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Subject:
From:
Pa Modou Jobe <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Mon, 23 Apr 2001 02:32:48 -0000
Content-Type:
text/plain
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Mr Ceesay
You sure seem to have all the answers to all the questions facing Gambian
politics. And to top it all, you surte have lots of time on your hands. Keep
up the hood work bra!


>From: Ebrima Ceesay <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: My 24th Message To All Gambians!
>Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2001 13:07:18 -0000
>
>My Fellow Gambians !
>
>In this posting, I shall talk about WHY we need a coalition (tactical
>Alliance)of the Opposition parties in The Gambia to contest the forthcoming
>elections.
>
>I shall give some pointers as to HOW and WHEN to get the Alliance underway,
>given that the elections are fast approaching.  I shall also talk about the
>Alliance’s task in the post-Jammeh –Gambia.
>
>Some of the issues are very complex, and I have endeavoured to use plain
>and
>straightforward language in order to clarify these for the man and woman in
>the street. As we have discussed many times before, there is an urgent need
>for political education in our country, and I am hoping that my series of
>messages to all Gambians, is going someway to meet this need.
>
>Once again, I urge our readers in The Gambia to circulate these messages as
>widely as possible – particularly in the provinces.  We have to use every
>means in our power to spread the Opposition message, and to ensure that we
>defeat Jammeh and his regime in the forthcoming elections.
>
>
>
>WHY DO WE NEED AN ALLIANCE?
>
>
>We all know the reasons why Jammeh and the APRC should be soundly defeated
>in the elections:  these are matters that I have touched on and detailed in
>my previous postings, and other contributors to the Gambia-L have also put
>forward strong arguments to support the case against Jammeh.
>
>Our once proud and confident nation is in the hands of a band of criminals
>who are interested only in filling their own pockets:  The Gambia has
>fallen
>into the doldrums under the mismanagement of Yahya.
>
>It is the task of all Gambians to bring an end to this dreadful regime at
>the first opportunity.
>
>But let us be clear that the actual task of ending Jammeh’s rule through
>the
>ballot box is not going to be easy.  Jammeh still has a strong groundswell
>of support throughout the country:  he has been careful to ensure that his
>people have been appointed to key and influential positions (for instance,
>Divisional Commissioners, Mayors, Chiefs, Alkalos, District Elders and
>Leaders); and with the whole machinery of state behind him, combined with
>his control of the public purse strings, he is in a powerful position.
>
>He is able to buy people’s loyalties, using public money, and the Kiang by
>election showed us that he has no qualms about buying people’s votes.
>
>The task for the Opposition parties is going to be immense:  they do not
>have access to the machinery of state, nor do they have their fingers in
>the
>public purse.
>
>People in The Gambia, furthermore, have tended to mystify and mythologise
>the presidency:  they bow without question to authority;  they believe that
>the governance crisis is God-given rather than man-made.  They are yet to
>understand that politicians are not superior beings – that they are our
>servants whose task is to work on our behalf.
>
>Our politicians are not our Lords and Masters.  People who are narrow
>minded
>or shortsighted, believe that if Jammeh is removed from office, then there
>will be even greater trouble in The Gambia, with fighting and resistance
>from the APRC regime and its supporters.
>
>Clearly, Jammeh is using the whole machinery of State in order to
>consolidate his grasp on power.  He and his supporters have access to
>government transport, to government fuel, to free telephone services, to
>the
>national media, to the services of civil servants who are supposed to be
>apolitical.
>
>Now, with all these advantages which they use in their favour, Jammeh has a
>huge political advantage as the incumbent candidate.
>
>More importantly, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which is
>supposed to be independent in the true and full sense of the word, has been
>undermined by Jammeh and may no longer be relied upon to remain impartial.
>The suspicion is that the APRC will use a supposedly independent IEC to
>their own advantage.
>
>In fact, by sacking the IEC Chairman, Bishop Johnson,  and replacing him
>with an APRC man, Jammeh has set the scene for us all:  we know what to
>expect, and it will certainly not be impartiality  and neutrality of the
>IEC.
>
>These are just some of the many hurdles facing the opposition groups in the
>forthcoming elections.
>
>We now have to ask what advantages there would be, if our Opposition
>parties
>were to come together and work as a united Opposition to Jammeh and his
>regime.  How would a united front, a coalition, an alliance be in a better
>position to defeat Jammeh in the ballot boxes.
>
>First and foremost, an alliance would restrict the possibility of vote
>splitting.  If each political party were to put forward its own
>presidential
>candidate, then it is apparent that votes could be split in more than two
>ways.  Rather than just an APRC and an opposition candidate, we could see
>three, four, five or more candidates in each constituency (APRC, UDP, NRP,
>PDOIS, Independent).
>
>But, by combining the opposition, you reduce the voting spread:  it becomes
>just a "two horse race", and gives greater chances for the opposition to
>defeat Jammeh.
>
>Secondly, elections are expensive enterprises, especially when you face
>incumbents who will be using state and public resources to hold onto power.
>To fight this entrenched incumbency, individual opposition parties need
>money and resources (manpower, logistics, vehicles, fuel etc.).
>
>Therefore, by combining the Opposition parties – by them coming together to
>work as one – there can then be a combination – a bringing together – of
>their limited resources.  This combination of resources would go a long way
>to matching the vast resources which Jammeh has already hijacked for his
>own
>ends.
>
>Thirdly, if the various opposition parties come together as one
>oppositional
>group, it will be possible for them to cover the whole of the country, and
>to do this very effectively. Each party can cover a good area of the
>country
>and no area will remain uncovered by an opposition candidate and the
>resources to support him or her.
>
>In the past, with their limited resources, not every village or town in The
>Gambia has been covered effectively. By sharing resources and manpower, and
>by backing just one presidential candidate, it will be possible for the
>Alliance to put a strong case in each and every constituency.
>
>The identified and agreed Presidential candidate for the Opposition
>Alliance, can then try to cover as many areas of the country as possible:
>where he/she cannot visit, other members of the opposition will have
>covered
>these areas.
>
>Fourthly, it will be far tougher for Jammeh to oppose a strong, united
>opposition alliance candidate, rather than individual party candidates.
>The
>psychological advantage to the opposition and against Jammeh would be
>immense.  Knowing the APRC, they would be seriously worried by the strength
>of a combined opposition.
>
>In the past, we have had direct evidence of the way in which Jammeh falls
>to
>pieces when strongly opposed or under public pressure:  the man lapses into
>wild dreams and even wilder threats, and he tends to make a public buffoon
>of himself when he is under pressure.
>
>Psychologically, by working together as one oppositional unit, Jammeh would
>as usual, lose his cool and start to act as a crazy man.  We have seen it
>in
>the past, and we need to make this happen again in order that each and
>every
>voter in The Gambia has a true picture of this dreadful man.
>
>Fifthly, it will be easier for concerned Gambians at home and in particular
>overseas, to raise funds for a united opposition rather than for individual
>parties.  People want to donate generously, knowing what Jammeh represents
>for the country.
>
>Without an alliance, these donations would be much more thinly spread
>across
>the existing opposition parties,  but  by coming together, we bring our
>financial resources together and strengthen ourselves in opposition.
>
>Sixthly, on the issue of unity and reconciliation amongst all of us who
>have
>been Jammeh’s "victims", our strength lies in working together.  An
>alliance
>would bring people together with a common purpose, uniting them against a
>common enemy.  We would feel stronger by virtue of working together, and
>this would be a very powerful weapon in our armoury against Yahya.
>
>
>HOW DO YOU FORM AN ALLIANCE ?
>
>We know that each political party has its own programmes, doctrines and
>policies.  In other words, each political party has a manifesto, outlining
>how The Gambia should be run if it were to assume leadership of the
>country.
>
>Clearly, the programmes are different, the principles are different, the
>underlying doctrines are different.  However,  there are times in life when
>COMPROMISE is an absolute necessity in order to take a cause forward, and
>to
>work for the general good.
>
>It is understandable for parties to express fears about going into a
>coalition, because the chemistry of the parties and their various members
>is
>different and important.
>
>And of course, there is no point in forming an alliance where the members
>of
>it will always be at daggers drawn all the time. Therefore, if a political
>party were to have anxieties about entering a political alliance, then that
>is understandable.
>
>BUT where there is both the will and determination, and where the need for
>alliance is clearly understood, then there should surely be a way forward,
>despite the differences in party programmes. At the end of the day, all
>opposition parties in The Gambia are claiming to be working for the
>betterment of Gambians and their country.
>
>Having said that, yesterday my message to the Gambian people was "act now
>or
>regret it for ever".
>
>Today my message to the Opposition parties in The Gambia is "COMPROMISE
>NOW,
>OR SINGLY LOSE OUT."
>
>The awful destruction that has taken place in our country, warrants us to
>come together tactically in order to rescue our country from its criminal
>hijackers.
>
>In the medium and long term, each party might and probably will have a
>different agenda for The Gambia, but in the short term, and in order to see
>the back of Jammeh through the ballot box, it is vital that we put these
>differences to one side, and work together with a common platform, to
>rescue
>our country.  If we do not do it, if we do not start to work together, then
>our country will become ungovernable and beyond rescue.
>
>The leaders of our political parties are intelligent people and their
>parties have  members who are people with keen brains, so really, if they
>are willing, they can handle and face the challenges that coalition will
>almost certainly mean.  They can work together to govern our country in a
>post Jammeh and post APRC setting, despite the differences in policy and
>programmes.
>
>If they really bring their heads together, they can surely work out ways in
>which not only to accommodate each other, but to make the coalition a
>working reality which will be durable in the post-Jammeh Gambia.
>
>In the longer term, when the country has been rescued from its hijackers
>and
>has been stabilised, then it will make sense for parties to split and work
>on their own individual programmes.  It is going to take all our combined
>efforts to bring about a restoration of true democracy in our country, but
>we CAN and MUST do it.
>
>The coalition is a short-term prescription to save our country from chaos,
>and to rescue it from the clutches of miscreants like Yahya.
>
>Once there is stability and signs of good governance, then the parties can
>opt out of the alliance and pursue their own interests.
>
>The question NOW, is HOW to get the alliance started.
>
>Well, since in The Gambia we have three main opposition parties, they can
>form a triumvirate, composed of either presidential candidates (Sidia
>Jatta,
>Ousainou Darboe, Hamat Bah) or their representatives.  This triumvirate
>could then meet and work out the best way to achieve an alliance.
>
>A Summit, or Congress of these three parties can be held, and then
>delegates
>to the Congress can elect/select a unanimously-agreed presidential
>candidate
>who will be acceptable to all three parties.
>
>Again, this will not be an easy process, but compromise is the word and the
>way forward.
>
>It is important however, that the coalition should be headed by a candidate
>who is likely to draw more votes, who can unite his/her people and more
>importantly who has the competence and know how to manage a coalition
>government, who can minimise, if not prevent, differences.
>
>Of course, ministerial posts in a coalition government will be shared
>appropriately and as agreed, and each party would have its agreed quota of
>Ministers.
>
>At this point, we are not really talking about position, title or
>competition:  it is about selecting and appointing a group of committed
>Gambians whose task will be the betterment of The Gambia (and in no way
>related to any political gain they could make).
>
>The timescale is very short.  In order for a tactical alliance to be a
>meaningful force in Gambian politics, then the formation of the alliance
>and
>the modalities for it, have to be worked out and agreed upon by mid-August
>2001 (if the election timetable goes according to schedule).
>
>Within this time span, the Alliance Coalition will need to have agreed:
>
>A. Their candidate for presidency
>
>B. Their election platform
>
>C. Their proposed governmental platform (policies)
>
>D. Named candidates standing for each constituency in the National Assembly
>elections.
>
>These are points which would have to be worked on straight away
>
>
>In simple terms, the alliance if it were set up in May, would have a three
>month timetable to prepare for the presidential elections.  The specifics
>will be:
>
>1. Get a triumvirate to work out the modalities
>
>2. Hold a Congress of supporters of the three main opposition parties
>
>3. Elect/Select a unanimously agreed Presidential candidate representing
>all
>opposition parties in the coalition
>
>4. Support in every way its Presidential Candidate in the forthcoming
>election
>
>5. Draw up a campaign programme for the elections, ensuring that each area
>of The Gambia is well covered.
>
>6. Issue a joint Manifesto outlining what the coalition government would
>do(its programmes)  in the short and medium term
>
>
>
>Time is critical:  there is great urgency to get this process under way.
>The Presidential elections are scheduled for October, and the parties need
>to be ready to start their campaigning early in September.
>
>Be in no doubt that it is already very late in the day, and that we need to
>get a move on.
>
>Who is going to be the INITIATOR ?
>
>Well, it has to be a group of individuals who are seen as neutral and
>acceptable to all parties.  The ideal group would be the Movement for the
>Restoration of Democracy in the UK and in the USA:  they fit the bill, and
>can definitely do the job from initiation through to successful fruition.
>
>
>WHEN ???????
>
>
>
>It has to be NOW.
>
>There is no time to spare.
>
>The timetable for the elections is short and we have to be ready and
>prepared for action.
>
>Basically, we are talking about a 12-14 week timetable from initiation to
>the start of the Presidential election campaign.
>
>
>
>
>My 25th Message to All Gambians will touch on the Alliance’s tasks in a
>post-Jammeh Gambia, and the measures which will need to be taken in order
>to
>consolidate the durability of the Alliance, so that it can at least succeed
>in implementing its short term programmes.
>
>Ebrima Ceesay,
>Birmingham, UK.
>
>
>_________________________________________________________________________
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>
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