A few weeks ago, on the 28th July 2001, I made the following prediction
about the possibility of a coalition of all opposition parties:

“1. A resurrected PPP is very likely to form a tactical alliance with the
GPP, GDP and NRP.

2. The former NCP is likely to embrace the UDP.

3. The PDOIS, as a matter of principle will not side with any other party.

The result, I submit, may very well look like the following:
A tactical alliance of the PPP, GPP, GDP and NRP will poll between 15 and
24% of the total votes cast come the October elections.
A combined UDP/NCP will poll between 11 and 17%.
The PDOIS may poll between 8 and 14%.
In other words, if the opposition ends up as in the case of the above
scenario, the opposition will loose the next elections to the APRC“.

Not far off the mark so far!

Before I made the above predictions I had toyed with the idea that the
decree 89 politicians, being the shrewd politicians that they are, would
pull another fast one on the Gambian people. Unfortunately it was very
difficult to imagine how or what they will do. The more I tried to think of
how they would make their comeback, the more I thought of the fast one the
PPP pulled on Senegal after the failed attempted coupe of 1981. The more I
toyed with that strategy the more I said to myself that “Gambians cannot be
that gullible and these veterans must know full well that we will see
through their strategy”. Weeks down the line I have come to realise that
some of the decree 89 politicians may be using the same strategy again.
Remember the adage “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”?

Following the aftermath of the attempted coupe of 1981, the PPP realised
that their political survival depended on TIME. Yes, they needed time to
consolidate their hold on power and needed to make sure that nothing like it
ever happened again. One of the surest ways of gaining that time was to
mortgage our sovereignty to the Senegalese. This, though appearing to be not
the wisest of moves unless you know how Jawara thinks, is one of the
smartest political moves this country has ever seen. Jawara knew exactly
that by taking that move he would gain enough time to consolidate his reign.
Thus, we went into a confederation that very few people knew its
implications.

The Senegalese believing that the government was sincerely in favour of the
confederation, as we signed the agreement from a position of weakness,
provided the necessary security guarantee that the PPP needed to entrench
themselves in power. What the Senegalese government failed to realise
however, was how shrewd an operator ex-president Jawara was. In that
confederation agreement he had his “EXIT CLAUSE” firmly entrenched and the
Senegalese government did not even know it.

Once they had everything under control, the PPP government began assuring
Gambians that “Confederation” was very different from “Federation” much to
the disappointment of the Senegalese government. They agitated for more say
as to how the confederation should be governed and started asking for a
rotation of the presidency. These new interpretations of the confederation
caused much anxiety and frustration within the Senegalese government that
they finally pulled out of it in anger in 1992.

The Senegalese, in retaliation, introduced stringent border controls that
virtually killed off our re-export trade. This had serious implications for
our economy the re-export trade contributed as much as 24% of GDP at its
peak in 1985/86. This, plus other factors, greatly contributed to the misery
we were in especially when coupled with the rampant mismanagement of the
time and the ERP.

While the PPP emerged as the winners, the losers were the Senegalese people,
government and the ordinary people of The Gambia.

THE PRESENT SCENARIO.

The decree 89 politicians knowing that PDOIS’s agenda for a transition
programme will be in conflict with theirs and knowing that the NRP was not a
very significant party chose to ignore them both. Make no mistake about it;
the decree 89 politicians had no interest in these parties. Why bring them
in when they may make unacceptable demands and thus cost you valuable time
to put your campaign strategy in place. The question now is what are they
going to do with the UDP, the biggest registered opposition party.

This situation may seem simple but it is not. The reason is that all the
National Assembly members of the UDP are from the NCP. Now are you going to
treat them as two parties in negotiations or are you going to consider them
as one party? The PPP knew the answer. First establish whether the former
NCP members will stay with the UDP or they will go back to the NCP if it
ever came to choosing between the two parties. The idea here is to negotiate
with as few parties as possible; it makes things less complicated. Pit the
two against each other and see which will come out of it stronger and engage
that party. Remember what Robert Copeland’s means when he says “To get
something done a committee should consist of no more than three people, two
of whom are absent”.

With that strategy in the minds of the PPP, the three parties comprising the
PPP, UDP and NCP met on the 13th August at the YMCA. According to Dibba,
after initially failing to agree on the choice of the leader of the alliance
that was to be formed, the PPP/UDP asked the NCP to excuse them, as they
wanted to discuss the issue within themselves. The NCP smelled a rat and
sought assurance that no press briefing will be done in their absence.
Having received such assurance, the NCP left the meeting. It must be
remembered here that the PDOIS had said that they were, earlier on, given
minutes of a meeting of the decree 89 politicians in which they indicated,
among other things, that the GPP will not be registered and that its leader,
Assan Musa Camara would be the facilitator of the formation of a coalition
of opposition parties. The minutes of that meeting also indicated that Assan
Musa Camara was mandated to invite the existing opposition parties to a
meeting to work out the modalities of a coalition of “all opposition
parties”. This invitation, PDOIS claims, is what they were waiting for when
they learnt of the YMCA meeting. According to PDOIS, when they heard of the
YMCA meeting, they called the facilitator of the proposed coalition and
requested that the meeting be postponed for a day or two to enable them to
attend it.

It is alleged that while Dibba and other members of his delegation were on
their way home, the UDP and PPP merged. The UDP leader was chosen as the
presidential candidate of the ”merged” party and the PPP pledged to support
it. A question to ask here is, what are the PPP and UDP hoping to get from
this merger especially when it is at the expense of the other opposition
parties? Why are these two parties in so eager to merge that they are
willing to leave out the others especially when the PDOIS had requested for
a day or two’s postponement? Knowing that all the UDP National Assembly
members are from the UDP what difference can there be between them that can
prevent them from coming to an amicable solution? My take is that the PPP
realised that if the strategy used in 1982 against the very shrewd
Senegalese worked so well to their advantage, why not use the same strategy
on the UDP and their supporters. Remember, “IF IT AIN’T BROKE, DON’T FIX
IT”.

The gullible on the list may ask why the PPP would do that when they did not
put forward a candidate to lead the coalition but instead supported the
candidate of another party. The answer is simple. If they can survive for 7
years in the wilderness under a hostile government that will not hesitate to
pick them up and incarcerate them, what disadvantage is there in being a
junior partner with a new party for transitional period of, say two years?
This question becomes even less relevant when the party happens to have a
significant number of their members in the national assembly.

Finally, we know that PDOIS favours a one-year transition program and the
PPP is reported to favour a two-year transition programme. How about the
UDP? I am yet to know what transitions programme the UDP advocates.

Have a good day, Gassa.

“Politics is not the art of the possible. It consists of CHOOSING BETWEEN
THE DISASTROUS AND THE UNPALATABLE". - J. K. Galbrath.


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