Dr. Saine's Proposals: Sensible....

Some of us G-Lers are proud of Dr. Saine's proposals for better governance
in The Gambia. We ought to be. Why? Because his proposals have
transmogrified us from being mere critics, constantly sending a volley of
acerbic commentaries on the coarsening of the affairs of governance in our
dear Motherland,into policy initiators, putting in place, a formula for a
healthier political environment, genuine democracy strengthened with
constitutionalism and liberalism,in our society. Dr. Saine's proposals have
honoured one of the essential tenets of constructive criticism: He who
criticises must provide alternatives. And the alternatives include:

* A truth and reconcialition commission

* Unbanning all political parties

* A constitutional clause for term-limits

* Equal access to media outlets

These are sensible proposals. And they rest at the very heart of the
Gambia's political and economic emancipation from the incapacity to maintain
a flourishing democratic system, leavening the livelihoods of its citizenry.
The current political system in The Gambia is skewed and tyrannical. To call
it democratic is at best a misnomer; at worst, an affront to the collective
conscience of the Gambian people.

Jammeh says he and his colleagues cannot be held accountable for their
actions in the past; he deliberately expunged from the constitution,
term-limits for the presidency, a political demand, a majority of Gambians
had forwarded to the Constitutional Review Committee; he banned all pre-coup
parties except PDOIS - the list continues.

Meanwhile, flagrant human rights abuses continue unabated. Mysterious deaths
from the November 11 incident to Koro Ceesay, others, continue to sully our
country's image and gnaw at our political sanity and
civility. Economic hopelessness continues to push Gambians to lunatic
fringes. Ostentation and extravagance characterize the public lives of our
leaders. Corruption is permeating the political psyche again. The trammels
of military-civilian-dictatorship are pushing the citizenry to Stygian
depths of ignorance, gullibility, fear and suppression.

The Gambia is a throwback to the past. Jawaraism - or rather a ghastly
version of it - is well-steeped in current-day Gambian political
consciousness, enfeebling the feasibility of
a new-fangled political process,disencumbered of the past and compatible
with the present. Leadership legerdemain germinates quickly in an
environment unaccustomed to accountability and transparency of leaders, and
unwilling to submit to the sovereignty of citizens. All good governments are
chiseled out of accountability and transparency to their subjects, and no
government can be good and democratic if it becomes more powerful than its
citizenry.

That's the inescapable fact of reality about The Gambia. The APRC
government, that initially seized power and surreptitiously changed into a
civilian administration, having skewed the transitional process to their
favour, weeding out most political parties, dehumanizing political
opponents, and creating a political climate of fear and repression,
continues to be unblushingly unaccountable to the people.

Which is why the electorate must, at all times, seize the opportunity to
call its government to account, and check on its unbridled recalcitrance and
abuse of power. By Dr. Saine's proposals, Gambia-L is doing that. And
democratically so.

                         ....And Toothless

To visualize what you can't see,in the words of the Ugandan poet Richard
Nitru,is simply a paradoxical pleasure of the mind. In our case, Dr. Saine's
proposals, much as they are sensible, do not carry with them, assurances of
compliance. And that's the only tragedy afflicting his proposals. And the
tragedy is not Dr. Saine's own making; rather it is the handiwork of a
deleterious political climate repugnant to governmental and leadership
reformism.

This is not the first time, proposals like Dr. Saine's,have emanated from
concerned Gambians, but all were consigned to the ash-can. In wolly
utopinianism,Dr. Saine's proposals make us wish for what is highyly
unattainable, atleast by Jammeh's own resistance to political changes. He
displays a tempestuous aversion to political calculation and reformation,
frustrating, times without number, national efforts at proper governance.

In an ideal Gambian political world, we would love to see our leaders become
accountable and transparent to us, be servants not masters,to us; resign
from office when we doubt their integrity; leave office after a certain
period; debate with political opponents on national tv; allow political
parties access to national media to propagate their platforms; allow the
press unfettered access to information relevant to the national good;
members of both the ruling and opposing parties dissenting on their parties'
proposals, rather than clinging to egocentric partisanship.

This ideal world eluded us during the days of Jawara, and we are no where
close to it in these days. Jammeh like Jawara before him, is puffing up a
self-perpetuating image to make The Gambia his own private hacienda. Always
a soldier, never a democrat, Jammeh will find any judgement calls for
democratic changes an anathema to his authoritarianism. But how we wish Dr.
Saine's proposals are accepted by Jammeh and are acted upon with immediacy.
How we wish we even use force to implement his proposals! But then that
would be self-defeatist, for no true democratic changes can be instituted by
force, but rather through the willingness and free-will offering of both the
leaders and the led.

So here is to the intractability of Dr. Saine's proposals. Sensible but
without the clout to guarantee their practicality. Since
the feasibility of his proposals is contingent upon an attitudinal change of
an unreformed, illiberal, unchecked leadership, we had better temper our
expectations with restraint. It's not simply a matter of crass pessmism. Far
from it.

Cherno Baba Jallow
Detroit, MI

>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: Proposals to President Jammeh, Political Party Leaders, etc.
>Date: Sat, 1 Jan 2000 15:44:39 -0500
>
>G-L Community:
>Happy New Year to the entire community, wishing you a healthy and
>prosperous New Year.
>
>I have just completed a position, proposal paper to President Jammeh,
>Leaders of opposition parties, Leaders of religious and civic
>organizations on the earlier theme we discussed and debated earlier in
>November, "It is Time to Heal."  I have included proposals for a
>National Conference and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to
>facilitate the healing/reconciliation process.  See attachment/or text
>below.  Thanks!
>
>Abdoulaye Saine
>No justice, no peace!
>
>It Is Time to Heal: Toward Truth Telling, National Reconciliation and
>Justice in the Gambia
>
>
>
>
>(A Position Paper written on Behalf of GAMBIA-L, An International
>Cyberspace Community of Gambians and those interested in The Gambia)
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Submitted to:
>His Excellency, Alhaji Yahya Jammeh, President of the Republic of the
>Gambia
>
>  Leaders of Political Parties
>  Leaders of Religious and Civic Organizations
>The Secretary-General of the Gambia Bar Association
>The Secretary- General of the Gambia Press Association
>The Secretary-General of the Gambia Trades Union
>The Secretary-General of the Gambia Students Association
>The Secretary-General of the Gambia Teachers Union
>The Director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Abdoulaye Saine
>Department of Political Science
>Miami University
>Oxford, OH 45056
>
>
>
>
>
>It is Time to Heal: Toward Truth Telling, National Reconciliation and
>Justice in the Gambia
>
>(A Position Paper written on Behalf of GAMBIA-L, An International
>Cyberspace Community of Gambians and those interested in The Gambia)
>
>
>
>
>
>Confession, forgiveness, and reconciliation in the lives of nations are
>not just airy-fairy religious and spiritual things, nebulous and
>unrealistic.  They are the stuff of practical politics.  Archbishop
>Desmond Tutu, Chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
>Commission.
>
>The future belongs to those who chose to grasp it, embrace it, and
>become one with change.  Excellence born of necessity dictates that our
>quests must be both moral and righteous.  All covetousness,
>excessiveness, pettiness and obsessions must now be set aside, we be
>broken by the quakes and consumed by the thunder that is to come.
>Rodney Coates, Professor, Sociology, Gerontology, Anthropology and
>Director of the Black World Studies Program, Miami University.
>
>
>
>    Despite the transition to "civilian" rule in 1996, the aftermath of
>military rule in The Gambia (1994-1996) continues to have a traumatizing
>effect on the lives of many Gambians.  And while the 1996/1997
>Presidential and National Assembly elections effectively reduced the
>more overtly repressive attributes of military rule, and set in motion a
>process of limited "democratization", repression and military
>involvement in The Gambia's political process remains strong.  Continued
>human rights abuses by the ruling Patriotic Re-orientation and
>Construction Party (APRC), coupled with declining transparency and
>accountability in matters of governance, recent revelations of official
>corruption, not withstanding, are dark reminders of the period of
>military rule.  This post military rule era has, however, witnessed
>simultaneously, limited growth in freedoms for "legal" opposition
>parties and their leaders to sometimes criticize government policy and
>hold political rallies.  Yet, in spite of this welcome "democratic"
>opening, the national press remains muzzled by undemocratic military
>decrees from the era of overt military rule.  With a doctored
>constitution whose legitimacy remains contested, and the existing ban on
>the major political parties and politicians, The Gambia's political
>landscape has descended precariously into another form of structured
>authoritarianism.  In the latter, the rules of the game remain poorly
>defined, characterized by intrigue and political subterfuge of bizarre
>proportions.  It is also a system where feelings of trust, tolerance and
>reconciliation, despite president Jammeh's call for the latter after the
>1996 elections, are persistently undermined and secondary to the pursuit
>of power, survival and self-aggrandizement.
>     Clearly, such a political atmosphere does not lend itself to mass
>political participation and democracy, both of which are fundamental
>rights that all Gambians are entitled.  For democracy and democratic
>procedures to take root in The Gambia, citizens must have the trust that
>those in power play by the rules enshrined in the constitution, despite
>its inherent weaknesses and work to reform it.  Barring this, those in
>power are likely to perpetuate themselves through election engineering,
>as was the case in the 1996 presidential election.  This must not be
>allowed to happen again in the forthcoming presidential election of
>2001.  Gambians must maintain the right to choose in free and fair
>elections the government of the day in order to avert a political
>crisis.  This impending crisis stemming from The Gambia's current
>political stalemate must be resolved politically.  It is important that
>the APRC leadership, together with leaders of opposition parties,
>women's and religious organizations, trade union and student activists
>and elders, begin a dialogue whose aim would be to initiate the process
>of truth telling, national reconciliation and justice in The Gambia.
>This is because, success in building a genuine participatory democracy,
>based on the rule of law, will depend upon a broad range of factors.
>These include participation of The Gambia's collective leadership, an
>active civil society, a reasonably free mass media and the existence of
>a supportive international political and economic environment.
>    The primary objective of this position paper is to suggest ways of
>unhinging the national political debate from its current impasse, by
>recommending strategies that would initiate a national dialogue whose
>fundamental aims are truth telling, national healing, reconciliation and
>justice.  The proposals presented in this position paper are the
>culmination of long and sometimes heated debate in November, 1999, on
>GAMBIA-L (G-L), a cyberspace community of Gambians and persons
>interested in The Gambia throughout the world.  Created by Dr. Katim
>Touray in 1996 and hosted by St. John's University in the United States
>of America, G-L is a forum where issues of relevance to The Gambia and
>Africa are discussed openly.  With a membership numbering a little over
>six hundred, G-L is a free, non-partisan forum, which aims to foster
>understanding through critical debate and analysis of challenges facing
>The Gambia.  While no systematic research has been conducted to
>determine the characteristics of its members in terms of age, income,
>education etc., it is safe to assume that G-L's membership is very
>diverse politically, with a mix of students, professionals, laypersons,
>governmental and non-governmental organizations.  It is a microcosm of
>The Gambia in its ethnic, religious age and gender configuration,
>harboring all the positive and contradictory attributes of Gambia
>society.  Also called the Bantaba, it is a strong vehicle of free
>expression.  What unites its members as a community is a vision and
>commitment to making The Gambia a country where Gambians and other
>nationalities can pursue a livelihood in freedom and dignity.   While
>the views expressed in support of this initiative on G-L were not
>unanimous, it seems that the overwhelming sentiment is to help resolve
>the current political stalemate and in so doing, assist in the building
>of a truly democratic society in The Gambia.  The anticipated benefits
>of such a dialogue are likely to be many, but one overarching potential
>consequence and one that enjoys broad consensus, is that of helping to
>improve the lives of Gambians through economic empowerment and
>democracy.
>    Empirical studies examining the link between economics and democracy
>gained much popularity in the 1950s.  And with the advent of
>globalization, interest in this debate has once more resurfaced in the
>1990s.  Virtually without exception, these studies have shown that
>democracy works best when people enjoy at least a minimal level of
>prosperity.  Thus, the link between prosperity and democracy rests on
>the twin assumptions that: (1) prosperity legitimizes democracy and
>gives citizens a stake in the system.  Additionally, it alleviates
>despair; and (2) prosperity enhances political awareness, conditions
>usually associated with feelings of trust, tolerance and other factors
>important to democracy.  More important, is that the link between
>economic empowerment and democracy is premised on the presumption that
>an equitable distribution of society's wealth is a primary obligation of
>government.  Unfortunately, post-independence government policy in The
>Gambia has created new and reinforced pre-existing social and economic
>inequalities.
>    A lot has been written and said by researchers and journalists alike
>about the Jawara and Jammeh regimes.  In fact, comparisons have been
>made as to their efficacy or lack thereof in upholding democracy and
>human rights.  A detailed performance evaluation of these regimes is
>beyond the scope of this paper.  Furthermore, this has been undertaken
>elsewhere.  It would suffice to say, however, that after almost thirty
>years of Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) rule under Jawara, only
>marginal improvements in the lives of Gambians were registered.  Under
>Jammeh, initial declarations not withstanding, the state of human rights
>and economic well being of most Gambians has deteriorated.  Although,
>some infra-structural projects that could have long-term benefits,  were
>undertaken by the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) and
>APRC governments. The investigations of alleged corruption and abuse of
>power under Jawara by the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council,
>revealed instances of official graft at multiple levels of government.
>The Nigerian oil scandal, corruption at Gambia's Co-operative Union, the
>Women's Bureau and ghost workers whose salaries were to some top
>government officials were emblematic of deep rooted corruption under
>Jawara's leadership.  Thus, an important plank in building democracy in
>The Gambia involves truth telling and the acknowledgement of
>wrongdoing.  These are necessary steps to national healing,
>reconciliation and justice.  Otherwise, efforts of national healing and
>reconciliation would be of little consequence.
>    Since its seizure of power in 1994, a dark cloud of suspicion has
>loomed over the AFPRC and continues to affect public perceptions of the
>current APRC government.  In particular, the sudden and mysterious death
>of former minister of the Interior Sadibu Haidara while in prison in
>June 1995 and the death of AFPRC's Finance minister, Ousman "Korro"
>Ceesay, which occurred 19 days later in a burnt-out car, continues to
>fuel strong suspicion of culpability of some military members of the
>former AFPRC government.  In fact, recent allegations by Ex-captain Ebou
>Jallow, a former spokesman of the AFPRC and now in exile in the United
>States of America, indicated an insidiously calculated murder by some
>military members of the AFPRC.  Jallow's allegations must, however, be
>taken with caution, as he, the current president, Yahya Jammeh, and some
>military members of the AFPRC are heavily implicated in a $35m
>embezzlement of a Taiwanese loan to The Gambia.   Less talked about
>however, are the lives lost as a result of an alleged counter coup
>attempt against the AFPRC on November 11, 1994, that led to the death of
>about 40 soldiers and the alleged summary execution of many more.  These
>deaths in particular, and the manner in which they occurred have left an
>indelible scar on The Gambia's post-colonial history and on the
>collective memory of Gambians.  Broken promises of government
>investigation to families of the deceased, recently prompted retired
>headmaster, Sainey Ceesay, "Korros" father, to urge government
>resumption of the investigations in goodfaith.  The pleas by Cessay and
>others are indicative of national frustration and a plea for justice for
>all the families who lost their loved ones.  These instances of gross
>human rights violations, including the disappearance of Waa Lamin
>Juwara, a leading member of the United Democratic Party (UDP) and
>instances of brutality against ordinary citizens must be investigated
>systematically and acknowledged.  It is in this regard, that Truth and
>Reconciliation Commissions play a critical role in a country like The
>Gambia struggling to come to terms with a period in her history of gross
>human rights violations.
>
>
>What Is a Truth and Reconciliation Commission?
>
>Truth commissions as they are called generically, are bodies set up to
>investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a country.
>These could include violations by the military or civilian governments
>as was in Uganda for instance, under Idi Amin and Milton Obote in 1974
>and 1986 respectively.  In Africa, South Africa's Truth and
>Reconciliation Commission after the 1994 elections and headed by
>Archbishop Desmond Tutu, is perhaps most widely know and recognized for
>its work.  Yet, in 1992 and 1993 the African National Congress (ANC) set
>up internal truth commissions to investigate alleged internal human
>rights abuses of detainees at their camps in Zambia and other Frontline
>States.  Similarly, truth commissions were also established in Zimbabwe
>(1985), Chad (1991), Rwanda (1993) and Ethiopia (1993) to name a few in
>Africa.  In South America, truth commissions were set up in Bolivia
>(1982-1984), Argentina (1983-1984) and in Chile (1990-1991) in
>particular, to investigate human rights atrocities.  Closer to home, in
>Chad a Commission of Inquiry on the Crimes and Misappropriations
>Committed by Ex-President Habre, his Accomplices and /or Accessories in
>1991-1992 was also established.  Truth commissions are typically set up
>by the executive branch of government and sometimes by the legislative
>branch.  Alternatively, truth commissions can be set up by the United
>Nations (UN) as in Rwanda or by domestic non-governmental organizations
>(NGOs) whose impartiality is beyond reproach.
>    In the end, they are set up to facilitate truth telling, national
>healing, reconciliation and justice.  And depending on its mandate truth
>commissions are sometimes limited to issues of investigation, data
>analysis and not in prosecution or amnesty.  South Africa's truth and
>reconciliation commission under Tutu, however, was empowered to both
>prosecute and grant amnesty to those who failed to acknowledge or
>admitted to the commission of political crimes under apartheid.
>Ultimately, then, the defined mission and mandate of a truth commission,
>whatever its characteristics, is a political decision hatched by the
>political actors in a country and reflective of the political realities
>in that country.
>    In many instances truth commissions tend to confirm what to many is
>common knowledge.  Thus, what they often do in earnest is to help the
>process of acknowledgement.  Acknowledgement of the truth implies that
>the state and its agents own up to the crimes and human rights
>violations committed in its name.  Indeed, it is this official
>acknowledgement that initiates the national healing and reconciliation
>process. And depending on the mandate of the commission, compensation
>for victims or their families are disbursed.  In other instances an
>apology is all that is mandated or both.
>    In setting up a truth commission it is important that it be perceived
>as neutral by the public and hence less susceptible to executive and /or
>legislative manipulation and directives.  Often commissioners are
>citizens of good moral standing who reflect the social, economic,
>religious, gender and sometimes regional composition of a country. And
>all are distinguished by their years of committed service to a country.
>It is also not unusual to have within these commissions reputable legal
>scholars and practitioners whose sole objective is to unearth the truth.
>    A compelling concern, however, is whether truth commissions help
>promote healing and reconciliation or whether as some would argue,
>deepen resentment by digging up old issues.  Others still argue that
>national healing and reconciliation could occur in the absence of a
>truth commission and that those implicated in human rights abuses are
>likely to oppose its creation.  Similarly, support is likely to be
>strong among those marred by human right abuse.  When judiciously
>conducted, however, truth commissions could empty old wounds of all
>infection and begin the healing process.  If Gambians were to establish
>a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate violations of human
>rights under the AFPRC and APRC governments, its success would depend on
>the role played by domestic actors and the support received from the
>international community.   In The Gambia's case, the limited
>availability of material resources could be a serious impediment to the
>creation of a truth commission.  This is because the commission,
>commissioners and their support staff must be availed the tools to do an
>effective job and be adequately compensated.   It is here that domestic
>organizations, both governmental and non-governmental could play a
>decisive role and make a contribution to healing, reconciliation and
>justice. If a truth commission were to be established in The Gambia, it
>would have to be set up by the state or an act of the National Assembly
>to ensure transparency.  And nominations to the truth commission would
>be invited from all quarters of society.  And once a truth commission is
>in place, various issues including, but not limited to these need to be
>decided:
>(1) Objective(s) of the commission, its duration and periods to be
>investigated;
>(2) Type of human rights abuses the commission is mandated to
>investigate; and
>(3)  Time for the submission of the final report to the state and/ or
>National Assembly.
>
>    It should be noted that truth commissions are only one avenue,
>albeit, an important one toward reconciliation and healing.  Also, for
>truth commissions to have a lasting effect, other institutional reforms
>in the judiciary, military and the constitution to reduce the likelihood
>of future abuse must accompany them.  Truth telling, national healing,
>reconciliation and justice must also be extended to the economic domain
>to investigate firms and/or persons that may have benefited illegally by
>their association with the regime or government officials.   Conversely,
>individuals and firms that have been adversely and negatively impacted
>economically by capricious government policy action(s) must be
>compensated for their loss.  The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group
>(CMAG) contends that the closure by the Jammeh government of Citizen FM
>Radio in February 1998, the sacking of two leading journalists, Demba
>Jawo and Theophilus George and the purchase of the Daily Observer
>newspaper by Amadou Samba, a businessman believed to be close to the
>APRC, constituted gross violations of human rights.  These contentions
>by the CMAG need to be investigated accordingly by a truth commission,
>in addition to the causes leading to the deportation of Kenneth Best, a
>former proprietor and founder of the Daily Observer newspaper in The
>Gambia.
>     Commissions of inquiry are not alien to The Gambia's legal and
>political culture. Indeed, they have been routinely used at various
>times by the Jawara and Jammeh administrations to look into extant
>allegations of maleficence.  What distinguishes the latter from truth
>commissions, however, is that truth commissions focus on the past and
>are generally allowed greater access to information, greater security or
>protection to dig into sensitive issues.  Admittedly, and in reality,
>the distinction between the two is thin and can become blurred depending
>on their mandate and scope.
>     Alternatively, a national conference or in conjunction with a truth
>commission could be an important vehicle in resolving The Gambia's
>current political impasse.  Used more extensively in Francophone Africa,
>the national conference involves a broad coalition of leaders from all
>sectors of society.  And similar to the truth commission, its members
>include elders, religious leaders, women's groups, labor and student
>activists and the ruling and opposition political leaders.  Together, a
>national gathering is convened at the country's capital to debate and
>deliberate the contours of a new democratic political order.  At its
>best, the national conference replicates at the national political level
>the ubiquitous Bantaba where mostly male participants have the right to
>voice an (and less often her) opinion.   And decisions are made only
>when agreed upon by every participant.  The use of the principles that
>underpin the Bantaba could serve as the basis of an evolving, albeit,
>embryonic political system similar to the Kgotla in Botswana.  The
>success of this vehicle in Benin, in particular, suggests that it is an
>effective instrument in addressing a national political stalemate or
>crisis.  More than eighteen years of authoritarian rule under Mathieu
>Kerekou were peacefully overcome by a 488-member national conference
>that lasted ten days.  While Kerekou was ousted in the process, he
>returned a few years later as president under free and fair elections.
>If tailored well, the national conference could help establish fair
>rules of the game, a level playing field for all parties and politicians
>and in so doing, provide a legitimate political governance framework for
>The Gambia.
>    There is general agreement in the international community that The
>Gambia's current political arrangement does not bode well for peace,
>stability and development.  This is because Gambians are largely
>excluded from participation in the very policies that are intended to
>improve their lives.  Furthermore, the political machinery is skewed
>disproportionately in favor of Jammeh and the APRC.  Thus, G-L agreed to
>the formation of a " Group of 10" to monitor, recommend, commend and if
>necessary condemn government action or inaction.  Additionally, it was
>agreed that the same scrutiny be made of other political parties and
>their leaders, citizens, and residents in The Gambia, whose acts and/or
>activities threaten the "national interest" not of the state
>necessarily, but of ordinary Gambians.
>    What follows is a summary of various proposals and strategies from
>members of GAMBIA-L. They are supportive of the call for truth telling,
>national healing/reconciliation and justice. The proposals are
>reflective of our commitment to positively engage president Jammeh, his
>government, the national assembly, political parties, civic groups, and
>other organizations in civil society.  We share and support the concerns
>and sentiments expressed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
>(CHOGM) held in Durban South Africa in November 1999 and call upon
>President Yahya Jammeh, his government, opposition political party
>leaders and members of civic and religious organizations to:
>
>· Convene a national conference to determine The Gambia's future
>political framework;
>· Establish a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate past
>violations of human rights in order to facilitate truth telling,
>national healing and reconciliation;
>· Unban all political parties and politicians to ensure free and fair
>elections in 2001/02 and a government based on the rule of law;
>· Review the constitution, introduce a clause for term-limits for all
>politicians, including the presidency;
>· Obey electoral laws and regulations enacted by the Independent
>Electoral Commission so as to ensure a level playing field for all
>political parties and their candidates;
>· Provide equal access to media outlets such that all political parties
>have their platform(s) known to the public;
>· Create an atmosphere where fear of retribution is not a constraint to
>the free expression of one's beliefs, in print and/or verbally; and
>· Train army, police and other security agents of the state to both
>defend and promote the human rights of Gambians, other nationalities and
>specifically journalists;
>
>    It is our ardent hope that these short-term proposals are acted upon
>soon in preparation for the forthcoming presidential and national
>assembly elections of 2001/02.
>In the long-term, we also call on President Yahya Jammeh or the
>government of the day to:
>· Create an enabling economic environment such that Gambians and other
>nationalities resident in The Gambia can pursue a livelihood in/with
>dignity irrespective of ethnicity, gender, age, religion, political
>affiliation and social standing; and
>· Work toward and vigorously support gender equality and other
>activities that empower women and young girls.
>
>We call upon the The Gambia's Development Partners, the United Nations
>(UN), the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the
>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United States
>Congress, the Black Caucus of the
>United States Congress and Amnesty International for their support and
>help us to create
>  in The Gambia, a truly democratic political framework.
>
>
>CONCLUSION
>
>    At a time when many countries in Africa are moving away from
>authoritarian rule in favor of democratization and democracy, The Gambia
>can not remain isolated and insulated for long from this global wave.
>And in light of the many social and economic challenges that face
>Gambians as a people, it is important that solutions be found to avert
>what otherwise could be a bleak and brutal future.  While we can not
>predict the future, we can begin to prepare for it.  Also, as we witness
>the dawn of a new millennium our call for reform and change becomes more
>urgent.  The Gambia, already disadvantaged because of its relatively
>small size and undiversified economy, must create a niche for herself in
>the global economy so as to attract needed investments from within and
>abroad.  We must embrace the future in order to face, what in The
>Gambia's case are daunting challenges.   Clearly, while the long-term
>proposals recommended herein may take longer to achieve, those of a
>short-term nature are more readily achievable by 2001/02.  Together,
>these proposals harbor important ingredients for the much-needed tasks
>of truth telling, national healing, reconciliation, justice and
>democracy.
>
>Sources Consulted
>
>Jamal Benomar, " Confronting the Past: Justice After Transitions,"
>Journal of Democracy (January 1993).
>
>Jamal Benomar, Coming to Terms with the Past: How Emerging Democracies
>Cope With a History of Human Rights Violations (Carter Center of Emory
>University, 1 July 1992).
>
>Richard Carver, "Called to Account: How African Governments Investigate
>Human Rights Violations," African Affairs, Vol. 89 (1990).
>
>David Cook and Arnold Hughes, "The Politics of Economic Recovery: The
>Gambia's Experience of Structural Adjustment, 1985- 94," Journal of
>Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1997).
>
>John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.) Africa in World Politics: The
>African State System in Flux (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000).
>
>Priscilla Hayner, " Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A
>Comparative Study," Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16(1994).
>
>Monte Palmer, Political Development: Dilemmas and Challenges (Itasca,
>Illinois: F.E. Peacock, Inc., 1997).
>
>Abdoulaye Saine, " The Coup d'Etat in The Gambia, 1994: The End of the
>First Republic,"Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No.1 (1996)
>
>Abdoulaye Saine, "The 1996/1997 Presidential and National Assembly
>Elections in The Gambia," Electoral Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4. (1997).
>
>Abdoulaye Saine, "The Military's Managed Transition to "Civilian Rule"
>in The Gambia," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 26,
>No. 2 (Winter 1998).
>
>Abdoulaye Saine, "The Political Economy of Human Rights: State
>Sovereignty and International Humanitarian Military Intervention in the
>Post Cold War Era," International Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December
>1999).
>
>Abdoulaye Saine, "The Soldier-Turn Presidential Candidate: A Comparison
>of Flawed "Democratic" Transitions in Ghana and The Gambia," Journal of
>Political and Military Sociology (March 2000).
>
>Abdoulaye Saine, "The Military (AFPRC) and Human Rights in The Gambia:
>1994-1999," Journal Of Third World Studies, (March 2000).
>
>Abdoulaye Saine, "Gambia's Foreign Policy Since the Coup: 1994-1999,"
>Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, ( July 2000)
>
>Jeremy Sarkin, The Trials and Tribulations of South Africa's Truth and
>Reconciliation Commission," South African Journal of Human Rights, Vol.
>12 (1996).
>
>Jeremy Sarkin, "Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda," Human
>Rights Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1999).
>
>Peter Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in
>Transformation (Boston: St. Martin's, 2000).
>
>John Wiseman and Elizabeth Vidler, "The July 1994 Coup d'Etat in The
>Gambia," The Roundtable, Vol. 333 (1995).
>
>John Wiseman, Military Rule in The Gambia: An Interim Assessment, "Third
>World Quarterly, Vol. 17 (1996).
>
>John Wiseman, "The Gambia from Coup to Elections," Journal of Democracy,
>Vol. 8 (1998).
>
>
>
>
>Acknowledgements:
>I wish to thank members of the entire GAMBIA-L cyberspace community and
>its managers for their invaluable input, suggestions, criticisms and
>spirited debate since the subject of national healing and reconciliation
>were first raise on November 11, 1999.   The proposals and
>recommendations in this paper were generated as a result of these
>activities.  I however, take responsibility for any errors.
>
>
>*  Abdoulaye Saine, Ph.D., teaches African Politics and International
>Relations at Miami University.
>
>Address for correspondence: Abdoulaye Saine, Department of Political
>Science, 218 Harrisson Hall, Miami University, Oxford, O H 45056, USA.
>Phone: (513) 529-2489; Fax: (513) 529-1709;  E-mail: [log in to unmask]
><< ITISTIMETOHEAL2.doc >>

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