G-L Community:
I am glad to share with you "Report on The Gambia.  I will in time also send
The Report  to President Jammeh, Vice-President Isatou Njie-Saidy,
Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Leaders of Political Parties and other interested
individuals in The Gambia.  Email addresses of these individuals would be
appreciated.  It takes about a month for regular mail to reach The Gambia
from Ohio.

Again, many thanks.

Abdoulaye

************ My Three Months in The Gambia **********

The Gambia's Changing Political, Economic and Social Landscape: A
Preliminary Regime(s) Performance Evaluation, 1994-2002
By
Abdoulaye Saine*

Introduction:

A three-month sabbatical to The Gambia ended much too soon.  It seems as
if it was just yesterday that I went through the immigration and customs
formalities at the Banjul International Airport (BIA).  I last visit The Gambia in
1996 and eagerly awaited my departure in early February 2002.  On arrival at
BIA, we were quickly picked up by a Gambia Public Transportation Company
(GPTC) bus and driven to the waiting/receiving areas of the airport.  I was
impressed by the promptness of the bus service and more by the refurbished
BIA and the friendly, yet professional staff.
The new airport appeared nice, clean and well run.  The tree-lined road from
the airport was reasonably good until you reached the Brikama highway via
Yundum, Banjulunding and Lamin.  As we approached the Tabokoto market,
the road got worse with frequent delays because of ongoing road
construction.  I could not but be taken aback, just for a moment, by the
teeming crowds, cars, bicycles and some domestic animals in the streets all
competing for stretches of paved but mostly impassable roads.  It made me
smile and reminded me that I was now home.
        In my decision to go home, I made a conscious effort not to have my
personal feelings about the regime negatively influence or color what I saw
and how I evaluated things.  The role of values in social research is an
important part of any research agenda and one cannot, nor is it desirable to
completely ignore them.  I was determined, nonetheless, to look at things
mostly from the perspective(s) of the average Gambian.  This was my frame
of reference by and large.  For the first two months, I made a concerted effort
not to interview or even casually discuss events in The Gambia with friends
and the pre-coup elite, so as not to be unduly influenced by what they had to
say.  Residing in Ibo-Town, a section of greater Serrekunda thrust me deeply
into a Jola and working class territory where Jammeh enjoys unrivaled
support.   In mid-March, I traveled from Barra, on the North Bank to Kaur,
spending several nights in Farafenni, Ballanghar and Kaur.  In April, I also
traveled from Serrekunda to Basse with night stops in Bansang and Basse. I
happened to be in Basse at the time when votes for the local government
elections were being counted.  I also traveled the coastal highway many
times.
In the three months I was in The Gambia, I traveled by bus, took a taxi only
when it was absolutely necessary and walked a lot of the time.   I spoke with
people from all walks of life, men, women, taxi-drivers, farmers, small-scale
traders, some junior and mid-level civil servants and some foreign nationals
but did not speak to any politicians until the last two weeks of my visit.  I had
the pleasure of a chance meeting and rode a GPTC bus from Basse to Banjul
with the Hon. Sidia Jatta.  Except for the routine ID checks at security
checkpoints, no one, including security officers, harassed me.  I was free to
speak to anyone if they cared to and most people were obliging.  I met with
some members of the press, some politicians and again visited the (Electoral
Commission) EC, interviewed some officials but missed Chairman Roberts.  I
spoke to officials of some major banking institutions, made friends with many
people, including a man who deals in foreign currencies.  Yes, I even visited
several nightclubs, bars, restaurants, markets, schools, clinics, hospitals,
institutions of higher learning, police stations etc.  I visited relatives, old
friends and was, likewise, visited by a countless number of people.  These
informal visits and chance meetings with people proved informative.  I also
attended local festivities (weddings, naming ceremonies etc.), as they are an
important glimpse into people's lives.  In sum, by the end of a three-month
stay in The Gambia, I felt that I had a relatively good sense of where the
country and its people were.
This Report is, therefore, based on a three-month personal experience in The
Gambia.  It represents a slice of what is a complex set of "realities," and
understandably one that may be different from your own.  It describes and
analyzes The Gambia's changing political, economic and social landscape.
It also critically evaluates the performance of the AFPRC/APRC regime(s)
and makes policy suggestions for improvement.  I have deliberately left out
the rich statistical data on economic performance for another project.  What
little data I use here are for illustrative purposes only.  The Report is sub-
divided into seven sub-sections.  Sections one and two outline two sets of
tendencies in The Gambia's political, economic and social landscape.  The
first set deals with issues that augur well with peace and development, the
second with civil-strife, political violence and national disintegration.  The third
sub-section discusses human rights and the fourth highlights changes in
Gambian society that appear to be a consequence of globalization or global
interdependence.  In the fifth sub-section, I make policy suggestions for the
regime to consider and in the sixth; I provide practical return strategies for
Gambians abroad and those that have already returned.   In the seventh and
last sub-section, I summarize and conclude the Report.


I Tendencies Toward Peace, Development and Prosperity

It is important to note from the outset that The Gambia is not constituted by
a single "reality" but  "multiple realities" that overlap considerably.  These
realities form an uneven tapestry that exhibit common but sometimes,
contradictory tendencies.  One set of tendencies is toward growing peace,
development and prosperity for some Gambians and other nationalities
resident in the country.  It is a popular perception that The Gambia is
fundamentally a haven of peace in this generally turbulent West-African sub-
region and that Gambians are a peaceful and peace loving people.  It is felt
that peace, i.e., the absence of war, is also an important ingredient for a
nation's quest for development and prosperity.
Thus, there are the fancy cars, new gas stations and road construction in the
greater Banjul area and elsewhere.  The highway from Barra to Kerewan is
paved with a bridge at Kerewan, replacing the antiquated ferry.  Construction
is underway from Kerewan to Farafenni and beyond.  The same is true from
Serrekunda to Soma in the South Bank.  While the stretch between Soma
and Basse is relatively good, it needs minor maintenance work.  The coastal
highway system from Brufut connects Gunjur and Kartong and other outlying
towns and villages.  These roads have eased travel for commuters to the
greater Banjul area, enhanced commerce, growth and development in the
area.  There is a boom in residential construction in this and near by areas-
Bakoteh, Kotu, Kerr Sereinge, Sanchaba and Brusubi-1.  Adjacent to Brusubi-
1 is the newly designated Brusubi-2, another area being developed by
government for Gambian nationals at home and abroad.  Yet this new and
growing affluence is not limited to these areas alone as the construction
boom can be seen even in the remotest parts of the country.  It may take the
form of a cement-brick wall around a number of grass-thatched huts or a
cement-block house in progress or neatly arranged blocks waiting to be
utilized when resources become available.
Similarly, availability and access to education, clean water, telephone
services and medical care appear to have grown since 1996, even though
Cuban doctors have a poor reputation and medications and school materials
are in short supply.  Yet the Farafenni and Bwiam hospitals, good roads and
well-trained doctors from the University of The Gambia's Medical and Nursing
schools could greatly enhance the health status of many Gambians.  The
University of The Gambia is also a necessary institution for national
development and its creation by the regime fills an important gap in The
Gambia's educational and development needs.  It is up and operating but
lacks funding, a functioning library and central campus.  Located in Kanifing,
the University Administration Office Building stands oddly besides the new
Gambia Radio and Television Services (GRTS) complex.
The increase in the availability of telephone-centers, internet-cafes and
mobile phone use has greatly eased communication in the urban areas and
between it and the provinces.  In 2000, there were almost 32, 000 main
telephone lines in use with approximately 5, 624 mobile phone, by 2002,
these have increased.  Television and satellite dish ownership once the
status symbols of the elite are more common today.  In 2000 there were
approximately 5,000 television sets and about 5,000 Internet users.  Without
figures for 2002, one can only assume that these numbers are increasing.
Those without television sets or personal computers at home visit neighbors
or frequent internet-cafes.  Thus, television viewing appears to have increased
significantly.  The Gambia television station's role has not changed much,
however, from being a strong advocate of the regime, with much valuable
airtime devoted to Jammeh.
There are more civic and community programs, however, with increased
access for some opposition and independent candidates, especially during
the Kombo North by-election and the local government elections.  There are
some educational health programs and what appears to be excessive
proselytizing.  Many young Gambian women and girls relish in the English
dubbed, Spanish/ Mexican soap opera, Esmeralda that comes on about
three times a week, with European soccer and wrestling to keep the men-folk
entertained.   The increase in satellite dish ownership even for mid-level civil
servants has exposed the average Gambian to multiple and alternative
sources of news and entertainment.  Thus, Gambians today are relatively
worldlier, widely traveled and keenly aware of global and regional forces at
play.  There is a sense of optimism for greater peace, development and
prosperity in the future, despite a sluggish economy and a weak dalasi that
exchanges for about D19. 15 to US $1. 00.  The inflationary effects are
severe for households on a limited income and for the construction industry
as well.
There is also renewed dedication to philanthropic giving on the part of local
banks and Gambian owned insurance companies and businesses.  Trust
Bank Limited, for instance, continues to sponsor several projects in health
and education.  The Jammeh Foundation also sponsors similar projects but
is seen by some as a front for graft.  Gambians also appear to be making
inroads into the foreign-dominated hotel and tourist industry.  Coconut
Residence, Palm Beach and Dandymayo hotels to name a few, are welcome
additions that provide excellent service for a reasonable price.  Also,
Gambians under the guidance of the Tourism Authority are assertively
penetrating the tourist market with promising economic effects for Gambian
nationals.   The retail trade in basic food items and clothing appear healthy,
albeit slow.  This has somewhat dampened a once robust cottage industry in
textiles and clothing for both the domestic and foreign markets.  In the
transport sector one observes a significant increase in taxi and other
transport services.
Imported cars and busses from Europe, therefore, have eased travel even to
remote parts of the provinces but there is urgent need to regulate pollution
and speed levels of drivers.  The fast-food sector is growing and caters to
many in the transport, construction, furniture and immigrant/refugee
populations.  Catering mostly to tourists, the crafts industry seems to have
been negatively affected by a decline in tourists with women still playing
important roles in the industry.  Employment for women, especially in senior
civil service jobs seems to have increased but still lags behind men.  Many
enterprising urban women also engage in international commerce making
trips to the U.K., U.S., Dubai and neighboring African states selling and
buying merchandise.  Women also appear to dominate the street-vendor
category and sell everything from roasted peanuts, cashew nuts, oranges,
mangoes, vegetables and other fruits in season.  These changes are in large
measure attributable to the efforts and will to succeed of the average
Gambian and together they have important employment and economic
effects.  The APRC regime has also modestly contributed to these changes
by way of infrastructure, liberal import-export regulations, but not enough to
attract more direct foreign investments.
Clearly, one positive and stabilizing tendency in The Gambia's political
system is the apparent popularity of Jammeh.  While his support clearly
transcends ethnic, religious and regional affiliations, the bulk of his support
lies solidly among his Jola ethnic kin.  There is some civil-servant support but
much of it appears self-serving with many civil servants in the provinces
doubling as APRC propagandists.  Through songs of praise by Gambia's
leading artists and support of some clergy, coupled with the careful
packaging of Jammeh by the media, he has come to be seen as the
embodiment of peace and development in The Gambia.  Consequently,
opposition to him or his policies is generally perceived as opposition to
Gambia's "national interest."  In so doing, he is more of a feudal lord whose
role is to "provide" for his serfs, just as a king does for his subjects, than a
president.
 In the eyes of his Jola and other supporters, he is in fact, a "Mansa" (king)
who is generous with his wealth and swift to punish offenders. He controls
the state coffers and distributes state-owned resources as if they were his
own.  He holds court in Kaninlai and is entertained by dancers, court jesters
and wrestlers.  While Jammeh has been prevailed upon to be less
adversarial, he has been known to rebuke and insult Gambians as if they
were his children and with impunity.  Yet he is also known to send many
supporters to Mecca and doles out money to admiring onlookers. This adds
to his "Mansa" mystique, which he relishes with great pride and panache.
He is like Mansa Musa of medieval Mali who on his pilgrimage to Mecca in
1324 gave out so much gold that it devalued the metal's worth.  Jammeh is
said to be one of the richest Gambians and is included among the richest
heads of state in the continent.  He, together with Amadou Samba and Tariq
Musa are said to own the Mall of The Gambia, in addition to valuable real
estate Jammeh owns in The Gambia and abroad. Also, Jammeh is reported
to have said,  "I will never be poor, nor my children and grandchildren."    All
this with a monthly salary of less that D40, 000.00 and for a coup leader who
professed to be "a soldier with a difference."  He vilified ex-president Jawara
and his government for corruption and vowed to root it out.  A chance meeting
with an aged Fulla man said of Jammeh, "he is a leader that speaks the truth
but does not follow it."  To his detractors, Jammeh is a big disappointment
because he did not deliver on his promises."  Another critic said, "He is
worse that Jawara."
To many average Gambians, however, there appears to be a tacit
acceptance, perhaps approval of Jammeh's ill-gotten wealth as long as he is
generous with it.  Not only has he built schools, an airport, hospitals
equipped with ambulances, etc., he has also upgraded his village of Kaninlai
with modern amenities, unlike Jawara's Barrajalli.    Under Jammeh allocation
of government-owned cars, tractors and foreign aid is his purview and not the
machinery of government.  In so doing, he has almost completely usurped
and likewise, eclipsed the role of the Gambian state and uses it for purposes
of clientelism and patronage.


II Tendencies Toward Civil-Strife, Violence and National Disintegration

The other set of tendencies in The Gambia's fluid political, economic and
social landscape is one toward national disintegration in the form of civil strife
and political violence.  Many Gambians, especially those in opposition
strongholds such as Basse and perhaps even among regime supporters,
harbor deep-seated fears for The Gambia and its people.  Growing wealth and
affluence enjoyed by a small politico-military-commercial elite in a sea of
deepening poverty, now estimated at 69 per cent, combine to heighten
resentment and frustration against the regime.  The rift between the "haves"
and "have-nots" is widening and perhaps unbridgeable.  Deep-seated
resentment is also widespread among those whose families were financially
hurt by the coup and certainly those who lost jobs and loved ones.  There is
also mounting resentment against Tariq Musa, Amadou Samba, Baba Jobe
and those closely associated with Jammeh and his regime.  Jammeh also
earned the anger of many pilgrims this year for the poorly executed flights,
lodging and meal arrangements in Mecca.  The food service was reportedly
poor, if available and accommodation was sub-standard.  Pilgrims also
complained of racism and discrimination from their Arab hosts.  Three
months after many pilgrims returned home their luggage from Saudi Arabia
were yet to arrive.
Yet the greatest threat to Jammeh, and his regime do not lie here nor in the
ballot box but within the military itself.  The perception that the country and
army in particular, are run by Jolas and the perceived exclusion of other more
populous ethnic groups, like the Mandinkas, is a trend that is likely to have
bloody consequences within the army and society at large.  Accordingly,
there is a mounting fever for "revenge" or settling of scores both within the
army and the populace.  Consequently, many predict that the "revenge" will
be brutal and that it is no longer a question of if, but when it will happen.  And
as opportunities for promotion and improved rank and social status for non-
Jolas are impeded, the expectation for civil-strife and political violence
heighten. The desire for revenge has also led to declining morale within the
army.  To this must be added the growing pool of unemployed, educated
youth, the product, in part, of Jammeh's successful efforts to expand
educational opportunity for the less advantaged.  Like their counterparts in
the army, they are growing restless because of their exclusion from income
and wealth making opportunities.  Many unemployed youth contend that
those in power today owe their wealth not because of any special skills or
gift(s) but to brute force.  What this may suggest is that the support that
Jammeh once enjoyed in the army and among the youth, may in fact, be
thinning.
Thus, the legitimacy and democratic credentials of the regime are
increasingly questioned, in part, because of the engineered outcome of the
October 2001 presidential election.  The alleged voting of some forty to
seventy thousand non-Gambians, the eleventh hour ruling by the EC
Chairman allowing bearers of voter cards whose names did not appear in the
main voter rolls to cast a ballot, severely compromised the fairness of the
presidential elections.  Gambians generally agree that extra-registration and
vote transfers took place in the last presidential election.  In fact, a former EC
employee claims to have been offered D15, 000.00 by Chairman Roberts to
add the names of forty-five thousand non-Gambians from Casamance to the
main voter registers.  This he refused but commented that others could have
accepted the offer.  Chairman Roberts did not have an opportunity to confirm
or deny this allegation.
 Furthermore, the spate of arrests, firings and violence against members of
the opposition has, in general, left many Gambians skeptical of the results
and Jammeh's legitimacy.  One such skeptic queried "Jammeh worked
tirelessly to franchise foreigners but disenfranchised some seventy to eighty
thousand Gambians resident abroad, what kind of democracy is that?"  The
UDP-led boycott was, therefore, a protest against these election
irregularities.  And while many Gambians did not support the UDP led-
boycott, many were also sympathetic, even if uncertain about Darboe's future
prospects for the presidency.  The low voter turnout for both the national
assembly and local government elections has been attributed to both voter
apathy and election-fatigue.  While these explanations seem plausible at first
glance, a more likely and compelling reason was voter protest over the
conduct of the presidential elections.  "If Jammeh wants it all" said a critic of
the regime, "then he can have it all." Also, the relative success of
independent candidates and the victory of Pa Sallah Jeng over the APRC
candidate in Banjul's mayoral elections was rejection of the regime's heavy
handedness in ignoring the wishes of the Banjul electorate.  "Banjul is not for
sale," protested some APRC dissidents in Banjul.  Some political observers
see these independent candidate victories as signifying a protest vote, a split
within the APRC and a sign of growing opposition to the regime nationally.
 In addition, the passage of the Media Bill dealt a blow to whatever
democratic pretensions the regime might have had.  The bill, in effect,
enables the regime to prosecute journalists and hold newspapers liable for
alleged breaches.  In many respects the Media Bill is a reincarnation of
Decrees 70 and 71, this time with greater punitive force.  Condemned by
national and international press organizations, the bill gives the regime and
its repressive arm, the NIA, unchecked powers to visit terror on journalists
and all those who oppose, are perceived to oppose or are critical of the
president and his policies.  And because opposition to Jammeh is construed
as opposition to The Gambia and its interests, it sets a dangerous precedent
and renders even the opposition political parties and their leaders subject to
further harassment and violence.


III Human Rights

Since coming to power in 1994 the greatest challenge and source of both
domestic and international criticism against the regime(s) is its poor human
rights record.  While there were no mass arrests of dissidents during my
three-month stay in The Gambia, the immediate post-presidential election
period was characterized by major rights violations that included the torture of
journalist Alhaji Mbye.  The brutal beating of Dr. Momodou Manneh and
others coupled with the arrest of the Chairman of Gambia's chapter of
Amnesty International raised serious concerns about the regime's continued
violation of citizen rights internationally.  There are also lingering concerns
about the rights violations of Dumo Saho, Sana Sabally and many others like
them that languish in Mile-2 prison with charges that are seen by many as
political.  The death of Korro Ceesay was once more raised by his father who
appealed to the regime to begin its long promised investigation into the
gruesome death of his son.  The bitterness resulting from Korro's death is
deep and widespread.
Another critical issue has to do with rights violations that occur as a result of
government policy or lack thereof.  This is what Norwegian Scholar Johan
Galtung terms structural-violence and/or rights violations that occur because
of negligence on the part of government.  The fact that farmers in the
provinces have yet to receive payment for their groundnuts and consequently
are unable to perform important family obligations, i.e., pay for school fees
and needed medication, which then lead to student suspensions, or deaths
because of no drugs, constitute not only a national disgrace but a gross
violation of people's and specifically farmer's rights.  Thus, preventable deaths
that occur as a result of the regime's failure to provide needed medical
services, medication, ambulances, incubators etc. while Jammeh's wife, in
particular, receives medical attention abroad is a violation of every Gambian's
right to similar or at least better treatment than what currently obtains in the
country.  After all, Zainab Jammeh's life is not any more precious than the
rural Gambian woman's who has to contend with poor facilities and possible
death at maternity clinics and hospitals.  And to this day, some students
that were injured on April 10 and 11 lie helpless in hospital or at home
without proper care and medication, despite family appeals for government
assistance.  Deaths occurring as well because of poor ferry services between
Banjul and Barra and other places, forcing many citizens to take rickety
canoes without protection, can be blamed directly and squarely on the
regime's failure to protect innocent lives.
And while the regime prides itself with improving The Gambia's infrastructure,
and it has, the highways on both banks of the river ought to have been
completed by now.  After all, the AFPRC/APRC have been in power for
almost eight years and at this pace, it could take another five or more years
before they are completed.  Also, the fact that the greater Serrekunda area
with a population of approximately 200,000, is served by one government-
owned health clinic alone is both dangerous and troubling.  Consequently,
the deaths that are likely to occur as a result of poor service and/ or lack of
access to adequate medical care constitute violations of people's rights.
Add to this the garbage that remains unpicked for weeks in Ibo-Town and
other areas, for services paid to the Kanifing Municipal Council, roads that
turn into little rivers in the rainy and dust bowls in the dry seasons, totally
disregard the health and sanitary rights of citizens.  In fact, it is alleged that
Ibo-Town's main road has since 1995 been approved for paving.   More ironic,
however, is that while the APRC regime prides itself as working for the
common, average Gambian, this category of Gambians is getting poorer
every year unlike the nouveaux riches that get richer by the day.
 Thus, the claim that only more development can guarantee individual human
rights is weak. This is because development strategies in Africa and
Gambia's in particular, have generally enriched those in power, at the
expense of the citizenry.    Thus, such a claim cannot often be used as the
basis upon which to justify the primacy of economic rights.  Also, Africa's
generally dismal record on human rights provides little evidence that the more
affluent countries have done better in implementing human rights provisions.
If fact, despite Gambia's material poverty, she had an unrivaled distinction in
Africa, for having protected it's citizen's rights under Jawara.  Therefore, the
APRC regime can no longer justify its flagrant abuse of its citizen's political
and civil rights because of its putative claim to improve the economic rights of
Gambians.  The reality in The Gambia is that both are being grossly violated.
These violations are likely to prove destabilizing in the long-term as the bulk
of Gambians get poorer.


IV Globalization and its Effects

Another important force that could have disintegrative or destabilizing
tendencies in The Gambia is the country's changing demographic
composition.  Regional civil wars in Liberia, Sierra-Leone and neighboring
Senegal have significantly impacted The Gambia's demographic
configuration.  It has led to a large and diverse refugee population.   In
addition, there has been an increase of immigrants from the sub-region who
come because of opportunity and The Gambia's relatively stable and peaceful
environment.  Accordingly, there is a subdued but brewing tension between
this large refugee/immigrant population that constitute roughly half of The
Gambia's population, and the native citizens.  Generally more enterprising
than their hosts, these immigrants are taking jobs that many Gambians
would not ordinarily perform.  The influx of Senegalese companies,
professionals and working class artisans into the furniture cottage and other
industries has meant the gradual displacement of Gambians in these money-
making ventures.  While much dynamism is likely to result from these
economic ventures, they are sure to create resentment and violence against
immigrants in the short and long-term.
Furthermore, increased Islamization and Senegalization of The Gambia and
the consequent rise of "political Islam," "Conservative Islam" and/ or what I
call "oppositional Islam" is a potent force for instability and intolerance
against a small but growing Christian population and women.  Resentment
resulting from lost economic opportunities by some Gambians could manifest
itself in ethnic and religious intolerance and political violence.   Thus, the
influx of foreign nationals into The Gambia while positive because of its likely
economic impact, its disintegrative tendencies and potential backlash must
not be overlooked.  Which tendency takes on the upper hand will depend
largely on how well the new immigrants adapt to Gambian languages and
culture but more importantly, the willingness of Gambians to accept them as
citizens.
In the aftermath of the groundnut industry's collapse and mounting inflation,
Gambians by and large depend on remittances from abroad.  In fact, Central
Bank figures suggest that Gambians abroad, who constitute any where from
70,000 to 80,000, send home approximately $25 million annually.  But this
official figure does not include an equally large remittance figure conducted
through unofficial, informal channels.  Even with a conservative estimate of $5
million in undocumented remittances, $30 million is a significant amount.  In
fact, the remittance figure could be as high as $50 million a year.  The sharp
increase in money transfer services to The Gambia from the U.S and Europe,
which now includes the U.S. based multinational, Western Union, attests to
the growing importance of these remittances.  It is estimated that in 1997
remittances through Western Union totaled about $2 million, by 1999 this
figure climbed to approximately $21million.
These remittances have important economic as well as political effects.
They bring in needed foreign exchange to support government expenditure
and help defray The Gambia's galloping domestic and external debt.
Remittances also have a stabilizing role politically.  They protect the regime
from potential popular protests over high prices of basic food and other
commodities.  In fact, an astute observer half-joking said, that if Gambians
abroad were to stop sending money to their families for a few months, the
regime could not survive politically, perhaps economically for long.  Thus,
remittances cushion the regime by rerouting or deflecting potential popular
protest and frustration to family members abroad or elsewhere.  It has
become a culturally institutionalized expectation that daughters, sons and
relatives abroad help support their less financially able families resident in
The Gambia.  Failure to do so could lead to being ostracized.
 Furthermore, the increase in foreign exchange bureaus coupled with a
growing number of individuals engaged in the purchase and sale of foreign
currencies is strong indication of this financial sector's importance to the
Gambian economy.  These remittances, then, pay for food, utilities, school
fees and help support the construction industry.   But remittances by
Gambians abroad are not limited to these earthly pursuits alone.  It is
estimated that 75 to 80 percent of pilgrims for the annual Hajj to Mecca are
sponsored by Gambians abroad.
Difficult economic times in The Gambia have also led to an increase in
panhandling or begging nation wide.  This includes begging for charity by the
handicapped, panhandling by able-bodied persons and official begging by the
regime.  These are practices that now transcend class or socio-economic
status.  Supermarkets on Kairaba Avenue are often lined with disabled
persons seeking alms.  They are now aided in their quest by a newly
installed traffic light at the junction of Kairaba and the new Senegambia
highway.  And once the light turns red, unsuspecting motorists are
bombarded with inaudible incantations from the Koran to win their sympathy
or guilt.  And needless to say, the Gambia Government depends on
international handouts to sustain its development and budgetary needs.
Today, The Gambia is home to well over 100 domestic and foreign NGOs,
where every third car, it seems, bears the insignia of some UN or other relief
agency. Clearly, the distinct image that emerges is a country under rescue,
sustained by international handouts and a people too impoverished and
burdened by their daily struggles to care.   The pride and strong work ethic
that once obtained among Gambians have gradually eroded only to be
replaced by growing dependency and get-rich-quick schemes. Thanks, in
part to the nouveaux riches and the national lottery, the embodiment of this
new mentality.  Not all have fallen for this, however.  Many, especially in the
provinces, cultivate their farms, holding on to what little dignity is left them
after a litany of broken promises and unredeemable promissory notes for their
groundnuts.  Failed promises to farmers over groundnut payments are
perhaps the greatest source of resentment against the regime.  Here visible
grinding poverty is on the rise, a sharp contrast to what one finds in the urban
areas of Banjul, Kanifing, Fajara, Bakau and to some degree Brikama.
One also gets the strong impression that almost every able-bodied person,
including senior and mid-level civil servants, is trying frantically to leave the
country.  Aging parents without a secure source of income try their best to
have a child abroad.  This way, the family is assured of a monthly allowance
to sustain itself.  The reasons on the part of those that wish to leave are
multiple and complex.  A combination of economic hardship and uncertainty
about the future loom large.  Fear over being singled out, victimized or fired
from a civil service job has reduced many into silence, afraid to make
comments that may reach the boss.  Many elderly, sometimes early retirees
and heads of households immigrate to the U.S or Europe in order to better
support their families.  This has put a heavy strain on marriages, especially
among younger and newly wed couples.
There is also a sense of resignation among unemployed youth whose primary
concern among others, it seems, is to drink "attaya" (green tea) while
conjuring up fantastic schemes to enter the U.S or Europe.  Meanwhile, the
new immigrants from Senegal or Nigeria, for instance, invest in make shift
restaurants, little stores, and sell newspapers in order to make money.
These new immigrants see their young Gambian hosts as unwilling to work
and too dependent on their aging parents for room and board.    The recently
established National Youth Program Scheme headed by Sebastian Njie is an
innovative policy departure.
 Clearly, many also remain in The Gambia out of dedication to family, job or
nation and could have otherwise earned higher incomes abroad.  This is a
small minority, however.  The thinking that seems to permeate much of
Gambian society today is service to self, family and perhaps nation.  How
else can one explain the rags to riches stories of the nouveaux riches?
While there is much talk about "serving the nation, Gambia first and
foremost," these utterances mean little even to average Gambians who
witness the unscrupulous loot of The Gambia's coffers, foreign aid and
scandalous land deals by this emergent politico-military-commercial class.
In fact, the interests of the average Gambian are fought for and defended not
by the regime per se, rhetoric not withstanding, but by dedicated politicians,
some civil servants at home and Gambians abroad who have little or no
stake(s) in the political process, send money home to support loved ones,
invest in the economy and make waves by challenging the regime to do right
by Gambian people.  This group must continue to make its voice(s) heard, its
presence better felt in The Gambia's political landscape as it is an important
and respected constituency in The Gambia.  And one that can make a
difference in a political system almost bereft of political opposition.  It is
widely read by top civil servants, including secretaries of state and Jammeh
himself.  Therefore, it is important that discussions on Gambia-L be
undertaken with the maturity and seriousness it deserves without resorting to
personal attacks.  Anything less severely trivializes discussion over issues of
national importance and inhibits participation.  In this regard, Gambia-L must
be strengthened by way of the growing concern and consensus over civility
even when members disagree.


V Things for Government to Consider

It goes without saying that these daughters and sons of The Gambia are not
only contributing to family prosperity but to national development as well.  In
fact, many Gambian professionals abroad are eager to return home and
continue their contribution to national development. This is true of students
and laypersons as well.  But many are dissuaded from this for several
reasons.  For research and teaching faculty in the U.S. and Europe,
specifically, the central pillars of any university are its faculty and library.  Yet
the libraries at Gambia College or the School of Medicine have no books to
speak of.  Adequate resources must be devoted to these institutions to
attract Gambian scholars and other professionals back home.  For a start,
Internet access to Gambia College's Computer Lab would greatly improve the
quality of instruction, learning and availability of research material.  A group of
six students or more huddled over a textbook while others wait their turn
does not reflect commitment to education and youth.
In fact, enough resources exist in the country to support a good university
with high standards.  But this would require rearranging priorities.  Instead of
a new GRTS complex, start a new university campus. This complex could
have otherwise served as the nucleus of the new University's main campus.
Similarly, a D 6,000.00 monthly faculty salary, if that much, pales in
comparison to a minister's D 13, 000.00 with perks and the president's D36,
000.00.  Something is fundamentally wrong with this picture and sends a
wrong message to the nation and children.  But it is not all about money
either.  Fundamental to scholarship is academic freedom.  Faculty like other
citizens must have reasonable assurance that their research findings and
opinions will not be a basis for their prosecution and victimization.  Valuable
student and faculty time, even lives are lost when the sword and pen clash as
events of April 10 and 11 showed.
And given the current regime's anti-intellectual outlook, many able Gambians
have been terminated from civil service employment or hounded out of the
country for feeble and unjustifiable reasons.  In fact, two leading national
assembly members commented on the inhospitable and anti-intellectual
climate that now obtains in the country and the national assembly, where a
newly nominated member warned an erudite opposition party leader that "the
assembly was not a university nor a place to show off book knowledge."
Thus, returning to The Gambia as of now would be premature, they
concluded.  Therefore, Gambians abroad and Gambian scholars specifically,
are not willing to make these sacrifices over careers that took years to build.
It would also be unrealistic to expect these scholars and professionals
abroad to make any more sacrifices than their counterparts at home are
unwilling to make.  In fact, it is the average Gambians that have historically
been called upon to make sacrifices on a daily basis in order to support the
ostentatious lifestyles of the old-elite and nouveaux riches.
In addition, the regime's poor governance and human rights record are likely
to keep out needed foreign investments, professionals and students who
would have otherwise returned.  Thus, poor governance has had a very
adverse effect on The Gambia's economic performance record.  While there
have been modest gains in economic growth, it is not strong enough to offset
the country's increasing population and high birth rates, one of the highest in
the world.  With much Gambian talent leaving for greener pastures, in part,
out of frustration, adds to the "brain-drain" which in turn hurts The Gambia.
Yet, in an increasingly global employment market, loss of a civil service job
in The Gambia may no longer mean long periods of unemployment and
destitution if you have the qualifications, experience and contacts.  Thanks to
growth in public sector and international appointments, especially in the U.N.
system.  Many that leave are content to making yearly visits to family and
properties and in due course, join the growing number of retirees from
international careers.  "But this is exactly what the regime wants, the regime
does not welcome intellectuals here," says an observer, "the regime is
mediocre and thrives on mediocrity."   A pragmatic leader, however, would
entice this group to return and begin to institute policies to reverse the
exodus and brain drain.  The regime must also provide inducements for the
many Gambians who work at factories, restaurants and hotel help, nursing
and private homes as nurse's assistants.  This is because in their stay
abroad these Gambians have developed valuable skills, supported by a
strong work and service ethic.
In part, to attract the retirement benefits of this retired group who are often
paid in foreign currencies, many banks now have in place special foreign
currency accounts to protect investments from the effects of a sliding dalasi.
This is a service that many actively employed Gambians abroad benefit from
as well.  The regime must, therefore, actively begin to make the necessary
overtures to its retired nationals at home and those resident abroad, like its
Senegalese counterpart does, to shore up its dwindling foreign direct
investment portfolio.  At a time when these resources are drying up,
government inducements, tax breaks, land allocations etc. could attract
needed foreign exchange, in addition to the $30 million in yearly remittances.

Unlike their Senegalese cousins abroad, however, Gambians abroad have yet
to collectively impact political events at home.  This is a political
constituency whose political power is yet to be felt in The Gambia.  In fact,
Senegalese abroad have won the right to vote and were instrumental in
Abdoulaye Wade's victory as president.  Also, Senegal's ministry of external
affairs has a special bureau devoted exclusively to the affairs of Senegalese
abroad.  The APRC government must follow suite and grant Gambians
abroad their voting rights because despite promises of looking into it prior to
the last presidential election, it was not effected by the EC.  In the interest of
The Gambia and its future, the regime must aggressively court this repository
of untapped human and financial capital.  And together they can begin to help
reverse The Gambia's dim and dwindling economic prospects.  The task of
developing The Gambia falls squarely on Gambians. And only so much can
be expected of international goodwill in helping to develop The Gambia.
Yet for development to occur the regime must rid itself of the notion that
political and civil rights can be traded for economic rights.  The two are
inextricably related.  Also, to achieve its development goals, the regime must
also improve its human rights record and only then would the investments
flight and brain drain be reversed.  In fact, a good governance system is the
surest way of dramatically improving the lives of people and not the reverse.
Just as important, the media bill must go.  It lacks basis in national and
international law and is a mockery, if not an insult, to the press and
Gambians.  Gambians have a fundamental right to information about their
government and its dealings and to criticize government policy.  Government
credibility hinges of these twin principles.  Additionally, brewing tensions
within the army and the larger society over the exclusion of other ethnic
groups must end, as it is a time bomb waiting to explode.  Every Gambian
regardless of ethnicity must have the opportunity to compete for jobs and
perceive the selection process as generally unbiased.
The regime must also work to improve its image by rooting out corruption and
seek to fulfill those promises it made to the Gambian people.  In fact, the
regime appears to be guilty of the same pitfalls as the former regime and
justifications and reasons of the coup apply more today than they did in
1994.  It is time for self and regime assessment.  And because the regime's
legitimacy is increasingly being contested, it makes free and fair elections
even the more necessary.  A handpicked Electoral Commission, a Chairman
who changes the rules mid-stream, extra-registration etc., do not portend
well for free and fair elections, nor a stable and democratic nation.  Other
political parties must have a say in the formation of the Commission.
Legitimate political party campaigns and presidential candidates should be
funded from government coffers so as to ensure a more level playing field.
Otherwise, the outcome of each election would be as easy to predict as the
change of seasons.  To have complete monopoly of state-owned media
almost to the exclusion of other political parties and other candidates and
their leaders borders on tyranny.  These are national and not personal
belongings that one can freely give or keep.  And despite the objectives of
"Vision 2020" and claims about an "enabling economic environment" the
regime has not been successful, so far, in reversing The Gambia's economic
downturn.  An unstable economic and repressive political environment have
shooed away potential investors and donors even though many now agree
that Jammeh has toned down his anti-Western rhetoric.  In sum, after eight
years in office the regime could have performed better in the economic realm.
 Jammeh must also abandon his foray into the Travel Industry and leave it to
the professionals who are better qualified to serve the pilgrims to Mecca.
.

VI Practical (personal) Strategies/ Suggestions

The Gambia because of its people and culture of tolerance is a good place to
live and raise a family.  In fact, most Gambians do just that and children
grown up with self-esteem relatively intact, untroubled by challenges of
racism that their cousins face in the West, even with increasing poverty for
children and women.  Thus, there are many enduring qualities about The
Gambia.  The extended family, although unraveling, serves as an important
safety net for many who would otherwise fall through the cracks.  While the
ethic of being one's brother's keeper and for that matter one's sister's keeper
is weakening, it is still strong.  Crime and violence are also on the increase
but this has not severely diminished the sense of safety and the genuine
concern for one another felt by many.  And despite the material poverty of
Gambians, they are a genuinely good and civilized people.  The relative
harmony between ethnic groups, religious communities and tolerance for
others are rare precious qualities in a world of growing intolerance for
difference.  Gambians must not take this for granted, as there are troubling
signs of ethnic and religious intolerance.  Clearly, much more remains to be
done and there is no room for complacency.
Despite these economic hardships and social challenges, however,
Gambians have an uncanny ability, to transcend their immediate economic
circumstances and take life as it comes and have fun.  But this easy-going
lifestyle masks a significant increase in the incidence of Type-2 diabetes and
hypertension in the larger population and among young adults.  This is
attributable, in part, to a diet high in saturated fat and a lifestyle that eschews
exercise in favor of car or taxi in the urban areas.  The increase in
hypertension, specifically, is perhaps due equally to life's daily challenges
and stressors that include providing for a family's daily needs.  These
stressors of which hard economic times is most prominent have contributed
in no small measure to shorter life spans, corruption, poor morale,
prostitution and the increase in HIV Aids and perhaps mental health
disorders as well.
However, if one were to go by the crowds in nightclubs, the elaborate
weddings and naming ceremonies and the somber "Gammos," one would
easily conclude that Gambians have few worries.  With nightclub entrance
fees ranging from D50 to D100, depending on the Senegalese music star on
hire, there is often only standing room.  But standing room is really all one
needs as the rhythms of the "mbalax" are irresistible even to the old and God-
fearing.  Here, young men and women dance seductively with eyes closed as
if in a trance, neck slanted and hands pointed upward as if beckoning the sky
to dance and with flapping thighs like wings of a butterfly, they shuffle to the
beat.  The music is simply exquisite and perhaps for a moment one forgets
life's trials and tribulations.
In the short-term, this could be to the advantage of the regime as it may give
the youth, especially those that are unemployed a moment of release, but it
also lends a false sense of stability to society and the regime.  It is also
likely, a political pundit observed, that this growing throng of educated but
unemployed youth who benefited from Jammeh's education programs, could
spell his undoing in the future, just as the creation of a national army by Sir
Dawda led to his political demise.  Relatively well educated, these youth will
not succumb to regime pressure to sell their vote.
Allow me now to distill from this discourse important practical strategies for
Gambians abroad that wish to return to The Gambia in the short or long-term
and those that already did.

·       Have a clear set of objectives and well though out plan;
·       Buy/ acquire a plot of land now.  Land grabbing is the order of the
day and it will cost you more the longer you delay;
·       Apply for a plot at Brusubi-2, the forms cost D150.00 and
applications are accepted until June;
·       Plan on saving, however, little toward constructing a house in your
ancestral compound or your own, if you do not already have one.  Rent it out
if your return is delayed;
·       Maintain a checking/ savings account with one of the existing banks,
or a fixed deposit with the Central Bank;
·       Visit as often as you can afford.  The country and people are
changing quickly.  You do not want to be a stranger in your own
home/country;
·       Keep ties with family and friends strong.  In the end, they are what
matter;
·       Assist family and friends without hurting yourself financially;
·       Give generously to the nation as well, sponsor a kid or donate books
to a school;
·       Many opportunities exist for gainful employment, better yet, create
your own employment if you can;
·       Invest financially in any sector of the economy.  The Gambia is rich
with investment opportunities;
·       Enjoy the beaches, woods and wildlife.  They are under-utilized
national treasures;
·       Remain optimistic about the country and its people, it could open up
new insights;
·       Keep an open mind and eye for unusual off the norm opportunities;
·       Work on building a more democratic society and respect the right of
others to see things differently because "the truth/reality" is more complex
than your own;
·       Join a political party and seek to positively impact/influence political
events at home;
·       The Gambia as a nation could out-live all of us but do not take her for
granted.   Do what you can to make her flourish, because after all is said and
done,
·       The Gambia belongs to us all.

VII Conclusion:

In sum, The Gambia is undergoing tremendous changes the consequences
of which are not all too clear.  More research is needed to unravel the
changing characteristics of Gambian society.  What is clear, however, is that
globalization of which immigration is but one component is quickly reshaping
the composition and fabric of Gambian society.  The increased influence of
immigrants, Senegal and Islam on Gambian society, The Gambia's
deepening economic divide with its attendant hardships for the majority,
remittances from Gambians abroad, and growing political sophistication of
Gambian, are forces that will undoubtedly impact The Gambia's development
future into the 21st Century.
Social and economic development, however, is a cumulative process.  It is
often slow and fitful, with painful mistakes and learning along the way.  Yet
the imperative in The Gambia's development agenda is to make important
distinctions and decisions about what is important for The Gambia and
Gambians, build upon the relatively few successes, while simultaneously
improving the quality of infrastructure, other services and people's lives.
Today, the average Gambian is worse of economically than in 1994.  The
popularly held view that "Jammeh is working," "Jammeh is trying," could ferry
the regime over rough political terrain only for so long before restlessness
sets in.  This is because there is an equally potent counter-argument that
could undercut, the otherwise, growing sense of optimism among supporters,
"people can not eat the roads and if these roads turned into bread, people will
eat them."  The regime, therefore, must not loose sight of the fact that there
is mounting frustration and resentment over its practice of exclusion of non-
Jolas in the army and senior civil service positions, the nouveaux riches and
the increasingly difficult economic times.
The time has long come for stock taking in terms of what has been
accomplished in eight years and make the necessary policy and personal
changes and amends.  Not withstanding the developments in infrastructure
and some improvements in access to health and education, if not quality, the
overall performance of the regime is poor and leaves much to be desired.
Therefore, the AFPRC/APRC regimes under Jammeh have failed, so far, in
improving the lives of common Gambians and that is the bottom line.
Jammeh himself is a big disappointment in the eyes of many.  He has
become a consummate career politician, a career he abhorred and has done
every thing he promised not to.  "We were not expecting this from Jammeh,"
said a former supporter, "this is a monkey government."  Without thoughtful
changes by the regime and Jammeh himself, Gambians can expect more of
the same thing, deepening poverty and economic decline.
        Thus, the regime must improve its human rights record because only
then will the economy begin to recover and grow.  Rural poverty is increasing
and support for farmers in the form of seeds, fertilizer and other inputs are
fundamental to addressing it.  But they must be paid for their nuts, no more
promissory notes.  Therefore, a farmer centered and controlled Cooperative
Union with mills to decorticate the nuts for export could greatly enhance rural
lives and welfare.  Entice Gambians abroad to return or at least invest in the
country.  This is what Senegal is doing.  Additionally, Gambians in all walks
of life must be made to feel that they and their contribution to national
development matter.  Giving national awards to individuals that are
undeserving and to political cronies only devalues these awards.  More
important, the exclusion of non-Jolas could boomerang into civil-strife.  The
regime must appoint and promote personnel not on the basis of ethnicity but
qualifications, without loosing sight of gender equity.  Morale in the army
must be addressed with command and reward structures that are perceived
as fair to engender confidence in the institution and what it stands for.  While
the task of re-socializing the army to accept the principle of civilian
supremacy in politics would be difficult, they must be retrained for national
development and to feed itself.
Similarly, the media bill must be abolished to enable journalists and citizens
to play the vital role(s) they are supposed to in the country's development.
The absence of Baboucarr Gaye's Radio FM station leaves a big void in this
industry and country.  It must begin broadcasting in order to dispel the widely
held belief that Gaye is being silenced.  Also, GRTS must be democratized
as it is losing viewers to Senegal and other stations because of its un-
diversified programming.  But diversification does not mean another
Esmeralda or European comedy show.  They are oddly out of place. The
radio and television stations could enhance their programs such that there is
more focus on sanitation, health, diet and exercise to target the larger
population.  This could in the long-term cut-down the incidence of diabetes
and hypertension.
Vital to the country's development is the speedy completion of the highways
on the North and South banks.  These projects must be speeded as it could
cut time on travel, health budget and prolong lives of cars, busses and
people.  The ferries from Banjul to Barra are, likewise, pitifully slow and need
to be distinguished by function, one for cars and trucks and another for
passengers.  The congestion on these ferries is disaster waiting to happen.
And with the local government elections concluded, it is vital that the newly
elected Chairmen (no women were elected to this position) and/ or regime
insist on proving quality garbage disposal, more clinics in populated areas
and impose car speed and pollution emission controls especially on imported
European cars.  It is also vital that assistance in the form of training and job
skills be provided the handicapped to enable them earn a good wage to
support themselves.  While alms giving is religiously sanctioned, it is no
substitute for a wage.  And the long lines at Kairaba Avenue supermarkets
are a national embarrassment. These suggestions and many more if
addressed could begin to reverse The Gambia's slow descend into deeper
poverty and political violence

Acknowledgements:

My three-month visit to The Gambia was deeply satisfying and productive.  I
learnt a lot from my visit.     My family and friends could not be kinder or
more supportive and generous with their time and resources.  I also wish to
acknowledge the assistance and kindness of a countless number of
Gambians who made this Report possible and two other persons for their
suggestions on the first draft of this Report.  I, however, take responsibility for
what is expressed herein. To all these people and many more, I say,
"Jaerreh n'gen Jaef," "on n'jarra ma," "al n'imbara," thanks!



*Department of Political Science
Miami University
Oxford, OH 45056

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