Here is a start:
Review of Verbal Behavior by B. F. Skinner by Noam Chomsky
Published by Irvington Pub
Publication date: October 1991
ISBN: 0829026037
Availability:
This title is out of print.
URL:
<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN%3D0829026037/alexanderchislenA/7188-6065881-634202>
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Related and may help:
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See:
<http://csmaclab-www.uchicago.edu/philosophyProject/sellars/chru-6.html>
1. 1ST STAGE: BEHAVIORESE
a. PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIORISM
The first task is to get clear about what Behaviorism claims. Ausonio
Marras has listed the following principles of a behavioristic methodology,
which probably reflects B. F. Skinner's approach:
(i) The basic laws of conditioning are the laws of reinforcement (law of
effect) and/or the classical laws of association (contiguity and frequency,
stimulus generalization and stimulus discrimination, etc.) (ii) S-R
connections are essentially functional, i.e., they have the form R=F(S),
where this is a 'gross function' usually derived from elementary functions
relating stimuli and responses to other 'environmental' variables (state of
deprivation, histories of reinforcement, etc.) (iii) An S-R connection is
acquired only if the probability of a response Rj given Si (under
conditions C) is greater than .5. (iv) Si and Rj are physical states
describable in the observational (molar) language of the experimenter. (v)
Non- observationally definable states of the organism may not be postulated
in a functional analysis of behavior. {26}
That a language can be understood and explained on behavioristic
assumptions is, of course, vehemently denied by Noam Chomsky who, in his
review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior presented a series of plausible
counter- arguments. His main objection was that Skinner had rejected theory
construction as a program, and, furthermore, had adopted a crude version of
the verifiability theory of empirical meaning, such that all legitimate
theoretical terms had to be definitionally reduced to empirical terms.
Chomsky believes that the grammar of a language is too complex a phenomena
to be understood without a theory, and, in addition, rejects Skinner's
theory of empirical meaning. So, inasmuch as Skinner's behaviorism rests on
a methodological rejection of theory construction, on the one hand, and a
reductionist theory of empirical meaning, on the other, his behavioristic
foundations for language are inadequate. Specifically, an explanation of
linguistic abilities, according to Chomsky, must include a theoretical
postulation in the language user of an innate knowledge of a universal
grammar--a knowledge which is not derivable from any finite learning
history. On his theory, particular grammars of the natural languages simply
utilize some of the resources of the universal grammar. It's as if the mind
had a propensity for learning only a range of possible grammars.{27}
Chomsky's approach is thus in two respects incompatible with Skinner's
version of behaviorism about language. It uses theory construction, and it
does not reduce theoretical terms to observational terms.
Note {27}
There is unclarity as to what Chomsky means by a 'universal grammar'. A
universal grammar is allegedly composed of rules. But there is an
ambiguity in this. Are the rules operative in the sense that they are
conformed to like a falling object conforms to the law of gravity, or are
rules like the premises of an argument which are, so to say, taken stock
off, or are rules like the rules of inference, e.g., the rule of modus
ponens, or are rules embedded structures like the hard wiring of a
computer? A related problem concerns the generality of these rules. Is a
universal grammar equivalent to the syntactical structures which are
necessary for any (empirical) language? In that case the universal grammar
will consist of at least rules of formation so as to allow
subject-predicate and relational sentences, formal and material rules of
inference, and sentences expressing practical intentions as conceived by
Sellars. If that is the case, then Chomsky's position is incompatible with
Sellars'. Sellars would take that these structures are not innate, but
learned.
[ [ TEXT CUT ] ]
Thus, taking Chomsky's criticism of Skinner's behaviorism seriously, it is
possible to introduce into behaviorism exactly those elements Chomsky
argues are missing: theory construction, irreducibility of theoretical
terms, and even connections between theoretical entities. So there is a
viable form of behaviorism, defended by Sellars, which is not taken into
account by Chomsky.
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General, not directly related
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URL:
<http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/pinker.langacq.html>
The scientific study of language acquisition began around the same time as
the birth of cognitive science, in the late 1950's. We can see now why
that is not a coincidence. The historical catalyst was Noam Chomsky's
review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior (Chomsky, 1959). At that time,
Anglo-American natural science, social science, and philosophy had come to
a virtual consensus about the answers to the questions listed above. The
mind consisted of sensorimotor abilities plus a few simple laws of learning
governing gradual changes in an organism's behavioral repertoire.
Therefore language must be learned, it cannot be a module, and thinking
must be a form of verbal behavior, since verbal behavior is the prime
manifestation of "thought" that can be observed externally. Chomsky argued
that language acquisition falsified these beliefs in a single stroke:
children learn languages that are governed by highly subtle and abstract
principles, and they do so without explicit instruction or any other
environmental clues to the nature of such principles. Hence language
acquisition depends on an innate, species-specific module that is distinct
from general intelligence. Much of the debate in language acquisition has
attempted to test this once-revolutionary, and still controversial,
collection of ideas. The implications extend to the rest of human
cognition.
URL:
http://www.fni.com/cim/briefings/behave.txt
III. THE CRITIQUE OF BEHAVIORISM
A. Some behavior cannot be traced to physical
reinforcement.
[ [ TEXT CUT ] ]
4. The theories of Noam Chomsky refute the
behaviorist idea that language is a product of
interaction with environment.
On Sun, 17 Aug 1997, David C. Larkin wrote:
> Can anyone tell me where I can locate Noam Chomsky's review of B.F.
> Skinner's book "Verbal Behavior" I heard a description of the review, but I
> do not know where to look to find it. It seems like it would be found in a
> journal years ago, but I suppose it may be reprinted in a more recent
> collection.
>
> David Larkin
> School of Justice Studies
> Arizona State University
> Tempe, AZ
> [log in to unmask]
>
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