Kosovo Peace Accord (Z, July '99)
http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/index.cfm
By Noam Chomsky
On March 24, U.S.-led NATO air forces began to pound the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FYR, Serbia and Montenegro), including Kosovo, which NATO
regards as a province of Serbia. On June 3, NATO and Serbia reached a
Peace Accord. The U.S. declared victory, having successfully concluded its
"10-week struggle to compel Mr. Milosevic to say uncle," Blaine Harden
reported in the New York Times. It would therefore be unnecessary to use
ground forces to "cleanse Serbia" as Harden had recommended in a lead
story headlined "How to Cleanse Serbia." The recommendation was natural in
the light of American history, which is dominated by the theme of ethnic
cleansing from its origins and to the present day, achievements celebrated
in the names given to military attack helicopters and other weapons of
destruction. A qualification is in order, however: the term "ethnic
cleansing" is not really appropriate: U.S. cleansing operations have been
ecumenical; Indochina and Central America are two recent illustrations.
While declaring victory, Washington did not yet declare peace: the bombing
continues until the victors determine that their interpretation of the
Kosovo Accord has been imposed. From the outset, the bombing had been cast
as a matter of cosmic significance, a test of a New Humanism, in which the
"enlightened states" (Foreign Affairs) open a new era of human history
guided by "a new internationalism where the brutal repression of whole
ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated" (Tony Blair). The enlightened
states are the United States and its British associate, perhaps also
others who enlist in their crusades for justice.
Apparently the rank of "enlightened states" is conferred by definition.
One finds no attempt to provide evidence or argument, surely not from
their history. The latter is in any event deemed irrelevant by the
familiar doctrine of "change of course," invoked regularly in the
ideological institutions to dispatch the past into the deepest recesses of
the memory hole, thus deterring the threat that some might ask the most
obvious questions: with institutional structures and distribution of power
essentially unchanged, why should one expect a radical shift in policy --
or any at all, apart from tactical adjustments?
But such questions are off the agenda. "From the start the Kosovo problem
has been about how we should react when bad things happen in unimportant
places," global analyst Thomas Friedman explained in the New York Times as
the Accord was announced. He proceeds to laud the enlightened states for
pursuing his moral principle that "once the refugee evictions began,
ignoring Kosovo would be wrong...and therefore using a huge air war for a
limited objective was the only thing that made sense."
A minor difficulty is that concern over the "refugee evictions" could not
have been the motive for the "huge air war." The United Nations
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported its first registered refugees
outside of Kosovo on March 27 (4000), three days after the bombings began.
The toll increased until June 4, reaching a reported total of 670,000 in
the neighboring countries (Albania, Macedonia), along with an estimated
70,000 in Montenegro (within the FYR), and 75,000 who had left for other
countries. The figures, which are unfortunately all too familiar, do not
include the unknown numbers who have been displaced within Kosovo, some
2-300,000 in the year before the bombing according to NATO, a great many
more afterwards.
Uncontroversially, the "huge air war" precipitated a sharp escalation of
ethnic cleansing and other atrocities. That much has been reported
consistently by correspondents on the scene and in retrospective analyses
in the press. The same picture is presented in the two major documents
that seek to portray the bombing as a reaction to the humanitarian crisis
in Kosovo. The most extensive one, provided by the State Department in
May, is suitably entitled "Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo";
the second is the Indictment of Milosevic and associates by the
International Tribunal on War Crimes in Yugoslavia after the U.S. and
Britain "opened the way for what amounted to a remarkably fast indictment
by giving [prosecutor Louise] Arbour access to intelligence and other
information long denied to her by Western governments," the New York Times
reported, with two full pages devoted to the Indictment. Both documents
hold that the atrocities began "on or about January 1"; in both, however,
the detailed chronology reveals that atrocities continued about as before
until the bombing led to a very sharp escalation. That surely came as no
surprise. Commanding General Wesley Clark at once described these
consequences as "entirely predictable" -- an exaggeration of course;
nothing in human affairs is that predictable, though ample evidence is now
available revealing that the consequences were anticipated, for reasons
readily understood without access to secret intelligence.
One small index of the effects of "the huge air war" was offered by Robert
Hayden, director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies of
the University of Pittsburgh: "the casualties among Serb civilians in the
first three weeks of the war are higher than all of the casualties on both
sides in Kosovo in the three months that led up to this war, and yet those
three months were supposed to be a humanitarian catastrophe." True, these
particular consequences are of no account in the context of the jingoist
hysteria that was whipped up to demonize Serbs, reaching intriguing
heights as bombing openly targeted the civilian society and hence required
more fervent advocacy.
By chance, at least a hint of a more credible answer to Friedman's
rhetorical question was given in the Times on the same day in a report
from Ankara by Stephen Kinzer. He writes that "Turkey's best-known human
rights advocate entered prison" to serve his sentence for having "urged
the state to reach a peaceful settlement with Kurdish rebels." A few days
earlier, Kinzer had indicated obliquely that there is more to the story:
"Some [Kurds] say they have been oppressed under Turkish rule, but the
Government insists that they are granted the same rights as other
citizens." One may ask whether this really does justice to some of the
most extreme ethnic cleansing operations of the mid '90s, with tens of
thousands killed, 3500 villages destroyed, some 2.5 to 3 million refugees,
and hideous atrocities that easily compare to those recorded daily in the
front pages for selected enemies, reported in detail by the major human
rights organizations but ignored. These achievements were carried out
thanks to massive military support from the United States, increasing
under Clinton as the atrocities peaked, including jet planes, attack
helicopters, counterinsurgency equipment, and other means of terror and
destruction, along with training and intelligence information for some of
the worst killers.
Recall that these crimes have been proceeding through the '90s within NATO
itself, and under the jurisdiction of the Council of Europe and the
European Court of Human Rights, which continues to hand down judgments
against Turkey for its U.S.-supported atrocities. It took real discipline
for participants and commentators "not to notice" any of this at the
celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary in April. The discipline was
particularly impressive in light of the fact that the celebration was
clouded by somber concerns over ethnic cleansing -- by
officially-designated enemies, not by the enlightened states that are to
rededicate themselves to their traditional mission of bringing justice and
freedom to the suffering people of the world, and to defend human rights,
by force if necessary, under the principles of the New Humanism.
These crimes, to be sure, are only one illustration of the answer given by
the enlightened states to the profound question of "how we should react
when bad things happen in unimportant places." We should intervene to
escalate the atrocities, not "looking away" under a "double standard," the
common evasion when such marginalia are impolitely adduced. That also
happens to be the mission that was conducted in Kosovo, as revealed
clearly by the course of events, though not the version refracted through
the prism of ideology and doctrine, which do not gladly tolerate the
observation that a consequence of the "the huge air war" was a change from
a year of atrocities on the scale of the annual (U.S.-backed) toll in
Colombia in the 1990s to a level that might have approached atrocities
within NATO/Europe itself in the 1990s had the bombing continued.
The marching orders from Washington, however, are the usual ones: Focus
laser-like on the crimes of today's official enemy, and do not allow
yourself to be distracted by comparable or worse crimes that could easily
be mitigated or terminated thanks to the crucial role of the enlightened
states in perpetuating them, or escalating them when power interests so
dictate. Let us obey the orders, then, and keep to Kosovo.
A minimally serious investigation of the Kosovo Accord must review the
diplomatic options of March 23, the day before "huge air war" was
launched, and compare them with the agreement reached by NATO and Serbia
on June 3. Here we have to distinguish two versions: (1) the facts, and
(2) the spin -- that is, the U.S./NATO version that frames reporting and
commentary in the enlightened states. Even the most cursory look reveals
that the facts and the spin differ sharply. Thus the New York Times
presented the text of the Accord with an insert headed: "Two Peace Plans:
How they Differ." The two peace plans are the Rambouillet (Interim)
Agreement presented to Serbia as a take-it-or-be-bombed ultimatum on March
23, and the Kosovo Peace Accord of June 3. But in the real world there are
three "peace plans," two of which were on the table on March 23: the
Rambouillet Agreement and the Serb National Assembly Resolutions
responding to it.
Let us begin with the two peace plans of March 23, asking how they
differed and how they compare with the Kosovo Peace Accord of June 3, then
turning briefly to what we might reasonably expect if we break the rules
and pay some attention to the (ample) precedents.
The Rambouillet Agreement called for complete military occupation and
political control of Kosovo by NATO, and effective NATO military
occupation of the rest of Yugoslavia at NATO's will. NATO is to
"constitute and lead a military force" (KFOR) that "NATO will establish
and deploy" in and around Kosovo, "operating under the authority and
subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command"; "the KFOR commander is
the final authority within theater regarding interpretation of this
chapter [Implementation of the military Agreement] and his interpretations
are binding on all Parties and persons" (with an irrelevant
qualification). Within a brief time schedule, all Yugoslav army forces and
Ministry of Interior police are to redeploy to "approved cantonment
sites," then to withdraw to Serbia, apart from small units assigned to
border guard duties with limited weapons (all specified in detail). These
units would be restricted to defending the borders from attack and
"controlling illicit border crossings," and not permitted to travel in
Kosovo apart from these functions.
"Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an
international meeting shall to be convened to determine a mechanisms for a
final settlement for Kosovo." This paragraph has regularly been construed
as calling for a referendum on independence, not mentioned.
With regard to the rest of Yugoslavia, the terms for the occupation are
set forth in Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation
Force. The crucial paragraph reads: 8. NATO personnel shall enjoy,
together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and
unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including
associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any
areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations. The
remainder spells out the conditions that permit NATO forces and those they
employ to act as they choose throughout the territory of the FRY, without
obligation or concern for the laws of the country or the jurisdiction of
its authorities, who are, however, required to follow NATO orders "on a
priority basis and with all appropriate means." One provision states that
"all NATO personnel shall respect the laws applicable in the FRY...," but
with a qualification to render it vacuous: "Without prejudice to their
privileges and immunities under this Appendix, all NATO personnel...."
It has been speculated that the wording was designed so as to guarantee
rejection. Perhaps so. It is hard to imagine that any country would
consider such terms, except in the form of unconditional surrender.
In the massive coverage of the war one will find little reference to the
Agreement that is even close to accurate, notably the crucial article of
Appendix B just quoted. The latter was, however, reported as soon as it
had become irrelevant to democratic choice. On June 5, after the peace
agreement of June 3, the New York Times reported that under the annex to
the Rambouillet Agreement "a purely NATO force was to be given full
permission to go anywhere it wanted in Yugoslavia, immune from any legal
process," citing also the wording. Evidently, in the absence of clear and
repeated explanation of the basic terms of the Rambouillet Agreement --
the official "peace process" -- it has been impossible for the public to
gain any serious understanding of what was taking place, or to assess the
accuracy of the preferred version of the Kosovo Accord.
The second peace plan was presented in resolutions of the Serbian National
Assembly on March 23. The Assembly rejected the demand for NATO military
occupation, and called on the OSCE (Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe) and the UN to facilitate a peaceful diplomatic
settlement. It condemned the withdrawal of the OSCE Kosovo Verification
Mission ordered by the United States on March 19 in preparation for the
March 24 bombing. The resolutions called for negotiations leading "toward
the reaching of a political agreement on a wide-ranging autonomy for
Kosovo and Metohija [the official name for the province], with the
securing of a full equality of all citizens and ethnic communities and
with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic
of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Furthermore, though
"The Serbian Parliament does not accept presence of foreign military
troops in Kosovo and Metohija," The Serbian Parliament is ready to review
the size and character of the international presence in Kosmet
[Kosovo/Metohija] for carrying out the reached accord, immediately upon
signing the political accord on the self-rule agreed and accepted by the
representatives of all national communities living in Kosovo and Metohija.
The essentials of these decisions were reported on major wire services and
therefore certainly known to every news room. Several database searchs
have found scarce mention, none in the national press and major journals.
The two peace plans of March 23 thus remain unknown to the general public,
even the fact that there were two, not one. The standard line is that
"Milosevic's refusal to accept...or even discuss an international
peacekeeping plan [namely, the Rambouillet Agreement] was what started
NATO bombing on March 24" (Craig Whitney, New York Times), one of the many
articles deploring Serbian propaganda -- accurately no doubt, but with a
few oversights.
As to what the Serb National Assembly Resolutions meant, the answers are
known with confidence by fanatics -- different answers, depending on which
variety of fanatics they are. For others, there would have been a way to
find out the answers: to explore the possibilities. But the enlightened
states preferred not to pursue this option; rather, to bomb, with the
anticipated consequences.
Further steps in the diplomatic process, and their refraction in the
doctrinal institutions, merit attention, but I will skip that here,
turning to the Kosovo Accord of June 3. As might have been expected, it is
a compromise between the two peace plans of March 23. On paper at least,
the U.S./NATO abandoned their major demands, cited above, which had led to
Serbia's rejection of the ultimatum. Serbia in turn agreed to an
"international security presence with substantial NATO participation
[which] must be deployed under unified command and control...under U.N
auspices." An addendum to the text stated "Russia's position [that] the
Russian contingent will not be under NATO command and its relationship to
the international presence will be governed by relevant additional
agreements." There are no terms permitting access to the rest of the FYR
for NATO or the "international security presence" generally. Political
control of Kosovo is not to be in the hands of NATO but of the UN Security
Council, which will establish "an interim administration of Kosovo." The
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces is not specified in the detail of the
Rambouillet Agreement, but is similar, though accelerated. The remainder
is within the range of agreement of the two plans of March 23.
The outcome suggests that diplomatic initiatives could have been pursued
on March 23, averting a terrible human tragedy with consequences that will
reverberate in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, and are in many respects quite
ominous.
To be sure, the current situation is not that of March 23. A Times
headline the day of the Kosovo Accord captures it accurately: "Kosovo
Problems Just Beginning." Among the "staggering problems" that lie ahead,
Serge Schmemann observed, are the repatriation of the refugees "to the
land of ashes and graves that was their home," and the "enormously costly
challenge of rebuilding the devastated economies of Kosovo, the rest of
Serbia and their neighbors." He quotes Balkans historian Susan Woodward of
the Brookings Institution, who adds "that all the people we want to help
us make a stable Kosovo have been destroyed by the effects of the
bombings," leaving control in the hands of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation
Army). The U.S. had strongly condemned the KLA as "without any question a
terrorist group" when it began to carry out organized attacks in February
1998, actions that Washington condemned "very strongly" as "terrorist
activities," probably giving a "green light" thereby to Milosevic for the
severe repression that led to the Colombia-style violence before the
bombings precipitated a sharp escalation.
These "staggering problems" are new. They are "the effects of the
bombings" and the vicious Serb reaction to them, though the problems that
preceded the resort to violence by the enlightened states were daunting
enough.
Turning from facts to spin, headlines hailed the grand victory of the
enlightened states and their leaders, who compelled Milosevic to
"capitulate," to "say uncle," to accept a "NATO-led force," and to
surrender "as close to unconditionally as anyone might have imagined,"
submitting to "a worse deal than the Rambouillet plan he rejected." Not
exactly the story, but one that is far more useful than the facts. The
only serious issue debated is whether this shows that air power alone can
achieve highly moral purposes, or whether, as the critics allowed into the
debate allege, the case still has not been proven. Turning to broader
significance, Britain's "eminent military historian" John Keegan "sees the
war as a victory not just for air power but for the `New World Order' that
President Bush declared after the Gulf War," military expert Fred Kaplan
reports. Keegan wrote that "If Milosevic really is a beaten man, all other
would-be Milosevics around the world will have to reconsider their plans."
The assessment is realistic, though not in the terms Keegan may have had
in mind: rather, in the light of the actual goals and significance of the
New World Order, as revealed by an important documentary record of the
'90s that remains unreported, and a plethora of factual evidence that
helps us understand the true meaning of the phrase "Milosevics around the
world." Merely to keep to the Balkans region, the strictures do not hold
of huge ethnic cleansing operations and terrible atrocities within NATO
itself, under European jurisdiction and with decisive and mounting U.S.
support, and not conducted in response to an attack by the world's most
awesome military force and the imminent threat of invasion. These crimes
are legitimate under the rules of the New World Order, perhaps even
meritorious, as are atrocities elsewhere that conform to the perceived
interests of the leaders of the enlightened states and are regularly
implemented by them when necessary. These facts, not particularly obscure,
reveal that in the "new internationalism...the brutal repression of whole
ethnic groups" will not merely be "tolerated," but actively expedited --
exactly as in the "old internationalism" of the Concert of Europe, the
U.S. itself, and many other distinguished predecessors.
While the facts and the spin differ sharply, one might argue that the
media and commentators are realistic when they present the U.S./NATO
version as if it were the facts. It will become The Facts as a simple
consequence of the distribution of power and the willingness of articulate
opinion to serve its needs. That is a regular phenomenon. Recent examples
include the Paris Peace Treaty of January 1973 and the Esquipulas Accords
of August 1987. In the former case, the U.S. was compelled to sign after
the failure of the Christmas bombings to induce Hanoi to abandon the
U.S.-Vietnam agreement of the preceding October. Kissinger and the White
House at once announced quite lucidly that they would violate every
significant element of the Treaty they were signing, presenting a
different version which was adopted in reporting and commentary, so that
when North Vietnam finally responded to serious U.S. violations of the
accords, it became the incorrigible aggressor which had to be punished
once again, as it was. The same tragedy/farce took place when the Central
American Presidents reached the Esquipulas Accord (often called "the Arias
plan") over strong U.S. opposition. Washington at once sharply escalated
its wars in violation of the one "indispensable element" of the Accord,
then proceeded to dismantle its other provisions by force, succeeding
within a few months, and continuing to undermine every further diplomatic
effort until its final victory. Washington's version of the Accord, which
sharply deviated from it in crucial respects, became the accepted version.
The outcome could therefore be heralded in headlines as a "Victory for
U.S. Fair Play" with Americans "United in Joy" over the devastation and
bloodshed, overcome with rapture "in a romantic age" (Anthony Lewis,
headlines in New York Times, all reflecting the general euphoria over a
mission accomplished).
It is superfluous to review the aftermath in these and numerous similar
cases. There is little reason to expect a different story to unfold in the
present case -- with the usual and crucial proviso: If we let it.
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