is expected from NGO operations in Zimbabwe.
Although NGOs may appear to be independent organizations operating outside
of government, many receive the bulk of their funding from Western
governments, shape their policy in consultation with Western officials, and
act in every way to further Western interests. As they work to undermine and
destabilize nations and to further Western corporate interests, they cover
their hostile actions with nice-sounding phrases such as "human rights" and
"civil society." It is a perfect arrangement. For U.S. and British leaders,
it allows them to engage in illegal and hostile actions against another
nation while assuming a pose of innocence. Zimbabwe is cursed with a plague
of NGOs, all operating with the self-righteous sense of mission that they
have the right to meddle in the affairs of a Third World nation and with the
colonial attitude that they should dictate how others are to think and live.


     One of the more active NGOs in Zimbabwe is the Westminster Foundation
for Democracy (WFD), which defines its purpose as providing "assistance in
building and strengthening pluralist democratic institutions overseas." As
always, terms such as "pluralist" and "democratic" actually signify parties
and organizations that are willing to take orders from Western leaders and
give primacy to Western corporate interests. The Westminster Foundation
currently receives around $6 million from the British government, and is
also tasked with "selected extra-budgetary technical assistance projects,"
so the true scale of government funding is much higher. The WFD may be the
most perfect example of an NGO that is a government operation in every way
except name. Sitting on its Board of Governors are representatives from each
of the three major British political parties, along with representatives of
business and other sectors of the society. Staffed and funded by the British
government, it is no surprise that its policy happens to coincide with that
of the British government. WFD has been involved in over 80 projects aiding
the MDC, and helped plan election strategy. It also provides funding
to theparty's youth and women's groups.
(45) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#45> The Foundation
considers "the development of political parties as one of the key areas for
our support and assistance,"
(46)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#46>and in 2000
it provided the MDC with $10 million.
(47)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#47>No figures
are available since then, but the flow of money has continued
unabated, and some ZANU-PF officials indicate that the MDC had received at
least $30 million by the beginning of 2002.
(48)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#48>According to
analysts, the majority of
the MDC's funding originates from abroad.
(49)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#49>Passage of
the Political Parties (Finance) Act in Zimbabwe in 2001 made it
illegal for political parties to receive financing from abroad, thus
requiring the MDC to be more circumspect about the extent of its financial
support from Western sources. The need for such legislation was urgent, as
the influx of Western money was grossly distorting the political process.
The effect, however, was merely to drive such contributions into the
shadows.

     The Westminster Foundation works closely with the major British
political parties to assist in efforts to "strengthen individual political
parties or movements with which they have a political affinity," and also
provides training and consultation to parties such as the MDC. In all, the
WFD spends fifty percent of its "project budget towards work which assists
individual parties abroad," and the money is channelled through British
political parties who then see to it that it ends up in the hands of its
intended recipients. Propaganda is an important aspect of any
destabilization campaign, and the WFD gives "direct support for media
organizations" abroad. This support can include funding "production costs
including equipment, training, expansion of circulation, radio and TV
coverage," as well as a range of other activities.
(50)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#50>The Foreign
Minister of Zimbabwe, Stan Mudenge, claims to have "documentary
evidence" that the WFD not only bankrolls the MDC, but also opposition media
as well. (51) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#51> British
and American leaders would never countenance a foreign power attempting to
buy their elections or funding hostile media within their countries, yet
they arrogate to themselves the right to engage in such activities against
others.

     Another so-called NGO active in Zimbabwe is the Zimbabwe Democracy
Trust (ZDT), which claims to "advance the cause of freedom and democracy."
Sponsored by prominent Western politicians and businessmen, the ZDT hopes
that with a change in government, Zimbabwe will become "a magnet for
investment." Western investment, of course. The patrons of the ZDT include
former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, architect of the
"Constructive Engagement" policy with apartheid South Africa during the
1980s. (52) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#52> Crocker
has very specific financial interests in seeing Zimbabwe move to a more
business-friendly environment, occupying a seat on the board of directors of
the Ashanti Goldfields Company. Ashanti Goldfields owns seven producing gold
mines located in four African countries, including Zimbabwe. The company
brags that it is "managed predominantly by Africans," yet 9 of its 13 board
members are either American or British.
(53)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#53>Three former
British foreign secretaries are listed as patrons of the
Zimbabwe Democracy Trust: Sir Malcom Rifkind, Lord Douglas Hurd and Lord
Geoffrey Howe. (54)
<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#54>The primary mover
in the organization is reputed to be Sir John Collins, the
Zimbabwean chairman of National Power, the largest British energy company
which happens to have sizable investments in Zimbabwe. Rifkind is involved
with an Australian company which owns a mine in Zimbabwe. Political analyst
John Makumbe, a supporter of the MDC, admits, "It is largely white
Rhodesians who are backing the trust."
(55)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#55>To put it
plainly, the ZDT receives much of its support from former
officials and supporters of Ian Smith's apartheid Rhodesia.

     The Southern African Media Development Fund (SAMDEF) focuses its
attention on supporting "independent private media enterprises." In
Zimbabwe, SAMDEF directs its aid, predictably enough, to opposition media.
Among its projects was issuing a loan to the publisher of the opposition
Mirror. The loan was "primarily aimed at making the newspaper competitive
and improving its market share." When financial difficulties brought
Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe, publishers of the major opposition
newspaper Daily News, to the point of bankruptcy, SAMDEF stepped in and
loaned the publishers $526,000, enabling it to stay afloat. The publisher
proved recalcitrant in repaying its loan, however, and this failure was only
recently resolved in court. It remains to be seen whether the loan will
ultimately be repaid or turn out to be a gift.
(56)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#56>The total
budget of SAMDEF's financial assistance fund stands at almost $3
million, but is expected to expand by $2 million per year over the next
three years. (57)
<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#57>SAMDEF lists
among its partner organizations other NGOs working in Zimbabwe,
such as the Media Development Loan Fund, which assists "independent news
organizations working in difficult economic and political climates," and the
U.S. Agency for International Development. SAMDEF is owned by another NGO,
the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA). An umbrella organization
claiming 100 members, MISA's mission is to promote and support regional
media friendly to Western interests. A significant portion of its funding is
provided by the U.S. Government through the U.S. Agency for International
Development. (58) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#58>

     Closely involved in SAMDEF's operations in Zimbabwe is the
Communication Assistance Foundation (CAF), which openly admits giving
"financial support" to "independent media initiatives" and "media
organizations." (59)
<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#59>CAF also
participates in Zimbabwe Watch, a consortium of several NGOs from
the Netherlands seeking to "influence policies," and "coordinate efforts to
support Zimbabwean Civil Society," once again that widely used euphemism for
organizations seeking to topple President Mugabe. A primary objective of
Zimbabwe Watch is to "influence governments and government networks" such as
the European Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations "to put pressure
on the Zimbabwean government to hold free and fair elections," a term that
is understood by NGOs as any election the opposition wins. "Political and
economic sanctions could be useful means" of applying pressure, Zimbabwe
Watch helpfully suggests.
(60)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#60>

     Yet another of the myriad NGOs executing Western policy in Zimbabwe is
International Media Support (IMS), funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The intent of IMS is to be an "action-oriented" organization
providing "technical and practical assistance" to media as well as working
to build "diplomatic pressure at the political level."
(61)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#61>It is rather
commonplace for an NGO to not only engage in practical mayhem
but to also devote considerable time and resources urging more extreme
measures from Western governments. Among its recent "interventions," IMS
lists Zimbabwe. (62) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#62>

     The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) bankrolls sixteen
"civil society organizations" in Zimbabwe, with emphasis on supporting MDC's
parliamentary activities.
(63)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#63>One of the
departments of USAID, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI),
was said to be funding a new short-wave radio station recently established
in Great Britain, SW Radio Africa, to the tune of millions of dollars.
According to diplomatic sources, SW Radio Africa utilizes the studios,
transmitters and frequencies of "a global communications provider." The
operating expenses for SW Radio Africa are covered by OTI. While the
specific station hosting SW Radio Africa has not been identified, it is
either Voice of America, with transmitters located throughout southern and
central Africa, or the BBC, with a transmitter located in South Africa.
According to Radio Netherlands, BBC Radio 4 recently rebroadcast a program
that had originally appeared on SW Radio Africa, "suggesting that there is
some contact between them at [the] editorial level."
(64)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#64>OTI gained
experience in destabilizing nations through its involvement with
covert operations in Yugoslavia, funding the printing of over four million
newspaper and magazines, as well as supporting opposition radio and
television. (65)
<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#65>Zimbabwe's
Minister of Information Jonathan Moyo reacted sharply to the
inflammatory tone of the illegal broadcasts by SW Radio Africa, accusing
Western nations of "fanning tribal divisions and ethnic hatred among
Zimbabweans," in order to render Zimbabwe ungovernable.
(66)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#66>

*Drought, Famine, and Food Aid*

     From January through April 2002, Zimbabwe experienced its worst drought
in 20 years. The drought affects several countries in southern Africa, and
the UN World Food Program (WFP) estimates that 12.8 million people may
require urgent food aid in order to avert the threat of famine. Jean-Jacques
Graisse, Deputy Executive Director of the WFP says, "We see this as a crisis
of enormous proportions. The situation worsens with each day." Western news
reports focus their gaze on Zimbabwe, attributing the drop in agricultural
output primarily to disruption caused by land redistribution. While it is a
normal pattern for land reform to cause some temporary dislocation, clearly
drought is the major factor in the decline of agricultural output. All of
the other countries the WFP identified as being at risk have seen their
crops suffer, none of which are undergoing land reform, while the crisis is
thought to be worst in Malawi.
(67)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#67>

     In Malawi, Western demands forced that nation to dispose of its grain
reserves in order to conform to the neoliberal economic model. The IMF then
halted new loans and the United States and Great Britain severed aid in
response to questions over the accounting of the sale of the grain reserves.
Left without grain reserves, Malawi had nothing to fall back on when the
drought deepened. Western officials also pressured Malawi to eliminate food
subsidies, again according to neoliberal prescription, and the subsequent
escalation in prices meant that maize very rapidly reached the point of
unaffordability for most people. February 2002 saw the first reports of
people dying of starvation in Malawi. The WFP concludes that the elimination
of the grain reserve and "the dramatic price increases played a critical
role in the humanitarian crisis last year." Malawi was in a food crisis even
before the onset of the drought, and the situation has since become far more
troubling. (68) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#68>

     Severe weather in Lesotho has affected crop output for two years in a
row, and cereal production for 2002 is calculated at 33 percent less than
the already reduced output of the previous year. Crop production is
declining, reports the WFP, "and could cease altogether over large tracts of
the country." The total area planted is only sixty percent compared to
normal. Here too, escalating food prices have driven more and more people
into poverty. (69)
<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#69>Similarly, in
Swaziland, agricultural output has declined by a startling 60
percent and half of the farmers will have nothing to harvest. In Zambia, the
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports, "People are turning to
desperate measures including eating potentially poisonous wild foods,
stealing crops and prostitution to get enough for their families to eat."
(70) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#70>

     It is estimated that cereal production in Zimbabwe will drop by 57
percent, while output of maize, the primary staple in the diet of
Zimbabweans, could drop by as much as two thirds. The overall agricultural
sector is expected to contract by nearly 25 percent. A mission from the WFP
and FAO determined that the "major cause of collapse of the 2002 main
season" has been "a severe prolonged drought between January and March,
which wiped out crops in most parts of the country. Land reform activities
contributed to the steep fall in production."
(71)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#71>It should
also be pointed out that severe fuel shortages have also limited
agricultural production, and that international sanctions are responsible
for Zimbabwe's lack of foreign currency to import sufficient quantities of
fuel. The extent of the net effect of land reform has been exaggerated in
Western reports, which operate on the premise that only white commercial
farmers are producing a meaningful supply of food. In actuality, black
small-scale farmers account for 70 percent of Zimbabwe's production of
maize, while the main crop grown by the large white commercial farms is
tobacco. (72) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#72>

     Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (Agritex), which performs
crop forecasting in Zimbabwe, reported in March 2002 the "early planted
crop" of maize "to be a complete write-off, with the late crop at temporary
to wilting point in Kwekwe." "Complete" means both on black farms and on
white; both on farms listed for redistribution and those that are not.
Agritex also noted that the maize crop in Umguza, Tsholotsho and Bubi
districts was a complete failure, while in Masvingo and Manicaland provinces
the crop was a near total failure. "Lack of sufficient moisture during the
critical flowering and grain-filling stages is the cause of the poor crop
condition," the report said. It wasn't only drought that was causing
problems. Termites and grasshoppers destroyed crops in Gokwe and Matabeland
South, while elephants ruined maize crops in Binga. Another survey in
Manicaland province concluded that most crops were a complete write-off, and
that very little remained to be harvested. Conditions were so dry, one
farmer claimed, that one "can light a match and it will take a few minutes
to burn the whole field."
(73)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#73>Adverse
weather conditions affected both white commercial and black
small-scale farmers, although the situation was more dire in the always arid
communal regions where most black-owned farms operate. The situation does
not seem noticeably better in surrounding countries. "There was no land grab
in either Malawi or Zambia," points out a Zimbabwean diplomat, "yet their
people suffer the consequences of the drought and famine threatens their
neighbors as well." (74)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#74>

     Projections indicate that Zimbabwe will need to import up to
1.2million tons of grain through May 2003. At current import prices,
this would
cost $165 million. The WFP's aid program to Zimbabwe has set a target of
half that amount, but so far has managed to raise only about a third of its
goal. (75) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#75> Although
the government of Zimbabwe has been importing maize to compensate for the
crop deficit, its ability to meet the demand is constrained by its depleted
foreign currency reserves. International sanctions also prevent the country
from obtaining loans to cover the import of food. To partially ease the
pressure, half of the funds the government had set aside for reviving closed
companies were shifted to the purchase of food. It was announced that
additional funds would be transferred from other programs to help meet the
demand for food. "We had to take such an action because of the need to feed
the nation in the wake of the drought," a government finance official
announced. "We cannot leave people to die."
(76)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#76>

     In August 2002, The European Union said it would be providing Zimbabwe
with about $34 million in aid, while blaming the political situation in
Zimbabwe for the food crisis. Great Britain had earlier announced a $33
million program of aid, and the United States $33 million. However, much of
the American aid intended for Zimbabwe was instead sent to other countries
due to a dispute with Zimbabwe over genetically modified (GM) maize.
(77)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#77>Zimbabwe
balked at accepting a shipment of 10,500 tons of gene-modified
maize because of fears that it would ruin Zimbabwe's beef exports to the
European Union. Joseph Made, Minister of Lands and Agriculture, pointed out
that there was concern that some farmers might use the imported grain as
seed rather than for consumption. "This could have created many problems for
us. Biotech maize, if eaten by livestock, would have jeopardized future
Zimbabwe's beef exports to Europe." The European Union currently bans the
import of GM food. There were also concerns that the spread of GM strains of
maize would result in Zimbabwe losing its certification to export hybrid
maize throughout Africa. Portrayed in Western reports as an act of arbitrary
childishness, Zimbabwe's reluctance to accept GM maize was based on real
concerns over its potentially adverse effect on exports. Zambia also
rejected shipments of GM maize, refusing to distribute the maize that had
already been imported from the U.S. American officials applied heavy
pressure on southern African states to accept GM maize, for this was an
opportunity to help U.S. corporations start to break down barriers to the
export of GM food in general. Zimbabwe insisted that it mill the maize
before distribution, precluding the possibility that farmers planting the
grain would spread GM strains throughout Zimbabwe. The U.S. and the UN,
however, refused to allow the government of Zimbabwe to be involved in the
distribution of the grain. In the end, a compromise was reached in which the
U.S. and UN agreed to allow Zimbabwe to accept the maize on the condition
that the government provide the UN an equivalent amount of maize from its
stocks which the UN would then pass to NGOs for distribution.
(78)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#78>For Western
officials, it was important to prevent the government of
Zimbabwe from distributing food, and to ensure that NGOs active in trying to
overthrow the government appear to be responsible for providing food to the
hungry. Food aid from the West was motivated more from its utility as
another weapon in the effort to overthrow the government of Zimbabwe than it
was by a concern for human suffering.

     Meanwhile, Western officials were playing other political games with
food aid. During meetings with United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
coordinator Victor Angelo in New York in May 2002, U.S. and European Union
representatives claimed that the food crisis in Zimbabwe was "two-thirds a
result of wrong economic policies." Angelo was attempting to organize an aid
package of $80 million from Western governments and aid agencies, but the
donors told him that unless Zimbabwe agreed to devalue its currency, "no
significant food aid will be given to Zimbabwe." Other demands Western
officials placed included the abandonment of the current land reform
program. Without the protection of "property rights," they indicated,
foreign investment in Zimbabwe was unlikely. One European diplomat revealed,
"We told the UNDP to first convey our concerns to the Zimbabwe authorities.
Food aid can come but there have to be associate measures that must be taken
that would ensure that there will not be a repeat of this same
situation weare dealing with now."
(79) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#79> When the IMF and
World Bank announced in August 2002 that they would be reviewing current
assistance to drought-stricken countries in southern Africa to plan
expanding financial arrangements to help fill the gap with donor assistance,
they pointedly excluded Zimbabwe.
(80)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#80>

     The state-owned Grain Marketing Board has sole responsibility for the
purchase and sale of strategic commodities in Zimbabwe, including maize and
wheat. Commercial farmers hope to break the monopoly on the distribution of
key commodities in order to capitalize on scarcities and realize high
returns. When some permits were illegally issued to private firms to
purchase grains, commercial farmers who had earlier told the Grain Marketing
Board that they had nothing for sale were offering to sell to private firms.
Many farmers refused to sell to the Board, leaving it with dwindling stocks,
while private firms drove up the prices, causing hardship for ordinary
citizens. When the government finally cancelled all illegal private permits,
it sought to recover the lost stocks. Over 16,000 tons of maize was
impounded in initial efforts, and it is thought that this is a small
proportion of the total grain that found its way outside of official
distribution channels.
(81)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#81>Prior to the
issuance of permits to private firms, many commercial farmers
were hoarding food, refusing to sell to the Board in hopes of realizing
greater profits elsewhere. At the end of a six-week period in January 2002,
during which the Grain Marketing Board impounded 36,000 tons of hoarded
maize, Minister of Lands and Agriculture Joseph Made declared, "We cannot
have a situation where people are starving while others are withholding
maize." (82) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#82>

     In August 2002, American officials proposed setting up a $85 million
fund which would allow private firms in Zimbabwe lacking foreign currency to
obtain and sell Western food aid. Western officials are withholding food aid
to Zimbabwe until it relents and allows private firms to purchase and
speculate in strategic food commodities. One aid official said his agency
was waiting for Zimbabwe to agree to "allow private sector players a bigger
role in importing food." Zimbabwean officials reject this demand, arguing
that in a time of scarcity, private speculation in food would drive the
price of food beyond the reach of most people. The United Nations
Development Fund has also joined Western officials in attempting to force
Zimbabwe into permitting the establishment of the fund. Western officials
are also insisting that private firms be allowed to purchase strategic food
commodities whether or not they participate in the proposed fund.
(83)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#83>By halting
food shipments, the West was using food as a weapon to pry open a
key state-owned sector of Zimbabwe's economy and coercively ensure its
privatization. Throughout the food crisis in Zimbabwe, the U.S. has
maintained its focus on what it feels matters most: privatization and an
economic environment in Zimbabwe friendly to Western investors. Where others
might see hunger and poverty, U.S. leaders see dollar signs. A U.S.
government analysis of the economy of Zimbabwe complains, "Privatization of
state-owned companies, liberalization of foreign exchange policies, removal
of price controls from food staples and energy are areas where progress has
been sub-optimal. The local ownership requirement and the large areas of the
economy where foreign investment is not allowed are other hindrances to
business establishment and free cross-border capital and equity flows." Note
the desire for the removal of price controls, which would result in greater
numbers of starving people. Profits always come first. At the time of the
1980 revolution in Zimbabwe, 70 to 80 percent of the corporate sector was
foreign-owned. Today, Zimbabwe's efforts to shift the economy towards the
interests of its people has reduced this to about 30 percent. According to
this same U.S. government economic analysis, "The vast majority of foreign
investment predates independence and is held by British and South African
interests." The central goal of U.S. and British policy is to return
Zimbabwe's economy to those fondly recalled days of apartheid Rhodesia, when
there were no impediments to Western investment.
(84)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#84>

*The Struggle Over Land Reform*

     Since the triumph of the 1980 revolution in Zimbabwe the promise of
land reform has gone largely unfulfilled. For ten years the nation was
saddled with constitutional restrictions imposed by British negotiators.
Nevertheless, during the 1980s three million hectares were redistributed to
about 70,000 families. This was followed immediately by the adoption of ESAP
at the urging of the West. Little could be done in the context of the
neoliberal agenda to rectify the inequity of the land ownership pattern
inherited from the apartheid Ian Smith regime. Investment was offered
primarily to white owners of large commercial farms, while the structure of
land ownership changed little. Under terms of the Lancaster House Agreement,
Great Britain was obligated to provide certain levels of funding to support
land redistribution. By 1996, when Great Britain ceased payments, it had
only contributed slightly more than half the promised funds. The $45 million
contributed by Great Britain paled in contrast to the billions it
expropriated from the people and land throughout the colonial period. By
emphasizing that land be held in so-called "capable" hands, British
officials encouraged the continued dominance of the agricultural sector by
white commercial farmers. In 1997, Zimbabwe finally abandoned the "willing
buyer, willing seller" formula which handcuffed efforts at progress,
particularly given Great Britain's parsimonious attitude.

     By 1998, growing frustration and resentment over the slow pace of land
reform induced rural workers, impoverished by ESAP, to take matters in their
own hands and occupy land on several large white-owned farms. In many areas,
local officials gave their support to these actions. Land occupations, while
variable and small in scale compared to the massive land expropriation of
blacks under colonial rule, served to put land reform at the political
center stage in Zimbabwe. According to one study, "land invasions is the
generic term used to denote a negative view of politically organized
'trespass' of farms led by war veterans. Invasions involve temporary visits
of a few days and sporadic repeat visits. They do not entail the extended
stays." The number of farms experiencing occupations peaked at around 800 in
2000, falling to around 300 the following year. A total of approximately 300
occupations over the years were marred by violence, often the acts of
opportunistic criminals engaged in extortion. Several case studies conclude
that where grievances existed against specific landowners, their farms
tended to be marked for occupation. Landowners who had mistreated workers,
paid excessively low wages or exhibited racism were much more likely to
experience occupation of sections of their farms. To a certain extent, the
recent acceleration in the pace of land reform is a response to the pressure
exerted from pent-up anger by the landless. "Past studies had all predicted
that inadequate land delivery would precipitate violent confrontations,"
points out a Zimbabwean economist. "There has been an instrumentalization of
violence although the scale of it has been exaggerated and it has been
wrongly made the focus of the whole land reform issue. In fact, compared to
rural and urban violence in South Africa, Ireland or Brazil, the level
inZimbabwe has been quite low."
(85) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#85>

     A total of around 2,900 white-owned commercial farms were earmarked for
redistribution in the latest round of land reform. Owners of listed farms
were notified to stop farming within 45 days, and given an additional 45
days to move from their farms. Land subject to acquisition comprised the
following categories: unused land, underutilized land, land owned by
absentee owners, land owned by a person possessing multiple farms, land
exceeding size limits (varying by region), and land contiguous with communal
lands. Owners of farms marked for redistribution will be compensated for
improvements made on the land, but not for the land itself, as this land was
stolen from its original owners in the colonial era.
(86)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#86>The
government of Zimbabwe has repeatedly stated that those landowners
whose
only farm is being taken will be given another farm of suitable quality.
"All genuine and well meaning white farmers who wish to pursue a farming
career as loyal citizens of this country will have land to do so,"
reiterated President Mugabe recently.
(87)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#87>

     Western reports repeatedly charge that land reform is an exercise in
rewarding President Mugabe's "friends and cronies." With over 125,000
families settled through February 2001 and an additional 100,000-some
expected to receive land in the current phase of land reform, one can only
conclude that President Mugabe is an extraordinarily popular man to have so
many friends and close colleagues. Nor do Western reports have an
explanation for why many of those receiving land are members of the
opposition MDC. Another oft-repeated myth is that land reform spells ruin
for the agricultural sector. Aside from the temporary dislocation caused by
land reform, Western reports assert that the break up of commercial farms
will lead to a loss of production, subtly, or in some cases not so subtly,
implying that black farmers are ignorant and incapable of knowing how to
farm efficiently. Aside from anecdotal stories about withering crops without
mentioning drought conditions, little evidence is offered.

     One of the popular assertions in Western reports is that land reform is
the cause of the drop in maize production, without pointing out 70 percent
of Zimbabwe's maize crop is grown by small-scale black farmers. While it is
reported that commercial farmland devoted to growing maize has declined due
to land reform, what is never mentioned is that the overall level has *
grown.* According to the WFP, "The area planted to cereals actually
increased by 9 percent over last year, with maize increasing by 14 percent,
mainly due to expansion in the communal and resettled areas." This is a far
cry from the arrogant picture we are usually offered of inept black farmers
not knowing what they are doing, and either botching the process of farming,
or simply sitting idle and confused on empty land.
(88)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#88>

     It is difficult to separate the effect of drought from that of land
reform in determining the overall impact of the process on agricultural
production, but it appears that the effect has been deliberately exaggerated
and losses due to drought are routinely attributed to land reform by Western
reporters. A report by the FAO concludes, "Yields on commercial farms are on
average four times higher than on communal farms, in part due to inherent
differences in land quality, but mainly because of facilities for
supplementary irrigation, greater use of improved technology and management
practices, as well as better access to working capital." None of these
factors need necessarily be denied to resettled farmers.
(89)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#89>

     Although Western reports persist in viewing land reform primarily
through the prism of its immediate effect on production, understanding the
process can only be achieved through judging its long-term results. The
widespread economic benefit for recipients of land must also be considered.
One study determined that "land reform can generate a sustainable income
flow for the beneficiaries, in year 15 reaching 570-690 percent of their
incomes before the project." The same study also examined the effect of land
reform on production and employment, and concluded that "production achieved
by the resettled farmers after 15 years would be significant." Since
small-scale farming is more labor intensive than on commercial farms, land
reform should also result in a net increase in employment.
(90)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#90>Increasing
wealth throughout a broader spectrum of the population should act
as a spur to what has been sluggish growth in Zimbabwe.

     A report issued by four economists, including two employed by the World
Bank, states, "Economic theory is very clear on the fact that a one-time
redistribution of assets can, in an environment of imperfect markets, be
associated with permanently higher levels of growth." Conversely,
"inequality in the distribution of land ownership is associated with lower
subsequent growth." A survey of resettlement households covering the years
from 1983 determined that "the income of resettled households is more than
five times as high as that of communal households in similar areas," and
their "productivity has increased significantly." Given enough time, the
increase in productivity means that crop yield should improve substantially,
although it may never entirely match that of commercial farms, due to the
greater possibilities for mechanization on large farms. It is important to
note, however, that the percentage of underutilized land in large commercial
farms averages about 40 to 50 percent in the regions with the best land, and
85 percent where the land is less suitable for farming. Every study finds
that resettled farmers plant a far larger percentage of land than commercial
farmers. Therefore, the difference in yield between commercial farms and
small-scale farming is to a certain extent offset by the greater utilization
of land by small-scale farmers. Consequently, the report by the four
economists finds that previous land redistribution has had "no negative
impact on large-scale commercial farm output." Those farmers who were
resettled in the first phase of land reform in the 1980s "represent 5
percent of the population, but produce between 15 and 20 percent of the
marketed output of maize and cotton, while also largely satisfying their own
food consumption needs." The report concludes, "The best available data show
that the performance of resettled farmers in Zimbabwe is better than is
conventionally believed," and that a well-designed land reform program "can
have a large impact on equity as well as productivity."
(91)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#91>

     A study examining the effect of global warming on agricultural
production in Zimbabwe lends urgency to the land reform process. The study
found that maize in Zimbabwe "is increasingly coming under stress due to
high temperatures and low rainfall conditions. Projected climate change
causes simulated maize yields to decrease dramatically under dryland
conditions," that is, primarily in communal areas. Previous studies on the
effect of global warming "indicate that smallholder farmers in the marginal
semiarid regions of Zimbabwe are the most vulnerable to climate change." The
study noted that Zimbabwe has experienced three droughts since 1982 (and now
a fourth in 2002, after the study was performed), and that southern Africa
is "one of the regions that appear most vulnerable to climate change." As
the climate changes, more and more of the land in the arid communal areas
will become nonviable for agriculture. Most of the communal areas "are
marginal," the study adds, "and will become more vulnerable with climate
change." (92) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#92>Consequently,
without land reform, six million poor black farmers crowded
into the communal areas are likely to be driven from their homes as their
land becomes increasingly incapable of producing crops. As black small farm
owners account for the majority of maize grown in Zimbabwe, climatic change
could have a serious effect on agricultural production, and leave millions
subject to starvation. Farmers migrating from their no longer viable farms
would be left homeless and jobless, with devastating consequences for the
economy of Zimbabwe. The lack of land reform, or even a delay in the
implementation of land reform, could spell economic and human disaster of
grand proportions. The fertile land occupied by the large commercial farms
can withstand climate change much more readily than the communal areas.
Because land reform is a long-term process, it will take years for resettled
farmers to achieve full potential yields. Any delay in implementing land
reform would run the risk of production in the resettled areas lagging
dangerously behind the rate of loss of production in the communal areas as
rising global temperature implacably eliminates farmland in arid communal
regions.

     Zimbabwe can no longer tolerate the grossly unjust distribution of land
created by colonial expropriation. The average white farmer owns
approximately 100 times more land than a black farmer, and the land he owns
is far more suitable for agriculture. Farms belonging to the Oppenheimer
family alone total an area exceeding the size of Belgium, while a
great manylarge tracts of land belong to absentee owners.
(93) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#93> Among the
absentee landowners are members of the British House of Lords and other
prominent British citizens, a fact not entirely unrelated to British efforts
to derail land reform.

     The success of land reform hinges on the extent of inputs into the
process from the government of Zimbabwe. A major impediment is that the
government finds itself in a dire financial situation due to international
sanctions, and this is affecting its ability to implement the support
structure necessary for the success of land reform. The government has in
place plans to establish 36 irrigation schemes in dry land communal and
resettlement areas. The irrigation project will rely on water in existing
dams and allow irrigation in areas formally lacking access to water.
Irrigation would result in increased yields in dry land areas, and allow
nearly year round farming. It would also help to limit or delay the loss of
farmland due to rising global temperatures. Unfortunately, progress on
implementing the irrigation schemes is held up by the lack of funding. An
official from the Department of Irrigation commented that some irrigation
projects "have been around for more than five or six years, the feasibility
studies are done, etcetera. But due to budgetary constraints we have been
unable to implement those projects."
(94)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#94>Once again,
it is seen that international sanctions serve to hurt efforts to
improve agricultural output.

     The government of Zimbabwe proposes spending a total of $3 billion in
support of the land reform process, much of which will be earmarked for
building up the infrastructure in resettled areas, including roads, schools
and clinics. The initial phase of the plan focuses on immediate support to
allow resettled farmers to start farming. Funding the process will be
difficult without access to foreign loans. Economist John Robertson warned,
"This will place a severe strain on the government's coffers and increase
pressure on money supply growth and inflation."
(95)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#95>Despite these
constraints, the government has spent $155 million
in initial support for resettled farmers.
(96)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#96>The intent of
land reform in Zimbabwe is not only to redress the injustice
of colonial theft, but also to reduce widespread poverty and raise the
standard of living not only for the resettled farmers, but for society as a
whole. It is also expected that land reform will eventually result in a net
increase in agricultural production. Sylvestre Maunganidze, head of
political affairs at the Zimbabwe Embassy in Georgia, says, "We realized
that unless we maximized production we would not be able to survive the
onslaught of the West. We are not a perfect people but we know that there is
a group of people outside of Zimbabwe who would only be waiting to pounce on
our mistakes but the only response we have for them is to ask them to come
back in two years and they would see a transformed Zimbabwe. We thought we
had good partners abroad and did not know that we were killing ourselves
with this dependency. Now we are winning ourselves from dependency and we
want to be independent both politically and economically." No longer would
Zimbabwe be "an appendage of the industrial capitalist system," he affirmed.
(97) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#97>

     It is precisely this independence that has made Zimbabwe a target. The
Western campaign against Zimbabwe will continue to escalate until it
achieves its goal of reversing that independence, regardless of the cost to
the people of Zimbabwe. Already New Zealand's Prime Minister Helen Clark has
advocated "tougher economic sanctions" against Zimbabwe and its "full
expulsion" from the Commonwealth, while British Prime Minister Tony Blair is
discussing possible further actions with leaders of African countries.
(98)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#98>
U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Reeker implied that the U.S. is
considering further punitive action against Zimbabwe when he warned that "it
is time to tell President Mugabe that he needs to reexamine these policies
in terms of land seizures and go back to the road of democratic norms that
Zimbabwe should be on."
(99)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#99>

     Sanctions continue to take their toll, and Zimbabwe's economy continues
to plummet. According to Ken Jerrard, Bulawayo regional president of the
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, the foreign currency shortage has
prevented most firms from importing essential capital goods and raw
materials necessary to maintain production. He noted that over 100 companies
closed down in his province in the previous few months, while others are
making drastic cuts in staff to avoid closing.
(100)<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#100>In order to
raise foreign currency to meet its budget commitments, the
government has been forced to engage in limited and targeted privatization,
a painful but unavoidable compromise under the circumstances. A ship
carrying fuel intended for Zimbabwe was unable to offload its cargo at the
port of Beira in Mozambique. British Petroleum, which owns the fuel storage
facilities at the port, refused to accept the fuel because Zimbabwe owed the
firm $3 million. Approximately 70 percent of Zimbabwe's fuel is shipped from
Libya through the port of Beira, where it is transferred to pipelines. The
lack of foreign currency has prevented Zimbabwe from meeting its payments to
British Petroleum, and unless a resolution to the dispute can be reached, it
could mean a near-total cutoff of fuel, bringing down production in
virtually all sectors of Zimbabwe's economy. (101)
<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#101>

     Despite Western hostility and belligerence, Zimbabwe remains resolute
in its pursuit of land reform and rejection of the neoliberal economic
model. "We have not sought to quarrel with any nation. We have no other
ambition than to remain sovereign as we cooperate and respect the
sovereignty of others," President Mugabe pointed out. "It cannot be the rule
of law that is the matter, for here they massacred thousands as they
colonized our country and pillaged our resources. We cannot be a nation
worth its name if we succumb to and acquiesce in the sheer erosion of our
sovereignty." (102) <http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html#102>


· · · · · ·


*References and Resources*

Due to the length of this essay and the large number of references, we have
created a dedicated footnotes page
<http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004a.html>. Each reference is
hyperlinked so that the reader can go back and forth between the article and
the notes.



*Gregory Elich* has published dozens of articles on the Balkans and East
Asia in the US, Canada and Europe, in such publications as *Covert Action
Quarterly, Politika, Der Junge Welt, Dagbladet Arbejderen, Science&Society,
Swans,* and other publications. His research findings on CIA intervention in
Yugoslavia was the subject of articles in newspapers in Germany, Norway and
Italy, including *Il Manifesto.* He has been involved in peace activities
since the Vietnam War, and was coordinator of the Committee for Peace in
Yugoslavia. He was a member of a US delegation visiting Yugoslavia after the
NATO war, and a member of the Margarita Papendreou delegation, the first to
fly on a Western national airline to Baghdad in challenge to the sanctions.
He spoke at the International Action Center's
<http://www.iacenter.org/>opening session of their Commission of
Inquiry into NATO War Crimes on July
31, 1999 and again as a witness at the final session of the Commission on
June 10, 2000. He has a chapter in the International Action Center's
anthology 'NATO in the Balkans.' His slide presentation on the NATO war has
been shown in several cities throughout the Midwest [cf. Geoff Berne's War
Against Women and Other Civilians in Yugoslavia: Terror Keyed Triumph of the
New Colonialism <http://www.swans.com/library/art7/gbern001.html>(January
2001) as well as America in Yugoslavia: Peephole into a Hidden
Empire<http://www.swans.com/library/art7/gbern002.html>(May 2001)].
Finally, Elich is a member of the collective that wrote the
recently published book "Hidden Agenda, U.S./NATO Takeover Of Yugoslavia"
which can be purchased on line at leftbooks.com <http://www.leftbooks.com/>.


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