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Subject:
From:
Jabou Joh <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Sat, 3 Jan 2004 00:14:21 EST
Content-Type:
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Date:       Mon, 17 Jan 2000

From:       foroyaa <[log in to unmask]
Subject: BLOOD AT THE DOOR STEPS OF POWER?


Published in FOROYAA of 17-20 January, 2000 BLOOD AT THE DOOR STEPS OF POWER

Events of tremendous political significance are unfolding in The Gambia.
Questions are being raised and answers are being demanded. FOROYAA has been
conducting investigation on the alleged foiled conspiracy and attempt to overthrow
the Government of The Gambia. It was in the month of December 1999 that a group
was reported to have made attempts to enter the premises of either the AMRC
or the Central Bank. According to reports, they wore camouflage uniforms. This
led to speculation that they could be soldiers. In FOROYAA's investigation, we
discovered remnants of gun powder on the fence of the AMRC and traces of
bullet marks on the walls of Saint Mary's School. We later confirmed that the
assailants had a shot gun. We traced blood from the Guard Room to the cover of the
drains in front of the Central Bank. We also discovered that those who were
trying to gain entry had left before assistance came. This raises many security
questions.

Was there a radio or telephone link between the security at the Central Bank
and other security units? What were the intruders up to? If their objective
was to collect weapons, what type of transport did they have to carry the
weapons? If their objective was to show that the country did not have a security,
then what would have been their strategic objective since such an action would
undoubtedly provoke greater security alert. Moreover, why would such a risk be
taken such as carrying a shot gun when the guards were armed with AK47s? Was
the attempt geared towards taking monies that were to be burnt since where they
were allegedly heading to was an incinery for the burning of paper monies put
out of circulation?

What is the connection between this event and the event of Saturday, 15
January 2000? Did this event create suspicion within the security forces? Is it
seen as the work of insiders or outsiders? Have sufficient investigations been
done to allay suspicion? Have the security lapses been identified? Furthermore,
prior to the incident of 15 January 2000, a letter was read over the BBC
threatening an attack on the State House. The Secretary of State for the Interior
did not dismiss the threats, but asserted that anybody was free to come that
they were waiting for them. Did the events of 15 January 2000 have anything to
do with the letter? These are all questions waiting for answers.

THE EVENTS OF 15 JANUARY 2000 On Saturday morning, FOROYAA received
information which was somehow cloudy that there had been an attack on the State House
and that a soldier by the surname of Sanneh was injured that one person had
been killed. It was not at all clear who the assailants were and what happened to
them. We made enquiries and nobody in Banjul seemed to have heard any gun
shot. People who travelled to and from Banjul did not indicate anything strange
at the bridge or close to the State House. The only other information we
received was the mounting of some security searches in Bakau on Friday night.
Everything at the Yundum, Fajara Barracks did not show any mass mobilisation of
troops towards the State House. We continued to monitor the situation by telling
everyone who could give us information to transmit everything they heard
irrespective of whether they believed it to be true or not. We were informed of the
arrest of the National Assembly member for Kombo North, Mr Musa Suso. It was
not made clear until later that it had nothing to do with the information we
received earlier regarding an alleged attack of the State House. By 3 p.m. on
Saturday, a press release was issued over Radio Gambia. It was indicated that
the press release came from the Department of State for the Interior. The conten
ts are as follows:

The Department of State for the Interior wishes to inform the general public
of a foiled conspiracy and attempt to overthrow the Government of the Republic
of The Gambia by unlawful means. The Intelligence Agency has for the past few
months been investigating information relating to a conspiracy to overthrow
the Government of The Gambia involving Lt. Almamo Manneh, Ordinance and
Logistics Officer - State Guard and Lt. Landing Sanneh (State Guard Commander) as
ring leaders. Several indicators, including an unauthorised and systematic
harassment of civilians at the Denton Bridge and elsewhere, intended to sow seeds of
discord amongst civilians under the direction of these two Officers confirmed
the information already received. This led the Intelligence Agency to further
monitor the activities of certain members of the State Guards under the
leadership of these two Officers. By Friday 14th January 2000, after their last
meeting at the office of the State Guard Commander, Lt. Sanneh, adequate evidence
was gathered to cause the security unit of the Presidential Guards to be on
full alert. After gathering evidence that preparatory activities leading to the
attempt were to commence in the early hours of Saturday 15th January 2000, a
security team was dispatched to move in with a view to arresting the leaders -
Lt. Almamo Manneh and Lt. Sanneh. Lt. Manneh was intercepted by the team at
Stink Corner on his way to Fajara and Yundum Barracks where according to the
plan he was supposed to take control and mobilise support for the operation.
After stopping him, the security team informed him that he was under arrest. He
immediately jumped out of his vehicle and opened fire. A shoot-out ensued
leading to his instant death.The security team proceeded to the residence of Lt.
Sanneh at Mile 7. Upon reaching the house, he was requested to open his door and
come out. He refused to comply upon realising that it was the security
officers. He thereafter switched off his house lights and tossed a grenade at them
from within the house, which exploded. The security Officers took cover and
still insisted that he comes out of the house. He still refused to comply and
opened fire from within the house. There was a shoot-out in which he sustained
injuries. He was eventually overpowered and arrested. He is presently under the
custody of the security officers and is helping in the investigations. The
general public is assured that the situation is completely under control and
there is no cause for alarm or panic. Meanwhile investigations are under way with
a view to bringing everyone involved within the full scale of the law.

 Our reporters went to Old Jeshwang, parts of Bakau and the Kanifing area as
close to Mile 7 in order to find out what people have heard or seen. There was
total information blank. According to the press release issued by the
department of State for the Interior, a shoot-out ensued between Lieutenant Manneh
and the security officers. It was also indicated that Lieutenant Sanneh tossed a
grenade at them which exploded+ADs- that a shoot-out also took place and that
he sustained injuries. We find it difficult to know what time of the night
the incident occurred. We would also be grateful if anybody who has heard
anything at the early hours of the morning of 15 January 2000 could contact our
Information Bureau. We would also request the Secretary of State for The Interior
to accompany journalists to make a conducted tour of the places where the
incidents occurred to help give greater clarity on the issue.

ON THE ALLEGED PLOT AND PLOTTERS

 It is alleged that the plot was to be orchestrated in the early hours of
Saturday, 15 January 2000. Preparatory activities were said to be in the making.
It is not clear what these preparatory activities were. Where there soldiers
at Fajara and Yundum Barracks who were actually ready to move? This is not
clear. The link between Lieutenants Sanneh and Manneh with the other alleged
plotters during the morning of the would-be-operation is also not clear. Our
reporters have visited all the places of interest but everything seem to be calm.
The events of 15 January 2000 appear to be a mere episode. When we enquired
about the alleged plotters, we gathered that Lieutenant Manneh is from Sitanungku,
Upper Niumi. He is married and has been among the earlier intakes of the
army. He is said to have finished his primary education at Sitanungku Primary
School and did his secondary education at Berending Secondary Technical School. He
is said to have played a key role in the 1994 coup d'etat, as far as the keys
to the armoury are concerned. He is said to be a soldier with skills. Many
viewed the information that he is disloyal to Jammeh with disbelief. He is said
to have been very close to President Jammeh. He is not known to assert any
dissent in terms of politics or way of life. The information we receive is that
many soldiers are still waiting for further information because of their
disbelief that he could be disloyal to President Jammeh. As for Lieutenant Sanneh,
he is said to be from Bondali, Foni, and is said to be related to the National
Assembly Member for Foni Bondali. He is said to have been in Liberia, but did
not complete his term because of conflict with his seniors. He is said to have
experience in security matters that he is reserved and that his promotion in
the army has been slow because of his tendency to exercise dissent. He is said
to have been very close to Jammeh who often called him 'uncle'.

THE SPECULATIONS
Speculations are rife as to whether there was a real coup attempt or not. The
State has to be very transparent in this matter to help the nation to know
the truth. The opportunity given to the Farafenni attackers to speak before the
television and the press, in general, should also be accorded to Lieutenant
Sanneh. If a court-martial is held, it should be made public. It should not be
in camera. The media should have opportunity to witness to the testimonies.
FOROYAA has many questions and in the next issue, we will try to reach the
authorities for further clarification.

OUR OBSERVATION
What the incident reveals is that the security forces do not constitute a
homogenous group. There are diverse interests which could lead to mutual
suspicion. Those who hold power are always looking for loyalties. It is also difficult
to know who is loyal and who is not. This is why fairness in giving promotion
and professionalism instead of personal loyalty becomes essential. This is
the only way to minimise such tragedies. In our view, as long as there is
struggle for power between a few, such tragedies cannot be completely eliminated.
The real solution is the transfer of power to the people. In that way, all
servants of the people will simply learn how to efficiently and effectively perform
their responsibilities and leave the people to decide who to put in office.
In the mean time, Lieutenant Manneh's body should be subjected to post-mortem.
The body should be given to his family so that he can have a decent burial.
The family should be given due respect and all the support necessary. They
should not suffer any ostracism from the encounter. The investigations that are on
should not become a witch-hunt which is likely to create greater insecurity.
Lastly, the head of state must constantly ask himself the question: What price
would have to be paid to maintain him in office, and whether his conscience
will permit him to pay that price. In our view, if a person's term in office can
only be sustained by uncovering coup plots after coup plots leading to
killings after killings, then it is best for a person to call it a day than to leave
such a historical record. A nation which cannot be governed under a climate
of peace is an ungovernable nation. A nation which requires massive security
machinery to be governed is a nation that cannot be at peace with itself. Every
head of state has the duty not to govern a country under a permanent state of
security alert. We envisage the day when soldiers will see themselves as part
of the division of labour of society and their functions as national service
which one does for sometime and be given all the opportunity to develop one's
potentialities to the fullest so that one would be able to move into another
area of civilian life and earn one's means of survival in dignity and
prosperity. This is the way to put an end to blood being poured on the door step of
power.

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