Mr. Sey wrote:

"Colley-the gambia l's defence attaché:

There are a lot of us on line who were soldiers like you brother.I and a
many
others were trained in pôl la peyre école nationale de la gendarmerie in
ouakam-from 1989 to 1990.

We are NOT experts like you but we were in that "thing" also.In 1989 i was
together with Sgt.Yaya Darboe,Anthony Correa(who was part of the UN mission
to
Angola). We were there undergoing an Nco training course in Dakar.We off
course
received our certificat inter-armée there.Mr. Colley you can call Sgt.Tijan
Ndure of the senegalese gendarmerie( Tambacounda station) or Sgt.Masamba
Ndoye
of their presedential guard(riders section) they the senegalese will tell
you
what kind of a soldier i was in their midst.I have nothing to worry about as
far
as military exellence is concerned.Call them and ask them.You may come back
on
your forum of rumours to discredit me with fabrications but the records in
Dakar
are there for life.

Mr. colley in 1989 the speech that ex president joof made to declare the
confederation (frozen) in french he said:"gelée" found me at pôl-la
peyre.MR.
Colley our team was put on stand by ready to join the senegalese soldiers at
Mauritania Border.The need to go was later on superceded by diplomatic
efforts
thus we never went.

Mr.Colley i can fully remember what some of these soldiers were saying. Non
amongst them wanted to be killed for a war they found unnecessary at the
time.Mr.Colley i love those Senegalese more than you because  they were my
good
mates. You know what it means for a soldier to remember or see his mate die
at
war,because you were and you are still one(i hope). " A say Mr.colonel sir
think
deep because you are  SAYING A LOT OF FALLACIES now!"

     The reason that urged me to say  they were DEFEATED  is not to jubilate
but
its rather to expose the error that their Gvt.made in Bissau(don't hide the
truth you know what i mean).When you were receiving those calls at an office
you
used to share with Alhaji Kanteh(commissioner of NBD) Was the permanent
secretary DOS defence there?

There are two famous Gen Seckas in Senegal.They are General Pâthé Secka and
the
one you mentioned in your art.I can't believe that Gen.will call you for
such
operations,however you reserve the right to say what u want.

Mr. Trapateau is not the french chargé d'affaires in the gambia no! no! no!
he
is the head of the pedagogical center in the Gambia.This evening i spoke to
him
he is one of the people i work with every day.So be mindful of spreading
unfounded stories only to gain popularity amongst innocent civilians who are
here to talk politics but not military strategies.

MR COLLEY PLEASE COME AND FACE US  AND LEAVE THESE CIVILIANS ALONE. THEY ARE
POLITICIANS AND THEY PREFER DEMOCRATIC STRATEGIES I HOPE.  JAW JAW IS BETTER
THAN WAR WAR. TRY ME AGAIN I WILL RESPOND ACCORDINGLY BEFORE GOING ON LEAVE
COLONEL SIR!

ESSA BOKARR SEY."

-------------------REPLY--------------REPLY--------REPLY--------------

This is despicable. Frankly, I was going to ignore this man because of the
emptiness of his piece. On second thought, I decided to write because I
remembered urging him to respond to Mr. Colly's postings on the
Casamance/Guinea-Bissau conflicts. I thought that it is only fair that I
come and say my little piece if he comes back and attack Colly; albeit a
very lame attack. I am offended that this man would want to compare his one
year Gendarmerie training with Colly's clearly superior training as
demonstrated by his vast knowledge in military issues. This man went to
Dakar for one year and now want to pretend that he can challenge Colly
….well, in his dreams. It is also puzzling that the Senegalese government
will call upon Gendarmerie personnel instead of their able army to fight a
war in Mauritania. Maybe am missing something here. I do not understand how
someone who was in New York during the Bissau conflict can challenge someone
who was in the front lines in Bissau about what happened in Bissau. I want
you to go back and read carefully what Colly said. That is why am replying
his message and not yours. Even Colly admitted that the Senegalese made
certain errors based on misinformation they were given. So what is your
point in saying that Colly should recognize the mistakes that were made.
Another issue you raised was the issue of General Seck. If you look at
Colly's piece again, you should realize that he was referring to the plural
(we) when he discussed the General's call. He could have easily and
logically said that the General spoke to him personally since Yaya was out
of the country and he was clearly among the top brass in the military. But
unlike you, this man is an honest and humble gentleman. Just because people
like the able General will snub people like you, that does not mean that
they would not talk to fine soldiers like Colly. I knew you would not be
able to come up with facts to contradict Colly. The facts are not there. You
changed nothing about the facts as Colly described them. What he said about
what happened on the ground in Bissau stays. Yaya's motives for entering the
negotiations also stays. Instead of trying to beef up your resume with your
one year Gendarmerie training, address the issue about the Casamance rebels
being caught with Gambian IDs; talk about the Casamance rebels that are
wounded in battle being treated in Gambian hospitals; talk about the
deportation of Senegalese nationals in the aftermath of the April 10 and 11
massacres; talk to us about the arms Libya gave to Yaya; talk to us about
the military jeeps France gave to Yaya etc. As you can see, there are
numerous issues you can address in this forum apart from trying to outdo
Colly's military credentials. You are nothing compared to him. No one need
to come here and parade their resumes. Our writings should speak for
themselves. In my opinion, you are barking the wrong tree with Colly. People
like me love hearing from Colly not because of his military expertise alone,
but because of his candor and his commitment to help get rid of the cancer
in our beloved Gambia. I am a civilian and I and many others welcome Colly's
contributions in this forum and other forums. He has our uncompromising
support. Your behavior in your last posting is the main reason why we are in
our current predicament. We have the inmates running the asylum. Empty
barrels and nonentities shouting down knowledgeable people; shouting them
down with nothing but garbage. Worse of all, the empty barrels do not even
realize how dumb they are. Silence is at times the best medicine for
ignorance. If you have never been in combat before, how on earth can you
challenge battle tested soldiers about the mechanics of war? It is just like
a motor mechanic wanting to operate on a sick patient or a surgeon
dismantling an auto engine. Like I said before, the suits with the Yaya
mindset who could not save our children on April 10 and 11 are at times even
worse than Yaya. Beware.
KB



>From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: THE BISSAU CONFLICT
>Date: Tue, 30 May 2000 22:14:23 -0700
>
>                                                  THE
>BISSAU CONFLICT
>
>
>
>
>The notion that the Guinea-Bissau Army defeated the
>Senegalese Army during the Bissau crisis last year is
>the most incorrect statement anybody could say about
>that regrettable event. It is only those wishful
>thinkers in blind support of the Junta in Bissau who
>were foolishly going around peddling that impossible
>story. But for those of us who were part of the crisis
>from start to finish and had a live experience of what
>happened there knew better.
>
>We first received the information at Yundum Airport
>that President Vierra and his former chief of staff
>General Ansumana Manneh had clashed militarily in
>their capital Bissau until the president’s protocol
>officer Mr. Ugine Spain and some senior officers were
>killed. Yaya was that morning flying to Mauritania for
>a one-day working visit. So he had little time to say
>much about the hot information. However, just before
>taking his flight, he made few remarks that showed us
>where he stood in the crisis. He clearly expressed how
>disgusted he had recently been with President Vierra
>for allowing Senegal to “lure” him into changing their
>currency to the CFA. Yaya had believed that President
>Vierra in agreeing to that monetary deal had sold the
>sovereignty of Bissau to Senegal. Whether he was right
>or not, Yaya had thought that Bissau as a result of
>the currency change was going to be dependent on
>Senegalese financial institutions such as their banks
>for any money to flow into the former Portuguese
>colony. So he was hoping that General Manneh would in
>that conflict easily overthrow Nino from office and
>revert all that policy of cooperation between Senegal
>and Bissau for a more anti-Senegalese stance. He flew
>away that morning with unhidden joy in his face,
>expecting to be informed sooner rather than later that
>Vierra had lost.
>
>Anyhow, what he did not understand at the time was
>that President Vierra had successfully consulted both
>Senegal and Guinea Conakry to lend him military
>support to overcome the General’s forces. By 11.00
>a.m. that morning we also received a distress call
>from President Vierra at the GNA headquarters, Marina
>Parade Banjul. (That street’s name has since been
>changed and is now called Momarr Ghadaffi Avenue,
>effected by Yaya alone). In that telephone call
>however, President Vierra speaking from his office in
>Bissau first explained how he had tried Yaya before
>calling us but was informed that the President had
>traveled. He then told us that he needed urgent
>military assistance in Bissau to deal with a “small
>gang of mutinous soldiers under the command of
>Manneh”. That was exactly the way he put it, the very
>way I suppose he also presented the problem to the
>Senegalese and Guineans. Yes he was detailed enough to
>inform us that he had spoken to both Presidents Abdou
>Joof and Alansana Conteh and that they had assured him
>their full support and would respond immediately.
>
>We told President Vierra that we could not take such
>decision of sending him any military assistance in the
>absence of Yaya. He accepted our excuse with the hope
>that he would soon reach Yaya somewhere for his
>approval to commit the Gambian troops in Bissau. He
>did not seem to know much about who Yaya was.
>
>Within the hour after President Vierra’s call, General
>Momodou Secka the chief of staff of the Senegalese
>Armed forces also called on the same number asking for
>whether we could all coordinate our forces into
>deploying to Bissau to help the president. Gen. Secka
>disclosed that he had contacted his counterpart in
>Guinea Conakry for a similar coordinated intervention
>and that the Guinean chief of staff had already
>started writing his operation orders on that premise.
>But again, we told General Secka that without Yaya who
>was in Mauritania, we could not make any decision on
>the issue. Anyway, the way Gen. Secka sounded that
>morning, he sincerely thought that they had a simple
>mission in hand to deal with which they could easily
>finish and leave Bissau at record time. That was the
>reason why I think the Senegalese hastily assembled
>one infantry battalion plus, mainly composed of their
>newly trained recruits with no battle experience and
>had them sent to Bissau. There were very good officers
>and NCO’s among the combatants including a fine
>captain, called Capt. Jasseh who out of pride fought
>his way into Bra Barracks and was killed. Bra Barracks
>was the Junta’s most heavily defended base. It was
>there; they had their toughest operation commanders
>such as Emilio Costa and Verrisimo.
>
>When the Senegalese moved into Bissau they certainly
>realized but a little bit too late, that President
>Vierra misinformed them about the strength of the
>force behind Gen. Manneh. Instead of “a few mutinous
>soldiers behind the General”, it was over 90% of the
>Guinea-Bissau Armed forces with almost all the
>Cassamance rebels based in the country. After several
>failed attempts by the Senegalese to overrun the
>Junta’s key positions, they changed their tactics from
>the offensive to the defensive. That was all the
>hoopla about the Senegalese Army being defeated by the
>Bissau troops. After that tactical withdrawal by the
>Senegalese, the battle changed from direct contact to
>indirect firing and shelling. The Senegalese depended
>mainly on 122mm and 81mm mortars, while the Bissau
>troops used the BM21 rocket- launchers. The Senegalese
>barely maintained their positions against the barrage
>of the firepower behind this formidable arsenal, the
>BM21. But they successfully defended the city from
>being taken over by the Junta forces until the
>peacekeepers arrived, a precondition they stated for
>their withdrawal out of the country.
>
>There is no doubt that Yaya started brokering for the
>peace, but for reasons completely different from what
>most people had believed. Yaya was seriously outraged
>when he learnt that the Senegalese and the Guineans
>had intervened on the side of President Vierra. He
>knew that if the fighting was not stopped until it
>escalated to an all out war, Senegal together with
>Guinea Conakry would have totally wiped out the
>military capability of Bissau from the sub-region,
>permanently ending the Cassamance rebellion as well.
>So he took the same aircraft and flew around back to
>Mauritania first, then to Senegal and finally to
>Guinea Conakry. On a frank note, Dr. Sidat Jobe who
>was very sincere about the peace initiative virtually
>came up with all the questions and answers The Gambia
>government had to offer in the search for peace. Of
>course, President Vierra and Manneh met in Banjul
>under the chairmanship of Yaya when the conflict
>seemed to have been at a stalemate; nevertheless, the
>actual merit for bringing the Junta and the Vierra
>government to accept a shared interim government was
>made possible by three people. In their genuine and
>honest efforts, these men were Dr. Sidat Jobe, Mr.
>Kofigo the foreign minister of Togo and General
>Hassani, the Togolese Defense minister. These two
>Togolese ministers were absolutely pivotal in the
>final solution.
>
>However let me shift to the GNA part in the crisis. It
>was the GNA’s peacekeeping role that took us to the
>ground when the situation was still fragile. While the
>French were working on sponsoring a peacekeeping force
>in which The Gambia was urged to participate as the
>only Anglo-phone contingent among the lot, Senegal on
>the whole was upgrading its battle fire power in
>Bissau with the modern 155mm American-made artillery.
>By the way, the other contingents were from Togo, the
>leading force (because Iadema was the ECOWAS
>chairman), Niger and Gabon. Anyhow, on the 3rd of
>February 1999, the day we were to deploy to Bissau,
>the Senegalese went into an offensive against the
>Junta, which caused the Gambian force to abort its
>participation until there was peace again.
>
>The effect of that assault was too devastating to the
>Junta. The new weapons were so destructive that the
>Junta fighters thought the firing had originated from
>the French battleship that brought the peacekeepers
>minus the Gambians from their assembly point in Dakar.
>The Portuguese, their former colonial masters, who
>were sympathetic to the Junta came close to being
>convinced that the French were actually firing the
>heavy guns. Mr. Fadul the Priminister of the interim
>government, chosen from the Junta’s side, had his
>house reduced to rubbles by a direct hit from a 155mm
>shell. His guards and those at the building at the
>time were all killed. The airport, that was considered
>too far for any Senegalese missile to reach was hit
>with deadly accuracy leaving the points of impact with
>frightening craters.
>
>The Gambian contingent the last to arrive in Bissau,
>left the Gambia on the 9th and arrived on a French
>landing craft in the war torn city on the 11th of
>February. The final decision from Yaya for the GNA to
>go to Bissau happened on the 6th of February at the
>Yundum Airport again. It was the day the former
>Nigerian head of state General Abubacarr came to the
>Gambia on a day’s visit. Just after his aircraft
>started to taxi its way for the Nigerian leader to fly
>back home, the crazy NIA brought the most ridiculous
>news to Yaya about the situation in Bissau. They said
>that their intelligence just informed them that the
>Junta forces had taken over the city of Bissau and
>that the Senegalese soldiers were running, taking off
>and throwing away their uniforms in order to blend
>with the population unnoticed. The naïve ignorant Yaya
>believed in every word of the impossible story making
>him so happy that he, at that moment, ordered that the
>GNA should be prepared to go to Bissau now. At that
>spot, the French Charge d’ Affairs in the Gambia, Mr.
>Allain Tapartua, responsible for the movement of the
>troops was contacted on a cellular phone and informed
>that the Gambia was finally going. How the NIA came up
>with that lie still amazed me. For such thing to
>happen in Bissau without the BBC mentioning it was
>practically impossible. Yet at that time, there was a
>Swedish female correspondent in Bissau City who had
>been updating the whole world through the BBC on the
>day to day developments of the conflict.
>
>Upon our arrival in Bissau, the overall operation
>commander Colonel Berena of Togo welcomed us. The
>situation was so uncertain that the colonel told us
>that if we were not able to pull out something within
>the next 48 hours he was afraid the fighting factions
>might again resume their battle for the city. However
>with out white flags raised high on top of our
>vehicles, we moved from one line of defense to another
>until both sides agreed to meet and talk for peace. To
>our amazement, the Senegalese force commander colonel
>Konny who was termed too intransigent and very
>difficult to deal with accepted us in his office and
>served us coffee. Coffee served in that battleground
>was a very humane gesture from a hard liner like
>Colonel Konny. We assured him that we were there for
>peace and nothing more, and he knew that we were very
>genuine indeed. By the end of that week, the Junta had
>given up their stiff demand that the Senegalese forces
>must withdraw from the country before the interim
>government was sworn in office. The Senegalese had
>made it clear to them and the peacekeepers that they
>would not leave Bissau until after the deployment of
>the peacekeepers and the swearing in of the interim
>government. And it happened in the exact way they
>prescribed it, although with the knowledge that
>President Nino Vierra also misinformed them about
>everything in the conflict. A defeated force could
>have adopted such a hard position in the face of its
>conquerors.
>
>The Senegalese army cannot suffer a defeat in the
>hands of the Bissau armed forces, especially when
>there was Guinea Conakry fighting side by side with
>them. It was only a very tiny fraction of their force
>sent to Bissau during that event. The Senegalese Armed
>forces in totality could swallow that of Bissau’s in
>any theater of war. That false story was purely
>garbage orchestrated mainly from Yaya and his rebel
>comrades in Cassamance.
>
>And by the way, did anyone try to reason out why the
>Yaya government deported Senegalese from the North on
>the accusation that they made remarks in support of
>the children’s demonstration, but few days later
>rebels from Cassamance identified as Senegalese were
>captured with Gambian ID cards? Hmmm!
>
>
>Ebou Colly
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>__________________________________________________
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