> Ok, let's work within your framework. You disagree with (b)
> the implementation and (c) the chance of success, but you
> agree with (a) NATO's putative goals, which, as you put it,
> are "to meliorate the humanitarian crisis."
>
> Since I don't want to be accused of making inferences again,
> let me ask you this: are you taking NATO's putative goals at
> face value, i.e., do you (1) believe that NATO's goal is
> indeed "to meliorate the humanitarian crisis" and thus agree
> with NATO or (2) are you saying that you agree with the goal
> itself, independently of whether NATO is involved? If
> neither (1) nor (2) apply, please clarify.

By definition I have to take NATO's putative goals at face value.  Are
you distinguishing putative goals from goals?  I hope I am using
putative properly.

I just mean NATO's supposed or publicly announced goals--the goals
most people think of when they talk about what NATO is trying to do in
the Balkans.

The US may well have goals it is not telling us about.  I've seen a lot
of speculation, and knowing America's human rights record I'm sure some
of it is accurate.

But the world population is judging the US (and NATO) by whether it
achieves what it says it will.  The West may subjugate Serbia to
neocolonialism, but if the current disaster continues unabated, Western
leaders are going to take a lot of heat.  People are watching.

So I agree with both (1) and (2), although (1) has to be revised
to mean only NATO's official, public goal.

> I'll tell you why I ask. I obviously disagree with (b) and
> (c) as well, but I also disagree with the (a) because I
> don't believe NATO's intention is or has ever been to
> meliorate the humanitarian crisis (and that's where examples
> of US actions in dealing with humanitarian crises are of
> value).

I also suspect hidden intentions.  But if genocide or near-genocide goes
on despite NATO's action, the world will see NATO as a failure.  NATO is
mostly (or entirely) composed of liberal democracies.  To some extent
Western leaders will have to answer to their populations.

On a more cynical note, if the US can't achieve its putative goal it
will have a harder time in the future coming up with viable pretexts to
cover its real goals.

> But if you were to decouple NATO's involvement, as in (2)
> above, I agree that that the crisis needs to be dealt with.
> But at the same time, I believe NATO (or at least the US/UK
> foreign policy controlling the NATO agenda)is part of the
> problem and a large reason for the escalation in the crisis.

I agree.

My argument here is that, under certain circumstances, we could support
US/NATO military action.  I do not think this is one of those
circumstances, but it's a close call.  There is evidence that Milosevic
was planning to cleanse Kosovo anyway.

My support for Western intervention (in general) is contingent on three
factors:

1. The putative goal is good.

2. There is reason to think the West will put an honest effort
into doing achieving the putative goal.

3. There is a good chance the effort will succeed. (We calculate the
chance based on what has been done up to the present and what the future
looks like).

Concerning Kosovo I think the intervention succeeds on (1) and (2) but
not on (3), for reasons I think I've already gone into.

Nevertheless, we should at least be willing to offer conditional support
to the West (if only verbal), regardless of its real agenda.  The
question is what those conditions are.  Obviously a lot of us disagree,
so we are having heated discussions on these lists.

And as you can see I've revised my "framework" after only one day.  With
some luck, though, we can resolve some issues rather than misrepresent
one another.