A STAMENT BY
HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT ALHAJI DR. AHMAD TEJAN KABBAH
MADE BEFORE THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
ON TUESDAY 5TH AUGUST, 2003

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I am delighted
to have been invited to make a statement at these public
hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
particularly on the theme "Promoting Reconciliation and
National Reintegration". In dealing with this theme, I take
the view that it will be useful if I put within its proper
historical perspective the situation prevailing in Sierra
Leone, which makes the promotion of reconciliation and
national reintegration an active and necessary element of
State Policy.

INTRODUCTION

1. The peace achieved at the end of the eleven years of war
in this country can be sustained only if there is
reconciliation among the people and if national
reintegration is actively and successfully pursued. Thus
reconciliation and national reintegration are necessary
ingredients in the peace building process which we need to
embark upon in order to avoid the recurrence of war.
Therefore to promote reconciliation and national
reintegration we need to understand what were the root
causes of the war itself and how those root causes are to
be eradicated for good. It is for this reason that I have
deemed it necessary to take the Commission back to an
appropriate point in the history of this country to narrate
the events and elements which, in my view cumulatively gave
rise to the war. It is also important to narrate the role
played by some of the actors in that war, and how they
subscribed to the causes of the war or to the war itself. I
will proffer no justification or explanation here for the
conduct of any of the actors because there is no
justification that can be found for their conduct. My
concern here is merely to state the facts that occurred as
a matter of history and the role my Government has played
and continues to play not only to ensure that peace returns
to the country but also to put in place measures to prevent
another war, promote reconciliation and national
reintegration.

2. Sierra Leone became independent from Britain on the 27th
April, 1961. At that time and for some years thereafter
good governance and the rule of law prevailed. Multi-party
Government and democracy were the two systems bequeathed to
this country. Both systems were valued and held in high
esteem by the population until the advent of the APC
Government in 1968. That Government from its inception
systematically dismantled those two systems up to a point
that not even a shadow of them remained. Thus for a period
covering nearly three decades what prevailed in Sierra
Leone was a one-party totalitarian form of Government
starting as a de facto one party government in 1968 until
it was formalized by the One Party Constitution of 1978
which remained in force up to 1991. The consequence was the
disenchantment of the population with the state and the
organs of government, the pervasiveness of bad governance
and the total lack of accountability by public officers.
Such public officers by and large held office by virtue of
their membership of the only recognized party (the APC) or
as a favour from that party which they regarded as their
duty to serve if they were to retain their positions. The
party in this situation became preoccupied with its own
survival and for this reason it would not tolerate any
dissent or opposition which it crushed by brutal force.
What follows now will give details of what I regard as
factors which cumulatively gave rise to the war.

3. Multi-Party political system continued to be practiced
in Sierra Leone for some years even after Independence in
1961. After the controversial election of 1967 and the
intervening one-year of military rule in 1967/68, the All
People's Congress (APC) Party took over the Government from
the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) in 1968. By diverse
and often questionable constitutional amendments, Sierra
Leone was transformed from a monarchical democratic system
of Government to a Republic in 1971, with a Ceremonial
President, which, within less than 24 hours, was again
changed to an Executive Presidential Government. By various
electoral manipulations at bye-elections following
successful election petitions filed by the A.P.C. Party
against the SLPP and other devices such as the use of thugs
and the rigging of those bye elections. From 1968 Sierra
Leone as already mentioned became a de facto One Party
State. By formalizing the one-party system in the 1978
Constitution the APC Party became the sole political party.
The membership of that Party then became a necessary
pre-condition for the participation by any person in the
political life and indeed in the governance of this
country. This was the situation that prevailed up to 1991
when the Government was obliged reluctantly to yield to
popular outcry for the return to political pluralism. This
resulted in the promulgation of the 1991 Constitution. A
number of political parties including the SLPP and the
People's Democratic Party (PDP) were registered in that
year in readiness for the elections, which were to be held
in 1992.

4. It needs to be mentioned here that sometime in 1966, Sir
Albert Margai who had succeeded Sir Milton Margai as Prime
Minister and leader of the SLPP, in 1964 proposed the
introduction of a one party system of government. Because
of the opposition received from all and sundry especially
from the A.P.C. Party to any change from the multi-party
democratic system of government, Sir Albert dropped the
idea of a one party system and nothing was heard about it
again until in 1978 when that system was formally
introduced by the APC Government. By the promulgation of a
multi-party Constitution in 1991 the APC Party was merely
grudgingly making good what it had formally deprived the
country of for close to two decades.

THE A.P.C. PARTY'S ATTITUDE TO THE 1991 CONSTITUTION AND
ITS DESIRE TO RETAIN ITS GRIP ON POWER AT ALL COSTS

5. The restoration of the 1991 multi-party Constitution
resulted in the registration of a number of political
parties, and with this the A.P.C. Party, which had been in
office since 1968 felt its position threatened. A number of
its previous supporters had reverted to the SLPP to which
they originally belonged or had joined the PDP. So much for
the state of affairs up to and immediately after 1991.

6. The rebel war in neighbouring Liberia had commenced in
1989 with the express objective of removing President
Samuel Doe from office in that country. Charles Taylor, the
current President of Liberia had come to Sierra Leone with
the view of using this country as a springboard for staging
a rebellion against Doe. The APC first received him and
even encouraged him to do so. This initial encouragement
for Charles Taylor, we are told, was as a result of some
financial consideration paid by him to the higher echelons
of the APC regime. The APC Government then failed to keep
to its own part of the bargain. It had a change of heart
and had Charles Taylor arrested, incarcerated at the
Pademba Road Prisons for a while and then expelled from the
country. This conduct by the APC regime is a factor that
might have provoked the hostility of Charles Taylor and his
active participation in the rebel war in Sierra Leone. He
is known to have organized and sponsored the initial
invasion into Sierra Leone by arming and directing the
invaders and his support for them remained active all
throughout the rebel war.

7. There is no attempt here to justify the attitude of
Charles Taylor and the stance he took against the people of
this country. But a salutary lesson can be learnt from the
relationship that was forged between the APC Government
then and this man and the transaction or deal that is
imputed to have transpired between the two. That lesson is
that matters of State should be embarked upon with greater
caution and circumspection and the receipt of personal gain
should never determine how important matters of State
should be decided. It would have been quite proper for the
then APC Government to have declined to allow Charles
Taylor the use of Sierra Leone territory for hostile
activity against a sister country such as Liberia. But the
impropriety lay in first accepting such use and for a
consideration, and then reneging on it. This country and
its people have paid most dearly and are still paying for
such improper conduct of the APC Government.

8. The rebel war in Sierra Leone commenced in March 1991,
and the multi-party Constitution of 1991 became effective
in October of that year. With the registration of a number
of political parties under that Constitution and with the
threat perceived by the APC to its position which for the
first time became assailable and the real prospect of its
losing the elections slated for 1992 under that
Constitution, the APC Party began devising strategies to
guarantee its continued grip on power. Some of those
strategies were to wage war against Liberia not for the
purpose of staving off the rebel incursion but in order to
provide a justification for not holding the scheduled 1992
elections. Other strategies the APC Party considered
adopting were either to use the war then in progress as a
pretext for declaring a state of emergency and for
establishing an interim government. This would necessarily
have resulted in postponing the elections. A reserved
strategy which that Party was adept in implementing was, in
the event that those elections could not be postponed, to
embark on the extensive use of public funds to rig the
scheduled elections in its favour. In other words, even
though there had been a serious incursion into Sierra
Leone's territory, the only preoccupation of the A.P.C.
Government was to retain political power. Thus, after
October 1991, the APC Party was determined to embark upon
any measures, which would result in the elections proposed
for 1992 to be postponed indefinitely and thus frustrate
the desire of the people for a smooth political change and
for a restoration of normal democratic multi-party
governance in this country after a dearth of more than two
decades.

9. The modalities for giving effect to the scheme hatched
by the APC Party were debated at length at one of the high
level meetings of that Party held at their Office and under
the Chairmanship of the then Inspector-General of Police,
the late Mr. Bambay Kamara. I quote here verbatim and in
extenso excerpts from the Minutes of that meeting which I
had since come by:

"Speaker AA:
The state of emergency will not solve the problem either,
but to declare war against Liberia. Registration of P.D.P.
has brought untold confusion in the Party. We have lost
most of our thugs to P.D.P. and other Parties. SLPP would
have been no threat to A.P.C. They are mild people or
Party. PDP has given SLPP minds to face us…

Speaker BB:
Chairman… About the state of emergency, Haja solemnly
appeal to Chairman and A.P.C. to see that it goes through.
It will be total destruction to A.P.C. survival if it
fails. This is a big test.

Speaker CC:
Let us address ourselves seriously to the formation of
interim government. You are bound by law to include
opposition members in policy-making cabinet. They would
want to know how much we have got for the war and how much
spent. The country's budget must be known. These are the
monies we depend on to rig the elections and to make
anything necessary to bring victory. How can we do these
effectively if we have these oppositions among us?

Speaker DD:
I wholeheartedly agree with the 1st Speaker Haja. Indeed we
have lost almost all our thugs and supporters to P.D.P.
Thaimu knows us better than any of the parties. We have to
exercise patience to destroy P.D.P. For SLPP is no  threat
to A.P.C. in any form. They cannot stand tensions and
thugs.

Speaker EE:
APC is at a crucial point since we are not accountable to
anybody now. Let us use the war front funds and national
funds to persuade Honourable Members to vote in favour of
counter motion as Honourable Sankoh is going to withdraw
his private motion. We cannot afford to lose any steps
now…"

10. I have decided here not to disclose the identity and
names of those present at that meeting and the speakers
because a number of them are now chastened and are
currently engaged in activities beneficial to the
governance of this country. No useful purpose will be
served by disclosing their identity as this will only cause
them embarrassment and the withdrawal by them of their
services. But if the Commission is desirous to know the
identity of these persons, I am prepared to disclose their
names in confidence.

11. I have attempted here to give the Commission an idea of
the state of affairs which prevailed in the body politic of
this country in the run-up to the proposed elections of
1992, which was aborted by the NPRC coup d'etat of that
year. This gives an idea of the level to which the APC
Party was prepared to go to satisfy its greed for power and
to do so even if it meant endangering the security of this
nation by plunging it into a war not as a defensive measure
but for the purpose of retaining power. It also gives a
glimpse of the frame of mind and attitude of the ruling
A.P.C. Government not only towards the proposed democratic
elections, but more so and naturally towards the junta
which ousted them, and towards my Government which
succeeded them after the elections of 1996. In other words,
my success at the elections of that year was not a matter
the A.P.C. Party was willing to accept lightly. From the
foregoing it is therefore reasonable to infer that the
defeated A.P.C. Party was even prepared to be involved in
machinations to cause problems for my government even if
this meant creating further chaos in the country. This in
fact turned out to be the case. Hence, the obvious
hostility shown by that Party to my Government and the
refusal of its leadership to accept my invitation to
participate in the broad based national government, which I
formed after the 1996 elections.

12. I have given this account not with any intention of
casting aspersions on the A.P.C. Party, but merely to
describe the political situation in this country at the
time I became President, and the course of events that
followed thereafter some of whose repercussions are still
haunting us. To achieve national reconciliation we need to
take due cognisance of these events and to prevent their
recurring so that the appropriate atmosphere can exist for
national reconciliation.

THE SECURITY SITUATION PREVAILING IN SIERRA LEONE BEFORE MY
ELECTION AS PRESIDENT

13. The account following will give the Commission and idea
of the prevailing precarious security position in the
country at the time I first assumed office as President.

Before I became President in March 1996, the RUF had
already entrenched themselves in the war for close to five
years both in combat and in their international contacts.
They then continued to have active support principally from
Liberia, Burkina Faso, and had haven in Ivory Coast.

The Sierra Leone Military Forces were then unwilling and/or
Unable to confront and engage the RUF in combat. On the
contrary, there was clear evidence that their loyalty had
been compromised to the extent that the civilian population
had lost confidence in them, and because of their perceived
collaboration with the rebels, they were nicknamed
"sobels". This was a word coined from the words "soldiers"
and "rebels" to emphasize the level of collaboration
between the soldiers and the rebels.

Because of the long stream of successes in combat by the
RUF, their anticipation of actually taking over the
Government of the entire country had been heightened. They
were therefore vehemently opposed to whatever or whomever
they saw as standing in their way to power. It was in this
light that they perceived the democratic process that was
emerging towards the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996.
Similarly the RUF considered all politicians participating
in the election process as real enemies attempting to
thwart their imminent occupation of the entire country.

DECLARED RESOLVE TO RESTORE PEACE TO SIERRA LEONE AND THE
OBSTACLES

14. When I became President, I was very conscious of my
political, constitutional and perhaps even moral obligation
to strive hard and exert every effort to bring an early end
to the war. The reasons for this were obvious.

The population had already become war-weary, and in spite
of my knowledge of the state of the military and its
inability or unwillingness to prosecute the war against the
rebels, I had made the ending of the war my main campaign
pledge. I made this pledge in the belief that by
negotiations and sound reasoning I would be able to talk
the rebels out of their hostile activities against the
population, persuade them to enter into negotiations with
the view of concluding a peace agreement with them.

I reasonably perhaps, had the belief that if they signed
any agreement they would see themselves obliged to abide by
their signatures.

I was also convinced that with a civilian government other
than the APC in power, the original stated rationale for
the RUF taking up arms would have been eliminated and my
new civilian government would be able to persuade them to
lay down their arms. This conviction was based on the fact
that the RUF had repeatedly stated that they embarked on
armed struggle in order to oust the APC Government from
power and to liberate the people of Sierra Leone from the
perceived tyranny and corruption of that Government.

On my assumption of office in 1996, I was quite conscious
that the military had been for long completely politicized
by the previous civilian regime and that by their having
been in power for over four years immediately before my
election to office the same military had cherished the fact
of having political power which they had used mainly to
accumulate wealth. I was therefore aware that they would
not be inclined to be loyal to my Government in the first
place and would also detest to give up power easily and
completely. The NPRC military junta clearly demonstrated
this attitude by their conduct as they grudgingly yielded
to the holding of the elections only after persistent
outcry from the civil population and pressure from the
international community for the elections to be held. They
unsuccessfully mounted and orchestrated a campaign for
"peace before elections" which was another way of
perpetuating the junta in office. Through this campaign
they even attempted to ingratiate themselves with the RUF
by demonstrating to the RUF that the junta was prepared to
delay the holding of elections so that it would forge a
power sharing arrangement with the RUF, but that the
problem was with the political parties as they were
pressing for the holding of elections for the purpose of
permanently excluding the RUF from participating in the
governance of the country. In order to convince the
population that "peace before elections" was a viable
proposition, and in order to demonstrate to the RUF that
the junta was sincere about its desire to bring the rebels
into the Government, the NPRC organized a hastily arranged
peace meeting with the RUF in Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast
just before the date of the elections and the continuation
of the meeting was adjourned to a date after the stated
date for the elections.

Again in order to prove its point that elections could not
be held successfully before peace was achieved, the junta
orchestrated acts of terror and intimidation of the
electorate in several parts of the country just before and
during the conduct of the elections so as to cow the
population down to give up the idea of holding or
continuing with the elections. Of course, the prospect held
out to the RUF by the military junta that the RUF had
better chances of participating in government if the junta
remained in office and elections postponed further
heightened the expectation of the rebels of actually taking
over the entire government, having regard to their
successes over the military and the internal weaknesses in
the military itself. In spite of all these, and because of
the resolve and determination of the population, the
elections were held in February/March 1996 and I became
President of Sierra Leone as a result.

MY IMMEDIATE CONCERNS ON ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE AS PRESIDENT:

15. On assuming office, I was quite clear in my mind as to
what needed to be done immediately -

I was anxious to fulfil my election promise to end the war
and to restore peace to this country. This was a near
obsession for me not just because it was a political
undertaking which I had made but also because I was
conscious that the country needed peace, and the population
was war weary and was yearning for peace. I knew that the
loyalty of the military or of what remained of it could not
be guaranteed to prosecute the war against the rebels
successfully; I was determined to bring to an end the long
fratricidal war in order to prevent the further killings of
Sierra Leoneans by Sierra Leoneans on either side. The only
option I saw available to me then was to embark on
negotiations with the rebels. This I did immediately after
my inauguration. The opportunity for my first meeting with
the RUF was afforded by their continued presence in
Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast, waiting for the adjourned
meeting with the junta leaders there.

I knew that I had to convince the RUF that in spite of
their misgivings, their situation would be better by their
agreeing to negotiate peace with me than with the military
junta as I was the elected leader and representative of the
people of Sierra Leone and therefore the only person with
authority to negotiate peace terms then agreeable to the
people of Sierra Leone. Of course, the initial reaction of
the RUF and their reception of me was hostile as they
regarded me as a stumbling block. They thought I and the
other politicians had insisted on the holding of the
elections as a deliberate device to frustrate their
ambition of participating in the government and eventually
their taking it over - a prospect which they considered as
real if the junta had remained in office and the elections
had been postponed under the slogan "peace before
elections". In the view of the RUF, my Government would use
the Constitution, constitutional arguments and the issues
of legality to frustrate their ambition. Therefore, only
very grudgingly did they agree with me on an initial shaky
cease-fire in anticipation of full-scale peace talks
between them and the Government.

I knew I had to extract from the military or whatever had
remained of it some element of loyalty for my Government
and a sense of Patriotism. This was necessary because I
needed their loyalty and support in any event. I never
deceived myself that this was an easily achievable
enterprise, but it was an enterprise I had to embark upon.
I therefore appointed the leadership of the Army with due
diligence and after consultations and advice from
appropriate sources.

While pursuing the peace process, I was also aware that the
people were anxious not only to have peace but also to
begin to realize concrete dividends from the restoration of
a democratic government which they had obtained, after much
toil and suffering. Therefore, my government from its
inception had pursued the search for peace and at the same
time embarked upon measures for the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of this war-torn country and its economy.
Because of my relative success with this two-pronged
approach, I was able to retain the patience of the
population and their cooperation and support as they
demonstrated at the elections of 2002.

The Peace Process in Sierra Leone

16. It will be useful to discuss at this juncture, the
process which I refer to here as the Peace Process covering
the period April 1996 to January 2002. This was a most
crucial period in the history of this country. It marked
the heightened atrocities of the rebels which threatened
the very survival of the nation, the attempts by my
Government to bring an end to the war, the initial
indifference of the international community to the plight
and suffering of the people of Sierra Leone until so much
lives were lost and property destroyed, the valiant
determination of the people not only to rid themselves of
the scourge of the rebel war but to restore their dignity
and to determine their own future in a democratic manner
and finally the realization of the international community
that this country and its people deserved to be helped and
saved, which realization resulted in the deployment of the
largest ever U.N. Peace Keeping Force of over17,000 troops
in any one country.

The Abidjan Accord 1996

17. As already stated, my Government had just been elected
in March 1996. Just after this, we rushed into negotiations
with the RUF. We took this step with the knowledge that the
only way of bringing the war to an end was by negotiated
settlement. We were aware of the problem relating to the
questionable loyalty of the military to my civilian
government that had just succeeded a military regime. I was
elected President against the background of the heightened
expectation of the RUF of actually taking over the entire
country because of the successes they had already achieved
in battle. Their manifest hostility to my Government which
by insisting on "elections before peace" had caused them a
sense of frustration was therefore explicable even though
not justifiable. All these weakened the bargaining position
of my Government when it entered the Abidjan Peace Talks
with the RUF rebels in 1996. However, a Peace Agreement was
concluded in spite of the acrimony engendered by the rebels
during the negotiations. The key elements in that Agreement
worth mentioning here were -

The total and immediate cessation of hostilities

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all
combatants

The disbandment and withdrawal from the country of all
mercenaries

The provision of an amnesty for the rebels

The establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The establishment of a Commission for the Consolidation of
the Peace with far reaching responsibilities for ensuring
that the peace agreed in that Accord was sustained

18. The people of Sierra Leone wholeheartedly welcomed the
signing of this Agreement and there was nationwide
jubilation as they regarded it as the end of their woes and
suffering and that it would restore lasting peace to the
country. It soon turned out that the people and the
Government had in fact been deceived b y the RUF. A message
from Foday Sankoh to Sam Bockarie alias Maskita which was
intercepted by the Government only days after the signing
of the Agreement, clearly showed that the RUF did not enter
the peace negotiations in good faith and had no desire to
abide by the terms of the resulting Peace Agreement. In
that message, Foday Sankoh had communicated with his Field
Commander, Sam Bockarie, alias Maskita, that he had agreed
to participate in the negotiations and to sign the Peace
Agreement only as a pretext to relieve himself of the
pressure of the international community; that he never
intended to abide by its terms. In the same message he
ordered his commanders to resume hostilities even with
greater force. Indeed the ceasefire which then prevailed
was unilaterally broken by the RUF immediately after the
signing of the Agreement, a clear indication that the
Abidjan Agreement was doomed to fail.

19. Another matter by which Foday Sankoh demonstrated his
insincerity in relation to the Abidjan Agreement was his
refusal on the very day of the signing of the Agreement to
append his signature to a document prepared and signed by
me which needed to be mutually signed personally by him and
by me to authorize the deployment of 90 UN peacekeepers in
Sierra Leone to monitor the observance of the ceasefire.
The signing of that document by both of us was a
precondition for such deployment. Sankoh had never agreed
to sign that document. Thus, no peacekeepers came to Sierra
Leone to observe the maintenance or otherwise of the
ceasefire under that Agreement which was violated at will
and in every respect by the RUF.

20. My Government however took measures immediately after
the signing of the Abidjan Accord to implement all the
obligations which on its part it had to implement under
that Agreement, in particular those it could implement
without needing the cooperation of the RUF to do so. Thus,
I proclaimed and caused the granting of an amnesty to all
the rebels to be gazetted; my Government terminated the
contract entered into by the previous military regime with
a mercenary South African security outfit, Executive
Outcomes. I myself in principle detest the idea of
mercenaries. But in the circumstances which then prevailed
and to which I succeeded, the Executive Outcomes was the
only credible and dependable military outfit opposing the
rebels. It had held them at bay or at least successfully
delayed their overrunning the entire country up to the date
of the signing of the Abidjan Accord. There was therefore
popular outcry that that outfit was to remain in Sierra
Leone at least for a while. But because of the persistent
demand of the RUF that they would sign the Abidjan Accord
only if it contained a provision for the termination of the
contract of the Executive Outcomes, I yielded to their
demand in spite of the popular opposition and the heavy
financial consequences that followed from the wrongful and
premature termination of that contract. My Government is
still paying the damages which followed from such
termination. But my yielding to the demand of the RUF in
this respect was dictated by my eagerness to produce an
early negotiated settlement of the war and a speedy
restoration of peace to enable my new Government to embark
on the rehabilitation of the people and the economy, and
the reconstruction of the extensively damaged
infrastructure of the country and on meaningful
development. But alas! The real motive of the RUF for their
demand for the exit of the Executive Outcomes as it turned
out was to facilitate their taking over of the whole
country, as with this outfit gone, there remained no
credible and dependable military force to oppose and resist
their advance.

21. My Government was also able to persuade the
international community to prevail on the RUF to nominate
its representatives to the Commission for the Consolidation
of the Peace. This Commission, which was to sit in
Freetown, was to be made up of an equal number of
representatives from the RUF and the Government with a
rotating Chairman. As Foday Sankoh was still resident in
Abidjan and had no intention to return to Freetown until
the RUF had secured victory, the Commission was charged
with the responsibility of reporting to him in Abidjan
progress of their deliberations. For this reason, the
entire Commission went to Abidjan early in 1997 to meet
him. Foday Sankoh refused to see the members of the
Commission who waited to see him for a long time. While the
members of the Commission were still in Abidjan hoping to
see him, Foday Sankoh left for Nigeria in March 1997 where
he was arrested for trafficking in arms. After his arrest,
Sam Bockarie, alias Maskita lured three of the RUF members
of the Commission into a trap where they were arrested
incarcerated and tortured. They were released only in 1999
after the Lomé Peace Agreement was concluded. By Foday
Sankoh's refusal to see the members of the Commission in
Abidjan and the subsequent arrest of its members, he had
brought an end to the implementation of a very significant
provision in the Abidjan Accord and thus jeopardized the
success of that Accord. Again, Foday Sankoh's conduct in
relation to the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
is an indication and affirmation of his initial intention
as manifested in other respects, namely that he did not
enter the negotiations of the Abidjan Agreement in good
faith and he never wished that Agreement to succeed.

22. There were other inherent weaknesses in the Abidjan
Accord itself which, on hindsight, I considered as
contributing to its failure. These were in addition to the
factors external to the Accord and to the real hope of the
RUF of taking the entire country because of the military
situation which then prevailed. In the first place, there
was little or no political incentive in the Accord for the
RUF to abide by the Abidjan Peace Accord. This contrasts
that Accord sharply with the Lomé Peace Agreement. Of
course, the absence of any power sharing provisions in the
Accord was of no great inducement, which to them would have
been merely half of the loaf. They already had firmly
within their grip, or at least they thought, more than half
of the loaf. The remainder of the loaf was attainable with
ease. Thus they did not seriously demand or make power
sharing or political incentives a pre-condition for signing
the Accord. To the credit of the RUF however, some attempts
were made at making some social demands, for example, free
education for all, of course, without consideration to the
devastated state of the country's economy at the time, all
due to them. Secondly, there was also a minimal provision
for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration without
any specific source of funding referred to, which meant
that the average fighter within the RUF's movement was
unlikely to receive any form of monetary payment and would
hardly be able to show anything for the years of fighting
he had been engaged in. Thirdly, unlike the Lome Peace
Agreement, the Abidjan Accord did not provide for a
definite time scale for the implementation of its
provisions except in the case of the Government which had
to do certain things within a rigid time period, for
example, to abrogate the agreement with the Executive
Outcomes within a month of the signing of the Accord.
Fourthly, most of the obligations under the Abidjan Accord
were imposed on the Government. Besides the obligation to
cease hostilities and a few others, the RUF was not
required to do anything or anything within a specific time
frame.

23. Thus, as a result of the provisions in the Abidjan
Accord, while the Government was dismantling its meager
remaining security and defence outfit and structures, the
RUF was consolidating its own, making further penetration
into the country and further strengthening its alliance
with the disloyal members of the Sierra Leone Military
Forces. Existence of this alliance became apparent when the
coup d'etat of the 25th May 1997 occurred. The rapidity
with which the makers of that coup invited the RUF to
participate with them in the coup and the equal rapidity of
the positive response of the RUF to that invitation and
their presence in Freetown and other towns which they had
not been able to penetrate earlier are all clear
manifestations of the existence of such alliance long
before the date of the coup.

THE INITIAL INDIFFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO
THE PLIGHT OF SIERRA LEONE

24. For some years the war in Sierra Leone was treated as a
localized conflict which did not deserve international
attention or even indirect intervention. This was the
position up to the time I assumed power in 1996. I made
several requests for international assistance to strengthen
the capacity of the security forces especially in the areas
of intelligence gathering and training but to these
requests I either received a flat refusal or where there
was some positive response, the assistance given was too
paltry to make any significant impact. I give here some
instances of the way in which the international community
initially reacted to my requests for assistance and the
dire need we then had to build up a dependable intelligence
network.

After the signing of the Abidjan Accord in 1996 and when it
became apparent to me that the RUF was not going to comply
with the terms of that Accord, I started thinking of other
ideas of beefing up the security of the country. My initial
approach was to the Americans to assist us with weapons, as
our armoury was empty. The rebuff I had from my request was
that the United States Government would not as a matter of
policy provide to a third world country aid which might
turn out to be lethal.

I then requested the Americans and the British to assist us
with the training of our soldiers at the Benguema Training
Centre. Their response was to send five soldiers, two
Americans and three British. The highest rank of them was
that of a Sergeant. In the course of the training at
Benguema there was a report of a rebel attack at Kabala. I
ordered the deployment of some soldiers who were then being
trained by the British and Americans to Kabala to deal with
that attack. These soldiers mutinied instead of complying
with my orders as their Commander-in-Chief. The reaction of
the American and British training team to this situation
was to leave the country without even saying goodbye.

A real handicap which my Government faced after the Abidjan
Accord which again had adverse effect on the security
situation in the country, was not only the absence of a
dependable system of gathering intelligence, but the
failure by the security forces to provide my Government
with reliable and credible intelligence which would form a
proper basis for the Government to make policies or take
actions relating to the security of the country. When they
gave intelligence reports such reports were full of
contradictions, deliberate falsehoods and deceptions, all
aimed at misleading my Government into believing that the
army, in relation to the conduct of the war, was on top of
the situation. Sometimes, I would receive at the same time
two intelligence reports about the same situation or
incident which were so diametrically opposed to each other
that I was unable to act on either of them. I give here
some examples of such contradictory, misleading and false
intelligence reports that were furnished to me at the time.
I give below some examples:-

At one time I received an intelligence report that the
rebels were preparing an attack on Pujehun and within
moments I received another report that the rebels were
leaving Pujehun to attack Kailahun. In that situation I
would not decide whether I was to order the defence of
Pujehun or of Kailahun.

On a number of occasions the army Chief and his men brought
to me information about a successful military campaign by
them which resulted in the routing or dislocation of the
enemy and seizure or destruction of its logistics including
even the killing of known rebel commanders. Such a false
account was given to me in relation to a purported attack
of government troops on a rebel camp in the provinces. In
the report it was alleged that that camp was wholly
destroyed, a large number of rebels including their
commander, Superman, was killed. A photograph of a charred
bed alleged to have been that of Superman was produced to
me as proof of the truth of the contents of that report.
Superman was one of the most hated of the rebel commanders
as he was notorious for his unrelenting propensity to cause
mayhem and carnage on the civilian population. As it turned
out, the report was wholly untrue. The particular camp was
never attacked by Government troops and it remained intact
long after the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999. Superman
himself remained alive for a long time after that report
and he perished only in a brawl that ensued later within
the ranks of the rebels themselves.

In the attempt of the security forces to furnish me with
false intelligence reports, I had the experience of
listening in the military network to a conversation between
two military officers one giving a glowing account of a
very successful exploit by the Government troops against
the rebels. This conversation became the subject of a
Situation Report (Sitrep), which was presented to me in
order to give the impression that the military's conduct of
the war against the rebels deserved to be commended. It
turned out that the contents of that Sitrep did not bear
any reality to any event at all, but that the two officers
who were in conversation were each in different rooms of
State House.

When I received from members of the public information
relating to security matters, the only means I had for
checking on the status of such information was to refer it
to the existing security outfit for investigation. I had no
means of verifying the accuracy of whatever findings on
that information that was reported to me.

As a result of this appalling lack of dependable means for
me to be furnished with credible and truthful intelligence,
I sought from the United Kingdom Government, assistance in
this area. My request was turned down on the grounds that
to assist an African Government in the area of intelligence
would amount to assisting that Government to entrench
itself and to resist any regime change. Because of this
latter rebuff, my Government increasingly turned for
assistance in this area and other areas to our ECOWAS
neighbours, principally Nigeria, and then Guinea and
others.

The military coup of May, 1997

25. On my taking up office as President in 1996 thereby
succeeding a military junta, the National Provisional
Ruling Council (NPRC) I was bequeathed with a security
outfit which had been politicized for years as I have
already mentioned and which regarded itself as having
loyalty not to the Government of the day but to the only
political class which they had known over the years and to
which they had related. The one thing the NRPC coup of 1992
did was to bring an end to that political hegemony and to
prevent it from perpetuating itself further. But the ill
effect of that coup, like all others, was to entrench the
military in government in this case for a period of four
years. In this situation, even when the leadership of the
NPRC appeared to have given up power on the assumption of
office of my civilian Government in 1996 there still
remained in the military in both senior and junior ranks,
elements who had tasted power and what they considered as
the perquisites of power. They were not prepared to give
these up lightly and become loyal to my civilian
Government. These were, for instance, personal bodyguards,
drivers and batmen of the NPRC Secretaries of State. Such
lackeys, because of the positions occupied by their patrons
were able to amass a lot of ill-gotten wealth by their
extortion and intimidation of the civilian population who
held such soldiers in awe. The fear of their losing their
undeserved privileges and of an end of the opportunities
they had for amassing more wealth illegally was one main
reason for their unwillingness to accept the changes from a
military regime to civilian rule.

26. In addition to their continued active collaboration
with the rebels, they attempted a number of coups d'etat,
which were foiled. One such coup plot involving an acting
Major Johnny Paul Koroma was unearthed early in 1997. In
order to produce a thorough and objective investigation
into the allegations relating to that plot I requested the
Government of Nigeria to assist my Government by the
provision of experienced Nigerian investigators. As a
result of those investigations Major Johnny Paul Koroma and
a number of junior military officers were charged with
treason. In this case, even though all the accused persons
were military men and therefore liable to be tried by
court-martial, they were all indicted in a civilian court.
The trial was in progress when the AFRC coup occurred in
May, 1997. The prisons were broken into and the accused
persons were released. Major Johnny Paul Koroma became the
leader and Chairman of the junta. I and my Government then
went into exile in Guinea from where we operated. The
entire Sierra Leone populace and the international
community totally rejected that coup, refused to cooperate
with the junta, and demanded the immediate and
unconditional restoration of my civilian government.

27. Because of the refusal of the AFRC (which was now in
formal league with the RUF) to relinquish power and the
uncompromising insistence of the people of the country and
the international community on the restoration of my
civilian government, it became necessary for ECOWAS to
device an exit strategy for the AFRC. This became the
Conakry Peace Plan of November 1997. By this plan, the
AFRC/RUF were to take measures one after another to
dismantle their outfit with a view of restoring my
Government back in Sierra Leone within six months of the
conclusion of the Plan. Of course, the AFRC/RUF failed to
comply and this resulted in the military intervention by
ECOMOG in February , 1998, the ousting of that military
junta and the eventual restoration of my Government in
Freetown.

28. It needs to be stated that my Government was not a
party to the Conakry Peace Plan of 1997. It only had an
observer status at the talks that resulted in that Plan. My
Government did not wish to compromise its constitutional
credentials by entering into a dialogue with the AFRC/RUF
on the status of that junta on which it did not at all wish
to confer even de facto legality. Again, the issue of power
sharing between my Government and the AFRC/RUF junta or for
that matter any other entity appeared for the first time in
the Conakry Peace Plan.

28a. Incidentally, before I leave the AFRC, I need to give
a brief account of some of the reckless manner in which
that regime dealt with the assets of this country. Some of
the associates of the junta had no restraint in causing
further havoc on the country.

At the request of Mr. Victor Foh, a gentleman, Mr. Michael
Hart Jones, purporting to belong to a company named Africa
Trade Link Ltd. entered into an arrangement with the AFRC
junta whereby the unused mining and mineral reserves of
this country were to be used as collateral for a loan that
the junta was determined to obtain.

In this connection in a faxed message sent to Mr. Foh,
dated 24th September 1997, Mr. Hart-Jones purported to have
secured one billion dollars for the project. The project
was to involve the Government giving four securities to the
tune of $200 million and the mining concessions were to be
the collateral. The funds to be raised by this arrangement
were alleged to be intended to be utilized partly on the
services of the AFRC junta.

The scheme was to be effected as follows:-

A company named Commercial African Development Ltd. (CARD)
was re-registered in Sierra Leone on the 19th day of
December 1997. This Company was made to enter into a joint
partnership with the junta and the mining concessions in
respect of the richest mining areas in the country were
given to the joint venture. Four Bank Guarantees of $50
million each dated 12th November 1997, in favour of CARD
for the $200 million secured were then issued by the
Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone and the Minister of
Finance, both appointees of the junta.

If the AFRC had not been ousted in February 1998, thereby
aborting the scheme, the effect on Sierra Leone and its
economy as a result of this arrangement would have been -

 Laundered money would have been brought into this country
undetected and this would have had serious adverse effect
on the economy for a very long time. In the fax message in
question, it was made clear that the one billion dollars
which was said to have been earmarked to be brought to the
country would have been brought stealthily and under cover.


The Bank of Sierra Leone and the Government would have been
encumbered with an obligation to discharge the security of
$200 million as a result of a scheme that would not have
benefited the people and Government of Sierra Leone, and in
any case, only members of the junta and their associates
like Victor Foh would have been the beneficiaries of that
arrangement.

The worst aspect of that scheme was that the richest and
most profitable mining areas in this country were given as
collateral under that arrangement and those areas were
available to be mined without restriction and the proceeds
from them taken away without any account given. The areas
to be affected were carefully identified and mapped out.

The documents involved in this transaction are available
here for the Commission's perusal.

The account of this transaction needs to be brought to the
notice of the Commission merely for the purpose of further
illustrating the reckless manner in which regimes, which
were unaccountable, schemed to wreck the economy and
destroy the mineral assets of this country.

The Lomé Peace Agreement 1999

29. During the intervention by ECOMOG in February 1998, a
number of the senior cadre of the AFRC/RUF junta and their
men escaped arrest and sought refuge in the jungle. There
they regrouped in readiness to make a comeback. They
intensified their activities predominantly in the diamond
mining areas. Thus, they were able to mine diamonds which
they exchanged cheaply for weapons with which they armed
themselves to the teeth. The concentration of ECOMOG was
mainly in the large towns. The AFRC/RUF were able to move
through the jungle into Freetown. It was the invasion of
the Capital City of Freetown and the slaughtering of
thousands of civilians which, for the first time, awakened
genuine international awareness to the plight of the
civilian population. That incursion was remarkable because
of the speed with which it almost engulfed the city and by
the level of the mayhem and destruction which resulted from
it.

30. The outcome of that incursion was the dire need for the
acceleration of the peace process. In collaboration with
ECOWAS, the international community was now willing to
intervene, at least diplomatically, and they together with
the Government were now determined to find a workable and
lasting solution to the rebel menace in this country. This
led to the commencement of the dialogue which resulted in
the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999. The initial stage for the
dialogue was set when I was invited to Lomé to sign a
Ceasefire Agreement with the RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh in
March 1999. I did this amidst a lot of misgivings from the
people of Sierra Leone. From the bitter experience they had
had regarding Foday Sankoh's attitude to the Abidjan Peace
Accord they on the one hand, preferred an all out war
against the rebels and an attainment of peace by their
defeat in battle. I on the other, was aware of the
handicaps and limitations of the Government to proceed that
way. I was also aware of the pending restoration of a
democratically elected Government in Nigeria as a result of
which the continued stay of the Nigerian contingent in
ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, which was by far the largest, could
not be guaranteed. Thus I chose the path of dialogue, but
this time, careful to avoid the pitfalls and weaknesses in
the Abidjan Peace Accord.

31. In my opinion, there is the need to state here why a
new Peace Agreement was necessary in order to reactivate
the Peace Process; why we did not just resurrect the
Abidjan Peace Accord, which after all had never been
abrogated. It was even reaffirmed in the Lomé Agreement
itself. The most important element now was the AFRC factor,
which was not present in the Abidjan Peace Accord. There
was also the emergence of a new portent force, the Civil
Defence Forces to which too recognition had to be given in
any new arrangement. Thus, the objective aimed to be
achieved by a new peace agreement could not be achieved by
merely effecting a patchwork to the Abidjan Peace Accord.

 Reasons for the Relative Success of the Lomé Peace
Agreement 1999

32. Although a number of terms in the Abidjan Peace Accord
were imported into the Lomé Peace Agreement, there were
additional key factors on the ground and in the latter
Agreement itself that led to its success.

There was then a robust presence of ECOMOG on the ground
which was given a role in the monitoring of the
implementation and observance of the terms of the
Agreement. ECOMOG, unlike the Sierra Leone army had already
demonstrated their ability and willingness to successfully
confront the AFRC/RUF.

There were above all else the power sharing provisions in
the Lomé Agreement. These included Cabinet, Deputy
Ministerial, Ambassadorial positions and Directorships in
Parastatals

There was the appointment of the RUF Leader as Chairman of
the newly provided-for Commission for the Management of
Strategic Mineral Resources plus status equivalent to Vice
President.

Extensive provisions were made for the payment of all sorts
of fees and allowances to the rank and file of the RUF in
exchange for their participation in the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process.

There were numerous provisions in the Agreement itself
committing the international community to the funding or
assisting in the funding of a number of the activities or
institutions established by the Agreement.

33. All these offers and provisions in that Agreement
proved too tantalizing for the AFRC/RUF to refuse. It was
these new provisions which finally tilted the balance in
favour of the peace process. The benefits of all those
offers had to be enjoyed in Sierra Leone and they could not
be enjoyed by a person still engaged in war against the
Government. Thus the disarmament proceeded steadily.

34. Another matter which assisted the implementation of the
Lomé Peace Agreement was the fact that activities that were
provided for in the Agreement had to be performed within
stated time periods. Further, that Agreement like the
Abidjan Accord, also conferred on the members of the
AFRC/RUF a blanket amnesty for all their wrong doings up to
the date of the Agreement.

35. To the average Sierra Leonean, the terms of the Lomé
Agreement were like a bitter pill they were asked to
swallow. It was like the case of the perpetrators being
richly rewarded whilst the poor victims received nothing at
all and were further required in the name of reconciliation
to forgive and forget. Had it not been for the events of
May 8, 2000 the members of the AFRC/RUF would most likely
still be enjoying the benefits of the provisions of the
Lomé Peace Agreement. But unfortunately, the temptation
arose within the ranks of the AFRC/RUF to continuously
breach the terms of the Agreement. In the process, they
articulated one of the weaknesses inherent in the Agreement
which was that in the absence of any provision vis-à-vis
accountability and particularly because of the blanket
amnesty the attitude of the rank and file of the members of
the AFRC/RUF was that they could continue to commit further
atrocities without being held to account. We had resisted
the persuasion of the international community for the
exclusion of war crimes, crimes against humanity and
against international humanitarian law from the
applicability of the amnesty provision in the Lome
Agreement. We did this deliberately. We realized that
limiting the operation of the amnesty provisions would give
a justification to the AFRC/RUF for refusing to sign that
Agreement and for the resumption of hostilities in the
country. Thus, we put beyond the ability and outside the
jurisdiction of our domestic courts power over the
prosecution of crimes committed before the signing of the
Lomé Agreement since the amnesty granted amount to a
constitutional bar to any form of prosecution in our
domestic courts in respect of the offences amnestied.
Further, there was no provision in the Agreement that was
to act as a deterrent against the resumption of hostilities
on the part of the AFRC/RUF. This led to numerous occasions
of violent acts by individual members of AFRC/RUF
particularly in the provinces - all in the belief that
those acts would go unpunished. Thus, the threat of the
AFRC/RUF resuming hostilities was always hanging like the
sword of Damocles over the heads of Sierra Leoneans.

36. Indeed, both the Abidjan Peace Accord and the Lomé
Peace Agreement provided for a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, and obviously since the Commission would not
have powers to punish, the AFRC/RUF willingly agreed to its
inclusion in the Agreement. Again even long before the
enactment of the legislation for the establishment of the
TRC, I had myself embarked upon a nationwide campaign to
urge reconciliation and forgiveness as I regarded this as a
most important element for the sustenance of the peace. I
had also urged my Ministers and other Government officials
and functionaries to take advantage of their private or
public discussions with members of the public to do the
same. When the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000
was promulgated, I established a committee comprising some
key Ministers and RUF members to tour the provinces
together to urge reconciliation and reintegration of
ex-combatants in their communities of origin.

37. But alas! The insincerity of the AFRC/RUF both in
negotiating and adhering to the Peace Agreements had been
abundantly manifested by the 8th of May, 2000. Although
they were anxious to receive and utilize all the benefits
and privileges accorded them under the Lomé Peace
Agreement, they certainly were not interested in the
burdens thereunder, nor did they consider themselves bound
by that Agreement in so far as it imposed any obligations
on them. Unfortunately, they could not and did not avail
themselves of the benefits without fulfilling their own
obligations since there were no conditions precedent to be
fulfilled by them, nor were these benefits tied up
reciprocally to any obligations on their part. Rather, most
of the Government's obligations were to be performed within
the context of a strict time frame regardless of
non-performance on the part of the AFRC/RUF. It was
therefore inevitable that the harassed, brutalized and
dehumanized citizens of Sierra Leone would finally rise
against the excesses of the AFRC/RUF which were in flagrant
violation to what the people considered as the final peace
settlement in the form of the Lomé Peace Agreement. The
people organized a peaceful demonstration and marched on
the residence of Foday Sankoh, the rebel leader, to insist
on his observing the terms of the Agreement and to refrain
from continuing with activities which obviously threatened
the peace, activities such as the continued taking as
hostages of UN Peace Keepers and the persistent laying of
ambushes on the highways for unsuspecting civilian
travellers. His response to this peaceful demonstration was
the cold-blooded murder of 21 of the demonstrators.

38. It was as a direct result of the events that led up to
and inclusive of the incidence of the 8th May 2000 that my
Government realised the insistence of the international
community that there was a need to introduce some form of
accountability mechanism and an avenue for the punishment
of the perpetrators of the war crimes and other crimes. The
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General had, during
the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, expressly reserved
the right of the international community not to be bound by
the amnesty provision in respect of flagrant violations of
international humanitarian law and war crimes. This belated
realization of my Government resulted in an agreement with
the United Nations in January 2001 for the setting up of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

The Civil Defence Force

39. At this point I consider it necessary to give a brief
account of the Civil Defence Force as this outfit played a
very significant role in the peace process. The promotion
of reconciliation and national reintegration will be
incomplete without their participation and cooperation in
the process. At a particular point they were perceived as
and became the embodiment of the collective will and
determination of the population to resist the combined
forces of the RUF rebels, AFRC and all other forces opposed
to the legitimate regime of this country. For this reason
it is important to include in this presentation a
historical account of the CDF, how this institution
evolved, the role it played and its relationship with the
military forces.

40. Quite early after the RUF incursion into Sierra Leone
in 1991 many able-bodied men volunteered to assist the
Sierra Leone army in diverse ways in the prosecution of the
war within their localities. Some of this assistance
included providing information, guides and porter services
in terrains in which they were obviously more familiar
with. Some of the much younger volunteers had even become
adopted members (so to speak) of some military units as
they provided food, shelter and clothing and traveled with
them virtually everywhere they went. The more adventurous
of the volunteers were even encouraged to carry out more
challenging tasks including penetrating behind rebel lines.
Sometimes they were given weapons for such missions.

41. Before long, these volunteers, now named vigilantes,
increasingly became casualties. Their numbers had increased
many times and in most units they almost outnumbered the
military personnel. This situation on many occasions
interfered or impacted negatively on the performance of the
forces as situations later proved. The Vigilantes at a
later stage as they became more adventurous and became
casualties made a collective request for their lot to be
issued with weapons. In response to this request they were
issued with MK 4 rifles and a substantial amount of
ammunition. This practice heralded the proliferation of
arms in the Eastern and Southern Sierra Leone for the most
part of 1991 and 1992. Gradually the demands of the
Vigilantes increased in types, quantities and quality of
the equipment they asked for. In addition to the stores
supplied, the Military was to start receiving subsidies to
formally provide rations for the Vigilantes. The level of
such provisions and rations will be given below. Control of
many of the Vigilante groups became very difficult for most
units. It was reported then that many of the Vigilantes had
been engaged in reprisal killings of their people as they
avenged the brutal killings and burning of their family
houses by rebels believed to have been aided by rival
townsmates. Also reported was collusion between the rebels
and some units of the military. This explains the lack of
trust by the CDF of the military much later in the
conflict.

43. By 1992 when the NPRC overthrew the APC government,
perhaps the most organized of the Vigilante groups was the
TAMABORO group from Koinadugu District. They were drawn
from local hunters in the district and were believed to
have supernatural powers, like many other groups that were
formed long after. Some of these powers were widely
accepted to have been demonstrated in many attacks the
Tamaboro group led. Before long, however, the Tamaboro
group became disillusioned as they complained they were
unfavourably treated as compared to the Vigilantes located
with the military forces deployed in the Eastern and
Southern Provinces. Twice between 1992 and 1994 the
Tamaboros were asked to return their weapons and return
home.

44. With the increased demands of the Vigilantes and the
need for them to have some formal military training, a few
hundreds of them in the Eastern and Southern Provinces were
selected and absorbed as Border Guards (BGs) and allocated
military-style identification numbers. These Border Guards
received their initial training within the units around
which they were recruited. At the completion of their
training, they were paid monthly allowances. By this time,
the Border Guards could use about every type of weapon the
soldiers were using.

45. Additional intakes or absorption of the Vigilantes or
Border Guards were made and within the first three years of
the war their numerical strength had almost equaled that of
the regular soldiers. At this point the distrust between
the military and the Vigilantes/Border Guards was mounting.
The Vigilantes perceived some of the regular forces as
colluding with the RUF rebels to attack their villages,
kill their relations and destroy their properties.

46. By 1992 when the NPRC announced formally that Vigilante
groups were to be formed in every locality, there were
already many such groupings in many parts in the South and
East working closely with the military. As the conflict
moved to the North more Vigilante groups were formed in
Port Loko, Bombali and Tonkolili Districts. These regional
groupings developed later in the GBETHIS and KAPRAS in
Temne areas in the North, and Tamaboro (reactivated) in
Koinadugu and DONSOS in the Kono District. By far the
largest grouping was the KAMAJORS, which drew its
membership from the large Vigilante groups already existing
in most of the Eastern and Southern Provinces. The
Vigilante groups came to be referred to collectively as the
Civil Defence Force (CDF).

47. The Kamajors were more cohesive and enjoyed the support
of large numbers of sons and daughters both locally and in
the Diaspora. Many had rightly assessed and experienced
that the greatest destruction of human and material
resources had taken place in their own homelands by that
time. Other motivating factors included the frustration
over the less-than desired efforts demonstrated by the
military already perceived to be an extension of the
already overthrown APC - hence their invigorating
determination to provide their own defence. So, by the time
the 1996 elections drew nearer and the established support
demonstrated by the potential winning SLPP, the Kamajors
and by extension the other CDF elements enjoyed
considerable support not limited to their individual base
areas. The people had then developed a collective and
nationalistic faith in their resolve to take the defence of
their country and their livelihood with or without their
armed forces. The CDF symbolised that determination.

48. The CDF continued to play significant roles in
providing the necessary leverage at critical stages for
Government to tilt the scale to its favour - first against
the RUF and on many occasions against the combined forces
of the RUF and AFRC. For this reason, the CDF became a
household name as the people embraced it as the viable
option. They provided the leverage at the 1996 elections;
they were the vanguard of the ECOMOG-led force that
countered the AFRC/RUF junta; they provided the leverage
when the RUF misbehaved again and again - notably during
the May 8, 2000 problem; they helped to send a clear
message to all renegades that the people meant to realize
the peace promised by my Presidency sooner rather than
later, by the end of 2000. At the end of their voluntary
service they gracefully disarmed, demobilized and most have
since returned to their respective homes. Those who opted
to go through the Military Reintegration Programme and were
successful are now proud members of the Republic of Sierra
Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). Others still have been trained
or are being trained in preparation for their reintegration
into profitable civilian life.

49. It needs to be stated here that the role played by the
CDF was at considerable cost to the Government. The
numerical strength of the CDF nationwide was, towards the
end of the war, given as 86,000 men.

The following expenditure on the CDF excluding cost of
armsand ammunition for the Financial Year 2002 gives an
idea of the financial burden the Government necessarily
carried:

Ration (Rice):

(rice): 5,160 bags @ Le28,00 per bag
That is, Le144,480,000.00 per month
or - Le1,733,760,000.00 per annum

Condiments:

Le400 pr person for 30 days -
That is, Le103,200,000.00 per month
or - Le1,238,400.00 per annum

Other Expenditures (transportation, fuel etc.)

Le753,418,491.36 per annum.

These figures show that the Government's total expenditure
on the CDF for the Financial Year 2001 was
Le3,725,578,491.36 (Three billion, seven hundred and
twenty-five million, five hundred and seventy-eight
thousand, four hundred and ninety-one Leones and thirty-six
cents).

Expenditure on the RSLAF for the Financial Year 2001:

The expenditure on an estimated 15,000 men in the RSLAF in
the Financial Year 2001 is given below. Again, these
figures exclude salaries and allowances and the cost of
arms and ammunition. The expenditure on the RSLAF for the
same period was:-

Diets-Rice: 7,000 bags @ Le 29,000.00 per bag
Le2,436,000,000.00.

Cash Ration Condiments: Le600.00 per soldier per day for 30
days - Le279,000,000.00 but government approved only
le270,000,000.00 per month.

Standing Monthly Imprest to Joint Support Command for
Unclassified expenditure-Le100,000.000.00.

Medical Imprest-Le50,000,000.00 monthly to Director, forces
medical services for the procurement of medical items for
the Military not provided in the drugs contract.

Imprest for CDS-Le5,000,000.00 monthly.

Drugs-Le100,000,000.00 monthly.

Other Hospital equipment-Le2,914,387,692.00 monthly.

Fuel and Lubricants-Le2,782,978,767.00 monthly.

Support and Attack Helicopter Contract-Le5,475,387,692.00
per annum.

Spares for vehicles etc.-Le1,039,357,950.00.

Building Materials and related expenses for maintenance of
military properties and buildings-Le1,177,825,978.00.

Stationery, Office equipment and
furniture-Le1,015,476,427.00.

Utility Bills-700,880,127.00.

Travelling overseas and Intelligence
gathering-Le1,552,352,667.00.

G1098 Stores-Le119,820,550.00.

Payment to Freetown Funeral Services Le17,585,00.00.

Rents and Compensations-Le302,669,540.00

Refund to Social Security fund for Rice-Le922,040,000.00.

Ferry Crossing-Le68,799,300.00.

Total expenditure on the RSLAF for the year 2001 was
le25,625,561,690 (twenty-five billion, six hundred and
twenty-five million five hundred and sixty-one thousand six
hundred and ninety Leones).

 50. The logistics support and the disbursement of the
funds to the CDF was through their National Civil
Coordinator, with whom their administration and supervision
lay. The funds were provided direct from the Ministry of
Finance through the Ministry of Defence.

51. As President, I did not and could not have interfered
in the operations or the internal organization as I was not
a member of the Society to which all the members of the CDF
had to belong and which created a bond among them. My role
was confined to ensuring that Government provided the
required funds and logistics and to insisting that the
membership of the CDF was contented, motivated enough to
perform their security roles.

The Special Task Force

52. Another group which I came to know about much later as
part of the security units utilized by the military, was
the "Special Task Force". I was never briefed about this
when I assumed office as President in 1996. I knew about
the existence of this unit only on the day of the AFRC coup
d'etat. Yet the army without regard for the origin and true
motive of the members of this group had used them regularly
and depended on them considerably.

53. It is important for this Commission to be told of the
role played by this unit in thwarting our peace efforts. It
is an instance of the reckless regard with which our
national army treated the security of the country.

54. The SPECIAL TASK FORCE was a grouping of mainly
Liberian militia personnel who survived the several
internal power struggles that characterized the initial
coalition force put together to counter Charles Taylor's
NPFL forces in Liberia.

55. By late 1990 when the Liberian war had reached the
outskirts of Monrovia, the refugee flow into Sierra Leone
had reached its highest peak. Among these refugees were a
substantial number of remnants of the late President Samuel
Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and Liberia Police
Force personnel who had fled the fighting. Their common
objective was to regroup and return to Liberia to continue
their resistance against Charles Taylor's NPFL. This group
included a number of influential Liberians who were
supporters of the late Samuel Doe's regime. This new
alliance was received by the APC Government and allowed to
remain in the country, and a special relationship developed
between them and the Government. Gradually and predictably
the Liberians requested for support from the Government,
initially by way of better accommodation facilities for
their leaders and then financial support. When the RUF
incursion occurred in Sierra Leone in March 1991 the
Government yielded to their demand to be supplied with
weapons which they could use to stave off the Charles
Taylor inspired incursion. By this time, they had developed
independent ambitions of their own, namely to use the
weapons supplied them by the Government to invade Liberia
and halt the rapid advances of Charles Taylor. Thus instead
of utilizing the weapons supplied them in the defence of
this country they hid them and always came back demanding
more weapons for more military operations, many of which
were only stage-managed.

56. Eventually, the unit of Liberian dissidents and
refugees in Sierra Leone was named ULIMO with Roosevelt
Johnson as their field commander. Again the new structure
was fraught with intrigues amongst the various tribal
groups notably KHRANS and MADINGOS. A split occurred,
Alhaji Koroma spearheaded a splinter group - ULIMO K backed
by Mandingo financiers based in Kenema (and some key
Guinean top officials). The other group holding allegiance
to Roosevelt Johnson became the ULIMO J faction.

57. When the NPRC Government took over in 1992 ULIMO did
not take long to support the overthrow. Efforts by the
ousted APC regime to get them to mobilise against the NPRC
did not yield much. Again, at that stage ULIMO used the
opportunity to acquire more weapons and other logistical
support. They joined the new regime as they now saw a
better future in the perceived-to-be more youthful NPRC.

58. The NPRC inherited from the APC regime the problem of
ULIMO, but it too never settled it or attempted to settle
it. All it did was to insist on the dropping of the "J" and
"K" from the names of the two factions and to collectively
rename them SPECIAL TASK FORCE (STF). The Special Task
Force was then almost incorporated in to the Sierra Leone
Army and they received salaries, allowances and their
supplies were regularly replenished. The two leaders of the
ULIMO K and ULIMO J factions, Alhaji Koroma and General
Johnson respectively later became members of the interim
Government of Liberia headed by Charles Taylor. Brigadier
David Livingston Bropleh eventually became the new head of
the Special Task Force.

59. The Special Task Force had its own command line
separate from that of the Sierra Leone Army. Their
personnel were attached to the army units throughout the
country. For many operations, however, the Special Task
Force elements in the units were regrouped into one large
unit. There was a general understanding that the Special
Task Force were experienced in jungle warfare and could
match the RUF in the brutal manner in which they handled
their troops - and hence their perceived effectiveness in
jungle fighting compared to the troops of the Sierra Leone
army.

60. My Government inherited the STF, but I never knew of
the existence of this outfit within the security apparatus
as no one briefed me about its existence. Incidentally this
situation was no different from the military's about my
persistent requests to know more about the military itself
especially in such crucial matters as the strength of the
military. There was no other means which I could source
such information. But as the war was still waging I allowed
the status quo to continue while my Government continued to
provide funds, rations and other logistics as demanded by
the military.

61. I first knew of the existence of the Special Task Force
as part of our security apparatus on the 25th May, 1997,
the day of the AFRC coup. While I was listening to the
military network, I heard the Chief of Defence Staff then
of the Sierra Leone military, ordering the Special Task
Force to move and engage the disloyal troops so as to foil
the incipient coup. Instead of doing this, the Special Task
Force moved and joined forces with the AFRC junta and
together they overpowered the few remaining loyal troops.
Their leader, General Bropleh was compensated by the AFRC
junta when he was made adviser to Johnny Paul Koroma and
given special privileges.

General Bropleh and his STF followers fled together with
other AFRC Junta personnel when the ECOMOG-led force
removed the junta from Freetown in February 1998. Together
they played an active role in all the attacks that
displaced ECOMOG and Government troops in such places as
Koidu, Makeni, Kamakwie and Lunsar. They supported the
January 6th 1999 attack of Freetown. On the recall of all
military personnel in 2000 after the granting of the
amnesty in the Lomé Peace Agreement 1999, the STF
resurfaced with General Bropleh still at the helm of the
Force. When this fact came to my knowledge I ordered the
expulsion of General Bropleh and his men from Sierra Leone.
He made a U-turn and was back in the country. I finally
succeeded in getting him out of the country when I insisted
with UNHCR that it was their responsibility to secure a
safe haven for this man and that his continued stay in
Sierra Leone was no longer desirable.

63. This account, I hope, gives the Commission an idea of
the precarious security situation which prevailed in the
country before and after my assumption of office. That
situation did not arise accidentally. It was contrived
without due regard for the true security of the people of
this country and it was the people who became victims of
the reckless conduct of their Government.

CONCLUSION

64. In this Statement I have endeavoured to furnish the
Commission with an account of the political experience the
people of Sierra Leone went through for nearly three
decades and how this adversely impacted on the security of
this country. I have illustrated the consequences which
flowed from the conduct of previous Governments when such
conduct was not focused on or did not take into account the
interest of the people and the nation which those
governments purported to serve. I have shown how a
Government which is more preoccupied with its own survival
is bound to embark on measures which will alienate from it
the citizens who do not necessarily subscribe to its views
on national issues and thereby exclude them from
participation in the governance of the nation. I have
further narrated the myriad of state actions which resulted
in the destruction of national cohesion and in the
alienation of the people whom it is now our duty to
reconcile and reintegrate. Some of the matters I have
narrated here are within my personal knowledge. Some have
come to my knowledge from the materials I have come by, as
a result of my own researches or from the accounts given to
me by persons credible enough to be believed. I am aware
that this Commission will be submitting its Report and
Recommendations to me in due course for my consideration.
Be that as it may, I now wish to bring to the attention of
the Commission some of my own views and thoughts on how
reconciliation can be promoted in this country and how
national reintegration can better be achieved, and the
steps and measures my Government has taken so far in this
direction. I believe that these will not only prevent a
recurrence of the horrible experiences the people of this
country have gone through, but will also further promote
national cohesion.

Sierra Leone Governments should always strive to maintain
peaceful relations with other countries, especially
neighbouring countries. Efforts should be made at giving
this country a reputation of a haven of peace where both
citizens and non-citizens can live in peace. Instead of
embarking on a deliberate policy of fuming conflicts and
discord in neighbouring countries, our Governments should
strive to make Sierra Leone a Centre for peace talks and
peace settlements and the resolution of conflicts between
countries and within sister countries.

Government and all opinion formers should lead in the
promotion of reconciliation and national reintegration. The
effort in this regard should be real and practical. I have
referred in this Statement to the practical steps my
Government has taken and continues to take in this
direction. I have since established the office of
reconciliation and national reintegration with the former
Vice President of Sierra Leone as head. His principal role
is to visit areas in the country where there may be a
concentration of persons who because of their activities
during the war are now afraid or reluctant to return to
their original localities. His business is to reconcile
those persons to their communities and facilitate their
reintegration.

Governments should maintain zero tolerance for corruption.
Above all, Governments should avoid the use of public funds
to promote political causes and in order to ensure its stay
in power. I have given in this Statement a glaring example
of how the APC Party was intent on using public funds to
prevent the holding of elections which it was sure to lose.
This was an instance of blatant abuse of office and it was
bound to provoke the resentment of the people.

Governments should espouse the observance of human rights
by all State Organs. Every citizen should experience
fairness and equality of treatment by the State. It is for
this reason that my Government is contemplating the
establishment of an effective human rights organization as
a successor to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It
is hoped that when established that unit will ensure the
protection of the rights of the citizens even against the
Government. More importantly it would be structured in such
a way and given enough capacity to educate the citizens
adequately on their rights under the law and also their
civic obligations. I hold the view that unless the people
are aware of their rights and their civic duties, they
cannot insist on the observance of those rights nor can the
Government properly expect them to perform their own civic
obligations to the State and their community.

Any effort whether made overtly or covertly or by any ruse
by the government or President to extend its or his stay in
office beyond the period provided for in the Constitution
should be condemned and criminalized. We have seen in this
country how Governments stage-managed demonstrations
demanding the continued stay in office of a President
irrespective of the Constitutional provision on the matter.


The use of hired thugs to advance any political objective
should be proscribed as a threat to the security of the
State.

All civil defence organizations shall only operate within
the security system of the country. Where such organization
become necessary, they should be an integral part of the
security apparatus of the country and subject to its formal
command structure.

Governments should practise measures which will promote
national cohesion. Thus appointments to public offices not
made on merit but on the basis of regional, religious or
personal affiliations can only militate against the
promotion of national cohesion.

I am aware of the cynical attitude of the people generally
against politicians. Because of the record of politicians
in this country, the attitude of the people is, with some
justification even more cynical. If there is no change in
the behaviour of politicians, the people will lose
confidence in them. The consequence of this happening will
be awful to contemplate. One way to restore the trust and
confidence of the people in all those holding political
offices is to convince them that they hold such offices for
the purpose of serving the population and not for personal
enrichment or self aggrandizement. Our catch-word as
politicians should be service. We need to demonstrate this
in a practical way. It is for this reason that I have often
described myself as the Chief Servant of the people and
required all other public officers to regard themselves as
servants of the people. A practical way of our illustration
of the concept of service and not personal gain is by
subjecting our own salaries to the determination by a
Commission comprising Civil Society and other prominent
citizens, particularly those who have demonstrated the
highest level of integrity in private or public life. This
of course will require an adjustment of the present
Constitutional position. This is to reinforce the point I
have made elsewhere, namely, that unless the wealth of the
nation is seen as being distributed equitably there is
bound to grow jealousy and resentment by the governed
against the governing class.

I would insist that political parties should seek the
mandate of the electorate in the form of clear-cut
programmes, issues or manifestos presented to them for
their choice and not by way of invoking regional, tribal or
religious affiliations. Elections won on the basis of such
affiliations would be bound to produce a government that
will practise nepotism with adverse consequences to the
nation. Similarly, I would urge that a culture be
inculcated in our politicians for the practice of
cooperating on matters which are in the national interest.
It is no business of the Opposition Parties to oppose
government measures merely for the sake of making political
points, and to do so even if in the process they mislead
the public or incite them to disaffection against the
Government. Both Government and Opposition have equal duty
to refrain from conduct or public pronouncements which may
tend to damage the image and reputation of the country;
both have a duty to strive to achieve the best for the
people and the country. It is for this reason that I often
say that after elections, politics takes the back seat, and
government, meaning the pursuing by the organs of the state
of what is good for the people, takes the front seat.

Members of the public too have a duty to ensure that the
Government and all organs of State work properly and in the
public interest. It will be folly for any Government to
pretend that it exclusively has the solution to all the
problems facing the country. Members of the public who
believe they have ideas or proposals which may influence
the effective performance by Government of its functions
should regard themselves as obliged to air out those ideas
or proposals frankly and objectively, failing this, they
stand the risk of forfeiting the right to criticize the
Government's inaction in respect of those matters. The
fanciful practice of condemning or blaming government for
all ills in society which are within the power of the
public to prevent or make good should be avoided.

In the case of the military, I have already demonstrated
that what they lacked was proper motivation and direction,
and that they were made to owe loyalty not to the State,
but to a particular political party or particular
politicians. The politicization of the security forces
deprived them of their professionalism and the proper focus
on their constitutional role, namely, to guard and secure
the State, to participate in national development and to
protect and secure the people's achievement. The emphasis
of my Government has since been to reverse this situation
and to ensure that the security forces are given the
motivation and direction needed to enable them to perform
their assigned roles effectively and efficiently solely in
the national interest and in a manner befitting the present
democratic setting. By providing them with proper training,
logistics and orientation, their general performance is
progressively becoming commendable. Government is
determined to even improve upon this. Government also
regards it as its duty to care for the welfare of the
security forces. In return, they too are required to
perform their assigned roles and exhibit professionalism
and patriotism in doing so. With this, they will regain the
respect of the entire citizenry. Favourable results are now
emerging in this regard and there is marked cordial
civilian/military relationship developing. It is necessary
that the depoliticisation of the security forces, and their
maintenance of professionalism at all times should be
promoted by Government. There is also the emergence of the
new esprit de corps among the ranks of the forces. This is
a positive trend which should be maintained and encouraged.


 With all these, we can sustain the peace.

 The attitude of workers in the public service and public
Enterprises deserves my comment here. It is common
knowledge that the average Sierra Leonean worker in the
public sector does not exhibit the correct attitude to his
work. He generally does not show the desired commitment
especially in situations where he realizes only his
legitimate income or salary. He engenders interest only
when he stands to gain personally over and above his
legitimate income. It is for this reason that Sierra
Leonean workers involve themselves in illegal and corrupt
practices in their places of work even at the expense of
the survival of the organizations for which they work. This
attitude accounts for the prevalence of corruption in the
public service. The effect of this is not only to demean
the character of the worker but also to prevent the
organization itself from fulfilling its objectives. In the
end the public are not provided with the services which
they are entitled to from that organization. Government is
blamed for this and there again exists another potential
cause for popular discontent. Again, because of the
negative attitude of Sierra Leoneans to their work, the
nation loses opportunities to build wealth. Without this,
better services cannot be provided for the population and
the Government would be unable to pay salaries attractive
enough to retain competent public officers and engage new
ones in the public service. They are lost to the private
sector with the result that the nation continues to plod on
with unproductive, inefficient and often corrupt officers.

Another matter which needs to be mentioned here is the
attitude of the press in Sierra Leone. Indeed the
Government fully subscribes to the freedom of the press.
This is an important institution, which enhances the
practice of democracy and helps in the promotion of good
governance. The hallmark of a democratic society is the
existence of a free press with the ability to expose the
excesses of the government and of persons in authority.
What is objectionable however, about the conduct of certain
sections of the Sierra Leone Press is their unwarranted and
unjustified attack on the personality and character of
individuals. Some journalists do this without regard to the
ethics that govern their profession and often for mean and
malicious reasons. They write as facts what they know is
untrue and without regard to the effect their publications
would have on the reputation of those they write about.
Such attitude does not promote reconciliation, especially
in a country like ours just emerging from war. Another
consequence of the practice of such unethical journalism is
that it causes a number of persons of known impeccable
character and reputation to shy away from public employment
for fear that they would expose themselves unnecessarily
and unjustifiably to the wrath of the press. A number of
individuals of immense competence in particular areas of
specialty have, for the same reason, turned down my offers
of employment in public positions. In this way the nation
has been deprived of the services of such persons. I am in
no way against the press exposing for public knowledge, the
improper conduct of public officers and the bad character
or reputation of an individual proposed for appointment to
a public position. This will be a valuable contribution by
the press to the good governance of this country. All that
is needed is that the publication must be factual, true and
objective and devoid of malice or ill motive. Otherwise,
the press instead of contributing to the enhancement of
democracy would sow the seed of discord among the people.

I thank you for your attention.


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