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MichaelP

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Eleven Questions Re Iraq:
An Interview with Noam Chomsky

Originally for the Italian journal "La Repubblica"

The interviewer was Giampaolo Cadalanu

1) The intervention of the U.S. in Irak seems at the momentunavoidable. Do
you think the real reason of this intervention is to impose respect of
U.N. resolutions?

To evaluate the proposal, we can ask how the US itself respects UN
resolutions. There are simple ways to check. For the past 30 years, the US
is far in the lead in vetoing Security Council Resolutions (Britain
second, France a distant third). In the General Assembly, the US regularly
votes against resolutions in virtual isolation -- hence in effect vetoing
them -- on a wide range of issues. The pattern extends to the World Court,
international conventions on human rights, and much else.

Furthermore the US freely disregards violation of UN resolutions that it
has formally endorsed, and often contributes materially to such violation.
The case of Israel is notorious (for example, the 1978 Security Council
resolution calling on Israel to withdraw immediately from Lebanon).

To select another example that is quite relevant here, in December 1975
the Security Council unanimously ordered Indonesia to withdraw its
invading forces from East Timor "without delay" and called upon "all
States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the
inalienable right of its people to self-determination."

The US responded by (secretly) increasing its shipments of arms to the
aggressors, accelerating the arms flow once again as the attack reached
near-genocidal levels in 1978. In his memoirs, UN Ambassador Daniel
Patrick Moynihan takes pride in his success in rendering the UN "utterly
ineffective in whatever measures it undertook," following the instructions
of the State Department, which "wished things to turn out as they did and
worked to bring this about." The US also cheerfully accepts the robbery of
East Timor's oil (with participation of US-based companies), in violation
of any reasonable interpretation of international agreements. The analogy
to Iraq/Kuwait is close, though there are differences: to mention only the
most obvious, US-backed atrocities in East Timor were vastly beyond
anything attributed to Saddam Hussein in Kuwait.

It is easy to extend the record. Like other great powers, the US is
committed to the rule of force, not law, in international affairs. UN
Resolutions, World Court Judgments, International Conventions, etc., are
acceptable if they accord with policy; otherwise they are mere words.

2) Which difference do you see between this intervention and Operation
"Desert Storm", with the Bush administration?

There are many differences. "Desert Storm" was allegedly intended to drive
Iraq from Kuwait; today the alleged goal is to compel Iraq to permit UN
inspection of Saddam's weapons programs. In both cases, a closer look
reveals a more complex story. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US feared
that in "the next few days Iraq will withdraw" leaving in place a puppet
government and "everyone in the Arab world will be happy" (Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs Colin Powell). The concern, in brief, was that Iraq would act
much as the US had done a few months earlier when it invaded Panama
(vetoing two Security Council resolutions condemning its actions). What
followed also does not quite conform to standard versions. Today, it is
widely expected that a military strike will leave Iraq's murderous tyrant
in power, continuing to pursue his weapons programs, while undermining
such international inspection as exists.

It may also be recalled that Saddam's worst crimes were committed when he
was a favored US ally and trading partner, and that immediately after he
was driven from Kuwait, the US watched quietly while he turned to the
slaughter of rebelling Iraqis, even refusing to allow them access to
captured Iraqi arms. Official stories rarely yield an accurate picture of
what is happening. Nonetheless, the differences between 1990 and today are
substantial.

3) Do you believe that the so-called "Sexgate", the scandal about sexual
behaviour of president Clinton, had a role in the decision to attack Iraq?

I doubt that it is much of a factor.

4) Do you see an alternative to the "new world order" of the U.S.?

"World order," like "domestic order," is based on decisions made within
institutions that reflect existing power structures. The decisions can be
changed; the institutions can be modified or replaced. It is natural that
those who benefit from the organization of state and private power will
portray it as inevitable, so that the victims will feel helpless to act.
There is no reason to believe that. Particularly in the rich countries
that dominate world affairs, citizens can easily act to create
alternatives even within existing formal arrangements, and these are not
graven in stone, any more than in the past.

5) Do you see in Irak an alternative to Saddam Hussein?

The rebelling forces in March 1991 were an alternative, but the US
preferred Saddam. There was an Iraqi democratic opposition in exile.
Washington refused to have anything to do with them before, during, or
after the Gulf War, and they were virtually excluded from the US media,
apart from marginal dissident journals. "Political meetings with them
would not be appropriate for our policy at this time," State Department
spokesman Richard Boucher stated on March 14, 1991, while Saddam was
decimating the opposition under the eyes of Stormin' Norman Schwartzkopf.
They still exist. How realistic their programs are, I cannot judge, and I
do not think we can know as long as the US remains committed -- as
apparently it still is -- to the Bush adminstration policy that preferred
"an iron-fisted Iraqi junta," without Saddam Hussein if possible, a return
to the days when Saddam's "iron fist...held Iraq together, much to the
satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia," not to speak
of Washington (NY Times chief diplomatic correspondent Thomas Friedman,
July 1991).

6) What would happen if Baghdad suddenly decides to obey the U.N.
resolution?

I am afraid that the probability is slight, and if he did, he would soon
find new ways of evading the resolutions.

7) Why did embargo not work against Saddam's regime?

The effects of the sanctions come as no surprise. They have strengthened
Saddam's position and undermined potential resistance to him among people
struggling to survive. New bombing is likely to have a similar effect.

8) This time, do you believe it will be again "Exxon's war"?

I do not think it was "Exxon's war" in 1991, or today, at least in a
narrow sense. It is quite true that since World War II, the US has been
firmly committed to maintaining control over Middle East oil, which the
State Department described as "a stupendous source of strategic power, and
one of the greatest material prizes in world history." But there is no
persuasive evidence that in 1990-91, the US was concerned about an Iraqi
threat to this control. There is, however, good reason to believe that
Washington saw the Iraqi invasion as an opportunity to extend its control
-- to demonstrate that "what we say goes," as George Bush announced
triumphantly while the missiles and bombs were falling. In fact, the US
used the opportunity to institute at once the rejectionist version of the
Israel-Arab "peace process" that it had maintained in virtual
international isolation for 25 years, but was now able to implement.

Previously, the US had been compelled to veto Security Council resolutions
calling for a diplomatic settlement, to vote regularly against similar
General Assembly resolutions (the last in December 1990, passed 144-2, the
US and Israel opposed), and to undermine other diplomatic initiatives from
Europe, the Arab world, and others. But after the Gulf War, the US was
finally able to proceed, unopposed. The background issue remains control
of the world's major energy reserves, but apart from that, the specific
problems of US energy corporations have not directly motivated the
policies we are discussing.

9) Which role did the military play in the decision to attack? And
industry?

Very little, I think.

10) This time, is it possible to link Gaza and the West Bank with respect
of U.N. resolutions?

Highly unlikely, as things now stand. The US government could always have
linked the issues, but has preferred not to. Its goal for the
Israeli-occupied territories is the Bantustan-style settlement that is now
being imposed (Israel's two political groupings are not very different in
this regard). US attitudes towards UN resolutions on these issues can
readily be determined by reviewing the record of US vetoes, isolated
negative votes, and disregard of continuing violations.

11) What can (or: could) be done to avoid (or: to stop) the war?

The usual answer: substantial popular pressure, in this case, from within
the US and in Europe, primarily. Right now, that does not seem likely.

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