Joe,

 Mr. Sidibeh's piece  was generally a very insightful and good piece, and that's what made it so
disappointing, when he decided to end it in such a fashion by being callous in his
characterization of what you and other well meaning Gambians are trying to do. It is quite OK for
him to have reservation on the importance given to fund raising, but the way he went about
riduling it, and trivilizing your efforts by mocking you is definitely un-call for. The
bottom-line is , we are all going to defer in our way we choose to contribute to what we consider
a struggle to impact politics in the Gambia. Undoubtedly, people reserve the right to be critical
with  methods used, but there is a  much more decent and effective way to coonvey such
constructive crticism. It is obvious that resorting to name calling and mocking does not help in
our efforts. Mr. Sidibeh has demonstrated on this list as a very insightful, and his contribution
is very much needed for the struggle.. We all need to be helping , encouraging and be critical in
an effective manner, and I hope Mr. Sidibeh to take note of this.

Thanks
Mua Jeng

Thanks
Musa jeng

Joe Sambou wrote:

> Mo, thanks for your analyses of political meandering in The Gambia for the
> past 20 years.  I agree with much of that analysis.
>
> "On the other hand some internet-based Diasporans have carved for themselves
> no political role except as excitable financiers, jumping from funding one
> emergency to the next. [Even as I write this after reading ten days of
> accumulated mails this morning, I see that Joe Energy Sambou, is on the move
> again. This time he says 3 cents a day will do]. That, indeed, is also a
> role, because emergencies are what Gambia is going to acquire in giant doses
> up to 2006, even if the rains give a sense of respite from one year to the
> next. But the rest of us simply must reject that kind of non-committal
> illusionary project and put something more concrete in its place."
>
> Mo, yes, call us illusionary and other such descriptions and reject what we
> are doing outright, but anyone with a sense of what it takes to win an
> election knows that rhetoric alone takes you no where.  I wish you and those
> that wish to join you in this outright rejection of what we are trying to
> accomplish here, success.  For your success is for all Gambians.  Mo, I can
> easily do the same thing you are doing, write volumes and reject this and
> that effort, but I have better ways of wasting my time.  I believe in the
> market place of ideas and thus, will leave it to the stakeholders to decide
> what they want to do.  Please do not attempt to distort what we are calling
> for.  If you want to convince yourself that we view our role as "excitable
> financiers, jumping from funding one emergency to the next", then by all
> means be my guest and I am not going to say what we are trying to accomplish
> the 1000th time, for folks on this and other lists know exactly what we are
> calling for.  If you must, continue your campaign to discredit what some of
> us are doing, but I think you should spend more time convincing the
> stakeholders to join your outlook and not discredit us.
>
> Mo, the reason the "limited coalition" failed in the last elections was not
> more so, because of Sheriff Dibba's boycott, but because of the exclusion of
> PDOIS and NRP.  As you pointed out, PPP and UDP wrongly believed that they
> were going to defeat the APRC and can do that with or without PDOIS and NRP.
>   NCP was invited because UDP and NCP had the same following, but UDP
> especially, believed that they just needed the other parties for cosmetics
> reasons.  The PPP was in it because they knew they do not have a support
> base, for almost all their support went to UDP or APRC while they were
> silenced. UDP did not want PDOIS and the NRP to be included in the coalition
> talks because they knew that they would not be able to put the fix they
> intended for the NCP.  If the two exclusions were in, the NCP would not have
> boycotted because the nomination would have followed due process and not be
> an announcement hatched by Darbo, OJ, and Assan Musa.
>
> On the other hand, PDOIS also miscalculated the need for a coalition to
> defeat Jammeh as they sincerely believed that with their message and ideas,
> Gambians would finally see where their interest rest.  They were convinced
> that it was important to go the first round solo and then contemplate a
> coalition in the second round, and they cited the situation in Senegal with
> Wade's victory.  Those of us calling for a four party coalition saw the flaw
> in that optimism and tried to convince all of them to come together up until
> the elections.  We all know what happened.
>
> Transitioning to the campaign  period (village to village, division to
> division canvassing), the opposition was not visible because they were all
> cash strapped and could only make appearances in few select places, while
> Yaya crissed crossed every real estate of our landscape, especially up
> country.  Our vision for the opposition was to come together, all four, and
> use Darbo, Sidia, and Hamat, all three with no baggage from the first
> republic to convince Gambians about the bad news that was the APRC.  That
> was a winning formula and any novice of politics knew that.  However, the
> moment the APRC saw OJ and Assan Musa next to Darbo, they forgot about Darbo
> and used the PPP card.  Thus, Gambians were falsely convinced that Darbo was
> a front for the PPP and Jawara was a shadow that lurked in their minds, and
> Jawara was indeed lurking in the shadows.  So, there are many minor reasons
> why Jammeh stayed on, in addition to voter registration rigging.  Thus,
> history tells us that we need to work with the opposition to bring about a
> genuine coalition and craft a winning formula that is well financed.  This
> is what we are trying to do and not the baseless and outright falsehood you
> try to paint.  That says more about you than about what we are about.  I
> wish you success in your efforts to discredit our efforts, but I am
> confident that the stakeholders will decide what is best for them.  Your
> opinion of what we are about is one in a million.
>
> Chi Jaama
>
> Joe Sambou
>
> >From: Momodou S Sidibeh <[log in to unmask]>
> >Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
> ><[log in to unmask]>
> >To: [log in to unmask]
> >Subject: Coalition - Make or Break!
> >Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2003 14:53:26 +0100
> >
> >Hi Everyone,
> >
> >I need to apologise for the delay in posting this opinion piece. Not just
> >because I had intended to post it much earlier than now but also because,
> >all other things being equal, drawing attention and interest to such
> >mundane matters when many of us have our spiritual energies reserved for
> >the requirements of Ramadan might be an added burden. Happily, Ramadan is
> >also a period for deep reflection and self criticism, a way to cleanse our
> >minds by auditing our circumstances and to, as a consequence, improve upon
> >where we are weak.
> >
> >While I have been hard pressed to allocate time to contribute to the debate
> >when it raged sweetest, there has been a beautiful and informative flurry
> >of  opinion expressed in view of the current dearth of strategy towards
> >removing Jammeh from power. Many, many thanks to brothers Omar Joof, Sanusi
> >Owens, and sister Jabou Joh. But even if we accept Mr. Omar Joof's view on
> >the intentions of Mr. Waa Juwara as regards his opinions about the
> >coalition published in the Independent, designing a strategy for coalition
> >building demands a return to the immediate past in order to attempt
> >determining the probable structural defects that may plague such a huge
> >project. The resolution of some of these problems, I think, are in fact
> >fundamental to the success or failure of the collective attempt to unseat
> >the APRC regime. As I shall argue here, much of it has to do with the
> >constellation of opposition parties since the usurpation of power by the
> >AFPRC in 1994.
> >
> >President Jawara, during one of his most memorable speeches, derided the
> >opposition for its inherent frailties, and ineffectual propaganda. In
> >Georgetown in 1990 (?), when he dropped a bombshell saying he was going to
> >resign as party chairman and therefore head of state, he threw his audience
> >into laughter by saying that the GPP is splintered from the NCP which
> >itself splintered off the PPP. He went on to say that "as for PDOIS, they
> >are a party of malcontents"!
> >[The mandinka word that approximates to splinter as a verb, "ka farasi",
> >when used in a particular context conveys its meaning  with tons of
> >humour].
> >The president's assertion, insofar as it related to the GPP and the NCP was
> >absolutely accurate. But it is not in fact the accuracy of the assertion
> >that per se, is important in describing the identities of the parties.
> >Since the APRC banned the PPP and the NCP prior to the 1996 elections, it
> >inadvertently created a political void  that the UDP and the NRP emerged to
> >fill. The UDP grew on the wreckage of the two former older parties. There
> >leaderships notwithstanding, the mass base of the UDP and the APRC were
> >mostly made up of former supporters of the two parties, with the APRC
> >drawing its constituency largely from the anti-PPP opposition that swept
> >across the country drawing immediate converts into the dizzying whirlwind
> >of revolutionary vengeance and humiliation meted to former PPP royalty by
> >instances such as the Algali commission. It was payback time for many, but
> >only briefly.
> >
> >Once the 1996 elections were over and the former soldiers consolidated
> >their positions of power and mastered the art of accumulating immense
> >wealth while still holding onto political office, they began to disband the
> >very structures that would have evolved into organs of popular power if
> >their programmes were infused with sincere democratic content. This process
> >is eerily analogous to Jerry Rawlings disarming of the PDCs and WDCs
> >(People's/Workers  Defense Committees) in Ghana barely fourteen months
> >after his second seizure of power, December 1981. These were the local
> >village committees or wards for the defense of the revolution; structures
> >designed by the party but under the control of the July 22 movement, active
> >in the rice distribution scheme and operated as portals into the party. The
> >APRC deliberately trimmed the winds in the sails of the July 22 movement
> >while it opened up itself to an influx of new blood. Very quickly, known
> >and unknown PPP "yai kompins" and former NCP foot soldiers rushed onto the
> >APRC gravy train. Yaa Fatou Badjan, a former backbone supporter and
> >mobilizer for Jibou Jagne simply told Uncle Jibou that it was time that she
> >and her followers  jumped ship. She quickly became the APRC's campaign
> >chairwoman in Serre-Kunda East, responsible for distributing Ramadan sugar
> >- annually supplied by the President - and campaign t-shirts to supporters
> >and members of the party. Another high profile defection was that of Mrs.
> >Nyimasata Sanneh Bojang, this time from the PPP. There are many similar
> >comical instances in Gambian politics where people who were ardent rivals
> >for years, suddenly find common cause under the patronising wings of
> >vitriolic dictator.
> >Without the charismatic nature and consistent work of O.J, the PPP, in most
> >likelihood would have fizzled away, not unlike the NCP, from the
> >constellation. As for the NCP, its leadership seems to have sold itself,
> >body and soul, to the APRC. It is unclear to me where its support base
> >migrated if at all it has not dissolved unnoticed into that vast emptiness
> >of personal allegiances.
> >
> >So here we are, with the UDP, NRP, NDAM, PPP and PDOIS with the potential
> >of forming a coalition. The only party, that we can claim with certainty,
> >stands ideologically apart from the rest is PDOIS. In spite of its
> >pan-Africanist outlook, and militant inclinations, NDAM's political profile
> >remains unclear to me. Counting PDOIS out, where concretely lie the
> >differences between the other four? Are there ideological differences or
> >considerations of political economy so prominent that one should vote PPP
> >rather than UDP? Not just that they share a common anti-corruption
> >position, vow to establish the rule of law, strengthen democratic
> >institutions, and prioritise agriculture, these parties hardly evince
> >opposing position on significant policy questions. I remain convinced that
> >the major differences between them have little to do with politcal,
> >economic, or cultural ideas. Herein lies the major difficulty of the
> >proposed coalition. Given that the differences had to do with economic
> >polices or principles of democracy for instance, the parties can appreciate
> >each other's standpoints and negotiate with some flexibility on the bases
> >of those differences in the interest of the common good even in the short
> >term. But the differences between the parties seem to be based on fractured
> >histories, personalised rivalries, and perhaps both ethnic and provincial
> >considerations. Provided that the parties have active democratic
> >structures, it is conceivable that backward leadership traits such as
> >personal rivalries, could be eventually swept away. But these structures
> >are either non-existent or hopelessly dormant. UDP vividly exposed this
> >weakness when it failed to internally and democratically address the
> >financial irregularities which led to Mr. Waa Juwara's resignation as
> >propaganda secretary.
> >
> >It is at this point important to recall the most recent attempt at
> >coalition building during the campaign towards the last elections. The APRC
> >regime deliberately delayed repealing decree 89, that effectively banned
> >politicians of the first republic and their parties from activity till July
> >22, 2001. But even before that date PDOIS had, as a result of a party
> >congress held in Wuli, declared its readiness to join a tactical alliance
> >in preparation for the elections. The other parties joined the chorus, but
> >despite calls for the newly franchised decree 89 parties to join forces
> >with what was tactically labelled the Opposition, a broad-based coalition
> >that was to field a single presidential candidate never materialised. A
> >reasonably vocal group from Gambia-L campaigned all it could muster and
> >called for the unity of the opposition and appealed to decree 89
> >politicians to join the Opposition. An obviously notable difficulty in that
> >process was Mr. Sheriff Dibba's claim that he was apparently sidelined in
> >one of the more important deliberations, an incident that eventually
> >supplied a convenient exegesis for his subsequent defection to the APRC.
> >
> >Immediately after the elections, Mr. Ousainou Darboe conceded defeat by
> >congratulating the incumbent even before proper consultations with others
> >in the UDP leadership on the party's official position regarding the
> >elections.  Mr. Juwara's departure from UDP was anything but smooth. His
> >fervid allegations against  Mr. Ousainou Darboe is a strong enough reason
> >to suspect that problems of personal chemistries may severely affect
> >efforts to build a coalition.
> >
> >Beside the problem of personalities, a coalition must agree on a common
> >political platform that must at once espouse the profiles of all parties
> >and yet appeal to the opposition as a whole. The constituent programmes
> >within such a platform are what must give credibility to the idea of a
> >coalition in the first place. Its mandate cannot solely extend to the
> >question of peacefully defeating the incumbency. The question of what to
> >replace the APRC regime with is at least as equally important. The entire
> >opposition needs to be mobilised on and persuaded for the relevance of
> >these programmes if a political vacuum is to be avoided; the sort of vacuum
> >that a military coup purports to occupy, or because of which Senegal might
> >intervene for reasons of its security. Needless to say, it is precisely in
> >the debate about programmes for the coalition that citizens, card-carrying
> >members, supporters and sympathisers of the different political parties
> >should make their voices heard: how should the coalition take issue with
> >the IEC, the registration of voters, the whole electoral process, the
> >regime's desperate attempts to incinerate the critical press out of
> >existence, reactionary amendments aimed at promulgating indemnity, issues
> >of local democracy, and so on and so forth. These and many other issues are
> >what even Diasporans like ourselves need to engage with, contribute to, and
> >thereby exercise our right to participate in the democratic process.
> >Equally, these and questions of the economic collapse are best dealt with
> >on a national basis. Not that Mr. Juwara of NDAM has no right to take
> >initiatives on issues of national political relevance; but to insist that
> >such issues are best dealt with in consultation with other members of the
> >opposition, collectively combining their propaganda efforts and exerting
> >combined strength to demand for peaceful protests against APRC's disastrous
> >economics. In times as hard and tough as these in Gambia, coordination of
> >the activities of, and consultation amongst the opposition parties provide
> >the ready psychological and concrete bases for a coherent and strong
> >coalition. Consultations will not just help do away with much of the
> >personal tensions that accumulated over the years, it also provides strong
> >signals to the grassroots that we are all in the same damn, sinking, boat.
> >
> >Two years ago debate about the problems within the coalition were felt to
> >be an exercise in destructive forensics. Prissy abstractions could not be
> >allowed to derail the all too important rush towards unseating Jammeh;
> >political expediency was felt to be best served by overlooking the enormous
> >problems a coalition could be subdued by. All this inspite of misgivings
> >and warnings by, especially,  sister Jabou Joh. The elections were so close
> >that clamouring for an unprincipled unity seemed to override all
> >considerations of what that unity should rest upon. The concentrated focus
> >on wresting power from the hands of the APRC induced neglect of critical
> >issues that needed to be put under scrutiny. While the APRC was celebrating
> >numerous cases of high profile defections to its ranks, many of us
> >dismissed GRTS broadcast of these river-crossings as misinformation ploys.
> >So when rumours of secret meetings between Mr. Dibba and Mr. Jammeh were
> >circulating, it was still derided by many on Gambia-L as yet another
> >furtive sting to divide the Opposition. The leaders on the ground, i.e some
> >of them at any rate, sensed what was going on. Perhaps they mistrusted Mr.
> >Dibba's secret consultations with president Jammeh so greatly that they
> >deliberately left him out from a meeting. So the coalition broke down. The
> >rest is history.
> >
> >Current actualities in Gambia demand interventions of many forms. While a
> >diasporan like me should never encourage people to take to the streets for
> >anything, I should in all humility, ask Mr.Waa Juwara, in his capacity as a
> >leader seeking political office, to mobilise his unique experience and
> >organisational skills to take the lead in initiating consultations with ALL
> >the opposition parties (if that indeed was not done prior to Waa's call for
> >a peaceful demonstration), so that they may collectively draw out a
> >strategy to deal with the disastrous consequence of the current economic
> >and social malaise. It will hardly help if one leader or party attempts to
> >take on the regime individually in a physically risky show of defiance.
> >True, one can make powerful statements as a leader, but unless those
> >statements are backed-up with the continuity of a committed, disciplined
> >and strong organisation, they will eventually fail in their declared
> >intentions; and that failure makes future efforts at reorganising that much
> >more difficult. Furthermore the failure to consult with others may
> >reinforce mutual suspicions that have their roots in the past.
> >We Diasporans, in our capacity as Gambian citizens(!) and concerned
> >individuals must demand of our leaders that they must get ahead and work
> >out their differences, concretely start negotiating on a coalition
> >programme that will be acceptable to their constituencies.
> >On the other hand some internet-based Diasporans have carved for themselves
> >no political role except as excitable financiers, jumping from funding one
> >emergency to the next. [Even as I write this after reading ten days of
> >accumulated mails this morning, I see that Joe Energy Sambou, is on the
> >move again. This time he says 3 cents a day will do]. That, indeed, is also
> >a role, because emergencies are what Gambia is going to acquire in giant
> >doses up to 2006, even if the rains give a sense of respite from one year
> >to the next. But the rest of us simply must reject that kind of
> >non-committal illusionary project and put something more concrete in its
> >place.
> >
> >Ramadan Mubarak to you all,
> >
> >Momodou S Sidibeh
> >
> >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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