Hi!
    The lifting of the ban on First Republic politicians has resulted in exciting times in Gambian politics. This euphoria has manifested itself in all kinds of pronouncements and speculations. The lifting of the decree has completely changed the country's political landscape and thrown into disequilibrium the realities inherent therein. It has suddenly brought former political heavyweights, whose participation the decree tightly condemned, into the equation. This move, whether calculated or not, shall no doubt have a direct bearing on the elections come October. It shall either have a positive or negative effect on the opposition depending on how the situation is handled. With this in mind, one might ask how the opposition is going to handle the realities of the aftermath of Decree 89. One might ask how the opposition is going to act after the euphoria has died down. Is it going to take advantage of and control the aftermath of the decree or is it going to allow itself to be taken advantage of and controlled by the lifting of the decree?
    In order for the oppostion to take advantage of and control the new political realities in the country, it must take into account several factors. The first factor is time. The time factor is very important and might have been crucial in the timing of the lifting of the decree. It makes it nearly impossible for the banned politicians and parties to effectively put in place the machinery necessary to launch an effective campaign. This should therefore bring to the fore the urgency of the moment. The opposition should realise that they do not have time to meddle in trivialities and hope to win come October. They should therefore move urgently. They should quickly work out their positions and move on to the next stage.
    The second factor is that of strategy. The opposition should quickly work out its strategy. It should be a strategy based on the current and concrete realities on the ground in the different constituencies. It should take stock of the economy, demographics etc. of each constituency and tailor its campaign strategy in accordance with the realities of each constituency. It would be a grave folly to apply a blanket strategy to cover the whole country as each region is differentiated by factors such as grouping, wealth, employment etc.
    The third factor is somewhat related to strategy. It has to do with a possible alliance and the modalities of such an alliance. A grave mistake that has been paraded even here on the L is the cry that Jammeh must go at all costs. This has given rise to the notion that the parties should come together now and defeat Jammeh and decide what to do next. I believe that this is a big mistake and tantamounts to putting the cart before the horse. An effective coalition should be based on mutual respect for all the parties involved, on agreements that are binding on all involved, on the strategic allocation of constituency and candidates to candidates who have the best chances of success determined as scientifically as possible, on the composition of a unity government, on the term limit of a unity government, on the mandate of a unity government, on a campaign strategy, on resource allocation and use so as to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, on publicity and marketing modes etc. In short, all the modalities and implications of a united opposition and possible unity government should be urgently worked out and signed as binding by all the parties involved so as to avoid potential conflicts and trouble.    
    The fourth factor that should be worked out and understood is the presence of Jawara on the political scene and the implications it might have. Whilst much energy has been expended here on whether Jawara should be a presidential candidate or not, the reality is that there is a legal bottleneck that hinders him from being such. Coupled with that is the fact that Jawara has been away from the country for a long time and would in all probability not be an electable candidate. It is therefore quite a waste of time and energy to dwell on this issue. What should be of concern is the impact Jawara is going to have on an opposition alliance or the resurrected PPP. Is Jawara's presence on the campaign trail going to be a hinder or a blessing for the opposition? My personal opinion is that using Jawara on the campaign trail to boost the chances of the opposition would do more good than harm. We have to remember the charismatic effect Jawara had on many a Gambian especially the elders. The fact that the current government has accused Jawara of massive corruption but has been wanting in providing proof of such allegations especially against the person of Jawara can but be interpreted as meaning that Jawara's rebuttal and defence of his government can take away a major campaign premise that is sure to be used by the ruling party. I would therefore venture to suggest that having Jawara beside Hamat Bah or an NCP candidate or another candidate would bring them some die-hard Jawara supporters. We have to remember that there are some elder Gambians who are as dedicated to their parties as they are to their religion. My grandmother's sister who passed away a couple of years ago was still a UP supporter and donned the party's colours etc. decades after the party ceased to exist.
    Another factor that the opposition needs to consider is a study of past mistakes especially in the recent by-elections. The opposition should by now have studied what went wrong and should have devised strategies to counter a repeat come October. One of the major mistakes made by the opposition in that by-election was the assumption of or overestimation of the popularity of the UDP. The opposition should consider each consituency as a 50/50 proposition where all campaign methods and strategies need to be unleashed to ensure victory. They should not take any constituency for granted.
    Another factor is the study of the modus operandi of the ruling party. One of the cornerstones in devising an effective strategy is knowing who your opponent is. This means not only professing to know who your opponent is but actually studying and knowing exactly what makes him/her tick. This way, one knows the opponent's strengths and weaknesses and devises strategies to take advantage of the weaknesses and counter the strengths. One of the major blanket assumptions is that the ruling party wins elections through fraud etc. I do not buy the argument that this is the only reason. The party has an effective machinery in place coupled with the benefits of incumbency and the state machinery. The opposition therefore has to devise ways to counter the factors associated with these realities if it is to be successful.
    The seventh factor is the method that would be used to ensure free and fair elections. The opposition needs to work out a common policy on this and present it as a united front. It should then co-operate to ensure its effective implementation and protection. The opposition should present among other things a united front on the issue of vote counting, the use of the state media, transport and other assets and work out ways to ensure equitable distribution and discourage unilateral abuse.
    The opposition should do its utmost to ensure that the elections are fought on issues and not personalities, tribalism and other frivolous and destructive premises. All the parties involved in this election should do all within their powers to ensure the stability and integrity of the Gambian entity as a tumultous Gambia is a curse we shall all live to regret. Using divisive and inciting politics should be discouraged at all levels. The opposition should therefore come up with guidelines as to how to fight an effective campaign without inciting, dividing or otherwise tilting the fine line that has kept our country in one piece in the midst of a region plagued by incessant and wanton killings and destruction.
    The above factors and many others which I am sure many Lers can come up with can paly a vital role in how the elections are going to fought and the results that are going to be realised. As the euphoria that has surrounded the lifting of the ban on the politicians gradually thins, it is time for the opposition to take stock. It is time for it to devise the wheres, hows and whens in order to present a formidable challenge come October. It is time for it to realise that winning against an incumbency in an African is far easier said than done. Thanks.
                                                                                                                                Buharry.

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