The World After Bush- Charles ClarkePublication date: 29/11/2006   Former Home Secretary Charles Clarke MP will give a major lecture on "The World After Bush" on Wednesday 29th November, assessing the impact of the US mid-term elections for global politics, and what the Labour government’s highly controversial foreign policy record means for the future of British foreign policy.
  • Send your views to [log in to unmask]   The World After Bush- a lecture given in the Fabian Next Decade Lecture series by the Rt Hon. Charles Clarke MP at 730pm on Wednesday 29th November in London.   Now is a good time for an assessment of the current foreign policy position of the United Kingdom.   We are just three weeks after the mid-term Congressional elections in the United States which have led to a change of political control in both Houses of Congress, and which caused the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld, Washington’s principal ‘neocon’.   It is not easy to predict precisely what impact these changes will have on role of the United States in world leadership but one thing is certain: the way that the US views itself and conducts itself will be different. These changes will certainly lead to a different stance on the place of the United States in world leadership, though in exactly what direction is not yet easy to predict. Some have asserted that the
 main reason for the Republican defeat was to send a message on Iraq but the exit polls offer a less conclusive explanation. They stated that the important issues for American voters were corruption and ethics (42%), terrorism (40%), the economy (39%), Iraq (37%) and illegal immigration (29%). Moreover very many of the Democrats elected to Congress could hardly be described as left-wing, liberal or internationalist even in traditional American terms.   This means that it is possible that the United States will revert to more introverted ‘America First’ thinking in arenas such as world trade, carbon reduction and the post 9/11 fight against terrorism. This would be dangerous for the world.   On the other hand, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union some argued that the peace and stability of the world could be guaranteed in a Pax Americana by the strength of one world superpower. These mid-term elections could well come to be seen as the moment
 when this idea conclusively failed and the American people faced up to the reality that this is a multipolar world which requires multilateral governance with many-sided solutions.   In Europe we have just seen the selection of Segolene Royal as the Socialist candidate for the French Presidency, in which she will be pitted against Nicholas Sarkozy. Though they come from different ends of the political spectrum, and have very different economic and political ideas, they are both modernisers who will represent a major opportunity for change from the old-fashioned, introverted and sclerotic leadership of traditional Gaullism in the form of Jacques Chirac, which has done so much to damage the European Union and the cause of internationalism.   And we are now just a month or so away from a German Presidency of the European Union which hopes to re-establish momentum for the EU after the debilitating rejection of the proposed new Constitution in France and Holland and the long
 impasse over the budget which was only resolved under our Presidency a year ago.   And of course, and by no means least, we are nearing the end of Tony Blair’s premiership which has been marked by immense, even inspirational, internationalist ambition and rhetoric, but continues to be dogged by controversy about the way that ambition is carried through to practice, both in the European Union and more widely.   And these important political events take place whilst the threat of Al Qaeda and related terrorism remains very real, the current phase of external military intervention in Iraq is moving to its close, the state of affairs in the Middle East remains pessimistic, there is continuing uncertainty about the future in Afghanistan, and there is doubt and hesitation about the future of Europe in a global age.   So it is a good moment to consider how we should use the opportunities afforded by these changes both to advance British interests and to achieve real progress
 towards a more peaceful and prosperous world.   This evening I want to set out six main themes which should govern our approach in the coming period.   <·> My first, most important, point is that we should resist those who preach isolation and inaction internationally. I strongly believe that we should remain committed to international action, politically, economically and militarily in order to promote beneficial change in the world, and that we should work with our allies, particularly in Europe and America, energetically to promote that commitment   <·> Second, that a particularly important aspect of this commitment to international action is to encourage the European Union to raise substantially its level of involvement in the main international problems of the day, notably the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan.   <·> Third, that we should learn from the mistakes of the past and devote far more energy, resources and creativity to building stable and secure societies in
 the aftermath of conflict.   <·> Fourth, that we should encourage the European Union to focus its future efforts upon the security of the continent.   <·> Fifth, that we should identify and promote a positive role for the Commonwealth in developing educational and cultural exchange, rather than it acting as a mini-United Nations     <·> And Sixth, that in the UK we should take our decisions on such issues as the future of Trident within a clear framework of the likely security threats that the UK is likely to experience ten years from now.   I turn first to the proposition that international action makes a positive difference. It should not really be necessary to make this case as so many problems facing the world, from terrorism to climate change, to world trade and aid and to energy supply are international in character. However I am concerned that as the political mood in the United States shifts it will draw the conclusion from failure to achieve quick good results in
 Iraq that America’s best interests are served by retrenchment from international engagement and turning inwards. In this country there are already plenty of signs that parts of our population are increasingly taking that view.   It is worth recalling history. From 1945 to 1989, the world had to deal with the tension and consequences of the bipolar standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. Management of the conflict dominated and frequently stifled thought across the Northern hemisphere. However from 1989, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall opened the possibility of very dramatic change across the world and of at least slowing the spiraling arms race.   The consequent atmosphere of change and the growth of freedom as the thaw evolved meant that more and more countries are now committed to building societies which:-   value and build free speech and freedom of expression, including free media;   respect all faiths, races, and beliefs; 
are founded upon the rule of law;   want every citizen to have a democratic stake in our society;   value the free economy which has built prosperity;   value the fact that women can play a full role in our society.   And of course we know that this type of democratic society has been the ambition which has driven enormous political and social change so that for example in the last 30 years:-   Fascist or militaristic Greece, Spain, and Portugal have been succeeded by democracy;   Apartheid South Africa has been succeeded by democracy;   Colonialist Southern Africa has been replaced by democracy;   Latin and Central American dictatorship has been replaced by democracy; 
The whole totalitarian Central and Eastern Europe has been succeeded by democracy;   In Southeast Asia, democracy has replaced dictatorship. 

In each of these parts of the world, massive problems certainly remain, there are still significant issues which need to be addressed, some of which are acute, and the definitions of democracy are not all identical.   However, it is the case that in just one generation there has been enormous positive change, much of which has happened without significant violence or bloodshed. This is a deeply optimistic message and we need continually to recall that the fight for democracy has been and is at the core of this change.   And another part of that optimistic message is that it is also encouraging, if perhaps surprising, to learn that all forms of political violence, significantly except international terrorism, have declined worldwide since the early 1990s.   The painstaking and very detailed analysis of the excellent Human Security Report - funded by a number of governments, including our own, and published last June - shows that:-   <·> the number of armed conflicts has
 declined by more than 40% since 1992;   <·> the deadliest conflicts (those with 1000 or more battle-deaths) dropped even more dramatically - by 80%;   <·> the number of international crises, often harbingers of war, fell by more than 70% between 1981 and 2001;   <·> the dollar value of major international arms transfers fell by 33% between 1990 and 2003;   <·> the number of refugees fell by about 45% between 1992 and 2003 as more and more wars came to an end, and   <·> the number of actual and attempted military coups has been declining for more than 40 years.   According to the authors the reasons for the change are the decline of colonialism, the end of the Cold War (including from their proxy powers) and an upsurge in international political activity to prevent war.   This heartening and inspiring set of conclusions makes a powerful statement in support of a renewed commitment by the major powers of the world to an engaged, active and internationalist foreign and
 security policy.   So whenever in any specific case we consider the case for inaction, perhaps because the place where action may be necessary is ‘a faraway country of which we know little’, a place like Rwanda in 1994 or Darfur today, we should consider the case for action too as, finally, we did in Bosnia.   And the case for action should not simply be dismissed because action is difficult and fraught with risk. Though inaction usually seems easier, it is fraught with risk too, with potential outcomes which are often just as terrible.   For example, the consequences of inaction, instead of the military invasion which toppled Saddam Hussein and his threat, would have been Saddam’s retention of tyrannical and genocidal power and menace, but with his prestige reinforced through what would have been his successful repudiation of years of United Nations resolutions. Progress in the Middle East would have been even more difficult than it is today.   In any such situation a
 call for action addresses principally the main European countries and the United States, and the more that European Union members are able to do the more that the approach of the European Union will influence the outcome and the less that the United States will need to do. It is a sad reality of the post Cold War world that too often major European powers have been unwilling to act, and that has meant that the United States has had to do more than was desirable. The NATO summit in Riga yesterday and today has addressed some of these critically important issues, in particular European participation in Afghanistan.   That is why my second main theme is the need to encourage the European Union to take more responsibility for promoting peace, stability and democracy in the world, but particularly in Europe itself and with its neighbours in the Middle East.   I do not accept the view of many people that our Government is subservient to that of the United States. Indeed I think
 that the Prime Minister’s motivation and practice has been to do what he can to influence the conduct of what is currently the world’s only superpower and that is a decent ambition which has had some successes.   But I do accept that it is not desirable to live in a world with only one effective superpower, the United States, particularly where there is such widespread lack of confidence in the judgement on some questions of its current Administration.   In our globalised world the old division of Europe or the United States has little to offer. It must be Europe and the United States co-operating to solve the problems which do exist. But for that to happen Europe has to step to up the plate when tough decisions are required and then develop the capacity and take the responsibility to forge a real partnership in action to make a difference.   The self-interested inaction which President Chirac proposed for Iraq mirrored French inaction against ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia
 and against genocide in Rwanda. And those who rush to judge the United States of America, under the leaderships of both Bill Clinton and George W Bush, should remember that action from the United States too often has to happen because of inaction by the European Union and some of its main members. It was true in the former Yugoslavia and in some parts of Africa and it is true in Iraq and Afghanistan.   And it is true in the Middle East too, as we saw in Lebanon earlier this year as the world called for urgent international action to halt the fighting. Though the final UN Security Council resolution did give a major leadership role to EU countries, the difficulties in fulfilling that Resolution, particularly in providing military support, show the distance which still has to be travelled if the European Union is to play its international role effectively. It is necessary for the European Union as a whole to commit itself more strongly to a peace settlement in the Middle
 East, for example through wider support for the Middle East Roadmap process.   A measure of the current dislocation in European Union relationships was the public announcement two weeks ago in Girona in Spain of agreement between French President Jacques Chirac and Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero that they would play leading roles in formulating a proposed peace plan for the Middle East, a scheme to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that they had been in contact about their plan with Italian Prime Minister Prodi. They stated that their proposal would have to be examined by other European governments before being presented to the Council of the European Union but it seems that their proposals came as a complete surprise to Britain and Germany.   This kind of incoherence between the main European powers, particularly in a matter of such importance, is absolutely unacceptable. And I believe that the top priority for the successors of President Chirac and our Prime
 Minister is to work for a co-ordinated, active and effective European position on these and other issues.   So my first two themes this evening argue for the United States, the European Union and also for this country that we should not be retreating from engagement in the wider world and hoping that problems will somehow go away if we do not act, but we should commit to action to address the evils of the world.   Perhaps I should just complete this section by stating that in my opinion, action by the United States since the end of the Cold War in 1989 should not be described in the same way as their many interventions before then and attempts to do so, for example by drawing a comparison between Vietnam and Iraq, are thoroughly flawed and take no account of a world situation which is entirely different. The conflicts in the Cold War were fundamentally dissimilar to those since, particularly to those since 9/11.   I now turn to my third main theme, which is that, as well
 as being well-conceived and executed in itself, any action must devote far more energy, resources and creativity to building stability and security in the aftermath of conflict. It should focus on working with neighbours and communities in the region rather than celebrating isolation and unilateralism, as the American neocons have preferred.   I am sad to say that the case for this approach has been made by the history of Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam. Despite the immense progress towards democratic elections and then the formation of a broadly-based government, there is still not the stability and an end to the terrorist violence which everyone has been keen to see.   Of course the responsibility for the violence lies unequivocally and firmly with those individuals who commit it and those organizations which plan it. But it was also the duty of the invading armies and their governments to take steps to maximize the possibility of peace, stability and reconstruction. 
  This was argued by many in the British government and some in the US administration, but not by others such as Mr Rumsfeld and Vice-President Cheney and the necessary political and economic action was not sufficiently planned and not taken to the level of support which was necessary.   Now, of course, the correct course of action must be to follow through fully on the commitments that are necessary, to assist the Iraqi government to take up its full security responsibilities as soon as is feasible and secure, to involve other countries in the region constructively, as the British have consistently tried to do, and to invest the resources necessary to raise the conditions of living for the average Iraqi family as high as possible.   The same is true for Afghanistan where, as the Prime Minister rightly said ten days ago, “Here in this extraordinary piece of desert is where the future of world security in the early 21st Century is going to be played out”. It is classically a
 case where inaction would be a worse option than action, however difficult. However, success in this action will only be complete if successful military engagement, hopefully including the major European powers as well as the United States, is supported and followed up by the kind of post-conflict support to the Afghan government which will enable a modern political and economic infrastructure to be created and modern livelihoods to exist for the many Afghanis who now depend on the drug trade for their existence.   Again in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe that the British government has been on the right side of the arguments, making the case for action and engagement rather than standing back, making the case for investment in future country-building rather than focusing on military action alone.   But many countries have not accepted both parts of this case. Some are not really prepared to commit to the military action. Others do not really see the critical need for
 building a stable and secure future. Both arguments have to be made and major world powers need to accept both sides of the argument.   It is a commonplace to point to the far-sighted reconstruction of the Marshall Plan, both for Germany and for Japan after 1945. But the power of the vision of George C Marshall in a Democratic Administration then applies with the same force to Iraq and Afghanistan today and the British government needs to continue to encourage both European and American Governments to apply those principles in our day. A multilateral modern Marshall Plan for Iraq, for example, would send the decisive message that reconstruction and confidence-building is the priority and we will commit the resources which are needed.   As in Germany and Japan, however, reconstruction is a long and painstaking process which can take longer than a decade of steady progress. And to succeed, the international institutions, particularly the European Union, NATO and the United
 Nations, must work far closer together. There are too many overlaps of responsibility and mandate and insufficient shared and partnership working.   And I believe that precisely the same principles apply in Europe itself, in the Balkans where there are still divided communities, fragile institutions and a level of international crime and corruption which threatens all of us.   So my fourth theme is that the European Union should make the security of the continent a major priority, which it is not today.   The most immediate threats the Union faces are those posed by terrorism from a variety of sources, by the serious and organised crime, principally people-trafficking and drug-dealing which reaches down into every community in the country and by the spread of illegal migration.   It should be pretty clear that each of these threats can best be dealt with in a focused way through far stronger international engagement. We have to transform our way of thinking from the idea
 that invasion of our territory, or threats to it from another nation-state, should be our main concern.   So for Britain ever stronger defences at the White Cliffs of Dover and ever-more-splendid isolation will not be enough to protect ourselves from the threats which we face. The Conservative Party has yet to grasp this truth but the future security of this country depends on it.   And I believe that a consequence of this truth is that we need, particularly in the European Union, ever-closer practical working co-operation between Foreign Secretaries, Defence Secretaries and Home Secretaries. International security and domestic security are increasingly closely intertwined and some of the organisational divergences between different parts of government are becoming increasingly anachronistic.   That is especially true in dealing with the threat of terrorism, illustrated again so dramatically by the bomb plot which the professionalism of our police and intelligence services
 prevented in August. We need both practical police and security co-operation and a co-ordinated legal framework in which the promoters of terrorism can be contested.   Labour already understands the need for better international working and we are beginning to re-orient our practice. Some good progress, for example, was made during the British Presidency of the European Union.   But we have to go further. In this lies the answer to what has been a central dilemma during recent years, of how best we should see the development of the European Union, and of the UK’s role within it. The creation of the euro from 1992 onwards has been a project in which the UK has stood on the sidelines, and consequently lost economic influence. The efforts to create a so-called ‘European Constitution’ - in my opinion a terminology which is both inaccurate and unwise - has run into the sand, important though the creation of more effective European institutions continues to be.   Across Europe
 the sense of political stagnation is tangible, whilst in Britain the whole European debate, important though it is and divisive though it has often been, has come to a stop.   This is the context in which I suggest that the European Union has to rediscover its momentum in promoting the security and democracy of the continent. That is after all the history of the European Union’s greatest achievements, from its origins in healing the division between France and Germany, to its development to end fascism and military government in Greece, Spain and Portugal, and then to its most recent achievement of confirming secure democracy in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Successive British governments can rightly take credit for these developments and now should take it further. The European Union should now give greater priority to developing the security and democracy of our continent than to the economic and trade priorities which have tended to dominate in recent
 years.   Internally in Europe, this means more effective policies to combat organised crime, through more effective co-operation between police and security forces, including joint operations against criminality. It means better common use of security protections such as passport and travel data and identity cards. And it means better co-operation on these matters between national governments and Parliaments, the European Commission and the European Parliament.   It means strengthening the current external land, sea and air borders of the European Union, for example with extended joint operations, and more effective policies to prevent illegal immigration, which continues to create ever more harrowing personal tragedies, for example in the Canaries or on the Mediterranean between Libya and Italy and Malta, and remains one of this country’s most pressing political challenges.   But I believe that the external boundaries of the European Union need to change too in order to
 remove our defensive weaknesses.   The European Union should greatly raise the priority it now gives to enlargement in the Balkans, particularly former Yugoslavia. This is the part of Europe where criminality is most strongly rooted and democratic government and institutions find it most difficult to flourish. It is the transit area for the overwhelming majority of land-based illegal people- and drug-trafficking into the rest of the European Union. It is the logical next step to follow previous enlargements, where the carrot of EU membership has successfully been an immensely important inspiration for change in the applicant states.   This process should include Croatia and Macedonia, which are already candidate members, and then Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia, as soon as possible, together with whatever stable future for Kosovo can be established. We need to work very closely with NATO and the United Nations to ensure that the security requirement for
 EU membership is fulfilled and that we offer whatever support is needed to achieve that.   This change would greatly strengthen our ability to fight the criminality in the Balkans which threatens the rest of Europe as well as giving us a stronger basis for resisting terrorist threats from the region.   I do take the view that, with the important exception of Turkey, the borders of the European Union should be stabilised at that point. It should be a European security priority to develop closer co-operation by a variety of means with our East European neighbours, particularly Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia as well as with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, but the European Union should not encourage further applications for full membership.   There are in addition wider security issues for the European Union, on which I will not focus today, in relation to environmental change, energy security, controls on the trade in arms and justice in trade and
 aid.   I turn fifth to the Britain and the Commonwealth.   This is a major world institution which is particularly well-placed to promote education and understanding and to sponsor democratic values. The shared history and culture, the story of migration and current links between different Commonwealth countries, the similarity of political and other institutions and some common basis in language all mean that, properly developed, the Commonwealth can make a major contribution which in my opinion would play to its strengths better than seeking to be a mini-United Nations in resolving difficult international disputes. I believe that in the current world of evolving and complicated multiple identities, the particular potential strength of the Commonwealth is not being maximized to the extent possible and this would both benefit strong international relations and resilient communities in this country.   Finally, it is important to consider the security context of important
 decisions such as the possible renewal of the Trident missile system. I have tried to argue this evening that we need a more flexible and outward-looking approach to our national security, which reflects the changing nature of the many and varied threats we face.   We should focus our energy and resources upon a careful analysis of the whole range of defence and security issues over the next 15 to 20 years. I look forward to publication of the White Paper, and will of course study it carefully, However, I remain extremely sceptical both of the need to take an early decision and of the case for deciding to replace Trident. It is a very expensive weapon system which was developed in the Cold War to meet the conditions of the Cold War which ended 17 years ago, and it is still capable of functioning fully for about another 15 years from now. There is a strong case for prioritising our security spending on what are likely to be the main security threats we face in the future,
 rather than building new weapons to fight the last war.   I am glad that the Government has apparently decided that a debate on this matter would be worthwhile, but I hope that it will take place within the wide context of the foreign policy and security challenges which I have tried to address this evening.   
END 
  The Fabian New Year Conference will also address the Next Decade agenda on Saturday January 13th 2007- for more information please visit www.fabians.org.uk     

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