Earlier this week the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of  the
obligation of local school districts to provide for related services needed
to assure that disabled children are afforded an appropriate public
education. The case on the surface appears to address a narrow aspect of
the "related services" requirement. ,  However, the Court's focus on the
goals of the statute and its refusal to narrow its scope of coverage by
embracing the District's cost based interpretation of "related service"
 could be important in addressing other "related services" issues such as
providing computer access and Braille trained teacher assistants.   Unless
Congress Acts to modify the requirements at issue in the Cedar Rapids case,
the decision should strengthen the quest for improved public education
access for blind children.  A summary of the opinion prepared by the
Supreme Court follows.  If any one is interested in the full text let me
know.

CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. GARRET F., a minor, by his mother
and next friend, CHARLENE F.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit

No. 96-1793. Argued November 4, 1998--Decided March 3, 1999

To help "assure that all children with disabilities have available to them
... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education
and related services designed to meet their unique needs," 20 U. S. C.
?1400(c), the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes
federal financial assistance to States that agree to provide such children
with special education and "related services," as defined in ?1401(a)(17).
Respondent Garret F., a student in petitioner school district (District),
is wheelchair-bound and ventilator dependent; he therefore requires, in
part, a responsible individual nearby to attend to certain physical needs
during the school day. The District declined to accept financial
responsibility for the services Garret needs, believing that it was not
legally obligated to provide continuous one-on-one nursing care. At an Iowa
Department of Education hearing, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that
the IDEA required the District to bear financial responsibility for all of
the disputed services, finding that most of them are already provided for
some other students; that the District did not contend that only a licensed
physician could provide the services; and that applicable federal
regulations require the District to furnish "school health services," which
are provided by a "qualified school nurse or other qualified person," but
not "medical services," which are limited to services provided by a
physician. The Federal District Court agreed and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, concluding that Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.
S. 883, provided a two-step analysis of ?1401(a)(17)'s "related services"
definition that was satisfied here. First, the requested services were
"supportive services" because Garret cannot attend school unless they are
provided; and second, the services were not excluded as "medical services"
under Tatro's bright-line test: Services provided by a physician (other
than for diagnostic and evaluation purposes) are subject to the medical
services exclusion, but services that can be provided by a nurse or
qualified layperson are not.



Held: The IDEA requires the District to provide Garret with the nursing
services he requires during school hours. The IDEA's "related services"
definition, Tatro, and the overall statutory scheme support the Court of
Appeals' decision. The "related services" definition broadly encompasses
those supportive services that "may be required to assist a child with a
disability to benefit from special education," ?1401(a)(17), and the
District does not challenge the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the
services at issue are "supportive services." Furthermore, ?1401(a)(17)'s
general "related services" definition is illuminated by a parenthetical
phrase listing examples of services that are included within the statute's
coverage, including "medical services" if they are "for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes." Although the IDEA itself does not define "medical
services" more specifically, this Court in Tatro concluded that the
Secretary of Education had reasonably determined that "medical services"
referred to services that must be performed by a physician, and not to
school health services. 468 U. S., at 892-894. The cost-based, multi-factor
test proposed by the District is supported by neither the statute's text
nor the regulations upheld in Tatro. Moreover, the District offers no
explanation why characteristics such as cost make one service any more
"medical" than another. Absent an elaboration of the statutory terms
plainly more convincing than that reviewed in Tatro, there is no reason to
depart from settled law. Although the District may have legitimate concerns
about the financial burden of providing the services Garret needs,
accepting its cost-based standard as the sole test for determining
?1401(a)(17)'s scope would require the Court to engage in judicial
lawmaking without any guidance from Congress. It would also create tension
with the IDEA's purposes, since Congress intended to open the doors of
public education to all qualified children and required participating
States to educate disabled children with nondisabled children whenever
possible, Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester
Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 192, 202. Pp. 6-12.

106 F. 3d 822, affirmed.

     Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined.


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