Mr. Jallow:
Your piece indeed explained the Army's and Jammeh's desire of protecting
their absolute powers. It is true that the Army will do everything possible
in protecting its power. Jammeh will also do likewise for the Army in keeping
tradition with his dictatorial powers.
My question is, after our careful analyses, what can we do as Gambians in
getting the opposition together. We can talk all the talk, and write all
those intellectual pieces, but at the end of the day, what can we do in our
powers in seeking total and unconditional unity?
We must be willing to use our valuable resources in formulating strategies.
Our pursuit for democracy in The Gambia should be goal-oriented. I think it
is about time we stop the talk and do the walk.
I again thank you for your wonderful piece. May Allah free us from the hands
of Jammeh.
Naphiyo,
Comrade ML Jassey-Conteh
On Sat, 7 Dec 2002 21:00:40 -0500 BambaLaye <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> It is generally assumed that the military of a
> nation, as a result of its
> perceived professionalism, is not supposed to
> intervene and disrupt
> popularly and legitimately elected governments.
> The virtues of a military
> relate to professionalism, discipline, and
> loyalty to the government in
> power as well as recognition of civilian
> dominance over the military.
> Inevitably, any political role for the military
> is seen to be a sabotage
> against the new liberalizing ethos of the
> democratization process.
>
> The behavior of the military in the Gambia has
> been one of unnecessary
> intervention in politics. Latest reports of
> their activities in response to
> a perceived demonstration by the opposition
> alludes to this fact. Instead
> of restoring order in the face of the anarchy
> we've had in Kanilai since
> 1994, they tend to want to protect the Kanilai
> Empire - with whom most of
> them closely identify - by exercising power out
> of corporate ambition, and
> much more often, because they think that they
> have the ability to forcibly
> dislodge any perceived opposition. This pattern
> of military contraventions
> in our politics, although unprofessional, is
> becoming so ingrained that it
> is being viewed as common practice, a notorious
> role of the military in our
> society.
>
> In the Gambia, like many African states, the
> reality of two existing power
> bases - civilian regime and the military - is
> common knowledge. So it is
> not unsuspecting to see Jammeh striving to
> consolidate both power bases for
> the perpetuity of the Kanilai Empire.
>
> A major reason for the decline of
> professionalism in our army and their
> attitude toward the ordinary citizen and the
> democratization process is the
> disintegration of other societal institutions
> which is in turn a
> consequence of A(F)PRC misrule. Thus the army
> becomes the institution with
> monopoly on the instruments of coercion and can
> thrive on what any decent
> human will consider an inappropriate exercise
> of power. They have
> effectively been given a carte blanche in the
> name of "national security."
>
> A good loyal citizenry is expected to directly
> intervene whenever
> disruptive primordial loyalties and
> opportunistic political behavior
> threaten to prevail in a country. The
> expectations are that we be prepared
> to intervene when the internal imperatives of
> economic mismanagement
> intensify the immiseration of our people and
> contributes to further
> economic dislocation and instability. We are
> expected to intervene in the
> face of the political indiscipline manifested
> in blatant corruption,
> economic mismanagement, and gross ineptitude.
>
> The political insecurity that is producing a
> politicized and co-opted
> military institution stems from the unfavorable
> societal conditions in the
> Gambia: internal fragmentation underlined by
> class and other social
> cleavages. These fragmentations are also
> reproduced within the army with
> serious implications to our democratization
> process. A politicized military
> institution has to ensure that junior officers
> and the militarist also
> benefit from the fruits of clientelism and
> neo-patrimonial connections.
> Such neglect is what brought us to the class
> over toned coup of July 1994.
> To rationalize their takeover of power, members
> of this "subordinate class"
> were engaged in populist rhetoric about the
> need to democratize Gambia,
> wipe out corruption, and ensure a decent life
> for every citizen – “soldiers
> with a difference.” While the rhetoric may have
> correctly diagnosed what
> was wrong with the country, their assumption of
> power is counterproductive
> of a democratizing culture and further
> institutionalizes military
> interventionism. Besides, the takeover by the
> junior officers undermines
> the respect for hierarchy among the soldiers or
> the chain of command
> thereby setting a precedent for successive
> aspirants to power from the
> militarist class. Is that what the Kanilai
> Empire wants?
>
> The skunk we have for a head of state is
> causing serious, perhaps
> insurmountable, obstacles for sustained
> democratization. Our brothers and
> sisters in the army have been inadvertently
> socialized into active
> involvement in politics through the coup and as
> a security support for the
> Kanilai Empire. Jammeh’s current tactics of
> entrenching subjective control
> of the military is an obvious hindrance of the
> full development of positive
> civil-military relations and the maximization
> of military professionalism.
> What we need for him to do is to ensure good
> control of the military by
> establishing a symbiotic relationship with
> society, providing more
> resources to the paramilitary units – ensure
> that they are free of undue
> influences - as checks and balances to the
> military, and possible foreign
> patronage (such as the presence of French armed
> forces in Senegal and other
> francophone African states).
>
> In the final analysis, to get our brothers and
> sisters in the army to
> disengage from political intimidations, it must
> be satisfied that the
> skunks we have for a civilian regime and the
> political economy are
> conducive to their professional career,
> economic and job security concerns.
> Negative developments that could motivate the
> military folks to continue
> their meddling of our political setting are:
> (1) the existing situation of
> serious socio-economic imbalance in our society
> manifested in current
> instances of high unemployment levels,
> resulting in widespread frustration
> and government ineptitude; and (2) the existing
> condition of gross
> differences in access to resources among
> elements of the civil society. In
> the Gambia of today, deprivations are bound to
> intensify for some groups -
> as we are currently witnessing - resulting in
> political agitation, which
> could motivate the military and other groups to
> take action. As the saying
> goes, the Kanilai Empire shall live by the gun
> and die by the gun.
>
>
> -BambaLaye
> ==============================================
> "Our lives begin to end the day we become
> silent about things that matter."
> -Martin Luther King Jr.
> ====================================================
> "Throughout history, it has been the inaction
> of those who could have
> acted, the indifference of those who should
> have known better, the silence
> of the voice of justice when it mattered most,
> that has made it possible
> for evil to triumph."
> -Halle Selassie I
>
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