Matt Hill wrote:
>
> By definition I have to take NATO's putative goals at face value.  Are
> you distinguishing putative goals from goals?  I hope I am using
> putative properly.
>
> I just mean NATO's supposed or publicly announced goals--the goals
> most people think of when they talk about what NATO is trying to do in
> the Balkans.
>
> The US may well have goals it is not telling us about.  I've
> seen a lot
> of speculation, and knowing America's human rights record I'm
> sure some
> of it is accurate.
>
> But the world population is judging the US (and NATO) by whether it
> achieves what it says it will.  The West may subjugate Serbia to
> neocolonialism, but if the current disaster continues
> unabated, Western
> leaders are going to take a lot of heat.  People are watching.
>
> So I agree with both (1) and (2), although (1) has to be revised
> to mean only NATO's official, public goal.

In that case, you agree with (2) and I would caution against agreeing with (1) because it then lends credence to NATO's claim that their objective really is just to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis.

>
> > I'll tell you why I ask. I obviously disagree with (b) and
> > (c) as well, but I also disagree with the (a) because I
> > don't believe NATO's intention is or has ever been to
> > meliorate the humanitarian crisis (and that's where examples
> > of US actions in dealing with humanitarian crises are of
> > value).
>
> I also suspect hidden intentions.  But if genocide or
> near-genocide goes
> on despite NATO's action, the world will see NATO as a
> failure.  NATO is
> mostly (or entirely) composed of liberal democracies.  To some extent
> Western leaders will have to answer to their populations.

I disagree. And this is where previous examples are useful. Did Western leaders answer to their populations for Vietnam? East Timor? Guatemala? El Salvador? And the list goes on. I think you may underestimate the power of the state-media propaganda team.
The US/UK/NATO have already laid much of the groundwork in stating early and often that Milosevic takes responsibility for _everything_ that is going on in Serbia. They have already laid the blame of civilian deaths from NATO bombs on his door, it will
not be difficult to blame genocide or near-genocide on him and shrug off any responsibility. Who in the West answered for Rwanda? France could certainly have shouldered some of the responsibility for hindering the UN operation, but there were no
consequences to that.

>
> On a more cynical note, if the US can't achieve its putative goal it
> will have a harder time in the future coming up with viable
> pretexts to
> cover its real goals.

Again, how many more times can we say that before we realize that there will always be another reason. Or even the same reason.

>
> > But if you were to decouple NATO's involvement, as in (2)
> > above, I agree that that the crisis needs to be dealt with.
> > But at the same time, I believe NATO (or at least the US/UK
> > foreign policy controlling the NATO agenda)is part of the
> > problem and a large reason for the escalation in the crisis.
>
> I agree.
>
> My argument here is that, under certain circumstances, we
> could support
> US/NATO military action.  I do not think this is one of those
> circumstances, but it's a close call.  There is evidence that
> Milosevic
> was planning to cleanse Kosovo anyway.

There is also evidence that he was willing to restore some autonomy and accept a UN peacekeeping force in Kosovo. What the Serbians were not prepared to accept was a NATO occupation force of the whole of Yugoslavia. I don't know if you have seen the full
text of the Rambouillet agreement or not, but the threw these little morsels into Appendix B:


      7. NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest,
         investigation, or detention by the authorities in the
         FRY. NATO personnel erroneously arrested or detained
         shall immediately be turned over to NATO authorities.

[I understand that you wouldn't want to be subject to arbitrary arrests but this item does not include provisions for lawful arrests even if crimes are committed.]


      8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their
         vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and
         unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the
         FRY including associated airspace and territorial
         waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
         right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of
         any areas or facilities as required for support,
         training, and operations.

[This isn't just for Kosovo, this is an occupation force over all of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.]

     11. NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and
         ports without payment of fees, duties, dues, tolls, or
         charges occasioned by mere use. NATO shall not,
         however, claim exemption from reasonable charges for
         specific services requested and received, but
         operations/movement and access shall not be allowed to
         be impeded pending payment for such services.

[Again, NATO is given free reign over all of Yugoslavia.]

     15. The Parties recognize that the use of communications
         channels is necessary for the Operation. NATO shall
         be allowed to operate its own internal mail services.
         The Parties shall, upon simple request, grant all
         telecommunications services, including broadcast
         services, needed for the Operation, as determined by
         NATO. This shall include the right to utilize such
         means and services as required to assure full ability
         to communicate, and the right to use all of the
         electromagnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of
         cost. In implementing this right, NATO shall make
         every reasonable effort to coordinate with and take
         into account the needs and requirements of appropriate
         authorities in the FRY.

[NATO would be entitled to any or all of the broadcast spectrum, simply by requesting it and for any reason whatsoever, as determined by NATO.]

Given that the bombing is based on the Serbs refusing to accept this agreement, and one of the stated (putative) goals of the bombing is to force Milosevic to sign this agreement, I can't imagine how I could possibly support this bombing.

>
> My support for Western intervention (in general) is
> contingent on three
> factors:
>
> 1. The putative goal is good.
>
> 2. There is reason to think the West will put an honest effort
> into doing achieving the putative goal.
>
> 3. There is a good chance the effort will succeed. (We calculate the
> chance based on what has been done up to the present and what
> the future
> looks like).
>
> Concerning Kosovo I think the intervention succeeds on (1) and (2) but
> not on (3), for reasons I think I've already gone into.
>
> Nevertheless, we should at least be willing to offer
> conditional support
> to the West (if only verbal), regardless of its real agenda.  The
> question is what those conditions are.  Obviously a lot of us
> disagree,
> so we are having heated discussions on these lists.
>
> And as you can see I've revised my "framework" after only one
> day.  With
> some luck, though, we can resolve some issues rather than misrepresent
> one another.
>

Yes, you have revised it, and I agree with (1), the goal itself. I still don't believe it is or has ever been NATO's goal, but I agree with the goal. I don't agree with (2) based on the way the Rambouillet "agreement" was "negotiated", the terms in the
agreement and the ultimatums issued relating to the agreement. I don't believe NATO/US/UK put in an honest effort. I don't believe they really gave diplomacy a chance. And again, I don't agree with (3).